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Conclusions and recommendations 
Japan and South Korea: Regional relations 
1. We conclude that recent Japanese commitments to the international fight against 
terrorism and to reconstruction efforts in Iraq have strengthened Japan’s relations 
with the United States, as has the two countries’ co-operation in developing a 
ballistic missile defence programme in response to the nuclear threat from North 
Korea. (Paragraph 38) 
2. We reiterate the conclusion in our 2006 East Asia Report that “productive links 
between China and Japan are essential for peace and stability in East Asia”. In that 
Report we expressed regret at the deterioration of the relationship to, as one witness 
put it, “the verge of dysfunctional”. We  conclude that the successful visit of Chinese 
President Hu to Japan in April 2008, and the agreement concluded in June 2008 
between the two countries over exploitation of gasfields in the East China Sea, are 
positive signs of an upswing in the relationship between China and Japan. We 
recommend that the Government should continue to do whatever it can to see that 
that this is maintained.  (Paragraph 46) 
3. We conclude that recent indications on both sides of a wish further to improve 
Japanese-South Korean relations are to be welcomed. Given the important 
contribution which enhanced Japanese-South Korean co-operation could make on a 
number of issues, especially policy towards North Korea, we further conclude that 
the continuing capacity of the Takeshima/Dokdo islets dispute to disrupt Japanese-
South Korean relations is regrettable. We recommend that the Government should 
urge Tokyo and Seoul not to escalate the dispute and encourage both parties to seek 
a mechanism for its lasting resolution. We further conclude that the issue of the 
Second World War “comfort women”—Korean and other Asian women obliged to 
provide sexual services for the Japanese army—remains a painful and emotive issue 
for the South Korean public and Government, and that its importance should be 
recognised internationally, including by Japan.   (Paragraph 54) 
4. We conclude that there is a realistic prospect of Japan normalising relations with 
North Korea, if progress can be made to resolve both the North Korean nuclear issue 
and the issue of North Korea’s abductions of Japanese nationals, but that these issues 
should be resolved separately. We further conclude that although the number of 
Japanese nationals who were abducted by North Korea is small, even allowing for the 
highest possible estimate, nonetheless it should be recognised by the international 
community that this is an understandably emotive issue for the Japanese public and 
Government. Like the Prime Minister, we extend our sympathy and respect to the 
surviving abductees and to the abductees’ families. We conclude that the British 
Embassy in Pyongyang has played a useful role in bringing pressure to bear on North 
Korea in relation to the abductees. We recommend that the Government should 
continue to give such assistance as it can to Japan over this matter, and in particular 
that it should encourage North Korea to proceed speedily to set up the proposed 
reinvestigation commission, with a view to reaching a final resolution of the issue 
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and removing this significant obstacle to the normalisation of North Korea’s 
relations with Japan. While recognising the importance of these country-specific 
sensitivities, we further conclude that, in relations with North Korea, the greatest 
interest of the international community as a whole, including the UK, lies in 
denuclearisation.  (Paragraph 68) 
5. We conclude that the recent moves on both sides further to strengthen the South 
Korea-US alliance are to be welcomed. We conclude that the likelihood of greater 
convergence between South Korean and US approaches to North Korea should be 
especially useful.  (Paragraph 76) 
6. We conclude that the growing relationship between South Korea and China is to be 
welcomed as a potential factor for stability in East Asia, in particular as regards the 
management of the risks posed by North Korea, and on the assumption that there is 
no question of the two countries aligning against Japan. We recommend that the 
Government should make clear to the parties that it would welcome an early 
agreement on the South Korean-Chinese maritime border.   (Paragraph 83) 
7. Particularly in the context of the failure of the global Doha trade round, and given 
our support for a strengthening of relations among regional states, we conclude that 
bilateral and regional trade agreements involving Japan and South Korea are to be 
encouraged, provided that they do not prejudice economic access to local markets 
for the EU nor undermine any remaining prospects for the conclusion of a global 
trade agreement. We recommend that the Government should remain vigilant in 
assessing the implications of such agreements for the UK and the EU, and ensure 
that the EU maintains a similar stance.    (Paragraph 91) 
8. We conclude that North-East Asia is characterised by a set of interlocking and highly 
delicate inter-state relationships. While there have been improvements recently in 
some bilateral relationships, the region continues to be marked by a number of 
historical and territorial disputes which are potential sources of instability and 
obstacles to enhanced co-operation. We further conclude that the states of the region 
have a clear common interest in maintaining stability, in the interests of perpetuating 
economic growth and enhancing their international standing. We also conclude that, 
although there is no question of replicating European institutions in East Asia, there 
are some aspects of the European experience which might usefully be drawn on in 
the region, in terms especially of the mitigation of historical and territorial disputes, 
and that the strengthening of standing forums for regularised security dialogue 
among regional states would be welcome. We recommend that the Government 
should continue to work with its East Asian, European and US partners to encourage 
the further development of regional security forums in East Asia. In particular, the 
Government should convey to the US Administration its support for what appears to 
be a shift in US policy towards promoting multilateral regional frameworks in East 
Asia. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should 
provide an assessment of the development of the various East Asian regional security 
forums so far, and in particular of the likely impact of the apparent shift in US policy 
and of prospects for the further institutionalisation of the Six-Party Talks framework.      
(Paragraph 101) 
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9. We recommend that in its work in East Asia, the Government should take every 
opportunity to support initiatives aimed at developing a shared historical 
understanding between the region’s Second World War combatants. We further 
recommend that the Government should build elements of co-operation between 
regional states into programmes and projects in the region that it might otherwise 
pursue bilaterally, for example regarding climate change or research co-operation. 
We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide 
information on such work as it is already doing to encourage co-operation between 
regional states in specific policy areas.  (Paragraph 102) 
North Korea 
10. We conclude that the North Korean denuclearisation process in the framework of 
the Six-Party Talks is difficult and imperfect, and that there can be no certainty that 
it will lead to the elimination of all North Korea’s nuclear weapons activities. 
However, we also conclude that the process has achieved a significant degree of 
denuclearisation, namely a halt to plutonium production at Yongbyon, verified by 
International Atomic Energy Agency personnel, and significant dismantling of the 
facility. We conclude that the fact that the agreements reached in the Six-Party Talks 
process are similar in outline to the 1994 Agreed Framework—namely 
denuclearisation steps by North Korea in exchange for energy supplies and security 
gains through improved relations with the US—suggest that this is the most effective 
basic deal for securing progress in denuclearisation. We further conclude that, by 
better harmonising the policies towards North Korea of the states most immediately 
concerned, and by increasing the number of states signed up to agreements and 
therefore the costs of defection, the Six-Party Talks format is more effective than 
bilateral US-North Korean negotiations, and may also have wider knock-on benefits 
for regional security. We conclude that the leading role of China in the Six-Party 
Talks is to be welcomed, and that the Government is correct to identify China as key 
to North Korean denuclearisation. We therefore conclude that the Government is 
correct to support the Six-Party Talks process, including the priority which the 
process gives to denuclearisation over other policy aims regarding North Korea. 
(Paragraph 137) 
11. Given the difficulties in the denuclearisation process which arose in September 2008, 
we recommend that the Government should make clear to Six-Party Talks 
participants that it is willing to assist in any way that might help prevent any further 
possible breakdown in the process. We further recommend that the Government 
should make clear to the incoming US Administration that it would welcome an 
early commitment to continuing the Six-Party Talks and the policy approach which 
they embody. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government 
should provide an assessment of prospects for the international North Korean 
denuclearisation effort under the new US Administration, in light of the latest 
developments in the process and in the West’s relations with Russia.    (Paragraph 
138) 
12. We conclude that the Government is correct to regard the North Korean case as 
having wider implications for nuclear proliferation and for international non-
proliferation efforts. We conclude that it is important from this perspective that 
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North Korea should be returned credibly to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) regime as a non-nuclear weapons state. We further conclude that the North 
Korean case highlights important weaknesses in the current NPT regime, and we 
recommend that policymakers should draw systematically on the North Korean case, 
alongside others, in considering the future of that regime. We further recommend 
that North Korea’s ongoing demand for civil nuclear power should be considered in 
the context of both the international effort to end the country’s nuclear weapons 
programme, and current international discussions about mechanisms for the future 
safe provision of such power to further states. (Paragraph 143) 
13. We conclude that the G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) could provide a strong base of political, technical and 
organisational experience for projects reducing the risks associated with WMD 
activities in North Korea, when appropriate political conditions are in place. We 
further conclude that the willingness of the G8, including the UK, to consider 
expanding the work of the Global Partnership beyond the former Soviet Union is 
welcome. We recommend that, as part of the discussions that are underway on the 
future of the Global Partnership after 2012, the Government should consider with its 
G8 partners—and especially the Six-Party Talks participants Japan, Russia and the 
US—the possibility of Global Partnership involvement in North Korea. We further 
recommend that the Government should encourage Global Partnership participants 
who are also participants in the Six-Party Talks to begin to explore the same 
possibility with their North Korean interlocutors. (Paragraph 150) 
14. We conclude that North Korea appears to retain an active ballistic missile 
programme. We further conclude that there is evidence that international efforts to 
deny North Korea both assistance and customers for its missile programme appear 
to be having some effect. We recommend that the Government should continue to 
work with its international partners to deny North Korea missile-related materials, 
equipment, technology and overseas sales. We further recommend that, in its 
response to this Report, the Government should provide an updated assessment of 
the impact of current international measures against North Korea’s missile 
programme, including the transport of North Korean missiles and missile 
components overseas. (Paragraph 161) 
15. We conclude that the North Korean regime is one of the worst human rights abusers 
in the world, that its human rights practice is an affront to the international 
community, and that the main reason that the issue is not the subject of a larger 
international outcry is because it remains too little known. We conclude that the 
work of the FCO in attempting to address North Korean human rights, both 
bilaterally and with international partners, is to be commended. Although we 
conclude that human rights abuses are deeply linked to the nature of the North 
Korean regime, we recommend that the Government’s efforts to address North 
Korea’s human rights abuses should avoid language which Pyongyang might 
construe as threatening, and should be couched in terms of reference to specific 
obligations under international instruments to which North Korea has signed up. 
We further recommend that enabling the acquisition of more human rights 
information from inside North Korea should be a major goal of the Government’s 
work, and that efforts should focus in particular on securing access for the UN 
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Special Rapporteur. We further recommend that the Government should seek to co-
ordinate its work on North Korean human rights with that of the South Korean 
Government, as Seoul’s new willingness to raise human rights issues with Pyongyang 
may come to represent an important strengthening of the international effort in this 
field.    (Paragraph 175) 
16. Given the failure of UN mechanisms so far to achieve any significant improvement 
in North Korea’s human rights practice, we conclude that the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR) which North Korea is to undergo at the UN Human Rights Council in 
December 2009 offers a major opportunity to advance the international effort to 
secure improvements in North Korean human rights, as well as to establish the 
credibility of the UPR process. We recommend that the Government should engage 
actively with Pyongyang and with international official and non-governmental 
partners to ensure that the potential of North Korea’s UPR process is realised to the 
maximum extent possible.        (Paragraph 178) 
17. We conclude that North Korea’s longstanding food shortage is an avoidable human 
tragedy and a matter of the gravest concern. Provided that conditions are felt to be in 
place that ensure the receipt of aid by the most needy, we recommend that the 
international community should do everything possible to respond to the food 
shortage. We conclude that the recent resumption of US food aid and expansion of 
World Food Programme access and monitoring in North Korea are to be welcomed. 
We recommend that the Government should point to the ongoing food crisis when 
discussing with North Korean interlocutors the possible advantages of further 
economic modernisation and international opening.      (Paragraph 190) 
18. We conclude that China is in breach of its obligations under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention as regards its treatment of North Korean emigrants—specifically, its 
failure to allow them access to a determination-of-status process, and its practice of 
repatriation without ensuring that deportees will not be subject to persecution, 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in North Korea. 
We further conclude that China’s practice as regards North Korean emigrants places 
them in a distressing and dangerous situation. Especially given its view that North 
Koreans in China include people who are not economic migrants, we recommend 
that the Government should press harder on the issue of Beijing’s treatment of North 
Korean emigrants, in its bilateral dealings with China, at EU level, and at the 
UNHCR. We recommend that in this effort the Government should prioritise the 
aims of: halting forced deportations from China to North Korea; securing access to 
the Chinese/North Korean border region for the UNHCR; and seeing the 
development in China of a legal regime allowing the regularisation of the status of 
North Koreans there, and above all of children with a North Korean parent. We 
recommend that in its response to this Report, and again in its 2008 Human Rights 
Annual Report, the FCO should report on the progress being made towards these 
aims. We further recommend that the Government should ensure that the issue of 
Beijing’s treatment of North Korean emigrants is raised effectively as part of China’s 
Universal Periodic Review process at the UN Human Rights Council in 2009.  
(Paragraph 209) 
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19. Given what appears to be rising interest in South Korea in pressing the issue of 
China’s treatment of North Korean emigrants, and given South Korea’s intimate 
connection with North Korea and its relationship with China, we recommend that 
the Government should consult on policy regarding North Koreans in China with 
the Government in Seoul. (Paragraph 210) 
20. We conclude that the growing outflow of North Koreans from North Korea is 
creating an emigrant population in several parts of Asia whose human rights are 
systematically vulnerable. We recommend that the FCO should ensure that its Posts 
in relevant locations are aware of the issue and ready to assist both the individuals 
concerned and host Governments as needed.  (Paragraph 214) 
21. We conclude that the absence of market reform in the official North Korean 
economy contributes to the international risks which the regime represents, by 
failing to generate incentives for improved relations with the West, and by fuelling 
the regime’s need to generate income from sales of weapons and illegal goods in the 
absence of alternative exports. We further conclude that, although the forces working 
against economic reform in North Korea are powerful, the Government should not 
assume that there is no possibility at all of more meaningful reform under the 
present regime. We recommend that the Government should remain alert so as to 
identify and cultivate any elements in the regime which may be open to further 
economic reform.  (Paragraph 228) 
22. Given North Korea’s possession of WMD materials, we conclude that the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding possible future political developments in the country is 
worrying. We conclude that, given the lessening in the regime’s social control since 
North Korea’s last leadership succession, and the apparently enhanced likelihood 
that Kim Jong-il is suffering from health problems, the international community 
should have a set of co-ordinated plans in place for sudden change in the situation in 
North Korea. We further conclude that, although the parties to the Six-Party Talks 
would be the lead states in any international response, the UK and the EU would be 
likely to be called upon to assist and would have an interest in doing so. We 
appreciate that there are reasons why it may be sensible not to discuss plans in 
public, but we recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government 
should provide assurance that such planning is being undertaken.  (Paragraph 234) 
23. We conclude that a breakdown in relations between North and South Korea would 
bring to an end opportunities for valuable human contacts, and increase insecurity 
on the Korean peninsula. We further conclude that it is legitimate for South Korea to 
attach conditions to its co-operation with the North. We recommend that the 
Government should continue to support North-South engagement. (Paragraph 250) 
24. We conclude that the current arrangements for the Kaesong Industrial Complex 
(KIC)—which allow South Korean firms to escape the International Labour 
Organisation standards to which they are subject at home, while providing non-
transparent transfers of hard currency to the North Korean regime—are far from 
ideal. However, we also conclude that the contact between North and South Koreans, 
and exposure of North Koreans to South Korean business practices, which take place 
at the KIC are to be welcomed; and that the KIC offers much better pay and working 
conditions than are available elsewhere in North Korea. We recommend that the 
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Government should seek to use the leverage which is afforded by South Korea’s wish 
to see the KIC included in the South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to 
encourage improvements in the position of workers at the KIC, within a context of 
what is realistically achievable, and without jeopardising either the FTA or the 
continued operation and expansion of the Complex. (Paragraph 268) 
25. We conclude that, while the UK is not in the frontline of the international effort to 
secure North Korea’s denuclearisation, it occupies a special position as a close US ally 
which has diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. Especially given the difficulties into 
which the denuclearisation process ran in August-September 2008, we recommend 
that the Government should ask both North Korea and the US whether, coming to 
the process as a fresh element, it could facilitate any meetings which would help to 
strengthen the process.  (Paragraph 273) 
26. We conclude that the Government is correct to make the aim of exposing North 
Korea’s people to alternative ways of life its top policy goal with regard to 
engagement with that country. However, we also conclude that the restrictions on 
relations which the Government has introduced, to try to leverage progress on 
denuclearisation and human rights, may be undercutting this goal. We recommend 
that the Government should think more creatively about ways in which it might 
increase contacts with North Koreans without simply benefiting the regime’s elite. 
We recommend that the FCO should discuss with interested higher education 
institutions possibilities for hosting North Korean students.  (Paragraph 287) 
27. We conclude that the work that the British Council is doing in North Korea is to be 
commended. We recommend that the British Council should expand its work there 
if possible.   (Paragraph 288) 
28. We conclude that the existence of a British Embassy in Pyongyang brings diplomatic 
benefits to the UK, in terms of both bilateral dealings with North Korea and the UK’s 
position in regional and international North Korea policy, and we recommend that 
its staffing and resources should reflect its value. (Paragraph 290) 
29. We conclude that the UK’s participation in the UN Command Military Armistice 
Commission represents an important British commitment to peace and security on 
the Korean peninsula, and we recommend that it should be maintained.  (Paragraph 
296) 
30. We conclude that although there had been some risk of a disjunction opening up 
between the evolution of the bilateral South Korean-US military relationship and the 
formal responsibilities of the wider UN Command for peace and security on the 
Korean peninsula, under UN Security Council Resolution 84 and the Armistice 
Agreement, the UN Commander and his team are making efforts to avoid this risk, 
and that this is to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should 
participate actively in UN Command preparations for the transfer of operational 
wartime command to South Korea in 2012.     (Paragraph 305) 
31. We conclude that the Government’s continued willingness to send officers to serve 
in the UNCMAC Joint Duty Office and at the UNC Rear Headquarters in Japan is a 
welcome expression of the UK’s commitment to the UN Command. We conclude 
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that the agreement reached among the Command’s participating states to ensure the 
continued provision of an international officer at Rear Headquarters is to be 
particularly commended.   (Paragraph 306) 
Japan and South Korea: International roles 
32. We conclude that Japan has offered valuable support to the international community 
through its very generous funding of peacekeeping and reconstruction activities, not 
least in Iraq and Afghanistan. We further conclude that the Japanese Government 
has displayed political courage in deploying Japanese ground and air forces to Iraq, 
and Japanese naval forces to assist in refuelling coalition vessels conducting 
operations in the Indian Ocean, and that these deployments are to be welcomed. We 
recommend that the Government should continue to engage with Japan as a co-
operative partner in promoting international security and the fight against terrorism, 
and to encourage Japan to expand its participation in UN peacekeeping and 
international military missions as far as permitted by its Constitution to do so. 
(Paragraph 326) 
33. We conclude that South Korea’s growing willingness and ability to deploy its forces 
in international peacekeeping and peace support operations are to be welcomed. We 
further conclude that South Korea continues to make valuable contributions to the 
international efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq in which the UK is also engaged. We 
recommend that the Government should continue to encourage South Korea to 
participate more extensively in international peacekeeping and peace support 
operations and to enhance its capacities to do so.   (Paragraph 333) 
34. We recommend that the Government should, with its EU partners, continue to work 
with Japan to develop a common approach on developing realistic proposals for a 
reduction in emissions and other measures to tackle climate change. (Paragraph 341) 
35. We conclude that recent signs that South Korea is coming to see efforts to mitigate 
climate change as a potential source of growth, not an obstacle to it, are greatly to be 
welcomed. We recommend that the Government should continue to encourage 
South Korea to develop its efforts against climate change, focusing on the potential 
which the development of “green” technologies offers for the country to exploit its 
industrial and technological strengths to boost growth and reduce energy 
dependence, but still aiming to secure a concrete national emissions reduction 
commitment which would help towards the achievement of a global Kyoto successor 
agreement in 2009. We  recommend that the Government should ensure that British 
companies are aware of opportunities for climate change-related projects which 
open up in South Korea. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, 
the Government should update us on progress regarding the implementation of the 
bilateral Memorandums of Understanding on climate change co-operation which 
were signed in May 2008.     (Paragraph 351) 
36. We conclude that Japan continues to play a positive role with regard to development 
issues. We recommend that the Government should continue to work with Japan in 
the G8 and other forums to press for the implementation of the Millennium 
Development Goals. (Paragraph 357) 
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37. We conclude that, from a low base, South Korea’s growing willingness and capacity 
to contribute to overseas development assistance are to be welcomed. We further 
conclude that the Government is correct to encourage and co-operate with South 
Korea in this area and recommend that it should continue to do so, as an 
opportunity to shape the development practice of a potentially important donor.  
(Paragraph 360) 
38. We conclude that, although the process of United Nations reform is currently stalled, 
the Government is right in principle to support Japan’s case for a permanent seat on 
the Security Council, on grounds of Japan’s economic strength, size of population, 
commitment to democracy, and ability to make continuing contributions to the 
finances and work of the United Nations. (Paragraph 364) 
39. We conclude that South Korea’s support for the UN and for UN reform is to be 
welcomed. We recommend that the Government should continue to encourage 
South Korea to enhance its tangible commitment to the UN. We further recommend 
that the Government should seek to engage South Korea fully with the UK’s ideas for 
UN reform.      (Paragraph 368) 
40. We conclude that support for whaling is culturally entrenched in Japan, and that this 
state of affairs is unlikely to alter in the short term. We further conclude that, 
notwithstanding this, the Government is right to lobby its Japanese counterparts 
vigorously on this issue, and to pursue all means at its disposal of dissuading the 
international community from turning back the clock in relation to the protection of 
whales. (Paragraph 375) 
Human rights in Japan and South Korea 
41. We conclude that, although there is undoubtedly a high level of public support for 
the death penalty in Japan, the moratorium on its use in 2005-06, under Justice 
Minister Sugiura, demonstrates that the Japanese Government is not necessarily 
immovable on this subject. We recommend that the Government should continue to 
convey its views on the death penalty to Japan, both directly and through EU 
channels; and that it should encourage the Japanese Government, if it remains 
committed to the death penalty, to reform the system so as to eliminate the 
unnecessary secrecy and arbitrary delay to which attention has been drawn by the 
UN Committee against Torture. (Paragraph 387) 
42. We conclude that South Korea’s 10-year record as a non-user of the death penalty is 
to be welcomed. While we recognise that the issue is subject to considerable 
domestic debate in South Korea, we recommend that the British Government should 
continue to encourage the new Administration and National Assembly in Seoul to 
move to formal abolition, as one of the priorities in the Government’s human rights 
work with South Korea. We further recommend that in its response to this Report 
the Government should update us on prospects for passage of abolitionist legislation 
in the new National Assembly.  (Paragraph 395) 
43. We conclude that there is compelling evidence that the ‘substitute prison’ or daiyo 
kangoku system in Japan involves significant breaches of the rights of suspects, and is 
likely to lead to miscarriages of justice. We further conclude that the reforms to the 
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system introduced in 2006 are to be welcomed, but that there remains cause for 
concern. We recommend that the Government should continue to press Japan to 
modify the daiyo kangoku system to ensure that detention procedures are consistent 
with its obligations under human rights law, and in particular to ensure that 
interrogations are subject to some degree of external monitoring in order to prevent 
abuses. (Paragraph 402) 
44. We conclude that South Korea has recorded major improvement in its human rights 
observance since the advent of democracy two decades ago. We welcome this. We 
further conclude that despite these significant improvements, several human rights 
concerns remain, such as the policing of demonstrations, the scope of free speech on 
the internet and the rights of migrant workers. However, we recognise that these 
issues also pose challenges to many other open societies, including the UK. We 
recommend that, in a spirit of partnership, the Government should continue to 
encourage South Korea to address human rights concerns and to ensure that human 
rights are safeguarded in new legislation and its implementation, prioritising the 
rights of migrant workers, the development of alternatives to military service, and 
reform of the National Security Law. We further recommend that the Government 
should update us on the steps which it is taking in these areas in its response to this 
Report.  (Paragraph 408) 
The UK and Japan and South Korea 
45. We conclude that the UK’s trading relationship with Japan is of great importance to 
both countries. We recommend that the Government should continue actively to 
encourage British companies to seize the long-term gains that the huge Japanese 
market offers, despite the initial difficulties of penetrating that market. We further 
conclude that the FCO is to be commended for its pro-active approach in 
encouraging Japanese inward investment in the UK, and in particular for its recent 
successful intervention to ensure that the implementation of the points-based visa 
system did not act as a disincentive to Japanese investors. (Paragraph 417) 
46. We conclude that the South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement which is currently 
under negotiation is a potentially effective means of securing further opening of the 
South Korean economy and improved access for UK firms, and that its early and 
successful finalisation would be of great benefit to the UK and South Korea. We 
further conclude that the FCO is correct to identify the services sector as a key target 
for further liberalisation under the planned agreement. We recommend that in its 
response to this Report, the FCO update us on progress in the negotiations, 
especially as regards access to South Korea’s services markets.   (Paragraph 425) 
47. We conclude that the economic, commercial and research ties which have developed 
between South Korea and the UK are to be welcomed, and that the work in this 
respect of UKTI, the Seoul Embassy and other relevant bodies is to be commended. 
We further conclude that, given South Korea’s level of development and rate of 
growth, and the existence of generally positive sentiment towards UK partners, there 
is considerable potential for the further development of such links. In this context, 
we conclude that the lack of UK Ministerial representation at President Lee’s 
inauguration was regrettable. While we welcome the recent Ministerial and other 
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visits to Seoul from the UK that have taken place and are planned, we conclude that a 
visit by an FCO Minister, and the Foreign Secretary in particular, with a significant 
economic component to the trip, would be appropriate, in South Korea’s 60th 
anniversary year, and as the South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement is being 
negotiated. We recommend that the FCO should take every opportunity with its 
South Korean partners to identify an early opportunity for such a visit. We further 
conclude that the FCO and the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform should increase the ability of our Embassy to support British business 
opportunities in South Korea. (Paragraph 430) 
48. Given the economic and strategic importance which the Government attributes to 
East Asia, and noting the Minister’s acknowledgement of the value of university-level 
specialist regional capabilities, we conclude that the Government should take steps to 
avert any risk of East Asian studies in the UK again facing a crisis. As the initial 
Government core funding for the White Rose East Asia Centre is due to expire in 
2011, we recommend that the Government should start now to consult with relevant 
partners in the university and private sectors with a view to developing follow-on 
core funding that will allow, as a minimum, the maintenance of UK university-level 
research and teaching on East Asia at its current level. We further recommend that 
the Government should ensure that public support for the development of regional 
language and other skills does not focus unduly on China but gives due weight to 
Japan and Korea, as important economies and cultures in their own right and vital 
components of China’s regional environment. (Paragraph 437) 
49. We conclude that the FCO’s practice of ensuring that the UK sends Ambassadors to 
Japan and Korea who speak the language of their host state is to the UK’s diplomatic 
advantage. We recommend that the FCO should continue this practice. (Paragraph 
440) 
50. We recommend that in its reply to this Report, the Government should set out its 
assessment of the scope for expanding the British Council’s role as a provider of 
English-language teaching in Japan, to cater for the large market of young people 
seeking English-language skills. We further recommend that the Government should 
continue to make efforts in its cultural promotion work in Japan to emphasise the 
UK as a modern, creative, technologically advanced country, and that it should, 
where appropriate, utilise the UK’s status as Olympic host nation in 2012 as way of 
highlighting this. We conclude that the British Council in Japan is to be commended 
for its emphasis on working with young people to deal with the challenges of climate 
change.  (Paragraph 445) 
51. We conclude that the British Council is correct to identify the potential for increase 
in the take-up of UK education services among South Koreans, especially in light of 
the Lee Administration’s push to enhance English language provision in South 
Korea’s state schools. We recommend that the British Council should continue to 
pursue these opportunities, while ensuring that UK universities are aware of the need 
to demonstrate the value of UK study in a tough South Korean market. We further 
recommend that, inasmuch as resources allow, the British Council should seek to 
increase its British cultural promotion work in South Korea, since the existence of a 
modern and dynamic cultural profile will contribute to the attractiveness of the UK 
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educational offer. Given South Korea’s history as an Olympic host nation and its 
strong showing at the 2008 Games, we recommend that the British Council should 
consider capitalising on the approach of the 2012 London Games as a means of 
giving focus to this objective.  (Paragraph 455) 
52. We recommend that BBC World television should continue to seek opportunities to 
increase its distribution in South Korea. (Paragraph 457) 
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1 Introduction 
1. This is the fourth in the Committee’s series of Reports under the general heading 
“Global Security”, following its Reports in 2007 and earlier in 2008 on the Middle East, 
Russia and Iran.1  
2. In February 2008 we announced that we would “inquire into the foreign policy aspects 
of the United Kingdom’s relationship with Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).”2 In particular, we agreed that 
we would “examine: 
• Japan’s and South Korea’s contribution to international security and peacekeeping 
• North Korea’s nuclear programme and international efforts to bring it to an end 
• Relations between North and South Korea 
• The three countries’ relations with the EU and other international organisations 
(particularly in the light of Japan’s current presidency of the G8) 
• The effectiveness of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)’s work in pursuing 
UK policy priorities—such as action against climate change and the upholding of 
human rights—with these countries, and in promoting diplomatic, economic and 
cultural links between these countries and the UK (including through the work of UK 
Trade and Investment, the British Council and the BBC World Service).”3 
3. As the FCO Minister of State, Lord Malloch-Brown, put it to us in his evidence, the UK 
is “in the second row”4 of states on the East Asian scene. For instance, neither the UK nor 
the EU is a participant in the Six-Party Talks involving North Korea (see Chapter Three), 
while, among Western countries, the US is the dominant state in East Asia. There is no 
direct security threat to the UK from the region: Lord Malloch-Brown told us that he did 
“not think that Europe […] is at any risk at this stage” from North Korea.5  
4. However, North Korea’s nuclear and other weapons activities are of international 
significance, and continue to be a matter of serious concern for all Western states, 
including the UK. There are risks of further proliferation or terrorist acquisition, and 
North Korea’s activities also have implications for the global non-proliferation regime.6 
Under the FCO’s new strategic framework, announced in January 2008, the first of what 
are now four policy goals for the FCO is to “counter terrorism, weapons proliferation and 
 
1 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2006-07, Global Security: The Middle East, HC 363; Second Report 
of Session 2007-08, Global Security: Russia, HC 51; Fifth Report of Session 2007-08, Global Security: Iran, HC 142 
2 The names “Republic of Korea” and “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea“ are sometimes abbreviated to “ROK” and 
“DPRK”, respectively. In this Report, we tend to use “South Korea” and “North Korea”, for simplicity.   
3 “Announcement of new inquiry: ‘Global Security: Japan and Korea’”, Foreign Affairs Committee press notice 16 (Session 
2007-08), 6 February 2008 
4 Q 110 
5 Q 111 
6 In July 2008, we announced a new inquiry into “Global Security: Non-Proliferation”; Foreign Affairs Committee press 
notice 38 (Session 2007-08), 14 July 2008 
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their causes”.7 The new UK National Security Strategy, published in March 2008, similarly 
identified nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as a risk for the UK.8 
North Korea also presents foreign and security policy challenges beyond its weapons-
related activities (see Chapter Three).   
5. Our choice of inquiry also reflected the status of Japan and South Korea as major 
economies, with important commercial links to the UK. Japan remains the world’s second-
largest economy.9 It is the UK’s largest trading partner outside the US and the EU, and the 
second-largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the UK after the US.10 The 
South Korean economy is between eleventh- and fourteenth-largest in the world,11 and the 
UK’s 25th-largest export market.12 As the FCO told us in its memorandum to our inquiry, 
trade and investment are “the dominant side of [the UK’s] relationship” with both Japan 
and South Korea.13 
6. The economic weight of Japan and South Korea gives added significance to the existence 
of a number of difficult regional relationships and issues in East Asia, even beyond the 
question of North Korea. For example, the way in which its East Asian neighbours interact 
with China’s rising power will be crucial to regional stability. We also considered that an 
inquiry into Japan and the Koreas would offer an opportunity to revisit, from a different 
perspective, a number of the regional issues which we considered in the China-focused 
Report on East Asia which we produced in 2006.14   
7. South Korea and especially Japan are increasingly important as regards several of the 
international issues which are central to UK foreign policy. These include climate change, 
international peacekeeping, development policy and UN reform. Japan has had a 
particularly important international role in 2008 as chair of the G8.    
8. A number of anniversaries made 2008 an auspicious year to examine the UK’s relations 
with Japan and the Koreas. The year marks the 150th anniversary of the opening of 
diplomatic relations between the UK and Japan, a milestone which is being marked by a 
major British Council programme of events in Japan (see Chapter Six). In 2008, it is also 
125 years since the 1883 UK-Korea Friendship Treaty, 60 years since the foundation of 
South and North Korea, and 55 years since the end of the Korean War. 
9. We held three evidence sessions during the inquiry. In March 2008, we heard from Dr 
John Swenson-Wright (Cambridge University), Aidan Foster-Carter (Leeds University) 
and Professor Hazel Smith (Warwick University). In April, we heard from Norma Kang 
 
7 HC Deb, 23 January 2008, col 52WS; FCO, “Better World, Better Britain”, mission statement, February 2008; FCO, FCO 
Departmental Report 1 April 2007-31 March 2008, Cm 7398, May 2008, p 16 
8 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, Cm 7291, March 2008, pp 11-12, 29-31 
9 Ev 56 [FCO]. See also World Bank figures for GDP (2007), in Quick Reference Tables, July 2008, via www.worldbank.org. 
Using purchasing power parity (PPP) figures, both the World Bank and the OECD put China second, ahead of Japan; 
World Bank Quick Reference Tables, July 2008, via www.worldbank.org, and OECD Factbook 2008, via 
www.oecd.org 
10 Ev 61 [FCO] 
11 The FCO put South Korea eleventh; Ev 56. The World Bank puts it thirteenth and the OECD fourteenth (in PPP terms). 
12 Ev 67 [FCO] 
13 Ev 56 
14 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860 
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Muico (Amnesty International), Sir Stephen Gomersall (Hitachi; formerly British 
Ambassador to Tokyo) and Dr Jim Hoare (author and former FCO official in Beijing, 
Seoul and Pyongyang). The FCO Minister responsible for Asia, Lord Malloch-Brown, 
appeared before us in July, together with the FCO’s Head of Eastern Group, Stephen Lillie. 
As part of our inquiry, we travelled in May to Japan (Tokyo and Osaka) and Korea (Seoul 
and the Demilitarised Zone in South Korea, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North 
Korea). Our meetings and visits there are listed in an Annex. We also took the opportunity 
to discuss questions relevant to our inquiry during meetings with UN and other 
interlocutors in New York in October 2008. We would like to thank all those who gave 
evidence to our inquiry, and the relevant UK Posts for their assistance in connection with 
our visits.  
10. We are grateful to all those who submitted written material. They included the Japanese 
and South Korean Embassies in London, who sent us a selection of their publicly-accessible 
foreign policy materials which we have not reproduced here. The North Korean Embassy 
was invited to submit evidence but declined to do so.   
11. Given the specific complex of policy issues which North Korea presents, in this Report 
we consider that country in a dedicated chapter (Chapter Three). The remaining Chapters 
consider Japan and South Korea, under a number of broad thematic headings. By taking 
the two countries together, we do not wish to downplay their independent status or the 
many important differences between them, but rather to reflect the fact that they present 
some common issues from a UK policy perspective. In our first substantive Chapter 
(Chapter Two), we establish the regional context, focusing on the relations of Japan and 
South Korea with the US and China, as well as each other. We also consider regional trade 
and security arrangements in this chapter. Our discussion of policy towards North Korea 
in Chapter Three—which includes consideration of North-South Korean relations—must 
be set against this background. Chapter Four discusses the wider international roles of 
Japan and South Korea, especially in light of Japan’s 2008 G8 chairmanship. Chapter Five 
considers human rights in Japan and South Korea, given that the promotion of human 
rights is an FCO policy goal.15 Chapter Six discusses the UK’s relations with Japan and 
South Korea in the economic and cultural spheres, including the work of the British 
Council and the BBC World Service. 
Current political and economic scene in Japan and South Korea 
12. Our inquiry took place at a time when domestic political and economic circumstances 
were impinging especially prominently on Japan and South Korea’s international affairs.  
Japan 
13. The recent political history of Japan has been marked by instability within the ruling 
party and parliamentary deadlock. This has particularly hampered attempts to expand 
Japan’s capacity to contribute to multinational peacekeeping operations and other forms of 
overseas intervention. 
 
15 FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2007, Cm 7340, March 2008, pp 7-9 
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14. The dominant party in Japanese politics since the 1950s has been the conservative 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It was in power continuously from 1955 to 1993, when a 
coalition of opposition parties briefly took over the government. By the following year the 
LDP was back in power as the head of a coalition, a pattern that has been followed in every 
parliament since then. The current coalition was formed in April 2000 between the LDP 
and New Komeito, a small party with Buddhist affiliations. The second-largest party is the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), formed in 1998 from a merger of four smaller parties. 
The DPJ forms the opposition in the lower house, but is the largest party in the upper 
house. 
15. The current period of turbulence in Japanese politics began following the resignation of 
Junichiro Koizumi in September 2006. The charismatic Koizumi had become Prime 
Minister in 2001. He made his mark as an economic reformer, steering through the 
privatisation of the post office (the largest financial institution in the country, offering 
banking and insurance services), and presiding over an improvement in Japan’s economic 
fortunes. In foreign policy, he struck up a personal friendship with US President George 
W. Bush, deployed the Self-Defence Forces to Iraq,16 was assertive in dealing with North 
Korea (over the nuclear issue and abductions),17 and controversially visited the Yasukuni 
shrine (where the spirits of Japan’s war dead—including convicted war criminals—are 
honoured) six times. He was popular with the general public and won a landslide victory in 
the general election of 2005. His resignation the following year followed his decision not to 
seek re-election as LDP leader after the expiry of his term of office. 
16. Koizumi was succeeded by Shinzo Abe, Japan’s youngest post-war Prime Minister, and 
the first to be born after the Second World War. In his brief spell in office he pledged to 
continue Koizumi’s reform programme, took a hard line on North Korea, and made a 
successful three-day visit to India in August 2007. He suddenly resigned in September 2007 
for health reasons, following mounting unpopularity, severe LDP losses in the upper house 
elections, and the suicide of his Agriculture Minister. 
17. Abe’s replacement, the 71-year-old Yasuo Fukuda, was described by the FCO as taking 
a “moderate, consensual approach”.18 His 12-month period in power was dominated by 
continuing parliamentary gridlock arising from the opposition DPJ’s control of the upper 
house. The government can secure its economic measures because only the lower house 
votes on these, but for the passage of other legislation the consent of both houses is 
required. There is an ‘override’ mechanism, whereby if the upper house votes down a bill, 
or fails to take a decision on it for 60 days, a two-thirds majority of the lower house can 
force it through. As with the use of the broadly comparable ‘Parliament Act’ mechanism in 
the UK, recourse to this means of over-ruling the upper house is seen as controversial. The 
Fukuda government made use of it in January 2008 to force through the Diet a bill to 
enable Japanese ships to continue to refuel coalition vessels in the Indian Ocean. However, 
the Government made no progress with general legislation to obviate the need for case-by-
case parliamentary approval of overseas deployment of the Self-Defence Forces.19 It also 
 
16 See para 321 below. 
17 See paras 55-68 below. 
18 FCO website, country profile: Japan (reviewed July 2008), at www.fco.gov.uk 
19 See paras 310-26 below. 
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had to deal with other political problems including allegations of corruption at the Defence 
Ministry, and gathering signs of an economic downturn. 
18. The Fukuda premiership came to an abrupt conclusion in September 2008. On 1 
September Mr Fukuda announced his intention of resigning. At a press conference he 
complained of the burdens of office and the intractable nature of the political problems 
facing his government.20 Like his predecessor Shinzo Abe, he had served only 12 months in 
power. Following an LDP leadership election, Taro Aso succeeded Fukuda as Prime 
Minister on 24 September 2008. He is Japan’s eleventh Prime Minister in 15 years, and its 
fourth in the last two years. 
19. Mr Aso, aged 68, served from 2005 to 2007 as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He has 
described himself as a “hawk” on foreign policy issues.21 As of November 2008, it is not yet 
clear whether he intends to continue Fukuda’s policy of conciliating China and other 
regional states by not visiting the Yasukuni shrine. However, he visited China in late 
October 2008 to attend the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) of Asian and European leaders. 
20. The DPJ has called for early elections for the lower house. However, from Mr Aso’s 
perspective this would be a risky strategy because further LDP losses might eliminate the 
LDP’s two-thirds majority in that house. Opinion polls have shown a steep decline in 
support for the LDP since the 2005 election, but the party will be hoping for an upwards 
‘bounce’ following the change of Prime Minister. There is no obligation to hold lower-
house elections until September 2009. Speaking on 2 October 2008, Mr Aso said that he 
had not decided on a timetable for these because he wished to give priority to sorting out 
the economy.22 Meanwhile, the LDP will have no opportunity to overturn the DPJ’s 
majority in the upper house until the next set of elections for that house, which will not be 
held until 2010. 
21. As Prime Minister Aso has indicated, the major issue facing his new administration is 
the state of the Japanese economy. Japan’s economy remains the world’s second-largest, 
measured by nominal GDP (behind the US), and its third-largest measured on a 
purchasing power parity basis (behind the US and China). In recent years the economy has 
staged a partial recovery after the ten years of near-stagnation which followed the bursting 
of the asset price ‘bubble’ in 1989. From 2002, growth rates picked up. In 2006 growth was 
2.2%, GDP per head was U$34,188 and total GDP was $4,367 billion.23 The FCO 
commented in early 2008:  
That the economy is recovering strongly is no longer in doubt. […] Booming exports 
and business investment and solid growth in private consumption have been driving 
this, but increasingly the domestic private sector has taken over from exports as the 
main driver for growth. The economy is now as close to achieving self-sustaining 
growth as it has been at any time since 1990.24 
 
20 “For Japan, ‘another year, another prime minister’”, International Herald Tribune, 3 September 2008 
21 “Japan PM front-runner says ‘I’m a hawk’”, AFP, 18 September 2008 
22 “Japan PM Aso says unsure about snap election”, Wall Street Journal, 2 October 2008 
23 FCO website, country profile: Japan (reviewed July 2008), at www.fco.gov.uk 
24 Ibid. 
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22. However, Japan has longer-term structural problems including the size of government 
debt, which totals 182% of GDP, and the world’s fastest-ageing population (attributable to 
high life expectancy and a low birth rate), which has implications for future health and 
social care costs. Japan has few natural resources and its major industries are heavily 
dependent on imported raw materials, making the economy vulnerable to increases in 
global commodity prices. 
23. Giving evidence in April 2008, Sir Stephen Gomersall, Chief Executive for Europe at 
Hitachi and formerly British Ambassador to Tokyo, told us that the Japanese economy was 
polarised between an efficient export sector (which had benefited from restructuring 
during the 1990s) and a less efficient domestic sector. He argued that, although growth 
rates under Mr Koizumi were comparable to those of the EU as a whole, looked at in the 
longer term, “the Japanese economy is under-performing in comparison to its potential”.25 
He added that, although in the short term Japan was probably less exposed to the sub-
prime crisis than other countries, nonetheless “the combination of dependence on export 
markets, increase in import prices, the potential rise in the value of the yen, the expected 
decrease in corporate earnings, and generally low consumer sentiment in Japan” is likely to 
result in significantly reduced rates of growth.26 
24. Since Sir Stephen gave evidence, Japan has increasingly felt the effects of the global 
downturn and the dramatic instability in financial markets in September and October 
2008. Prime Minister Aso has undertaken to introduce an emergency budget to tackle the 
deteriorating economic situation in a context of rising inflation, slowing growth and a fall 
in both business and consumer sentiment.27 There is a debate within the LDP over how far 
to discipline Japan’s fiscal policy. While there is agreement that in the short to medium 
term, fiscal measures are needed to stimulate demand, some senior LDP politicians also 
argue that that there should be a longer-term shift from income tax and other forms of 
direct taxation, to indirect taxation on the European model. Consumer tax in Japan is 
currently set at 5%, significantly below the EU rate for VAT. 
South Korea 
25. South Korea experienced a political earthquake in December 2007, when the 
conservative Lee Myung-bak won the Presidency in an emphatic election victory which 
ended a decade of government by the political left, under former Presidents Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun. President Lee took office in February 2008. His position and that of 
his Grand National Party (GNP) appeared to be strengthened in the April 2008 
Parliamentary elections, in which the political right similarly overturned a previous left-
wing majority. Coming from a business background, as a former CEO of Hyundai 
Construction (part of one of South Korea’s major conglomerates), President Lee was seen 
as a forceful, “can-do” executive, nicknamed “the Bulldozer”. However, a series of incidents 
saw the new President’s popularity collapse to around 20% by early summer 2008, when 
 
25 Q 84 
26 Q 84 
27 “Japanese PM signals delay on election”, Financial Times, 2 October 2008 
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the GNP also lost a number of local by-elections, although the President’s standing had 
recovered somewhat by the autumn.28  
26. The most high-profile controversy of the new Presidency surrounded the import of US 
beef, an issue relevant to both trade policy and US relations. South Korea banned such 
imports in 2003, after a BSE case, but in April 2008 President Lee announced the lifting of 
the ban, as he left on his first visit in office to the US. President Lee appeared to be aiming 
to boost prospects that the US Congress would ratify the South Korea-US Free Trade 
Agreement (KORUS FTA) (see Chapter Two).29 Amid food safety fears, President Lee’s 
move was rejected by the political opposition in Seoul, which linked the beef deal to its own 
willingness to ratify the KORUS FTA. The proposed resumption of US beef imports also 
prompted prolonged mass protest demonstrations which appeared to channel other 
sources of discontent with the new Administration, rooted partly in the historic divide 
between the former right-wing authoritarian regime and the 1980s pro-democracy 
movement against it, and perhaps also drawing on economic protectionist and anti-
American sentiments and dislike for President Lee’s political style.30 President Lee felt 
obliged to apologise publicly for his handling of the beef issue, and to negotiate a revised 
agreement with the US which allowed imports from July only of beef younger than 30 
months.31 President Lee replaced three Ministers over the affair, although in the midst of 
the crisis the entire Cabinet had offered to resign. Largely owing to the beef row, the 
outgoing National Assembly did not ratify the KORUS FTA before its term ended in late 
May, as President Lee had wished; the opposition boycotted the new National Assembly 
until mid-July; and US President Bush postponed a visit to Seoul which had been planned 
for the same month.32 The Government re-introduced the ratification bill to the new 
National Assembly in October 2008.33 When he gave evidence to us in early July, Lord 
Malloch-Brown said that President Lee’s domestic crisis meant that the Government was 
“not quite sure how dynamic [South Korea’s] foreign policy can be in the coming 
months”.34 
27. In the economic field, President Lee came to office with ambitious plans to boost South 
Korea’s flagging growth, through privatisations and pro-business measures as well as free 
trade agreements such as that with the US. However, given President Lee’s background in 
one of South Korea’s large conglomerates (chaebol), which had flourished in the country’s 
somewhat more closed and state-dominated economy up to the 1990s, Aidan Foster-
Carter of Leeds University already expressed some scepticism to us in March about the 
strength of the new Administration’s commitment to further economic liberalisation and 
 
28 “Lee pushes for economic rebound”, Korea Herald, 18 September 2008 
29 “South Korea agrees to lift ban on US beef exports”, Wall Street Journal, 19 April 2008 
30 “US beef imports stir Korea’s political pot – protests seen as part of complex sentiment toward country’s ally”, Wall 
Street Journal Asia, 12 May 2008; “S Korean rally aims to force out Lee”, Financial Times, 10 June 2008; “Korean 
protests of US beef take on broader dimension - Cabinet offers to quit as anger at Lee boils; all ‘exploded at once’”, 
Wall Street Journal Asia, 11 June 2008; “Korea protests betray deeper anger”, Wall Street Journal Asia, 3 July 2008 
31 “S Korean leader says sorry for US beef deal”, Financial Times, 23 May 2008; “Seoul seeks new US beef talks”, Financial 
Times, 4 June 2008; “S Korea strikes deal on US beef imports”, Financial Times, 22 June 2008 
32 “Bush cancels S Korea trip after street protests over beef imports”, Financial Times, 25 June 2008 
33 “’US actively pushing for FTA passage’”, Korea Herald, 11 October 2008 
34 Q 106 
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internationalisation.35 The US beef row also highlighted economic sentiments—and left a 
political landscape—which some have interpreted as casting doubt over prospects for 
President Lee’s reform agenda.36  
28. The South Korean economy is also being hit by the global economic downturn. 
Following the liberalisation undertaken after the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis, South 
Korea is highly exposed to the international economy, and it is heavily dependent on 
imports for its energy supplies. By October 2008, the won had fallen to 10-year lows against 
the US dollar, amid liquidity and debt fears. Forecast economic growth had been lowered 
to perhaps 4.7% for 2008 and significantly less for 2009.37 Having raised interest rates in 
August to tackle inflation, the central bank cut them twice in October, including as part of 
central banks’ coordinated international response to the credit crunch early in the month.38 
In October and early November, the Government extended liquidity to banks, guaranteed 
their foreign-currency borrowings and announced an economic stimulus package of tax 
cuts and extra spending worth $11 billion.39  
29. The former FCO official Dr Jim Hoare told us in April that he thought that President 
Lee realised that “one way to get round [South Korea’s economic problems] will be more 
international links and trade.”40 Although the Administration has delayed some planned 
privatisations, in his opening address to the new National Assembly in mid-July President 
Lee reaffirmed his commitment to deregulation, privatisation and reform of the state 
sector;41 and in September and October President Lee again indicated plans along these 
lines, particularly regarding services, and including a relaxation of some restrictions on 
foreign ownership.42 In August, South Korea agreed with Australia to open talks on a free 
trade agreement (see Chapter Two).43  
 
35 Q 32; see also Aidan Foster-Carter, “Seoul needs sound policy, not soundbites”, Financial Times, 17 February 2008 
36 “Lee faces more than beef crisis in Seoul - his economic agenda is threatened by his crumbling support”, International 
Herald Tribune, 4 June 2008; “S Korean leader to slow pace of reform”, Financial Times, 20 June 2008 
37 “Growth slashed to 3.5% next year: IMF”, Korea Herald, 9 October 2008; “The financial crisis: Taiwan, Korea cut rates”, 
Wall Street Journal, 10 October 2008; “Forecasts for Korean growth tumble below 3%”, Chosun Ilbo, 11 October 
2008; “Sinking feeling”, Financial Times, 14 October 2008 
38 “Korea raises rates to tame inflation”, Financial Times, 8 August 2008; “Sinking feeling”, Financial Times, 14 October 
2008 
39 “Financial crisis: world round-up”, BBC News online, 3 November 2008 
40 Q 91 
41 “Full text of President Lee’s National Assembly address”, Korea Times, 13 July 2008; “S Korea to reduce state 
ownership”, Financial Times, 12 July 2008; “Change of heart”, The Economist, 19 July 2008 
42 “Economic reform shifts into high gear: Lee Administration unveils more deregulation, urges corporate investment”, 
Korea Herald, 19 September 2008; “Provincial consolidation tops 100 policy priorities”, Korea Herald, 8 October 
2008 
43 “Korea to launch FTA talks with Australia”, Korea Herald, 12 August 2008 
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2 Japan and South Korea: Regional 
relations 
30. Relations among East Asian states, including Japan and South Korea, continue to be 
marked by the legacy of earlier historical periods. Western powers, including the UK and 
the US, began to “open up” the region from the mid-19th century, through instruments 
such as the treaties signed between the UK and Japan in the 1850s and the UK and Korea 
in 1883. Among regional states, Japan emerged in the early 1900s as the dominant power, 
defeating China and then Russia, and formally annexing Korea in 1910. Under a militarist 
regime, Japan invaded China in the 1930s and extended its control across much of Asia 
during the Second World War. After Japan’s surrender to the Allies in 1945, the US 
became the dominant political and security force in East Asia. With the Cold War looming 
between the former Allies, the US and the Soviet Union encouraged the creation of two 
separate client states in liberated Korea, one in each of their occupation zones, in the South 
and North of the country respectively. Meanwhile, the Communist Party emerged 
victorious from China’s post-1945 civil war. In 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea, 
with the backing of the USSR, triggering the Korean War. Military successes in defence of 
the South by a US-led coalition mandated by the UN, which included the UK, prompted 
Communist China to join in on the North Korean side. The inconclusive conflict was 
brought to an end in 1953 only with an Armistice; technically, North and South Korea 
remain at war (see Chapter Three). As part of the Cold War alignments which were 
institutionalised after the Korean War, the US incorporated Japan and South Korea into its 
regional alliance system, while North Korea was aligned with the Soviet Union and China 
in the communist camp. Western states did not initially recognise North Korea, while 
communist and pro-Soviet states did not initially recognise South Korea. As the Cold War 
system broke down, North and South Korea were admitted to the United Nations as two 
separate states in 1991. Many countries subsequently recognised the previously 
unrecognised of the two Korean states, although South Korea, the US and Japan have not 
normalised diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.    
Japan’s regional relations 
United States 
31. The relationship with the US remains Japan’s most extensive security relationship. 
Since 1960 the US has guaranteed Japan’s security under the US-Japan Security Treaty. 
32. In several respects, the relationship with the US is deepening. The FCO notes that the 
“Japanese support for the war on terrorism, along with the absence of major trade frictions, 
has contributed to a warming of relations”,44  and that the two countries “have begun co-
operation on a ballistic missile defence programme in response to [North Korea] and 
terrorist threats”.45 Largely driven by the US, NATO is also seeking to forge a new 
relationship with Japan, among other out-of-area allies. Former Prime Minister Fukuda 
 
44 FCO website, country profile: Japan (reviewed July 2008), at www.fco.gov.uk 
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appeared to reaffirm the importance of the US relationship by making Washington his first 
foreign destination after taking office.  
33. However, a recent incident in which a US soldier stationed in Okinawa was accused of 
raping a Japanese woman has disturbed the bilateral relationship and reawakened anti-
American sentiment in Japan. A similar incident in the mid-1990s helped to trigger a 
reconfiguration of US forces in the region which is still being implemented. During our 
visit to Japan, we were told that the presence of US troops is strongly resented by local 
people in Okinawa, where they are based in large numbers: Okinawa accounts for 1% of 
the total land-mass of Japan, but is host to 65% of the US forces stationed in the country. 
We were told that the US military presence is much less of an issue elsewhere, and that 
there was no strong anti-US feeling across the board.  Dr Swenson-Wright confirmed that 
“general attitudes towards the United States […] for the most part remain very 
favourable”.46 
34. In September 2008 the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington 
arrived at her new home port of Yokosuka at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. She is the first 
nuclear-powered surface warship to be permanently stationed in Japan.47 Her arrival was 
welcomed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs as “symbolizing the firm 
commitment of the United States to the [Japan-US] Alliance”,48 but was greeted by some 
local people with protests.49 
35. There are some concerns in Japan that, as regards North Korea, the US might be 
concentrating on that country’s plutonium programme at the possible expense of 
managing other threats which North Korea represents to Japan, and resolving the North 
Korea-Japan abductees issue.50 
36. In its written evidence, the FCO states that the success of Japan (and South Korea) in 
ensuring stability in East Asia “will depend on their close relations with the US”,51 and 
notes that former Prime Minister Fukuda commented that Japan’s alliance with the US 
“should be used to leverage an enhanced Japanese role in Asia to boost relations with 
China and the Republic of Korea”.52 
37. Japan has a policy, not enshrined in the constitution but of long standing, not to export 
defence equipment or technology. This has caused problems in terms of Japan-US co-
operation, especially in the field of ballistic missile defence. There is a question as to how 
far Japanese and US systems can be integrated. Ballistic missile defence for Japan involves 
not only short-range Patriot missiles but also Aegis mid-range interceptors. 
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38. We conclude that recent Japanese commitments to the international fight against 
terrorism and to reconstruction efforts in Iraq have strengthened Japan’s relations with 
the United States, as has the two countries’ co-operation in developing a ballistic 
missile defence programme in response to the nuclear threat from North Korea. 
39. We deal in paragraphs 58 to 68 below with the specific question of Japanese concern 
that US rapprochement with North Korea over the nuclear issue should not be at the 
expense of a satisfactory resolution of the abductees issue. 
China 
40. Japan normalised relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1972. In the course 
of our 2006 East Asia inquiry, we heard evidence that Japan was in some respects 
concerned about the “rise of China”, particularly as regards the scale and non-transparency 
of the increase in Beijing’s defence spending, and the potential economic competition 
which the Chinese economy may represent. However, we also heard that Japan, along with 
other regional economies, was benefiting economically from the opening-up of China, as a 
new market and a new element in the regional supply chain.53 One of our witnesses in that 
inquiry described the relationship between the two countries as “hot economics, cold 
politics”.54 
41. Politically, Japan’s behaviour during its pre-1945 occupation of China, and Tokyo’s 
subsequent handling of the issue, continue to cause friction. Particular flashpoints are the 
disagreement between Chinese and Japanese historians over the scale of Japanese atrocities 
in the so-called “Rape of Nanking” in 1937-38, and the issue of Chinese women abducted 
into sexual slavery, known as “comfort women” (although in its peace treaty with Japan, 
China renounced all claims for compensation arising from wartime actions).55 
42. Former Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo, which 
honours Japanese war dead, including war criminals, caused particular offence in Beijing. 
However, neither of Koizumi’s two immediate successors, Mr Abe and Mr Fukuda, visited 
the shrine. It is not yet clear whether new Prime Minister Aso will do so. During his period 
as Foreign Minister he made statements supportive of Koizumi’s visits, but it is noteworthy 
that although three cabinet ministers and 53 members of the Diet, along with former Prime 
Ministers Koizumi and Abe, visited the shrine on 15 August 2008 (the anniversary of 
Japan’s surrender), Aso did not do so.56    
43. More generally, Sino-Japanese relations appear to be improving. The Chinese President 
Hu Jintao spent five days in Japan in April 2008, the first visit by a Chinese head of state for 
a decade. During the visit, President Hu and former Prime Minister Fukuda made a joint 
statement which was the first bilateral political document signed by the two countries’ top 
political leaders. The declaration signed in 1972, when the two countries normalised their 
relations, was signed by the then Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, not the President. 
 
53 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, paras 229-46 
54 Ibid., para 229; the witness was Professor David Shambaugh of Washington University. 
55 For “comfort women”, see para 48 below. 
56 Shiro Armstrong, “Yasukuni Shrine”, East Asia Forum, 19 August 2008, at http://eastasiaforum.org 
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The two countries’ 1978 treaty was signed by the two Foreign Ministers. In 1998, the then 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin refused to sign a bilateral joint declaration. The willingness 
of President Hu to sign the new joint statement signals the political importance that China 
now attaches to the relationship.  
44. In June 2008 the two countries announced that they had reached agreement on what 
had been a significant area of contention between them, regarding the ownership of rights 
to exploit what may be extensive gas fields in the East China Sea. This is linked to a 
territorial dispute over a group of islets in that Sea which the Chinese call the Diaoyu 
islands and the Japanese call the Senkaku islands.57 China’s official position has been that 
the whole of the East China Sea belongs to its economic zone. Japan’s position has been 
that the area should be divided along a central line which does not take Taiwan and the 
southern area into account. China has already started unilateral development of some of 
the fields. At the Hu-Fukuda summit in April, both sides agreed that great progress had 
been made in their negotiations over the gasfields issue. On 19 June it was announced that 
the two sides had effectively shelved their dispute over the sea border, whilst at the same 
time neither side had actually renounced its claim. The two countries will co-operate in 
carrying out joint surveys of the sea bottom, and Japanese companies will invest in Chinese 
petroleum firms operating in a defined “joint development area”.58 
45. In its written evidence, the FCO commented that “a confident, outward-looking Japan 
which enjoys good relations with China is essential for regional security”.59 
46. We reiterate the conclusion in our 2006 East Asia Report that “productive links 
between China and Japan are essential for peace and stability in East Asia”. In that 
Report we expressed regret at the deterioration of the relationship to, as one witness 
put it, “the verge of dysfunctional”. We  conclude that the successful visit of Chinese 
President Hu to Japan in April 2008, and the agreement concluded in June 2008 
between the two countries over exploitation of gasfields in the East China Sea, are 
positive signs of an upswing in the relationship between China and Japan. We 
recommend that the Government should continue to do whatever it can to see that that 
this is maintained.  
South Korea 
47. Like Japan, South Korea has been a US ally in the post-1945 era. However, the common 
geopolitical alignment between Japan and South Korea has not overcome the strains 
deriving from the two states’ pre-1945 history, when Korea was under Japanese rule. In this 
respect, Japan’s relationship with South Korea has points in common with its relationship 
with China: Dr Swenson-Wright told us that “difficult historical issues […] bedevil”60 both 
sets of ties, and that Japanese public opinion could be “volatile” with regard to both states.61 
Japan normalised relations with South Korea in a Basic Treaty of 1965, but any enduring 
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improvement in relations has repeatedly been disrupted by flare-ups over historical issues, 
including the Second World War “comfort women”62 and history text books. Relations 
deteriorated especially under former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi (2001-06), 
principally over his visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Although relations improved somewhat 
subsequently, Dr Swenson-Wright told us that Japan had still tended to see South Korea’s 
previous President, President Roh, “as being over-willing to play the history card over 
territorial differences and to use the vexed question of history text books as a means of 
securing domestic support on the home front”.63 
48. It is alleged that 200,000 young women captured during the Second World War were 
forced to serve in Japanese army brothels. These victims—euphemistically known as 
“comfort women”—were predominantly Korean, but also included Chinese, Philippine 
and Indonesian women. The Japanese Government has not offered an apology to former 
“comfort women”, and has not offered direct compensation, on the grounds that 
compensations claims were settled by post-war treaty arrangements. However, in 1995 it 
established an “Asian Women’s Fund”, funded by donations from the general public. This 
paid 2 million yen (about £10,000) each in compensation, plus medical and welfare 
support, to 285 former "comfort women" in South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan. 
These arrangements have been criticised by Amnesty International as “fail[ing] to meet 
international standards on reparation and […] perceived by survivors as a way of buying 
their silence”.64  Hitherto, all claims for reparation brought on behalf of survivors before 
the Japanese courts have failed. The Asian Women’s Fund was recently wound up. Japan’s 
treatment of the former “comfort women” continues to face criticism internationally, for 
example in resolutions passed by the European Parliament65 and by a number of national 
legislatures, including the US House of Representatives, which said in July 2007 that Tokyo 
should “formally acknowledge, apologise and accept historical responsibility in a clear and 
unequivocal manner”.66 Japan’s Foreign Minister at that time, now the Prime Minister, 
Taro Aso, issued a reply to the US House, stating that its resolution was not based on facts 
and was “extremely regrettable”.67 At government-to-government level, Japan and South 
Korea regard the “comfort women” issue as being settled. However, some South Korean 
former “comfort women” continue to protest about their treatment. 
49. Despite recurrent difficulties over historical issues, economic and human contacts 
between Japan and South Korea have continued to expand. Bilateral trade was worth 
around $78.5 billion in 2006; Japan was South Korea’s third-largest trade partner after 
China and the EU.68 Japan and South Korea agreed a visa waiver programme in 2006, and 
Tokyo has been issuing growing numbers of working holiday visas to South Koreans; air 
traffic between the two states is busy. The two states successfully jointly hosted the football 
World Cup in 2002. Dr Swenson-Wright also drew our attention to “the importance of 
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cultural exchange” in the Japanese-South Korean relationship, in the form of significant 
consumption of the popular culture of the other country.69 Even in the difficult field of 
history, a Korea-Japan Joint History Research project was launched in 2002, to try to start 
to develop a common historical understanding.   
50. South Korea’s new President, President Lee, came to office aiming to improve relations 
with Japan as one of his top foreign policy goals. The FCO told us of “signs that [President 
Lee’s stance was] receiving a warm response in Tokyo”,70 and Dr Swenson-Wright told us 
that Japan’s reaction to President Lee’s election had been “generally […] very positive”.71 
Dr Swenson-Wright noted that President Lee had been born in Japan, and that he was seen 
in Tokyo as a “pragmatist”.72 Former Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda attended President 
Lee’s inauguration in February 2008, and President Lee made Tokyo his second destination 
in office, after the US, in April 2008. During our visit to the region, shortly after President 
Lee had been in Tokyo, we too gained the impression that both sides saw prospects for a 
welcome improvement in relations. At his April summit with then Prime Minister Fukuda, 
President Lee said that “the past should not stand in the way of the two countries”.73 The 
two leaders pledged to step up diplomatic dialogue and further strengthen business and 
people-to-people links. President Lee also invited Emperor Akihito to Seoul.  
51. Japan and South Korea are the two states which face the most immediate potential 
security threat from North Korea, primarily from Pyongyang’s missile arsenal. Japan and 
South Korea are both participants in the Six-Party Talks, in which regional states are 
pursuing North Korea’s denuclearisation.74 Professor Smith said that Tokyo and Seoul—
along with Beijing—share an interest in ending the North Korean crisis, in order to ensure 
stability and thus continued economic growth in the region, and that Japan broadly 
supported South Korea’s efforts to engage with North Korea.75 Nevertheless, Japan itself 
has tended to adopt a tougher approach towards Pyongyang than has South Korea.76 
Under President Lee, South Korea is now adopting a more robust stance towards the 
North.77 Dr Swenson-Wright told us that under these circumstances Japan’s “relations 
with South Korea offer a new opportunity […] with regard to co-operation between Seoul 
and Tokyo in developing a more co-ordinated approach towards North Korea”.78   
 
52. In the period following the April 2008 summit between former Prime Minister Fukuda 
and President Lee, Japanese-South Korean relations were again disrupted in familiar 
fashion, on this occasion over the two states’ rival claims to a group of islets situated 
between the two states, known as Takeshima in Japan and Dokdo in South Korea (and also 
sometimes as the “Liancourt Rocks”). The islets are located between South Korea’s Ullung-
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do island and Japan’s Oki islands (see map). The islets are barely inhabited but South 
Korea maintains a police garrison there and South Korean tourist boats visit regularly.79 
The sea area around the islets is rich in fishing, and possibly also energy resources. The 
dispute turns on whether Japan’s claim to the islets—made in 1905—was part of its 
subsequent annexation of Korea and thus surrendered as part of the post-1945 peace 
settlement, or a separate issue. The sovereignty question was not resolved in the post-
Second World War settlement, and it has been one of the periodic irritants in bilateral 
relations over the last decade. In July 2008, Japan’s Education Ministry issued a set of 
school curriculum guidelines which referred to the islets as Japanese territory, while also 
noting the existence of South Korea’s different view. South Korea temporarily recalled its 
Ambassador to Tokyo in protest.80 There were also protests outside the Japanese Embassy 
in South Korea, where Dr Swenson-Wright told us that the dispute was “much more of a 
live issue […] than in Japan”.81 In the wake of the row, the Lee Administration announced 
plans to back up Seoul’s claim to the islets in more concrete fashion, for example by 
making them habitable and starting energy exploration.82 There were some signs during 
the summer that the dispute might hobble the nascent reinvigoration of Japanese-South 
Korean diplomatic relations,83 although it did not prevent the two states from meeting 
together with the US in the revived Trilateral Oversight and Coordination Group (TOCG) 
in October.84 New Prime Minister Aso met President Lee for the first time at the Asia-
Europe (ASEM) meeting in China in late October, at which relations appear to have been 
repaired somewhat, and by early November it was being reported that a three-way Japan-
China-South Korea summit would go ahead in December.85  
53. Dr Swenson-Wright told us that Japan and South Korea could not agree on a 
mechanism to resolve the dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islets: while Japan has been 
willing to take the issue to international arbitration, this meets with “complete reluctance 
on the part of the South Korean Government, who see the territory as legitimately 
Korean”.86 Dr Swenson-Wright was therefore “afraid that [the issue] will continue to 
bedevil the relationship”.87 However, he noted that “we may see the leaders being willing to 
find some formula for avoiding […] unexpected flare-ups”.88  
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54. We conclude that recent indications on both sides of a wish further to improve 
Japanese-South Korean relations are to be welcomed. Given the important 
contribution which enhanced Japanese-South Korean co-operation could make on a 
number of issues, especially policy towards North Korea, we further conclude that the 
continuing capacity of the Takeshima/Dokdo islets dispute to disrupt Japanese-South 
Korean relations is regrettable. We recommend that the Government should urge 
Tokyo and Seoul not to escalate the dispute and encourage both parties to seek a 
mechanism for its lasting resolution. We further conclude that the issue of the Second 
World War “comfort women”—Korean and other Asian women obliged to provide 
sexual services for the Japanese army—remains a painful and emotive issue for the 
South Korean public and Government, and that its importance should be recognised 
internationally, including by Japan.   
North Korea 
55. Japan does not have diplomatic relations with North Korea. In this respect, Japan has 
followed the US position. The central policy issue for Japan, as for the US, is whether to 
normalise bilateral relations with Pyongyang.     
56. Japan regards North Korea as a direct security threat. This was confirmed to us in our 
meetings in Tokyo. Rather than Pyongyang’s nuclear activities, Dr Swenson-Wright told us 
that “from the vantage point of Tokyo, the principal security concern is about ballistic 
missiles”.89 In its submission to our inquiry, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 
listed North Korea’s test firings of missiles over and beyond Japanese airspace in 1998 
among the factors which had pushed Tokyo into a more activist security policy in recent 
years,90 and Dr Swenson-Wright told us that the 1998 tests “pulled Japan out of its post-
war cocoon” and “made the Japanese public in particular aware of their vulnerabilities”.91   
57. Japan is a participant in the Six-Party Talks which since 2003 have been the 
international community’s framework for dealing with North Korea.92 One of the working 
groups established in the Six-Party Talks framework is dedicated to the normalisation of 
Japanese-North Korean ties, but the FCO told us that the group had “failed to make 
substantive progress”.93 This was also the impression that we received during our meetings 
in Tokyo in May.  
58. Japan makes any normalisation of relations with North Korea conditional on 
resolution of a specific bilateral issue which dominates the relationship: North Korea’s 
abduction of a number of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. The reason for the 
abductions appears to have been that North Korea needed people of different nationalities 
to train its own spies in foreign languages and culture. The abductees were later used for 
other purposes like making counterfeit money. During a groundbreaking visit to 
Pyongyang by former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in 2002, North Korean leader Kim 
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Jong-il admitted 13 abductions. Mr Koizumi secured the release of five of the abductees, 
and—during a subsequent visit—of their families too. Pyongyang said that the eight 
remaining admitted abductees had died. Tokyo claims that North Korea abducted 19 
Japanese citizens in total, but families of Japanese missing persons believe that the number 
of Japanese abducted by North Korea may be higher.94  
59. During our visit to Japan two members of the Committee met the families of some of 
the abduction victims.95 The families have campaigned for more information about their 
fates. The Members were given two individual accounts of abductions by the parents of 
those concerned: 
• In 1982 Keiko Arimoto, aged 23, went to London to study at an international 
school. She stayed there for a year, and in 1983 she was abducted through 
Copenhagen and Moscow to Pyongyang; she sent a letter to her parents in 1988. 
North Korea claims that she died in a gas poisoning accident but her parents regard 
this as an untrustworthy claim. 
• In 1977 Megumi Yokota, aged 13, was walking back to her house in Niigata 
Prefecture when she was abducted by North Korean spies. In 1997 her parents 
received information that she was in Pyongyang. At the time, North Korea denied 
any involvement in her abduction. In 2002, at the Japan-North Korea summit, it 
admitted that she had been abducted but claimed that she had subsequently 
committed suicide. In 2004, at the second Japan-North Korea summit, it undertook 
to reinvestigate the case. Subsequently her parents were sent what were purported 
to be her ashes. However, we were told that DNA tests showed that the remains 
were not of Megumi and that the supposed death certificate contains elementary 
errors. Megumi married another abductee and had a daughter who is now aged 20 
and at university in North Korea. There is no guarantee that Megumi is alive, but 
there is no proof that she died, so her parents believe that she is still alive. 
60. The fate of the admitted and suspected abductees remains a high-profile and highly 
emotive issue among the Japanese public. Japan does not give humanitarian aid to North 
Korea largely because of this issue, which is widely regarded within Japan as being no less 
important than the nuclear issue in the country’s dealings with North Korea. It is raised 
with visitors from the UK because the UK has an Embassy in Pyongyang and is therefore 
seen as able to exercise leverage; the DPRK Abductee Family Association told us that the 
Embassy had been very helpful to them on this issue. 
61. In the context of the progress which was being achieved in late spring and early 
summer 2008 on the North Korean denuclearisation issue,96 we picked up some anxiety in 
Tokyo that the US might move towards a normalisation of relations with North Korea 
without “waiting” for sufficient progress on the abduction issue that Japan would feel able 
to do likewise. Dr Swenson-Wright told us that Japan  
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worries […] that as part of the necessary arrangements to provide incentives to 
North Korea, the US is about to de-list the country as a state sponsor of international 
terror, in effect undercutting Japan’s negotiating position with North Korea and 
potentially creating very significant problems domestically.97  
Dr Hughes similarly suggested that the issue might cause strains between Japan and the 
UK, if progress on North Korea’s denuclearisation meant that the UK faced calls to provide 
new support to Pyongyang, at a time when Japan had not yet normalised relations with 
North Korea.98 However, the FCO told us that at the two leaders’ summit in November 
2007 President Bush had “reassured [former Prime Minister] Fukuda that the US would 
not jeopardise the US-Japan relationship as it sought to normalise relations with the 
DPRK, and that the Japanese abductees would not be forgotten.”99  
62. Giving evidence to us in April 2008, Dr Swenson-Wright expressed the view that if 
Japan could find a formula for dealing with the abduction issue, there was a real possibility 
that relations with North Korea could be normalised. He noted that the then Prime 
Minister Fukuda was “adopting a much more pragmatic approach” than his predecessor 
Abe.100 Dr Swenson-Wright also felt that “even public opinion in Japan is much more 




g evidence in early July 2008, the FCO Minister of State Lord Malloch-Brown told 
us that: 





We have been trying to support the Japanese efforts on this in every way that we can. 
There have been some quite positive bilateral talks—hosted by the Chinese, but 
between Japan and DPRK—in which the DPRK authorities agreed to reopen the 
investigations. As you will have gathered from your briefing in Tokyo, the numbers 
are quite small. There are only 19 officially recognised abductees. However, you will 
also know from your visit to Tokyo that it is a dramatic issue in Japan, over which 
Governments fall and Prime Ministers get chosen. It has a huge emotional 
attachment. So, yes, we do support the Japanese. The good news is that, because it is 
such a priority for the Japanese, the DPRK understands and within the general coat 
tails of t
64. The two members of the Committee who had met the families of abductees in Tokyo 
wrote to the Prime Minister to draw his attention to that meeting and to the plight of these
. On 11 August the Prime Minister replied, setting out the Government’s position: 
I am aware that the issue of abductees remains extremely emotive in Japan and is 
very distressing for the abductees and their families to whom I extend my heartfelt 
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sympathy and respect. We continue to support Japanese efforts to resolve the issue. 
[…] We support the [Six Party Talks] process as the principal mechanism for 
denuclearising the Korean Peninsula; however we also attach importance to Japanese 
concerns over abductees. We support recent US statements by President Bush and 
ress the North 
103
reign Ministry described this decision as 
106
ontinue to support Japan 
108
Korean economy of up to around $40 billion, with 
mo t figures much lower than this.109    
 
Secretary of State Rice that the abductees issue will not be forgotten. 
[…] The abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea represents a particularly 
terrible abuse of human rights. I assure you that we will continue to p
Korean regime on this and other aspects of its human rights record.  
65. On 12-13 August 2008, further Japan-North Korea Working Group talks were held, at 
Shenyang in northeast China. Japan’s Foreign Ministry subsequently announced that it had 
reached an agreement with North Korea that a commission would be set up to 
reinvestigate the abductions of Japanese nationals, with a view to discovering any further 
survivors and returning them to Japan.104 The intention was for the new investigation to 
proceed quickly, with the aim of concluding it by autumn 2008. In return, Japan agreed to 
lift restrictions on individual travel and charter flights between the countries.105 However, 
after Prime Minister Fukuda’s resignation on 1 September 2008, North Korea informed 
Japan that it would suspend implementation of the agreement until it had ascertained the 
views of the new Government. The Japanese Fo
“extremely unfortunate and […] regrettable”.  
66. The decision by the United States in October 2008 to remove North Korea from its 
blacklist of state sponsors of terrorism107 provoked severe criticism in Japan for having pre-
empted efforts to resolve the abductions issue. In response to these concerns, the US 
Ambassador in Japan, Thomas Schieffer, stated that President Bush believed that “the 
abduction issue needs to be addressed and the United States will c
and these families in their efforts to get this situation resolved”.  
67. Dr Swenson-Wright highlighted Japan’s potential role vis-à-vis North Korea as and 
when the two countries normalised bilateral relations, particularly in terms of economic 
development. He said that during former Prime Minister Koizumi’s 2002 visit to 
Pyongyang, the talk had been of an aid package of perhaps $5-10 billion, compared with 
estimates of the total size of the North 
s
68. We conclude that there is a realistic prospect of Japan normalising relations with 
North Korea, if progress can be made to resolve both the North Korean nuclear issue 
and the issue of North Korea’s abductions of Japanese nationals, but that these issues 
103 Ev 106 
104 Transcript of press conference, 29 August 2008, via the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, at 
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should be resolved separately. We further conclude that although the number of 
Japanese nationals who were abducted by North Korea is small, even allowing for the 
highest possible estimate, nonetheless it should be recognised by the international 
community that this is an understandably emotive issue for the Japanese public and 
Government. Like the Prime Minister, we extend our sympathy and respect to the 
surviving abductees and to the abductees’ families. We conclude that the British 
Embassy in Pyongyang has played a useful role in bringing pressure to bear on North 
Korea in relation to the abductees. We recommend that the Government should 
continue to give such assistance as it can to Japan over this matter, and in particular 
that it should encourage North Korea to proceed speedily to set up the proposed 
reinvestigation commission, with a view to reaching a final resolution of the issue and 
removing this significant obstacle to the normalisation of North Korea’s relations with 
Japan. While recognising the importance of these country-specific sensitivities, we 
further conclude that, in relations with North Korea, the greatest interest of the 
international community as a whole, including the UK, lies in denuclearisation.  
South Korea’s regional relations 
m War, and it contributes to the current US-led missions in 
bot  Afghanistan and Iraq.111  
took office in 2001. While the Bush Administration initially adopted a tough stance 
 
United States 
69. The relationship with the US is South Korea’s most important security relationship. 
The US was the first and largest provider of troops to the UN Command which defended 
South Korea in the Korean War, and the US continues to lead the UN Command, under 
UN Security Council resolution 84 of 1950.110 The US continues to guarantee South 
Korea’s security under the two states’ Mutual Defence Treaty of 1953, concluded at the end 
of the Korean War. The US deployed tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea between 
1957 and 1991, and it retains 28,500 troops there. For its part, South Korea sent troops to 
fight with the US in the Vietna
h
70. The centrality of the security relationship notwithstanding, South Korea’s relations 
with the US have sometimes been bumpy. At times, there has been resentment in Seoul at 
perceived US dominance and lack of consultation, leading to assertions of greater South 
Korean status and independence. This has occurred, for example, when the US has been 
seen to be making North Korea policy over South Korea’s head, whether Washington’s line 
was tougher or more accommodating than that preferred by Seoul. Anti-American Korean 
nationalist sentiment may have been one of the factors behind the mass protests over 
renewed US beef imports in 2008.112 At other times, there has been uneasiness in Seoul lest 
the United States’ security commitment to South Korea was weakening. South Korea’s 
relations with the US were often seen to be particularly difficult under the two previous 
liberal Presidents in Seoul, Presidents Kim and Roh, especially after US President Bush 
110 See paras 291-306 below. 
111 See paras 328-9 below. 
112 See para 26 above. 
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towards North Korea, South Korea’s leaders were pursuing their “sunshine policy” of 
engagement with the North.113 
71. The new South Korean President, President Lee, has made an improvement in relations 
with the US one of his top foreign policy aims, in parallel with his similar goal as regards 
Japan.114 The FCO told us that the “key political difference” under President Lee in relation 
to North Korea will be his “determination to co-ordinate his DPRK policy more closely 
with that of the United States”.115 US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice attended 
President Lee’s inauguration, and President Lee made the US his first foreign destination in 
office, in April 2008, becoming the first South Korean head of state to be received at Camp 
David. At the summit, Presidents Bush and Lee reaffirmed the importance which they 
attach to the bilateral alliance. The two sides agreed on steps that allowed South Korea to 
be admitted to the US visa waiver programme from November 2008, and to gain a status 
equivalent to NATO members for the purposes of US military sales; the two leaders also 
agreed to facilitate South Korean student visits to the US.116 
72. The US military presence in South Korea, like that in Japan, is undergoing major 
reorganisation and reconfiguration, which can be a source of bilateral difficulties. The 
long-term trend is for South Korea increasingly to attain a greater and more independent 
military capacity, with the US moving to a supporting role. This accords both with South 
Korea’s wish for a more equal bilateral relationship and with the United States’ need to 
shift military resources elsewhere. Since an agreement in 2004, the US has reduced the 
number of its troops in South Korea from 37,500 to 28,500, although Presidents Bush and 
Lee agreed in April that there was not, after all, scope to implement the further cut—to 
25,000—which had originally been foreseen. Under the same 2004 agreement, the US has 
so far closed 39 of its bases in South Korea. By 2012, US forces will be concentrated in only 
two major “hubs”, both in the south of the country, in contrast to US forces’ previous 
dispersion throughout South Korea, including Seoul. The reconfiguration will reduce the 
US military presence in heavily populated areas, where relations with the local population 
have sometimes come under strain, and leave the frontline forces nearer the North Korean 
border overwhelmingly South Korean. Reaching agreement on sharing the costs of the 
reorganisation has sometimes been a source of difficulty between Seoul and Washington.  
73. As regards military command structures, South Korea took peacetime operational 
command of its own armed forces from the US in 1994. Wartime operational command 
currently remains with the Commander of the US-South Korea Combined Forces 
Command (CFC), who is always from the US. However, in 2012 the CFC is to be 
disbanded, and wartime operational command of South Korea’s armed forces will pass to 
Seoul, with the US forces and their Commander moving to a supporting role. In summer 
2008, South Korea took command for the first time of one of the regular US-South Korean 
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joint military exercises. We discuss in Chapter Three below the implications for the UN 
Command in Korea of the changes to the US-South Korean command relationship.117    
74. The most high-profile issue in South Korean-US relations is currently the two states’ 
Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).118 Despite the other difficulties in the bilateral 
relationship at the time, the agreement was negotiated under former South Korean 
President Roh and signed in 2007. In terms of the value of trade affected, the agreement is 
the United States’ largest FTA since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which came into effect in 1994; it is South Korea’s largest-ever free trade agreement. The 
FCO told us that if the KORUS FTA were to come into effect, it would be expected to boost 
trade between the two countries by up to 20%, and to add up to 1.99% to GDP in South 
Korea and 0.2% in the US.119  
75. As of November 2008, the South Korea-US FTA had not been ratified by the legislature 
in either country. As outlined in the previous Chapter, in Seoul political opposition to the 
agreement became linked to the row over renewed US beef imports, and the outgoing 
National Assembly did not ratify the agreement. In his opening address in July to the new 
National Assembly, where his party now enjoys a majority, President Lee urged the 
legislature to ratify the agreement as soon as possible.120 His Government re-introduced 
the required legislation in the legislature in October.121 For his part, when he visited Seoul 
in August President Bush promised to “press hard” for US Congressional ratification of the 
FTA.122 However, the agreement faces significant opposition in Congress, which did not 
ratify the deal before rising in advance of the 4 November US Presidential election. 
Prospects for possible ratification during a “lame-duck” session between the election and 
the formation of the new US Administration are uncertain.123  
76. We conclude that the recent moves on both sides further to strengthen the South 
Korea-US alliance are to be welcomed. We conclude that the likelihood of greater 
convergence between South Korean and US approaches to North Korea should be 
especially useful.  
China 
77. South Korea’s relations with China have undergone a major transformation in recent 
years. China fought with North Korea against the South in the Korean War, and during the 
Cold War it did not recognise South Korea. Having established diplomatic relations with 
South Korea in 1992, China is now its largest trade partner, by some considerable distance. 
Bilateral trade was worth $118 billion in 2006.124 China is an important destination for 
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South Korean investment, and significant numbers of students from one country study in 
the other.   
78. The British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS) reminded us that, historically, 
when faced with Japanese aggression “the Koreans have always been allied with the 
Chinese”. BAKS suggested that the current situation might be regarded as one in which 
“this old equilibrium is re-emerging” to some extent.125 Professor Smith similarly said that 
South Korea and China “share a[n] […] intangible but nevertheless important 
commonality in that both countries harbour still important popular antagonism towards 
Japan for a perceived recalcitrant attitude to the consequences of the colonial past.”126  
79. We heard during our visit to the region that the Chinese leadership might feel 
uncomfortable with the renewed priority which South Korea’s new President, President 
Lee, is awarding to improved relations with the US and Japan. Nevertheless, President Lee 
and Chinese President Hu have already held two bilateral summits, in Beijing in May and 
in Seoul in August. At the former meeting, the leaders agreed to upgrade the South 
Korean-China relationship to a “strategic and cooperative partnership”.127    
80. China and South Korea have not settled their mutual maritime border. Talks on the 
issue since 1996 have failed to reach a resolution. The dispute concerns in particular what 
Korea calls the Ieodo isles and China the Suyan Rock, where the two countries’ claimed 
economic zones overlap. In their August 2008 summit statement, Presidents Lee and Hu 
called for an acceleration of talks on the issue.128 
81. China’s human rights record may be becoming a more potentially contentious area in 
the relationship with South Korea. When the torch relay for the Beijing Olympic Games 
passed through Seoul in April 2008, South Korean anti-China protestors clashed with 
Chinese students studying locally. South Korea protested to China about the behaviour of 
its nationals and threatened to tighten visa arrangements for Chinese,129 although the 
incident did not disrupt the two countries’ summit in May. The South Korean 
demonstrators were protesting not only about Beijing’s behaviour in Tibet but also about 
its policy of repatriating North Korean emigrants in China, if apprehended. There appears 
to be increasing South Korean sentiment on this issue. At his summit with President Hu in 
Seoul in August, at which there were again demonstrations on the issue, President Lee 
raised the issue of China’s treatment of North Korean emigrants directly with the Chinese 
leader.130  
82. China and South Korea are the two countries with the most direct interest in avoiding 
any crisis within North Korea which would produce unmanageable numbers of emigrants 
or other immediate security risks. Professor Smith told us that:  
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it would not be an exaggeration to state that Communist China and capitalist South 
Korea have probably more in common today than China and North Korea because 
of their joint commitment to sustaining stability in the region to promote economic 
growth and their concern that [the] North Korean Government is a major cause of 
instability.131 
In the longer run, however, the two countries’ interests in North Korea may diverge. Aidan 
Foster-Carter told us that “China and South Korea are rivals for influence in 
Pyongyang”.132 The British Association for Korean Studies reminded us that historically 
“the Chinese have viewed Korea as a buffer state” and “have committed massive resources 
to defend Korea—in alliance with a Korean state—to drive military power away from their 
Korean frontier […] when it has had the resources, China has never allowed a hostile or 
potentially hostile power to dominate Korea”.133 Beijing would therefore presumably resist 
any change in North Korea that would allow the US to extend northwards its existing 
security presence in South Korea.    
83. We conclude that the growing relationship between South Korea and China is to be 
welcomed as a potential factor for stability in East Asia, in particular as regards the 
management of the risks posed by North Korea, and on the assumption that there is no 
question of the two countries aligning against Japan. We recommend that the 
Government should make clear to the parties that it would welcome an early agreement 
on the South Korean-Chinese maritime border.   
Trade agreements 
84. In recent years Japan and South Korea have acceded to a burgeoning number of 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) and other preferential economic 
arrangements. Japan has reached economic partnership agreements—which include trade 
liberalisation measures—with Mexico, Chile, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Singapore, as well as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
as a whole. Tokyo is currently negotiating agreements with Australia, India, Switzerland 
and Vietnam, as well as the Gulf Co-operation Council countries.134 For its part, South 
Korea has FTAs with ASEAN, Chile, Singapore and the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), as well as the KORUS FTA with the US (which we discussed above). Seoul is in 
FTA talks with the EU135 and with a further 40 countries, including well-advanced 
negotiations with India; and it is exploring the possibility of launching negotiations with a 
range of further states.136 For example, at their summit in May 2008, President Lee and 
Chinese President Hu agreed to continue to study the possibility of a South Korea-China 
FTA; and in August 2008, President Lee and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd agreed 
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to launch FTA talks.137 A number of ideas have also been floated about possible pan-Asian 
free trade arrangements.    
85. In our 2006 Report on East Asia, we welcomed stronger links between states, but 
expressed some concern in case preferential trade arrangements in the region developed 
into “a group which might discriminate against EU trade”.138 At that time, the FCO told us 
that “There is no evidence that the emergence of particular groupings or Free Trade 
Agreements in the region are having any negative impacts upon EU or UK business 
interests.”139 Two years on, Lord Malloch-Brown reaffirmed this position. He told us that 
the Government 
remain[ed] of the view that a global successful conclusion of the Doha trade round to 
prevent the need for all these regional agreements is the way to go, but we are not 
inherently against regional agreements as long as their general impact is to increase 
international trade.140 
At the end of July 2008, the latest attempt to bring the Doha round to a conclusion with a 
global trade agreement ended in failure.   
86. In the context of efforts to encourage a greater opening-up of the South Korean 
economy, Dr Hoare suggested that free trade agreements involving the country were “a 
good thing”, because they “bind the South Koreans into more open trading practices”.141 
87. Japan and South Korea opened negotiations on a bilateral FTA in 2003, but the talks 
stalled the following year. At their summit in April 2008, former Prime Minister Fukuda 
and President Lee committed themselves to re-launching the negotiations. However, Dr 
Swenson-Wright told us that “there will inevitably be tensions in the economic relationship 
between the two countries” and that if the FTA talks were reopened “there will be 
difficulties, particularly in the agricultural sector.”142 Moreover, in summer 2008, the two 
states’ dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islets, outlined above, led Seoul to postpone 
further talks.143  
88. For the UK, currently the most important prospective FTA involving Japan or South 
Korea is that between the EU and South Korea. The proposed deal, on which talks opened 
in 2007, is one of a series of FTAs which the EU plans to negotiate with emerging states 
and regional groupings outside Europe, partly in response to the possible risk of losing out 
as others negotiate bilateral or regional deals.144 The EU is now South Korea’s largest 
foreign investor and second-largest trade partner (after China), with trade worth $78.6 
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billion in 2006. South Korean exports to the EU were worth $48.5 billion and EU exports to 
South Korea $30.1 billion.145 The European Commission has estimated that an FTA might 
boost EU exports to South Korea by 48%.146 Other studies have suggested that a deal might 
boost EU GDP by perhaps 0.1% and South Korean GDP by 2.0-3.0%, depending on its 
content.147  
89. In the context of the negotiations on the South Korea-EU FTA, Dr Hoare warned us 
that “it is essential that an eye is always kept on [South Korea’s] free trade agreement with 
the United States”.148 An analysis for Chatham House has suggested that, if the South 
Korea-US FTA were implemented, it would make the proposed South Korea-EU deal both 
more urgent and more beneficial for the parties involved, because a US deal without an EU 
one would give US firms an advantage in sectors in South Korea in which the EU is more 
competitive. However, the analysis also suggested that any EU wish to secure terms at least 
as good as those secured by the US might “delay or even preclude success” in the 
negotiations.149 If, on the other hand, the South Korea-US agreement were to fail to be 
ratified, impetus towards further trade liberalisation might be undermined in both 
countries, and Seoul might in particular be unwilling to make concessions to partners 
which were not available to its prime ally the US.    
90. After several rounds of talks in 2008, South Korea and the EU have both suggested that 
the negotiations on their proposed FTA could be concluded by the end of the year. 
However, analysts have pointed to a number of serious potential difficulties in the 
negotiations, relating to rules of origin and market access in sensitive sectors such as 
services (for South Korea) and cars (for the EU), a number of which still appeared to 
require resolution as of November.150 We discuss some further policy issues for the UK and 
the EU regarding the South Korea FTA in Chapters Three and Six below.  
91. Particularly in the context of the failure of the global Doha trade round, and given 
our support for a strengthening of relations among regional states, we conclude that 
bilateral and regional trade agreements involving Japan and South Korea are to be 
encouraged, provided that they do not prejudice economic access to local markets for 
the EU nor undermine any remaining prospects for the conclusion of a global trade 
agreement. We recommend that the Government should remain vigilant in assessing 
the implications of such agreements for the UK and the EU, and ensure that the EU 
maintains a similar stance.    
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Regional security forums 
92. East Asia does not have an overarching security architecture or a set of strong, well-
established political/security institutions along the lines of those developed in post-War 
Western Europe and the Transatlantic area. There are, however, a number of regional 
bodies and forums, including:  
• Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). This was formed in 1989 and 
encompasses 21 states, including Japan, South Korea, the US, China, Russia, 
Australia and states in South-East Asia and Latin America. APEC focuses on 
economic issues and has become less prominent in recent years.   
• ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This has been meeting since 1994 and has 24 
members. It brings the 10 member states of the established Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Burma, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) together with other 
countries including Japan, both Koreas, the US, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, plus the EU.  
• ASEAN+3. This grouping brings Japan, China and South Korea together with the 
10 ASEAN countries. The ASEAN+3 framework has existed since 1997, and 
encompasses meetings between all 13 countries, ASEAN plus just one of the 
additional three states, and the “plus three” countries only.  
• ASEAN+3+3, also known as the East Asia Summit (EAS). The EAS is the newest 
regional grouping, having been meeting since 2005. The EAS brings together 16 
countries, adding India, Australia and New Zealand to the ASEAN+3 format.  
93. Since 2003, the framework for international engagement with North Korea has 
comprised Six-Party Talks which offer a further alternative line-up for regional security 
discussions. The Six-Party Talks involve North Korea and its neighbours—that is, South 
Korea, China, Russia and Japan—and the US.151 One of the working groups in the Six-
Party Talks framework is addressing “North-East Asia peace and security”.  
94. We heard during our visit to the region about plans for a possible Japan-China-South 
Korea summit, which was reported to be likely to go ahead in December;152 and Dr 
Swenson-Wright also referred to “talk of possible trilateral co-operation between China, 
the United States and Japan”.153 Dr Swenson-Wright also mentioned the possible 
“reactivation” of the Trilateral Co-ordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), a US-Japan-
South Korea mechanism for discussion primarily of North Korea.154 TCOG fell into 
abeyance after the launch of the Six-Party Talks in 2003, but, as noted above, a renewed 
meeting in the TCOG framework went ahead in October 2008.155  
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95. As will be clear, a perennial issue in regional co-operation initiatives in East Asia has 
been the line-up of countries to be involved. One possibility is an exclusively North-East 
Asian framework, but other options would involve the South-East Asian states. Another 
question concerns the extent of involvement by major states proximate to, but not 
exclusively part of, East Asia—namely the US, Russia, India, Australia and New Zealand. 
Countries’ preferences regarding the line-up of states often reflect the regional power 
considerations that are at issue: thus China reportedly prefers smaller groupings, whereas 
Japan was among the states which pushed for India’s inclusion in the East Asia Summit, as 
a means of balancing China.156         
96. In our 2006 Report on East Asia, we noted the region’s “lack of effective regional 
security mechanisms”. We recommended that the Government should “encourage debate 
about the institutionalisation of security issues in East Asia” by drawing on “the UK’s 
involvement with and knowledge of NATO and of regional organisations in Europe, such 
as the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and 
the European Union”. We suggested that these organisations provided “useful models for 
any indigenous security structures which might broaden the security system from one 
based on alliances into one of mutual interdependence.”157 In its response, the Government 
said that the EU was in particular using the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to “encourage 
debate on institutionalisation of security issues in East Asia” and that the UK Government 
was “working with Asian and EU partners to make the ARF more effective as a 
preventative diplomacy tool.”158   
97. Witnesses to our current inquiry were largely of the view that regional security bodies 
in East Asia remained weak. Dr Hoare said that “the reality has not changed a great deal 
since 2006”,159 and he characterised regional security bodies as “not very powerful or 
dynamic”.160 Lord Malloch-Brown assessed East Asian security forums as remaining 
“pretty insipid”.161  
98. Dr Hoare went into more detail for us on the difficulties facing any efforts to develop 
regional security institutions in East Asia, especially along the lines of those seen in Europe:  
There are a number of problems with trying to impose a European or western-style 
security apparatus on East Asia. There is the difficulty that there are two leading East 
Asian nations: China and Japan. There are difficulties because of the historical legacy 
of the Second World War, which affects attitudes towards Japan, and because East 
and South-East Asia are not [a] coherent political and cultural region in the way that 
Europe is […] There is also the historical fact that until very recently the major 
outside power interested in East Asia—the United States—was not really very 
interested in any sort of regional security system. It preferred what was called the 
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hub-and-spoke system, whereby the United States was the hub and had bilateral 
treaties with countries such as the Philippines, Japan and South Korea. Therefore, 
one of the problems is that you lack one of the basic building blocks to create the sort 
of regional security structure that we have in Europe.”162 
Dr Hoare also said that the “various off-spins” from ASEAN were weak for “partly 
cultural” reasons: “anything that might provoke confrontation was to be avoided”.163 
Summarising, Sir Stephen Gomersall concluded that “Asia and Europe are fundamentally 
different in geography, culture, stages of development and relative wealth, and therefore 
the European experience cannot be transported there”.164 
99. Alongside the fact that the US has preferred to maintain only bilateral security 
arrangements with its regional allies, Sir Stephen Gomersall highlighted the similar 
position of Japan. He argued that:  
Japan has also slightly missed out by not being more proactive in trying to promote 
some structures based loosely on ideas of free trade and respect for certain political 
norms in the area, which would have put relationships among Japan, China, Korea 
and the ASEAN countries on a more stable and constructive kind of framework and 
taken some volatility out of the situation […] the bottom line is that there are 
virtually no takers for those kinds of ideas in Japan. Japan has pursued its own 
diplomacy through aid, the negotiation of free trade arrangements with individual 
ASEAN countries and […] through the ASEAN+3 format.165 
100. There have been signs recently that interest in strengthening East Asian regional 
security institutions is increasing in some quarters.166 Dr Hoare told us that “the emergence 
of some issues, particularly the North Korean nuclear issue and how to cope with it, have 
made countries in the region look much more at the idea of some form of overarching 
security apparatus”, although he warned that he did “not see [the problems] being solved in 
the short term.”167 Perhaps most significantly, in an article in Foreign Affairs in July 2008, 
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the parties to the Six-Party Talks “intend 
to institutionalise [their] habits of co-operation through the establishment of a Northeast 
Asian Peace and Security Mechanism—a first step toward a security forum in the 
region”.168 In their joint statement after their August 2008 summit, Presidents Bush and 
Lee agreed to work “with a view to […] the creation of a new peace structure on the Korean 
Peninsula and in Northeast Asia”.169 For his part, Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the 
question of an East Asian security framework would “become more and more of an 
issue.”170 
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101. We conclude that North-East Asia is characterised by a set of interlocking and 
highly delicate inter-state relationships. While there have been improvements recently 
in some bilateral relationships, the region continues to be marked by a number of 
historical and territorial disputes which are potential sources of instability and 
obstacles to enhanced co-operation. We further conclude that the states of the region 
have a clear common interest in maintaining stability, in the interests of perpetuating 
economic growth and enhancing their international standing. We also conclude that, 
although there is no question of replicating European institutions in East Asia, there 
are some aspects of the European experience which might usefully be drawn on in the 
region, in terms especially of the mitigation of historical and territorial disputes, and 
that the strengthening of standing forums for regularised security dialogue among 
regional states would be welcome. We recommend that the Government should 
continue to work with its East Asian, European and US partners to encourage the 
further development of regional security forums in East Asia. In particular, the 
Government should convey to the US Administration its support for what appears to 
be a shift in US policy towards promoting multilateral regional frameworks in East 
Asia. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should 
provide an assessment of the development of the various East Asian regional security 
forums so far, and in particular of the likely impact of the apparent shift in US policy 
and of prospects for the further institutionalisation of the Six-Party Talks framework.      
102. We recommend that in its work in East Asia, the Government should take every 
opportunity to support initiatives aimed at developing a shared historical 
understanding between the region’s Second World War combatants. We further 
recommend that the Government should build elements of co-operation between 
regional states into programmes and projects in the region that it might otherwise 
pursue bilaterally, for example regarding climate change or research co-operation. We 
recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide 
information on such work as it is already doing to encourage co-operation between 
regional states in specific policy areas.  
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3 North Korea 
103. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) is one of the world’s few 
remaining communist regimes, and the most oppressive and internationally isolated. It was 
established in 1948 under Soviet sponsorship and largely on the Soviet model, under the 
leadership of Kim Il-sung. Kim’s son, Kim Jong-il, became leader of North Korea on his 
father’s death in 1994. Compared to other communist states, North Korea is distinguished 
by the combination of: hereditary succession and the personality cult which surrounds 
Kim Il-sung (the “Great Leader” and “Eternal  President”) and Kim Jong-il (the “Dear 
Leader”); the official nationalist ideology of “self-reliance” (“juche”); and the size, favoured 
economic position and political prominence of the military, under the regime’s “military 
first” (“songun”) policy. 
104. North Korea was initially more economically developed than South Korea. Most 
industrialisation under Japanese rule had taken place in the north, where the peninsula’s 
mineral deposits are mostly located. South Korea is generally reckoned to have overtaken 
North Korea in terms of economic development by the early 1970s. North Korea went into 
a steep economic decline after the collapse of the non-market Soviet-bloc trading system in 
the early 1990s, which brought a major fall in aid and access to cheap energy and other 
inputs. During our visit to the region in May 2008, it was suggested to us that the North 
Korean economy should now be thought of as several separate economies, namely: the elite 
or “court” economy surrounding Kim Jong-il; the military economy; the official civilian 
economy; and the unofficial economy. We were told that the elite economy operates in 
hard currency, with revenues generated from international sales of weapons, drugs, and 
counterfeit currency and cigarettes. Professor Smith summed up for us the situation facing 
most of the rest of the population:  
Chronic food shortages underlie continuing malnutrition in all parts of the country. 
Unemployment and underemployment is prevalent. The economic and social 
infrastructure remains degraded with basic services of running water, sewage 
systems, electricity and heating availability unpredictable and inadequate even for 
those living in the capital city.171 
105. As noted at the start of Chapter Two, during the Cold War Western states did not 
recognise North Korea. Many effectively did so in 1991, when North and South Korea were 
both admitted to the UN. Many Western states have subsequently established diplomatic 
relations with Pyongyang, including the UK.172 The US and Japan do not have diplomatic 
relations with North Korea. In addition, the US maintains some bilateral sanctions against 
North Korea, including, until 2008, restrictions under the Trading with the Enemy Act. 
Until October 2008, the US also continued to list North Korea as a state sponsor of 
terrorism, a designation applied since North Korean agents blew up a South Korean 
commercial airliner in 1987.  
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106. For the West, and the country’s regional neighbours, North Korea presents a number 
of security and other policy risks and challenges. Aidan Foster-Carter told us that the 
situation in North Korea satisfied the UN definition of a ‘complex emergency’: “there are 
so many issues”.173 Professor Smith referred to “the continuing Korean security crises”,174 
and in our 2006 East Asia report we discussed North Korea as a “failing state”.175 The FCO 
assessment is that “the DPRK nuclear and missile issues and the fragility of its economic 
and political systems are a major threat to international peace and security in the 
region.”176 We discuss a number of the relevant policy issues in the following sections. 
 
Nuclear programme 
107. Internationally, North Korea is regarded as a security risk primarily because of its 
nuclear activities. These include both a domestic nuclear weapons programme and nuclear 
proliferation to other countries.177   
108. When we completed our Report on East Asia in July 2006, it was not known whether 
North Korea had developed a nuclear weapon: in February 2005 Pyongyang had 
announced that it had done so, but there was no hard evidence.178 In October 2006, this 
uncertainty was ended: North Korea tested a small nuclear device. Dr Hoare told us that 
“whatever was tested in October 2006 was hardly a resounding success”:179 the bomb is 
believed to have detonated only imperfectly. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that North Korea 
“could not sustain any kind of nuclear military effort against Japan beyond a first strike, 
but we have to remain wary of, or alert to, the possibility of a once-off nuclear weapon or 
flight of nuclear weapons—or the launch of a very small number with the character of a 
dirty bomb—that could [...] do significant civilian harm”.180 North Korea’s nuclear bomb is 
based on plutonium which Pyongyang is known to have produced at the Yongbyon facility 
before 1994 and between 2002 and 2008. North Korea is reckoned to have enough 
weapons-grade plutonium to make up to perhaps a dozen nuclear weapons.181   
109. North Korea had acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-
nuclear weapons state in 1985, largely through Soviet pressure. Pyongyang only allowed 
full inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992, when its 
173 Q 27. The UN definition of a “complex emergency” is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there 
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possession of weapons-grade plutonium was confirmed. Disputes over further inspections 
led North Korea to threaten to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This prompted bilateral 
negotiations between the US and North Korea which yielded the Agreed Framework (also 
known as the Geneva Framework Agreement) of 1994. Under the Agreed Framework, the 
US in essence deferred temporarily the issue of the plutonium which Pyongyang had 
produced prior to 1994 in defiance of the NPT, in the interests of securing an IAEA-
inspected freeze on new production. The US also agreed to supply Pyongyang with fuel oil, 
organise an international consortium to provide a light water reactor for civil energy 
production, and move towards a normalisation of bilateral relations. Under the Agreed 
Framework, North Korea froze its plutonium programme, under IAEA inspection, 
between 1994 and 2002.  
110. The Agreed Framework broke down in 2002, after the US accused North Korea of 
running a second—secret—nuclear weapons programme, based on uranium enrichment 
and employing gas centrifuge technology obtained through the A.Q. Khan network based 
in Pakistan. The US claims that North Korea admitted running a uranium programme, 
although Pyongyang has subsequently denied its existence. The FCO told us that it believes 
that North Korea “has […] tried to develop a uranium enrichment programme for 
weapons purposes.”182 In response to the US charges in 2002, North Korea restarted its 
suspended plutonium-based activities at Yongbyon, expelled IAEA inspectors, and 
formally withdrew from the NPT in January 2003. North Korea is the only state ever to 
have acceded to the NPT and subsequently withdrawn. (The UK does not regard 
Pyongyang as having met the procedural requirements for NPT withdrawal, and therefore 
continues to regard North Korea as bound by its NPT commitments.)183     
111. Following North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear weapon test, the UN Security Council 
unanimously passed Resolution 1718, which demanded that North Korea conduct no 
further such tests. The Resolution also banned trade with North Korea in goods and 
technologies that could be used in ballistic missile programmes184 or programmes for the 
manufacture of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). UNCSR 1718 also imposed an asset 
freeze on individuals and entities supporting North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missile 
programmes, and a travel ban on the relevant individuals. The resolution also demanded 
that North Korea return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.185  
112. Alongside the UN sanctions regime, since the country’s nuclear weapon test the 
international community has continued to negotiate with North Korea on 
denuclearisation, through Six-Party Talks which were established in 2003 following 
Pyongyang’s NPT withdrawal. The Six-Party Talks involve North Korea and its 
neighbours—that is, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan—and the US. China was largely 
responsible for securing North Korea’s acceptance of this negotiating format, and chairs 
the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks made little progress until 2005, when the parties 
agreed a joint statement of principles, including that their aim was “the verifiable 
denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner”. The parties also agreed 
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that they would proceed on the basis of “commitment for commitment, action for action”. 
In the joint statement, North Korea promised to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards, 
and the other parties promised to discuss the provision of a light water reactor for civil 
energy purposes. North Korea and the US, and North Korea and Japan, also agreed to take 
steps towards the normalisation of bilateral relations.186  
113. Following North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, the parties to the Six-Party 
Talks reached agreement in February 2007 on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of 
the [2005] Joint Statement”. This constituted a breakthrough, by establishing sequencing 
and deadlines for specific steps to a greater extent than had previous agreements—
although, in his submission to our inquiry, Dr Tat Yan Kong of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies highlighted the many difficulties inherent to the “denuclearisation” process 
that nevertheless remained.187 In the first implementation phase under the February 2007 
agreement, North Korea was to shut Yongbyon and allow the return of IAEA inspectors, in 
return for the shipment of 50,000 tons of fuel oil, and talks with the US and Japan on the 
normalisation of bilateral relations. The US was to start the processes of de-listing North 
Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and removing the country from the terms of the 
Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). North Korea did not shut Yongbyon on time, but it 
had done so to the satisfaction of the IAEA by July 2007.188 In October 2007, the parties 
agreed on a second phase of implementation measures. In this phase, by the end of 2007 
North Korea was to disable Yongbyon and make a full declaration of all its nuclear 
programmes, while the other parties were to supply further fuel oil or equivalent, up to a 
total of 1 million tons supplied in phases 1 and 2 combined. The US said that it would fulfil 
its commitments regarding terrorist de-listing and the TWEA “in parallel with the DPRK’s 
actions”.189   
114. When he gave evidence to us in March 2008, Aidan Foster-Carter said that North 
Korea’s plutonium programme was by then “canned”.190 Lord Malloch-Brown confirmed 
to us in early July 2008 that the disabling of Yongbyon was ongoing, although the process 
was “going slower than had been hoped […] partly due to deliberate stalling by the DPRK, 
but […] also some health and safety issues.”191 On 27 June 2008, North Korea blew up the 
cooling tower at Yongbyon in front of the international press. US negotiator Christopher 
Hill told the Senate Armed Services Committee on 31 July 2008 that North Korea had by 
then completed eight of eleven agreed disabling tasks at Yongbyon, and was “no longer 
able to produce weapons-grade plutonium at Yongbyon”.192 Both IAEA and US personnel 
have been on the ground at Yongbyon monitoring the disabling process. Mr Hill also told 
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the Senate Armed Services Committee that, as of end-July, North Korea had received 
420,000 of the 1 million tons of fuel oil or equivalent which it is due in the first two 
implementation phases, and that the remainder would be provided by the end of October 
2008.   
115. North Korea did not meet its end-2007 deadline for a full declaration of its nuclear 
programmes. Matters were held up when the US insisted, against North Korean resistance, 
that the declaration cover the United States’ longstanding allegations of a covert uranium-
based programme, and more recent US charges that North Korea had assisted in Syria’s 
construction of a covert nuclear facility at al-Kibar which was destroyed by Israel in an air 
strike in September 2007.193 In March 2008, Aidan Foster-Carter told us that “unless [US 
negotiator] Chris Hill […] can come up with some way of getting the Syria issue and the 
enriched uranium issue off balance sheet, as you might say, or shove them away into a 
separate track of talks, the Bush Administration will run out of time.”194 By April, it was 
being reported that the US might be preparing to accept a North Korean nuclear 
declaration which did not provide full information on these issues.195  
116. In May 2008, North Korea handed to the US over 18,000 pages of documentation on 
its activities at Yongbyon. On 26 June 2008, North Korea made its formal nuclear 
declaration. The FCO’s Stephen Lillie told us that the Government’s “understanding [was] 
that the declaration itself probably does not include [an accounting of proliferation 
activities] but there have been other discussions with the US to address it.”196 According to 
US National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, in its declaration North Korea denied that it 
was engaged in uranium enrichment or nuclear proliferation, but the Administration was 
prepared to set aside temporarily its continuing suspicions on these counts “in order to 
keep the process going”.197 The amount of plutonium which North Korea admitted 
possessing, 37 kilograms, is also lower than US estimates.198 President Bush announced on 
the same day that the US was removing North Korea from the provisions of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act, and starting the process of de-listing the country as a state sponsor of 
terrorism. Under this process, the US would de-list North Korea after a minimum of 45 
days if the parties to the Six-Party Talks had agreed on “acceptable verification principles 
and an acceptable verification protocol” and “an acceptable monitoring mechanism” as 
regards North Korea’s nuclear declaration.199 Combined with the symbolic public 
destruction of the Yongbyon cooling tower the following day, the developments at the end 
of June appeared to mark a major breakthrough in the international effort to secure North 
Korean denuclearisation. The Foreign Secretary wrote on his blog that North Korea’s 
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nuclear declaration was “significant” and that there was “hope” that the “process of 
engagement [with North Korea] may be working”.200 
117. During our trip to Tokyo and Seoul in May, we picked up some anxiety that the Bush 
Administration might be preparing to accept less-than-complete fulfilment by North 
Korea of all international demands, in the interests of making a breakthrough in bilateral 
relations during its remaining months in office that it could claim as a foreign policy 
success.201 We asked Lord Malloch-Brown about this in early July, with respect especially 
to verification of North Korea’s 26 June nuclear declaration. Lord Malloch-Brown told us 
that he thought that “the Six-Party Talks process has been very well grounded […] 
President Bush will not do anything imprudent. He will move cautiously on this matter 
right until the end.”202 However, Dr Hoare warned us that “the unwillingness to settle for 
less than total demands could well mean no settlement at all”.203 
 
118. When the first possible date arrived for North Korea’s de-listing as a state sponsor of 
terrorism, 11 August 2008, the US did not proceed with the step, because no agreement 
had been reached on a verification mechanism for North Korea’s nuclear declaration. US 
negotiator Chris Hill said that having the “declaration without a [verification] protocol is 
really like just having one chopstick. You need two chopsticks if you’re going to pick up 
anything”.204 In response to the US stance, North Korea halted disabling work at 
Yongbyon and threatened to start to restore the facility. On 19 September 2008, North 
Korea confirmed that it had started preparations to reactivate Yongbyon. Pyongyang also 
announced that it no longer wished to be de-listed by the US as a state sponsor of 
terrorism.205 On 24 September, the IAEA said that it had removed its seals and surveillance 
cameras from Yongbyon at the request of North Korea, and that IAEA inspectors would 
have no further access to the site.206  
119. After negotiations conducted by Mr Hill in Pyongyang at the beginning of the month, 
the US announced on 11 October that it was de-listing North Korea as a state sponsor of 
terrorism. The US said that it had reached an agreement with North Korea that included 
“every element of verification that [it had] sought”, including that experts will have access 
to all declared facilities and, “based on mutual consent”, to undeclared sites, and that all 
measures contained in the verification protocol will apply not only to the plutonium-based 
programme but also to “any uranium enrichment and proliferation activities”.207 North 
Korea welcomed the US move, and, in response, halted its activities to reactivate 
Yongbyon, resumed disabling activities there and allowed IAEA inspectors back to the 
site.208 Although the agreement appeared to have restored the Six-Party process, observers 
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warned that it might run into the same kinds of dispute over implementation details as 
have previous denuclearisation deals with North Korea.209  
120. International interpretation of North Korea’s moves in the denuclearisation process in 
September-October 2008 was complicated by separate speculation over the possible illness 
of Kim Jong-il and its impact on decision-making in Pyongyang.210 In addition, Dr Kong 
had already noted in his submission to our inquiry that the US presidential election 
timetable might be a further difficulty for the denuclearisation process, with North Korea 
perhaps “waiting for the outcome of the 2008 presidential contest” and “unlikely to 
commit to commit fully to denuclearisation unless it can be sure that the guarantees made 
by one Administration will be maintained by its successor”211—although Dr Kong also 
noted that the involvement of the other four parties to the process gave a “more binding 
effect” to agreements reached in the Six-Party Talks framework than had been enjoyed by 
purely bilateral US-North Korea deals.212  
121. Beyond the difficulties surrounding North Korea’s nuclear declaration, there is a third 
phase to the implementation of the Six Parties’ 2005 joint statement. In this third phase, 
which the parties have not yet reached, North Korea is supposed to give up all its nuclear 
weapons, materials and programmes. The FCO told us that “until these are given up the 
DPRK will remain a nuclear and proliferation threat”.213  
Onward nuclear proliferation   
122. The FCO’s Stephen Lillie told us that the UK’s concerns regarding North Korea’s 
nuclear activities were “not just its indigenous programmes, but its proliferation”.214 As 
regards possible North Korean nuclear proliferation, the most recent allegation has been 
the US charge in 2008 that North Korea assisted Syria in the construction of a covert 
nuclear facility at al-Kibar which was destroyed in an Israeli air strike in September 2007.215 
In April 2008, the US published intelligence material which it said demonstrated the North 
Korean link, including photographs showing the apparent similarly of the Syrian facility to 
Yongbyon, and North Korean officials at the Syrian site.216 Mr Lillie told us that the “fact 
that [North Korea] appears to have provided technology to Syria is in itself an indication of 
the continuing threat that it poses”.217 Mr Lillie also reminded us that the two 2006 UN 
Security Council resolutions on North Korea, one passed after the country’s nuclear 
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weapon test in October and an earlier one passed after missile tests,218 were “very much 
directed at the proliferation threat”.219     
123. On 20 September 2008, it was reported that preliminary results from the investigation 
of the al-Kibar site by the IAEA “show[ed] nothing to back up US assertions that the target 
was a secret nuclear reactor”.220 However, it was reported in late October that the IAEA’s 
final evaluation of the relevant samples from the site had led it to conclude that “there is 
enough evidence there to warrant a follow-up”, although this had not been publicly 
confirmed.221 There are doubts both over the likely extent of Syrian cooperation in any 
further IAEA investigations and over the feasibility of reaching firmer conclusions, given 
that the Syrian facility was not completed when it was destroyed and IAEA inspectors were 
in any case able to visit the site only nine months later. It should be stressed that some 
credible independent observers find the US evidence of the North Korean link 
convincing.222  
Assessment of the Six-Party Talks 
124. The Foreign Secretary has likened the international effort to secure North Korean 
denuclearisation to a “slow and tortuous process [that] looks like a delicate piece of bomb 
disposal”.223 In addition to the apparent breakthroughs and reversals with North Korea 
which were outlined above, our discussion in Chapter Two indicated some of the 
difficulties involved in harmonising the North Korean policies of all the non-North Korean 
participants in the Six-Party Talks, including the US, China, Japan and South Korea.  
125. In the history of the international effort against North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
programme over the last 15 years, US policy has been the most controversial element. The 
US has moved from being, according to Professor Smith, “two days away” from a pre-
emptive strike on Yongbyon in 1994 to making an agreement with North Korea later that 
year; and from declaring North Korea to be part of the “axis of evil” along with Iraq and 
Iran, in President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, to beginning in 2007-08 to 
implement agreements in the direction of an eventual normalisation of bilateral relations.  
126. One issue has been the coherence of US policy. Aidan Foster-Carter reminded us that, 
at the time of our East Asia inquiry in 2006, the question being asked was, “did the 
Americans have a policy towards North Korea?”224 Giving evidence to our present inquiry 
in March 2008, Mr Foster-Carter reported that the “Bush Administration, rather belatedly, 
has acquired a policy”.225 Professor Smith told us that the US has “adopted a de facto policy 
of de-linkage […] such that progress in any one issue has not been made contingent on 
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another. It has also made difficult decisions to prioritise some issues for negotiation over 
others with denuclearisation being given top priority since 2006.”226  
127. A second issue for US policy has been whether to pursue North Korean 
denuclearisation through negotiation and agreements, or sanctions, isolation and hostility 
alone. In our 2006 East Asia Report, we concluded that “the US policy of increasing 
pressure on the North Korean regime may be entrenching the divisions between the 
parties”, and we recommended that the Government “use its relationship with the US to 
suggest a more flexible and pragmatic approach”.227 In its response to that Report, the 
Government appeared to reject our criticism of US policy, saying that “it is the highly 
provocative actions of the DPRK, in particular its decision to carry out a nuclear test, which 
represent the real obstacle to progress.”228 In his evidence to our present inquiry, Lord 
Malloch-Brown acknowledged that there had been a shift in US policy, saying that the 
Bush Administration was “initially […] against [the] kind of approach [now being 
pursued] and they have come round to it somewhat reluctantly.”229 While Dr Tat Yan 
Kong of the School of Oriental and African Studies told us that “ideological hostility 
towards North Korea” on the part of the Bush Administration had been “the most decisive 
factor”230 in the breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework in 2002, Aidan Foster-Carter 
told us that he was “amazed and pleased at how far the Bush Administration have moved 
from where they were in their disastrous first few years on the Korean issue”.231  
128. The policy of negotiation with North Korea remains highly controversial in US 
political and policy-making circles and, it is reported, within the Bush Administration.232 
Critics of the approach argue that North Korea never fulfils its commitments and has no 
intention of giving up its nuclear weapons capability, but is merely using the negotiations 
process to extract economic and symbolic concessions that will benefit the regime. Aidan 
Foster-Carter told us that “if the Bush Administration run out of time, […] the views of 
those [...] who argue that the North Koreans were never going to make a deal and that Kim 
Jong-il will never give up nuclear weapons and is just stringing us along, will become more 
persuasive.”233  
129. Discussion of the most effective way of securing North Korean denuclearisation is 
linked to debate over Pyongyang’s motives in pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies wrote in 2004 that:  
For years, North Korea watchers have debated whether Pyongyang views nuclear 
weapons as indispensable to the regime’s survival and therefore non-negotiable, or 
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whether it sees its nuclear assets as a bargaining chip to be traded away for political 
and economic benefits necessary to sustaining the regime.234  
130. Aidan Foster-Carter tended somewhat to the former view. He told us that: 
the North Korean regime has consistently traded on […] genuine fears and, for older 
North Koreans, on memories of attack from the outside, to create a permanent 
impression of a country at war on the verge of being attacked […] I cannot imagine a 
North Korea that is not trying to arm itself with everything under the sun, partly for 
bargaining, but mainly because it cannot conceive of security in any other way […] 
That is the kind of state it is.235  
131. Professor Smith, on the other hand, told us that North Korea was exercising “quite a 
classical use of […] nuclear possession as a negotiating card. It is a fairly normal […] use of 
nuclear deterrence”.236 She told us that “the DPRK’s nuclear weapons development 
programme was designed to offer a deterrent capacity against the perceived threat of 
United States attack,”237 especially after the Soviet Union and then Russia in the early 1990s 
“made it clear to the DPRK leadership that there could be no automatic military support 
for the DPRK in the event of hostilities breaking out on the Korean peninsula.”238 Dr 
Hoare similarly told us that “North Korea feels and is threatened by nuclear weapons, and 
believes that the only way to counter that threat is to make it costly for any attacker.”239 
Professor Smith further said that Pyongyang conceived of the normalisation of relations 
with the US primarily as a security gain. “If there was some form of normalisation, in their 
view it would mean that they were not going to be invaded or bombed”,240 she said; “they 
want a security guarantee”.241  
 
132. Professor Smith said that the conception of security which North Korea was pursuing 
extended beyond territorial security to the survival of the regime itself. According to 
Professor Smith, regime maintenance is one of North Korea’s two core aims.242 She said 
that North Korea saw a risk not only of military action against it, but also of “regime 
change through different ways of trying to undermine the regime”.243 She told us that:  
until they are sure that the regime will be safe—that is the Government with Kim 
Jong-il in charge and the structure around them—they are not likely to do anything 
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about the wholesale abandonment of what they consider to be their trump card, 
which they call their nuclear deterrent.244        
133. Dr Tat Yan Kong argued that, among those who contend that North Korea seeks 
merely to extract concessions from the US without denuclearisation, “what tends to be 
overlooked is the high value that North Korea places on developing friendly relations with 
the US.” He suggested that “beyond immediate economic benefits, North Korea seeks a 
relationship with the US in order to counter-balance China’s growing influence on the 
Korean peninsula.”245  
134. In addition to US and North Korean stances, Professor Smith drew our attention to a 
“contributory factor” in what she called, in March 2008, “the relative success recently of the 
Six-Party Talks”.246 This was two changes in the position of China, the Talks’ chairing state, 
compared with the early 1990s. First, Professor Smith said that China’s new economic 
weight meant that it “is a valued partner of both South Korea and Japan, to a certain 
extent”.247 As a result, “North Korea is much more isolated” than it was in the early 
1990s.248 Second, Professor Smith said that, while China continues to be North Korea’s 
main economic prop, Pyongyang had done various things over recent years that “China 
was very unhappy about”, including, most notably, the October 2006 nuclear test. 
Professor Smith described the nuclear test as “a red line” for China,249 and Aidan Foster-
Carter called the test “a fateful day” as regards Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing.250 Mr 
Foster-Carter said that “China is already applying more pressure than it used to [on North 
Korea], and it is in a position to apply more;”251 he said that “China is key now” as regards 
further progress on North Korean denuclearisation.252 In the UK National Security 
Strategy, published in March 2008, the Government stated that “many of the security 
challenges [the UK faces] will not be solved without Chinese engagement”, including 
denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.253       
135. In our 2007 Report on Global Security: Russia, we noted that, compared with the US 
and China, Russia was not the most influential participant in the Six-Party Talks. We also 
reported that Russia had tended to be more reluctant about supporting sanctions against 
Pyongyang than the UK, but that at the strategic level Russia shared the wish not to see 
North Korea become a nuclear-armed state.254 In his evidence to that inquiry, the then 
Minister for Europe, Jim Murphy MP, agreed with a description of Russia as “credible” and 
“a good partner” on North Korea.255 In conclusion, we “welcome[d] Russia’s participation 
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so far in international anti-proliferation efforts regarding North Korea”.256 In a statement 
released on 27 August 2008, after the war in Georgia had seen relations between Russia and 
the West deteriorate significantly, the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed “disappointment 
and concern” about Pyongyang’s threat to halt the disabling process at Yongbyon.257  
136. As regards the UK, Lord Malloch-Brown acknowledged that it is “not […] a front-line 
player” in North Korean denuclearisation, being outside the Six-Party Talks. Lord 
Malloch-Brown told us that  “supporting the Six-Party Talks is the most important thing 
that [the UK] can do”.258 The FCO told us that:  
the UK and the EU strongly support the [Six-Party Talks], and both [the UK] and 
the EU have made clear [their] readiness to assist. The UK and EU also take every 
opportunity to press the DPRK to honour NPT obligations and to negotiate 
constructively and in good faith in the Six-Party Talks. [The UK] will continue to 
work with the EU and the international community to try to reduce the threat of 
DPRK WMD proliferation.259 
We discuss British policy towards North Korea in more detail in a separate section 
below.260  
137. We conclude that the North Korean denuclearisation process in the framework of 
the Six-Party Talks is difficult and imperfect, and that there can be no certainty that it 
will lead to the elimination of all North Korea’s nuclear weapons activities. However, 
we also conclude that the process has achieved a significant degree of denuclearisation, 
namely a halt to plutonium production at Yongbyon, verified by International Atomic 
Energy Agency personnel, and significant dismantling of the facility. We conclude that 
the fact that the agreements reached in the Six-Party Talks process are similar in 
outline to the 1994 Agreed Framework—namely denuclearisation steps by North Korea 
in exchange for energy supplies and security gains through improved relations with the 
US—suggest that this is the most effective basic deal for securing progress in 
denuclearisation. We further conclude that, by better harmonising the policies towards 
North Korea of the states most immediately concerned, and by increasing the number 
of states signed up to agreements and therefore the costs of defection, the Six-Party 
Talks format is more effective than bilateral US-North Korean negotiations, and may 
also have wider knock-on benefits for regional security. We conclude that the leading 
role of China in the Six-Party Talks is to be welcomed, and that the Government is 
correct to identify China as key to North Korean denuclearisation. We therefore 
conclude that the Government is correct to support the Six-Party Talks process, 
including the priority which the process gives to denuclearisation over other policy 
aims regarding North Korea. 
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138. Given the difficulties in the denuclearisation process which arose in September 
2008, we recommend that the Government should make clear to Six-Party Talks 
participants that it is willing to assist in any way that might help prevent any further 
possible breakdown in the process. We further recommend that the Government 
should make clear to the incoming US Administration that it would welcome an early 
commitment to continuing the Six-Party Talks and the policy approach which they 
embody. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government should 
provide an assessment of prospects for the international North Korean 
denuclearisation effort under the new US Administration, in light of the latest 
developments in the process and in the West’s relations with Russia.    
Nuclear non-proliferation implications 
139. In demonstrating its possession of a nuclear bomb in 2006, North Korea became the 
newest addition to the group of states which are not acknowledged nuclear weapons states 
under the NPT but are known to possess such weapons. The other members of this group 
are Israel, India and Pakistan. Unlike those states, however, which never acceded to the 
NPT, North Korea developed much of its nuclear weapons programme while an NPT 
member, before its disputed withdrawal in 2003. In this respect, the closest potential 
parallel to the North Korean case is that of Iran, which is a signatory to the NPT but which 
is suspected of seeking to develop a nuclear weapon.261 There has been considerable 
discussion in policy circles of possible parallels between, and lessons to be drawn from, the 
North Korean and Iranian cases.262   
140. In discussing the possibility of North Korea using its nuclear capability, Lord Malloch-
Brown said that “the issue is the irrationality of the leadership that is equipped with such 
damaging […] weapons.”263 The UK National Security Strategy states that  
Both North Korea and Iran are of particular concern because of their attitude to 
international institutions and treaties, and because of the impact of their activities on 
stability in regions crucial to global security. But [the UK] oppose[s] all proliferation, 
as undermining our objectives of de-escalation and multilateral disarmament, and 
increasing the risk of instability in the international system and ultimately the risk of 
nuclear confrontation.264    
The FCO told us that “an unchecked DPRK nuclear programme would undermine global 
non-proliferation norms weakening our ability to counter proliferation elsewhere”.265  
141. Like Iran, North Korea insists on its right to civil nuclear power. In the history of 
international dealings with North Korea over its nuclear programme, the provision of a 
light water reactor for civil energy production has been a consistent demand from 
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Pyongyang and a frequent source of dispute and difficulty regarding its interlocutors’ 
fulfilment of their commitments. There is now considerable international discussion of 
potential mechanisms by which states might gain access to civil nuclear power without 
increasing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, and a number of proposals have been 
floated.    
142. We are considering these wider nuclear proliferation issues as part of our recently-
launched inquiry into Global Security: Non-Proliferation.266 
143. We conclude that the Government is correct to regard the North Korean case as 
having wider implications for nuclear proliferation and for international non-
proliferation efforts. We conclude that it is important from this perspective that North 
Korea should be returned credibly to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
regime as a non-nuclear weapons state. We further conclude that the North Korean 
case highlights important weaknesses in the current NPT regime, and we recommend 
that policymakers should draw systematically on the North Korean case, alongside 
others, in considering the future of that regime. We further recommend that North 
Korea’s ongoing demand for civil nuclear power should be considered in the context of 
both the international effort to end the country’s nuclear weapons programme, and 
current international discussions about mechanisms for the future safe provision of 
such power to further states. 
Chemical and biological programme 
144. The FCO told us that North Korea is “believed to have chemical and biological 
weapons capabilities.”267 However, the available information is uncertain and imprecise. 
During our 2006 East Asia inquiry, some witnesses expressed doubts as to whether North 
Korea retained a capacity to manufacture chemical or biological weapons, given the run-
down state of its industrial base.268 Whether or not it continues to manufacture them, one 
authoritative recent study reports “a strong consensus that the DPRK has a large stockpile 
of chemical weapons”.269 The study cited South Korean intelligence estimates that North 
Korea possessed between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical agents.270 The FCO noted that 
North Korea has ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention but is not a party 
to the Chemical Weapons Convention.271  
Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction 
145. The Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction is a G8 
programme established in 2002, initially for ten years, which aims “to prevent terrorists, or 
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those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and 
biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology.”272 Twenty-
four states are now involved (plus the EU), including—among non-G8 countries—South 
Korea. In 2007, the UK’s contribution to the Global Partnership was incorporated into a 
cross-departmental Global Threat Reduction Programme, with a single budget of £36.5 
million a year.273   
146. The Global Partnership is not currently involved in North Korea. It has focused its 
work on Russia and other former Soviet states, where Global Partnership projects have 
addressed the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantling of nuclear submarines, the 
security of fissile materials and the development of alternative employment for former 
weapons scientists. We commended the work of the Global Partnership in the former 
Soviet Union, and especially the contribution of the UK, in our Report on Global Security: 
Russia in 2007.274  
147. In its response to our Global Security: Russia Report, the FCO told us that the UK was  
working actively with a number of Global Partnership members to promote a more 
‘global’ vision amongst Global Partnership partners. Over the next few years, and as 
work in Russia is completed, an increasing proportion of the UK’s Global Threat 
Reduction Programme budget is expected to be committed in countries where 
WMD-related material presents the greatest threat, and where the capacity to deal 
with it is least developed.275  
A mid-point review of the Global Partnership conducted under Germany’s G8 
chairmanship in 2007 concluded that the scheme “is open to further geographical 
expansion”, and in its latest annual report on the Global Partnership, the Government says 
that the UK “supports the expansion of [the programme’s] geographical scope”.276   
148. Dr Swenson-Wright suggested that the Global Partnership might have a role in 
addressing the risks arising from North Korea’s WMD activities. It has been reported that 
US specialists who visited the Yongbyon plant in February 2008 under the Six-Party Talks 
process “found Pyongyang receptive to the idea of a programme similar to that which 
helped former Soviet republics destroy their nuclear weapons and find alternative work for 
scientists”.277 
149. Dr Swenson-Wright highlighted the role that Japan in particular might play with 
regard to possible Global Partnership involvement in North Korea. Dr Swenson-Wright 
said that Japan, which had been active in encouraging denuclearisation, often behind the 
scenes and in a low-profile context, could play an equally valuable role in providing 
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technical assistance in reducing the risks associated with both nuclear and non-nuclear 
WMDs. Such assistance might be offered in conjunction with the UK.278 
150. We conclude that the G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) could provide a strong base of political, technical and 
organisational experience for projects reducing the risks associated with WMD 
activities in North Korea, when appropriate political conditions are in place. We 
further conclude that the willingness of the G8, including the UK, to consider 
expanding the work of the Global Partnership beyond the former Soviet Union is 
welcome. We recommend that, as part of the discussions that are underway on the 
future of the Global Partnership after 2012, the Government should consider with its 
G8 partners—and especially the Six-Party Talks participants Japan, Russia and the 
US—the possibility of Global Partnership involvement in North Korea. We further 
recommend that the Government should encourage Global Partnership participants 
who are also participants in the Six-Party Talks to begin to explore the same possibility 
with their North Korean interlocutors. 
Delivery systems 
151. The FCO told us that North Korea “possesses and has tested missiles which [the FCO 
believes] are capable of delivering payloads to all of Japan and beyond. [North Korea] has 
also demonstrated expertise in technologies that could, if developed successfully, give its 
missiles the capability to reach the UK.”279 More specifically, North Korea is believed to 
possess hundreds of short-range missiles capable of hitting South Korea, and to have 
deployed at least 90 Nodong missiles capable of reaching Japan.280 One recent study, by Dr 
Daniel Pinkston of the International Crisis Group, for the Strategic Studies Institute, US 
Army War College, estimates that North Korea has deployed over 800 ballistic missiles, 
including perhaps 200 Nodongs.281 In a military parade in April 2007, North Korea 
displayed a new medium-range missile, the Musudan. This has a reported range of over 
2,500 kilometres, making it capable of reaching the US military bases on Guam.282  
152. It is not known whether North Korea has the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead 
by ballistic missile. Pyongyang’s missiles are certainly believed to be capable of delivering 
chemical as well as conventional payloads.   
153. As outlined in Chapter Two above, in 1998 North Korea tested a long-range 
Taepodong-1 missile over Japan, in a move which had a major impact on Japanese security 
perceptions.283 Taepodong-1 missiles have a range upwards of 2,200 kilometres and would 
therefore be capable of reaching Guam, as well as Japan. Following the test, and with North 
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Korea’s plutonium production frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework, US policy 
appeared to focus for a time on North Korea’s missile programme. In 1999, Pyongyang 
agreed to a moratorium on missile testing. However, on 4 July 2006, North Korea broke its 
moratorium by test-firing seven missiles, including a Taepodong-2. Such missiles have a 
range upwards of 3,500 kilometres and would therefore be capable of reaching the US from 
North Korea. However, the Taepodong-2 failed, and Dr Hoare told us that  “the tests […] 
carried out in 1998 and 2006 appear to show a regression rather than an advance.”284 In our 
2006 Report on East Asia, completed just after North Korea’s July missile launches, we 
concluded that they were “calculatedly provocative and unacceptable”, and we 
recommended that the Government should call on North Korea to return to its 
moratorium on missile testing.285 North Korea has not conducted a long-range missile test 
since July 2006, although it has continued to carry out tests of short-range missiles. 
154. In response to the July 2006 tests, the UN Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution 1695, which demanded that North Korea suspend its ballistic missile 
programme, including by returning to its moratorium on testing. The resolution also 
required member states to prevent transfers of missiles and missile-related items to North 
Korea’s missile and WMD programmes, and to refrain from procuring such items from 
the country.286   
155. Experts differ widely regarding the degree of foreign assistance which North Korea 
may have received or may still be receiving for its missile programme, and therefore over 
the extent to which Pyongyang could continue to develop its missile capability regardless of 
international efforts to the contrary. Countries from which North Korea may at various 
times have received help include China, the Soviet Union/Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Syria. 
In its response to our 2006 East Asia report, the Government noted in particular that it was 
“working […] to develop [its] relationship with China on counter-proliferation issues, 
through which [it] would aim to help prevent the import by North Korea of sensitive 
materials required by their missile programme.”287 In his February 2008 study, Dr Pinkston 
said that “international export controls and denial strategies have made it increasingly 
difficult [for North Korea] to procure dual-use items and technologies.”288 He argued that 
these restrictions, when combined with domestic economic constraints, may prove “so 
formidable that Pyongyang might find diplomatic initiatives to end the programme an 
attractive alternative”.289 
156. Sales of missiles and missile technologies to third countries are believed to be a major 
source of hard currency earnings for the North Korean regime.290 Countries to which 
North Korea may have exported missiles or missile technologies include Iran, Libya, 
 
284 Ev 80 
285 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06, East Asia, HC 860-I, para 193 
286 UNSCR 1695, 15 July 2006 
287 FCO, Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2005-06: East Asia: Response of the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6944, October 2006, para 67 
288 Daniel Pinkston, “The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program”, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 
February 2008, p vii 
289 Ibid., p 57 
290 See para 104 above. 
 
62    Global Security: Japan and Korea 
 
Pakistan, Sudan and Syria. In our 2006 East Asia Report, we concluded that “North Korea’s 
exports of missile technology pose a threat to peace and security”.291 Dr Pinkston’s 
February 2008 report states that “North Korea has […] established itself as the Third 
World’s greatest supplier of missiles, missile components, and related technologies”.292 
However, the report also notes that international efforts against North Korean missile 
proliferation “have caused a decline in North Korean missile exports”.293 In its response to 
our 2006 East Asia Report, the Government told us that “many of [North Korea’s] former 
[missile] customers have agreed not to purchase further equipment or services from North 
Korea, including Egypt, Libya and Yemen.”294  
157. The Government also noted that UNSCR 1965 did not allow the interdiction of 
shipments suspected of carrying missiles and missile-related equipment without the 
consent of the vessel’s flag state, but that recent changes to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would strengthen 
the regime in some cases.295 
158. The long-range missile tests which North Korea conducted in 1998 and 2006 took 
place at Musudan-ni, on the country’s north-east coast. In September 2008, it was reported 
that North Korea had constructed a second long-range missile launch site, in the west. The 
claim was made by independent specialists, on the basis of satellite imagery.296 South 
Korea’s Defence Minister reportedly told a parliamentary hearing that the site was 80% 
complete. An anonymous US intelligence official was quoted as saying that the US had 
known about the second site for several years.297 
159. On 16 September 2008, an anonymous US official was reported as saying that North 
Korea had tested the engine on a Taepodong-2 missile at the new launch site earlier in 
2008.298 Such a test would be in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 1695 and 
1718.  
160. On 1 November, the Wall Street Journal reported that in August 2008 India had 
acceded to a US request to deny permission to enter Indian airspace to a North Korean 
plane which US intelligence believed was carrying a forbidden cargo, most likely missile 
components, to Iran.299  
161. We conclude that North Korea appears to retain an active ballistic missile 
programme. We further conclude that there is evidence that international efforts to 
deny North Korea both assistance and customers for its missile programme appear to 
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be having some effect. We recommend that the Government should continue to work 
with its international partners to deny North Korea missile-related materials, 
equipment, technology and overseas sales. We further recommend that, in its response 
to this Report, the Government should provide an updated assessment of the impact of 
current international measures against North Korea’s missile programme, including 
the transport of North Korean missiles and missile components overseas. 
Human rights 
162. The nature of the North Korean regime means that reliable, up-to-date, first-hand 
information on the human rights situation in the country is not readily accessible. North 
Korea has no independent media, human rights organisations or legal profession. In 2004, 
the former UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the 
human rights situation in North Korea, but Pyongyang does not recognise him and has 
never allowed him into the country. North Korea has denied requests for visits from a 
further three UN Special Rapporteurs for thematic human rights issues.300 North Korea 
similarly denies access to researchers from international human rights NGOs, such as 
Amnesty International (from whom we took evidence). As regards foreign diplomats 
posted to Pyongyang, the FCO notes that they   
are subject to severe internal travel restrictions and some 20 per cent of the counties 
in the DPRK remain inaccessible ‘for reasons of national security’. The government 
denies foreign diplomats access to judicial institutions, saying that it amounts to 
interference in the country’s internal affairs.301  
The same restrictions apply to humanitarian aid workers.302  
163. Under these circumstances, information about the human rights situation in North 
Korea—including that presented by the UN Special Rapporteur for the subject—is largely 
compiled from the testimony of emigrants, interviewed in countries such as China or 
South Korea.303 A number of South Korean NGOs and media outlets are active in 
attempting to document the North Korean human rights situation. For example, a team of 
South Korean journalists has produced a documentary film “On the Border”, about North 
Koreans leaving for China and other destinations in Asia, footage from which was used in 
BBC documentaries shown in 2008;304 and the British Embassy in Seoul is sponsoring a 
South Korean NGO to produce a report on children’s rights in the North, on the basis of 
emigrant testimony.305 
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164. The FCO told us that North Korea “is widely considered to have one of the worst 
human rights records in the world”.306 North Korea has featured as a “country of concern” 
in the FCO’s Human Rights Annual Report every year since the UK opened an Embassy in 
Pyongyang in 2001. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that North Korea “continues to abuse 
human rights on a massive, systematic scale”.307 The human rights situation in North 
Korea is assessed as “poor” by the US State Department,308 “abysmal”309 by Human Rights 
Watch and “grave” by the UN Special Rapporteur, who repeated in his latest report in 
August 2008 that there are “longstanding and systematic […] human rights transgressions 
[…] which are highly visible, substantial and exponential”.310 In our Report on the latest 
FCO Human Rights Annual Report, we concluded that the human rights situation in North 
Korea was “extremely grave”,311 and the FCO agreed with this assessment.312 
165. On the basis of the information that is available, human rights concerns in North 
Korea that are raised consistently by international official and non-governmental bodies 
include the following:313     
• Professor Smith told us that “in terms of political freedoms, human rights are still 
non-existent.”314 There is no political competition, and no freedom of assembly or 
association, including no independent trade unions. The judiciary is not 
independent.    
• North Korea has no independent media, and no freedom of expression or 
information. In Reporters Without Borders’ press freedom index, published 
annually since 2002, North Korea came last every year until 2007; in 2007 and 2008 
it was second-last, ahead of Eritrea.315 No foreign books or magazines are available 
for open purchase, and the authorities control access to the internet on an 
individual need-to-know basis. Official permission is required to own a mobile 
phone or computer.316 In its submission to our inquiry, BBC Global News 
confirmed that radio and television sets are sold permanently pre-tuned to state 
stations, and are subject to regular inspection.317 BBC Global News also noted that 
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“ordinary North Koreans caught listening to foreign broadcasts risk harsh 
punishments, such as forced labour”.318  
• Movement within North Korea is, at least in theory, strictly controlled. Leaving 
North Korea without official permission is illegal and those who are caught or 
returned are often imprisoned and sometimes tortured or executed.319 
• The state is believed to distribute permits, jobs and goods at least partly on political 
grounds, according to a system by which it classifies the population into more and 
less politically reliable and deserving groups. For example, this applies to official 
permission to live in Pyongyang.  
• There is no freedom of religion. The US designates North Korea a “Country of 
Particular Concern” under its International Religious Freedom Act. There is some 
organised religious activity, but it is largely under the control of the state; reports 
vary as to the existence of underground churches.320  
• In the sphere of criminal justice, North Korea employs detention without trial, and 
the detention of family members. Prison conditions are believed to be poor and 
detainees to suffer abuses, including sometimes torture. 
• North Korea operates a system of prison and labour camps. The number of people 
being held in the camps is commonly put at around 200,000.     
• North Korea employs the death penalty. The anti-death penalty NGO Hands Off 
Cain puts the numbers of executions at minimums of 13 in 2007, three in 2006 and 
75 in 2005, and records 37 so far in 2008.321  Execution is by hanging or shooting, 
including, it is reported, occasionally in public. Five categories of crime carry the 
death penalty, namely conspiracy against the state, high treason, terrorism, anti-
national treachery and international murder. These categories are reportedly often 
interpreted broadly.   
• As we discussed in Chapter Two above, North Korea has abducted a number of 
Japanese nationals.322 In a report from February 2008, the UN Special Rapporteur 
said that North Korea may have abducted or otherwise be detaining nationals of 
perhaps another dozen countries.323 The largest group is from South Korea. It 
comprises both prisoners-of-war and perhaps originally 80,000 non-combatants 
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from the Korean War period,324 plus what South Korea claims are 485 subsequent 
abductees.325  
166. North Korea is party to four of the major international human rights instruments: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. North 
Korea has not signed up to two further UN instruments to which the FCO has urged that it 
accede, namely the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, and the Convention against Torture.  
167. North Korea’s human rights record, its failure to meet its obligations under the 
human rights conventions to which it is party, and its failure to co-operate with the UN 
Special Rapporteur, have been condemned in a series of resolutions since 2003 by the 
former UN Commission on Human Rights, the new UN Human Rights Council, and the 
UN General Assembly.  
168. The British Government makes human rights a focus of its North Korea policy. 
According to the FCO, the Government has “made it clear to the DPRK Government that 
[the UK] cannot extend the benefits of a full and normal bilateral relationship until [the 
UK has] evidence that it is addressing [the UK’s] concerns on issues such as human 
rights.”326 Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the Government uses “every opportunity that 
[it] can to raise the issue bilaterally”.327 The EU and the Embassies of other EU Member 
States in Pyongyang also raise human rights issues with North Korean interlocutors. The 
EU was one of the sponsors of the resolutions on North Korean human rights passed by 
the former UN Commission on Human Rights and by the UN General Assembly, and the 
UK and most other EU Member States also sponsored the resolution passed by the new 
UN Human Rights Council in March 2008.328 This resolution extended the mandate of the 
UN Special Rapporteur, at a time when there was a movement to terminate a number of 
country-specific mandates established by the former Commission on Human Rights. The 
FCO told us that the Government “worked closely with partners to ensure that [the 
Rapporteur’s mandate] was not weakened or abolished.”329    
169. Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International told us that the UN regime of 
resolutions and the Special Rapporteur should be persisted with, despite its apparent failure 
to achieve any significant improvement in North Korea’s human rights practice. Ms Muico 
said that the UN mechanisms at least provided for a system of monitoring and reporting, 
and represented the “best hope”.330    
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170. Ms Muico commended the work of the FCO, and especially the British Embassy in 
Pyongyang, on North Korean human rights. She said that the Government had “pressed 
on human rights issues” but had also “maintained a good relationship” with the North 
Korean authorities. Ms Muico suggested that the UK’s role as a “Government that is not 
the United States works in [its] favour.”331 Given the restrictions on the activities of 
international human rights NGOs in North Korea, Ms Muico also said that the 
Government could “provide a venue” for such organisations to speak.332 
171. The FCO’s Stephen Lillie told us that the FCO had “seen some reports from non-
governmental organisations suggesting that when there is international pressure and 
international attention, there are limited changes” in North Korea’s human rights practice. 
However, he said that “the big picture—the overall trend—is still rather pessimistic.”333 
Lord Malloch-Brown was frank enough to admit that the ability of the UK and its 
international partners to influence North Korea’s human rights practice was “very 
limited”.334 
172. The FCO told us that North Korea has “repeatedly invoked sovereignty, non-
interference and cultural differences to avoid its human rights responsibilities.”335 Lord 
Malloch-Brown suggested that North Korea’s human rights practice was “the cost of a 
country that has essentially opted out of the international system.”336 It has been suggested 
that human rights abuses are intrinsic to the nature of the North Korean regime. Professor 
Smith told us that Pyongyang itself viewed matters in this way: she said that North Korea 
“understands ‘human rights’ talk as a synonym for ‘regime change’ talk” and that “a serious 
effort to support the North Korean population on human rights issues requires thinking 
about how to engage the DPRK Government in a human rights dialogue that is not 
conceived of by them as a way of promoting regime change.”337 Professor Smith 
recommended that “such discussion should be accompanied by offers of technical 
support”.338 
173. The Six-Party Talks process has prioritised denuclearisation over other policy goals 
which the parties involved may have as regards North Korea, including an improvement in 
human rights. However, Ms Muico told us that policy on denuclearisation and on human 
rights could and should be separated. The goal of denuclearisation did not require foreign 
Governments to refrain from pressing Pyongyang on human rights.339  
174. The FCO noted that South Korea has “to date […] been hesitant to openly criticise the 
human rights situation in the DPRK”,340 under its “sunshine policy” of engagement with 
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the North.341 However, South Korea’s new President, President Lee, has said that he does 
intend to raise human rights issues and pursue an improvement in North Korea’s human 
rights practice, as part of his wider recalibration of policy towards the North.342 Until the 
Lee Administration took office, South Korea had not voted for resolutions condemning 
North Korea’s human rights practice at the former UN Commission on Human Rights, 
and had backed only one of the relevant General Assembly resolutions. Under its new 
Administration, South Korea voted in favour of the resolution on North Korean human 
rights at the Human Rights Council in March 2008. There are signs that the issue of North 
Korean human rights may be gaining in prominence among the political class and public 
in South Korea, as evidenced, for example, by the demonstrations during Chinese 
President Hu’s visit to Seoul in August 2008 against Beijing’s treatment of North Korean 
emigrants. Ms Muico told us that South Korea’s new position on North Korean human 
rights offered a “window of opportunity”.343     
175. We conclude that the North Korean regime is one of the worst human rights 
abusers in the world, that its human rights practice is an affront to the international 
community, and that the main reason that the issue is not the subject of a larger 
international outcry is because it remains too little known. We conclude that the work 
of the FCO in attempting to address North Korean human rights, both bilaterally and 
with international partners, is to be commended. Although we conclude that human 
rights abuses are deeply linked to the nature of the North Korean regime, we 
recommend that the Government’s efforts to address North Korea’s human rights 
abuses should avoid language which Pyongyang might construe as threatening, and 
should be couched in terms of reference to specific obligations under international 
instruments to which North Korea has signed up. We further recommend that enabling 
the acquisition of more human rights information from inside North Korea should be a 
major goal of the Government’s work, and that efforts should focus in particular on 
securing access for the UN Special Rapporteur. We further recommend that the 
Government should seek to co-ordinate its work on North Korean human rights with 
that of the South Korean Government, as Seoul’s new willingness to raise human rights 
issues with Pyongyang may come to represent an important strengthening of the 
international effort in this field.    
176. In our Reports on the FCO’s Human Rights Annual Reports since the new UN Human 
Rights Council was established in 2006, we have discussed criticisms that the new body has 
not so far developed a body of credible and even-handed positions against human rights 
abuses in all parts of the world.344 A new mechanism introduced in the framework of the 
Human Rights Council is the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). This is a peer review 
process, for all member states, in which three randomly selected member states review the 
human rights performance of the state in question every four years.345 Japan and South 
Korea were among the first states to undergo the process, in 2008; we discuss their human 
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rights records in Chapter Five below.346 North Korea is to undergo its UPR in December 
2009. In its response to our Report on its Human Rights Annual Report 2007, the FCO told 
us that the UPR mechanism would “be a particularly important priority for the 
Government” as regards its future work at the Human Rights Council.347 
177. The Committee welcomes the opportunity that was afforded to a member of the 
Committee to attend in a House of Commons representative capacity the 5th General 
Meeting of the International Parliamentarians’ Coalition for North Korean Refugees and 
Human Rights held in Seoul in October 2008. 
178. Given the failure of UN mechanisms so far to achieve any significant improvement 
in North Korea’s human rights practice, we conclude that the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR) which North Korea is to undergo at the UN Human Rights Council in 
December 2009 offers a major opportunity to advance the international effort to secure 
improvements in North Korean human rights, as well as to establish the credibility of 
the UPR process. We recommend that the Government should engage actively with 
Pyongyang and with international official and non-governmental partners to ensure 
that the potential of North Korea’s UPR process is realised to the maximum extent 
possible.  
Food security 
179. North Korea is food insecure. It experienced a famine in the mid-to-late 1990s in 
which around one million people, roughly 5% of the population, are commonly reckoned 
to have died (although estimates vary widely). In the largest survey of North Koreans’ 
nutritional situation, conducted in 2004, well after the worst of the famine, 37% of children 
were still found to be chronically malnourished.348   
180. There are several sources of North Korea’s food insecurity. Opinions vary regarding 
the relative weight to give to natural factors as opposed to what the UN Special Rapporteur 
has called “mismanagement on the part of the authorities”.349 Professor Smith told us that 
North Korea “is not a natural […] agricultural country”, and that in its more successful 
period its agriculture sector “relied heavily on agro-industrial inputs: electricity for 
irrigation; fertiliser, chemicals and pesticides”.350 Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, these inputs became much less readily available, just as energy and other inputs also 
became scarcer for industry. In turn, North Korea’s failure to produce significant 
manufactured goods capable of export constrains its ability to generate income with which 
to import food. The Soviet collapse also led to a significant reduction in food aid. In 
addition, North Korea is susceptible to seasonal flooding, which may be exacerbated by 
man-made deforestation.     
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181. In the face of the famine of the mid-1990s, the regime requested international 
assistance, most notably from the World Food Programme (WFP). Between 1995 and 
2005, the WFP supported around one-third of the population with direct food aid.351 In 
2005, North Korea announced that it no longer needed emergency assistance, and 
requested an end to such aid. In 2006, the WFP agreed with Pyongyang on a much scaled-
down, two-year food aid operation, focused on longer-term needs. However, in 2006 and 
2007, renewed flooding triggered a new WFP relief operation. The WFP has consistently 
found it difficult to secure sufficient contributions to its appeals for food aid for North 
Korea. Many states are reluctant to contribute to assistance for the country, partly owing to 
political considerations such as North Korea’s nuclear programme, and partly owing to 
doubts as to whether food aid reaches its intended recipients rather than the country’s elite. 
In March 2007, nearly half-way through the WFP’s two-year programme, donations were 
running at less than 20% of the required total, meaning that the WFP was unable to 
implement its full planned programme.352   
182. In addition to WFP assistance, North Korea has received food aid bilaterally from 
China and South Korea. These two states picked up much of the slack left by the significant 
withdrawal of Soviet/Russian assistance, although South Korea temporarily suspended its 
supplies after North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test. Professor Smith told us that “the 
humanitarian situation is kept afloat by aid from South Korea and China”,353 and that 
South Korea, in particular, “has been the main supplier of food and fertiliser to help North 
Koreans grow food over the past six or seven years.”354     
183. Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International highlighted the advantages of WFP 
over bilateral food aid. Although the WFP has accepted some restrictions on its activities at 
Pyongyang’s insistence, Ms Muico told us that the agency was more likely to request and to 
secure better access and monitoring than has South Korea.355 
184. The year 2008 has seen North Korea’s food situation again deteriorate significantly. In 
April, the WFP warned that “it is increasingly likely that external assistance will be urgently 
required to avert a serious tragedy”.356 The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation has 
forecast that North Korea’s food deficit in 2008 will nearly double compared to 2007, and 
will be the largest since 2001.357 After the North Korean authorities allowed the WFP in 
June to carry out the most extensive survey of the situation since 2004, the organisation’s 
assessment was that “millions of vulnerable North Koreans are at risk of slipping towards 
precarious hunger levels”, and that the situation had not been as bad since the late 1990s. 
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Nearly three-quarters of households had reduced their food intake, and consumption of 
wild foods was up by nearly 20% compared with the 2003-05 period.358      
185. North Korea’s 2008 food shortage partly reflects the effects of the 2007 flooding, 
followed by a dry winter. The 2007 cereals harvest was down by around 25% year-on-
year.359 The effects on prices of North Korea’s production shortfall are being exacerbated 
by high global prices for food. These are affecting North Korea’s own ability to import 
food, the WFP’s effort to provide official food aid, and individuals’ purchases of food at 
unofficial private markets.360 By June 2008, the price of rice in Pyongyang had nearly 
tripled and that of maize had quadrupled compared with a year earlier.361  
186. Political factors are also contributing to North Korea’s food shortage. After coming to 
office in February 2008, South Korea’s President Lee announced that aid to the North 
would be made conditional on Pyongyang’s progress on denuclearisation and human 
rights.362 In response, North Korea declined to request further South Korean food aid. As 
of summer 2008, North Korea had received no food aid from the South during the year, 
and the North also did not receive fertiliser from the South in time for the spring 2008 
planting season. The FCO forecasts that the main October/November harvest is likely to be 
down by 25-30%.363 Meanwhile, food aid from China is reported to have nearly halved 
between 2005 and 2007,364 partly because Beijing seeks to retain food stocks for its own 
population and thereby clamp down on domestic food price inflation.       
187. In May 2008, the US announced that it was resuming food aid to North Korea, after a 
three-year hiatus since the end of the major WFP programme. The US is now contributing 
up to 500,000 tons of food, largely through the WFP, with the remainder being channelled 
through US charities. The US made its announcement after securing what it called “a 
substantial improvement in monitoring and access in order to allow for confirmation of 
receipt by the intended recipients”.365 This came shortly after Pyongyang had provided 
large-scale documentation on its nuclear activities at Yongbyon,366 but the US said that the 
two events were unconnected. In June, the WFP announced an agreement with Pyongyang 
allowing a major expansion in the geographical scope of its aid programme and in the 
number of WFP workers in North Korea. The first shipment of US food aid arrived 
immediately after the announcement of the agreement.  
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188. The conjunction of a worsening food situation with a key stage in the denuclearisation 
process has prompted renewed discussion in 2008 about the use of food aid as a source of 
leverage over Pyongyang on other issues. Our witnesses were sceptical about this 
possibility. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the North Korean regime “does not thank us 
for the generous food aid we provide and does not allow us to use it as a lever because of its 
lack of humanity towards its own people.”367 Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty agreed, 
saying that “what would normally work as leverage in most countries cannot be guaranteed 
to work with the North Koreans.”368   
189. Professor Smith told us that, in the longer term, both North Korea’s plans and those of 
the UN are based on the proposition that “if North Korea wants to feed its people, it needs 
to do something about developing and manufacturing export capacity so that it can buy 
food.”369 
190. We conclude that North Korea’s longstanding food shortage is an avoidable 
human tragedy and a matter of the gravest concern. Provided that conditions are felt to 
be in place that ensure the receipt of aid by the most needy, we recommend that the 
international community should do everything possible to respond to the food 
shortage. We conclude that the recent resumption of US food aid and expansion of 
World Food Programme access and monitoring in North Korea are to be welcomed. 
We recommend that the Government should point to the ongoing food crisis when 
discussing with North Korean interlocutors the possible advantages of further 
economic modernisation and international opening.      
Emigrants and China 
191. Since the famine of the mid-1990s, increasing numbers of North Koreans have been 
leaving the country. This is despite the fact that it is a criminal offence to leave North Korea 
without official permission, which is typically granted only to officials and a few favoured 
sportspeople and cultural figures;370 and that family members of those who leave illegally 
are routinely consigned to prison. The first destination of most North Koreans leaving the 
country is China. This is partly because it is easier to cross the long land border than to 
attempt a sea crossing or get across the heavily militarised border with South Korea, and 
partly because the Chinese population in the region next to the border includes a large 
group of ethnic Korean descent. The pull of the region as a destination is presumably now 
being augmented by the growing community there of more recent North Korean 
emigrants themselves. The border between North Korea and China can be crossed either in 
secret or by bribing border guards. Some would-be emigrants have been known to die in 
the attempt.371  
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192. Some North Koreans going to China aim to settle there, and others to leave for a 
further destination, while others intend to return to North Korea, either after one trip or 
after repeated crossings. Human Rights Watch has noted that North Koreans in China 
include  
those fleeing political and religious persecution, women who are in de facto 
marriages with Chinese men, those who have fallen victim to human trafficking, 
family members who are temporarily visiting China to meet their relatives (most 
without official permission) but intending to return home, people who escaped 
because of the food shortage or other economic reasons, and merchants who 
regularly cross the border for business either secretly or by bribing border guards.372 
The diversity of North Koreans in China means that no single term is appropriate for the 
whole population; the FCO notes that those involved are referred to variously as 
“defectors”, “refugees”, “escapees” or “border-crossers”.373 In this Report, we use 
“emigrants” as the most neutral and inclusive term. The diversity of the group also adds to 
the difficulties involved in assessing its size: the FCO has said that estimates of the numbers 
of North Koreans in China range from 10,000 to 100,000.374 A 2007 report by the US 
Congressional Research Service noted that the official Chinese estimate was 10,000, the US 
State Department assumes 30,000-50,000, and some estimates range up to 300,000.375 
North Korean emigrants to China include a particularly large share of women, who are 
especially vulnerable to human trafficking and other forms of exploitation.   
193. North Korean emigrants in China almost all have illegal status there (as well as having 
committed a criminal offence under North Korean law, by leaving without permission). 
Under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, to which China is a party, refugee status can be 
granted either by the authorities of the receiving state or by the UN refugee agency, the 
UNHCR.376 However, only a handful of North Koreans in China have received refugee 
status: the FCO told us that around 180 were registered as refugees with the UNHCR.377 
The vast majority of North Koreans in China are not given the opportunity to apply for 
refugee status. China does not allow the UNHCR access to the border region which 
receives North Koreans,378 and it does not itself have a developed and accessible asylum 
application system.379 There are some reports of variation in the treatment of North 
Koreans in China by different local officials—perhaps, among Chinese-Korean officials, on 
the basis of co-ethnic fellow feeling.380 However, China’s habitual practice is to assume that 
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the North Koreans whom it discovers are economic migrants and to deport them back to 
North Korea, without their having gone through a determination-of-status process. In its 
2008 Annual Report, Amnesty International estimated that China is forcibly repatriating 
“hundreds” of North Koreans each month.381  
194. China’s asylum and deportation practice effectively obliges its North Korean 
immigrants to live in secret. This gives rise to human rights concerns, made especially 
serious because of China’s official identity registration system. As North Korean emigrants 
do not make themselves known to the authorities for fear of deportation, they cannot work 
legally or access many services. Some take on false identities. The problem is particularly 
acute for the large number of children born to Chinese fathers and North Korean mothers: 
the identity registration process which is required in order for them to access schooling 
risks revealing the nationality and illegal status of their mothers, thus exposing the mothers 
to the risk of deportation. The situation is even more difficult for children in China who 
are born of two North Korean parents.382  
195. Such assistance as is available to North Korean emigrants in China comes from 
networks of local Chinese people of Korean descent, and from small South Korean, 
Japanese, US and European NGOs. They tend to operate in a low-key manner, in order to 
avoid attracting the attention of the Chinese authorities.383  
196. Further human rights concerns arise from North Korea’s treatment of its nationals 
repatriated from China. As with all human rights issues relating to North Korea, it is 
difficult to obtain reliable information on this question. There are reports that North 
Koreans deported back from China have been subject to prison, labour or prison camp, 
torture, execution and, for women who have become pregnant by Chinese men, forced 
abortion.384 Human Rights Watch has reported that North Korea toughened its treatment 
of would-be or returned emigrants after 2004, but in 2007 both Human Rights Watch and 
the UN Special Rapporteur also noted reports that the treatment of captured emigrants had 
improved somewhat.385 Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International told us that “the 
treatment of border-crossers is getting harsher, because numbers are growing and it is a 
huge embarrassment for the North Korean Government”, but also that some repatriates 
“tended to receive sentences that were less than what they would have been in previous 
years”.386 Stephen Lillie of the FCO noted “reports that suggest that the North Koreans 
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have stopped the practice of forced abortions on returnees from China”.387 There have 
been several suggestions that the North Korean authorities are increasingly differentiating 
on political grounds among repatriates from China, with those who are reported to have 
sought contact in China with foreign and/or Christian organisations receiving harsher 
punishment than those who appeared motivated by purely economic factors.388 Aidan 
Foster-Carter told us that “the degree of punishment can vary greatly”, and said overall that 
“there seems to be a growing arbitrariness” in North Korea’s practice regarding its returned 
nationals.389 
197. As already noted, China is a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 
1967 Protocol. The Convention obliges states parties not to expel persons formally 
recognised as refugees. It also grants certain rights before a determination of refugee status 
has been made, solely on the basis of a person’s physical presence in the state concerned. 
The most important right which is implied is the right to enter and to remain in the state, 
pending a determination of status. This is the result of the principle of non-refoulement—
that is, that no-one should be returned to a state where their “life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion”.390 This applies to people not yet formally recognised as 
refugees or not given the opportunity to apply for refugee status.391 Other such rights 
include freedom from arbitrary detention and rights to physical security, the necessities of 
life and family unity.  
198. We asked Lord Malloch-Brown whether China’s treatment of North Korean 
emigrants constituted a breach of its international human rights obligations. We also 
sought additional written evidence from the FCO on this issue. We were told that: 
• China would be in breach of its obligations under the Refugee Convention if it were 
to repatriate persons recognised as refugees.392 
• It is legitimate for China to distinguish between refugees and economic migrants. 
Lord Malloch-Brown reminded us that “just the fact that you are punished for 
illegally leaving your own country is not in itself grounds for being able to claim 
refugee status”.393 The Refugee Convention stipulates that refugees are those who 
are outside their country of nationality or habitual residence “owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, nationality [or] membership 
of a particular group or political opinion”.394 However, as regards North Koreans in 
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China, Lord Malloch-Brown also told us that the Government did “not accept 
[China’s] position that all the people concerned are economic migrants.”395 
199. The Government’s position does not appear to address at least four possible violations 
of international refugee law which China may be committing:  
• While it is legitimate to distinguish between refugees and economic migrants, 
China does not fulfil its obligation—implicitly required under the Refugee 
Convention—to provide North Korean emigrants with access to a process whereby 
such a determination of status may fairly be made.  
• As noted above, the principle of non-refoulement—that is, the principle that no-one 
should be returned to a state where their “life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion”396—applies to people physically present in a state which 
is party to the Refugee Convention, whether or not they have been formally 
recognised as refugees or given the opportunity to apply for refugee status.397 In a 
document for the October 2008 meeting of the UNHCR Executive Committee, the 
High Commissioner said that the principle of non-refoulement “prohibits any form 
of forcible removal, whether direct or indirect, to a threat to life or freedom […] or 
to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.398 In a report to 
a meeting of its Standing Committee in March 2004, UNHCR said that it 
“remain[ed] deeply concerned that [North Koreans in China] do not have access to 
a refugee status determination process and are not protected from refoulement”.399  
• Many North Koreans in China may have left North Korea for economic reasons, 
rather than owing to fear of political persecution, and may therefore not have been 
refugees. However, international law recognises the concept of “refugee sur 
place”—that is, a person who was not a refugee when he left his country but who 
becomes a refugee at a later date.400 Such refugees may include someone who 
acquires a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason in his original 
country simply through the act of leaving it. What seems to be the growing 
arbitrariness of North Korea’s treatment of returned emigrants might make it 
difficult to determine the applicability of the concept as regards North Koreans in 
China. 
• States parties to the Refugee Convention are obliged to “to co-operate with the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees […] and […] in 
particular [to] facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of 
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[the] Convention.”401 China’s refusal to allow the UNHCR access to the border 
region which receives North Korean emigrants would appear to be a clear breach of 
this obligation. 
200. Apart from the UN Refugee Convention, a number of other international and 
regional conventions also contain (or have authoritatively been interpreted as containing) 
prohibitions on refoulement, notably as a component part of the prohibition on torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Principal amongst these is Article 3 
of the 1984 Torture Convention, to which China is a party. This article prohibits a state 
party from returning “a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”, and says that for the 
purposes of making a determination on this question the authorities “shall take into 
account […] the existence in the state concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant 
or mass violations of human rights”.402 
201. China’s position with regard to North Korean emigrants is complicated because 
China and North Korea have a bilateral repatriation agreement dating from 1986. China 
claims that, under this agreement, it is obliged to return all North Korean emigrants.403 
However, bilateral agreements do not override international obligations.  
202. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the issue of North Korean emigrants was one that 
the Government had raised in both the bilateral UK-China and the EU-China human 
rights dialogues.404 The FCO has said that the Government “regularly urge[s] China to 
allow the UN High Commissioner for Refugees access to the border region and to observe 
its obligations under the 1951 Convention”,405 and Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the 
Government had told China about its rejection of Beijing’s claim that all North Koreans 
there are economic migrants.406 In previous Reports, we have consistently expressed 
scepticism about the effectiveness of the UK-China human rights dialogue.407  
203. As regards action at the UN, the FCO noted that “there is no enforcement mechanism 
for the [Refugee] Convention, but member states and the UNHCR can call on a member 
state to comply with the terms of the conventions if they believe a breach has taken place.” 
The FCO said that “the UK has not yet done so in this case, judging that it was more 
effective to raise this bilaterally and through the EU.” The FCO told us that it was 
“considering raising the issue at the next [UNHCR] Executive Committee meeting in 
October”.408 In November, the FCO confirmed that it had not done so, “because we felt 
that it would be more effective to concentrate our efforts on the resolution on DPRK 
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human rights which the EU is currently sponsoring at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). 
However, we will discuss this matter at working level with the UNHCR.” Writing in early 
November, the FCO further told us that “the text of the UNGA resolution is still being 
finalised, but it includes a reference to the harsh penalties imposed upon returnees to the 
DPRK and calls on all States to respect the principle of non-refoulement (i.e. not returning 
refugees to their country of origin).”409  
204. In its North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008, passed in January 
2008 to update the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act, the US Congress called on 
China to “immediately halt its forcible repatriation of North Koreans”; fulfil its obligations 
under the Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol; and allow the UNHCR “unimpeded 
access to North Koreans inside China to determine whether they are refugees and whether 
they require assistance.”410  
205. As noted in our discussion above, South Korea has so far tended not to raise North 
Korean human rights issues.411 However, at the two leaders’ summit in Seoul in August 
2008, South Korea’s new President, President Lee, urged China’s President Hu not to 
repatriate North Koreans against their will.412  
206. China faces a number of sensitive political considerations in deciding on its handling 
of the issue of North Korean emigrants. Given its alliance with Pyongyang, it might be 
politically awkward for Beijing to recognise North Korean emigrants as refugees—
especially because of the international criticism which China itself faces on a number of the 
human rights questions also at issue in North Korea. As chair of the Six-Party Talks, China 
has a special responsibility to consider the wider political and security implications of 
developments in North Korea. Any significant easing of the conditions facing North 
Koreans in China might encourage a larger emigration flow, possibly leading to what 
would be for China an undesirable destabilisation of North Korea, as well as of the Chinese 
border region. Given that there is a settled population of Korean descent in the border 
region, Beijing may also see further North Korean immigration as potentially giving rise to 
a new ethnic minority issue. On the other hand, it has been suggested that Beijing may  
believe that allowing the influx—without recognising those arriving as refugees—acts as a 
helpful “safety valve” for the North Korean regime in some respects.413    
207. The weaknesses of China’s practice as regards immigrants are not confined to North 
Koreans. China has no national legislation implementing the provisions of the 1951 
Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol.414 In its 2007 Country Operations Plan for 
China, UNHCR said that it planned a “major shift in focus and strategy”, away from 
providing direct assistance to refugees, to encouraging the Chinese authorities to develop 
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“national refugee regulations that comply with international protection standards” and to 
provide a legal status that will facilitate refugees’ local integration.415    
 
208. We referred in our earlier discussion of human rights in North Korea to the new 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism at the UN Human Rights Council.416 China 
is to undergo its first UPR in February 2009.   
209. We conclude that China is in breach of its obligations under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention as regards its treatment of North Korean emigrants—specifically, its 
failure to allow them access to a determination-of-status process, and its practice of 
repatriation without ensuring that deportees will not be subject to persecution, torture 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in North Korea. We further 
conclude that China’s practice as regards North Korean emigrants places them in a 
distressing and dangerous situation. Especially given its view that North Koreans in 
China include people who are not economic migrants, we recommend that the 
Government should press harder on the issue of Beijing’s treatment of North Korean 
emigrants, in its bilateral dealings with China, at EU level, and at the UNHCR. We 
recommend that in this effort the Government should prioritise the aims of: halting 
forced deportations from China to North Korea; securing access to the Chinese/North 
Korean border region for the UNHCR; and seeing the development in China of a legal 
regime allowing the regularisation of the status of North Koreans there, and above all 
of children with a North Korean parent. We recommend that in its response to this 
Report, and again in its 2008 Human Rights Annual Report, the FCO should report on 
the progress being made towards these aims. We further recommend that the 
Government should ensure that the issue of Beijing’s treatment of North Korean 
emigrants is raised effectively as part of China’s Universal Periodic Review process at 
the UN Human Rights Council in 2009.  
210. Given what appears to be rising interest in South Korea in pressing the issue of 
China’s treatment of North Korean emigrants, and given South Korea’s intimate 
connection with North Korea and its relationship with China, we recommend that the 
Government should consult on policy regarding North Koreans in China with the 
Government in Seoul. 
211. Among the countries to which North Korean emigrants move on from China, South 
Korea takes the largest numbers. The number of North Koreans arriving in the South each 
year is estimated to be rising by several hundred a year, with the FCO putting the annual 
influx now at around 2,000.417 The total population of North Koreans in the South is 
reckoned at around 10,000. South Korea’s constitution commits it to granting citizenship 
automatically to arriving North Koreans. Despite the common language and the provision 
for them of dedicated integration programmes, there are reports of North Koreans finding 
it socially and psychologically difficult to integrate into South Korean society.418  
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212. Smaller numbers of North Korean emigrants are found in a range of other countries 
in South-East Asia, including Laos, Burma and Vietnam. Thailand appears to be taking the 
largest numbers. Bangkok’s capacity to deal satisfactorily with North Korean emigrants 
appears to be coming under strain: Amnesty International has reported that North 
Koreans have been subject to mass arrests there,419 and Human Rights Watch has referred 
to their being held in “overcrowded immigration detention centres”.420 Unlike China, 
Thailand is not a party to the UN Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, leaving North 
Korean emigrants there especially vulnerable.  
213. Some North Koreans in China leave northwards for Mongolia, often as another step 
towards another eventual destination. Although Mongolia is not party to the Refugee 
Convention, it does not repatriate North Koreans, and the UN Special Rapporteur has 
noted that its policy towards them “has been based upon humanitarian considerations”.421 
Mongolia also has a separate official guest worker programme with Pyongyang, bringing 
North Koreans to Mongolia to work. In August 2008, Human Rights Watch called on the 
Mongolian authorities to ensure that the rights of North Korean guest workers were 
safeguarded.422 
214. We conclude that the growing outflow of North Koreans from North Korea is 
creating an emigrant population in several parts of Asia whose human rights are 
systematically vulnerable. We recommend that the FCO should ensure that its Posts in 
relevant locations are aware of the issue and ready to assist both the individuals 
concerned and host Governments as needed.  
Regime reform and stability 
215. The nature and stability of the North Korean regime have security implications for the 
region and beyond. This is partly because of the country’s weapons materials and 
capabilities, and partly because any breakdown in North Korea could generate new security 
risks, including an early unmanageable outflow of people, primarily to China.  
Developments at the grass roots 
216. In discussing prospects for North Korea with us, Aidan Foster-Carter identified three 
issues. One was developments at the “grass roots”, among the North Korean population.423 
Official structures in North Korea formally remain rigid and restrictive. However, there is 
now widespread agreement among researchers and visitors that the total social control and 
discipline previously exercised by the regime has weakened significantly over the last 
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decade. This has been the result largely of processes triggered by the 1990s famine. 424 For 
example:  
• As a result of the famine, the state food distribution system collapsed, and people 
were obliged to fall back on their own resources. In the economy more generally,  
Dr Kong told us that “North Korea’s economic collapse of the 1990s led to the 
spontaneous rise of non-state economic activities (especially private farming, light 
manufacturing and primitive markets) as the state could no longer provide 
employment and goods for the desperate population”. He referred to North 
Korea’s “fledgling private economy”.425 Professor Smith concurred that “people 
have much more access to individual decision-making—they are making their own 
decisions about their day-to-day economic transactions because the state does not 
provide them”.426  
• The development of traffic across the North Korean-Chinese border has resulted, 
in Aidan Foster-Carter’s words, in “a partial breakdown of the information 
quarantine”.427 This has resulted both from exposure to China itself and from the 
goods which can be obtained in China and brought back across the border—above 
all, recordings of South Korean films and television programmes. The FCO 
reported “anecdotal evidence […] suggest[ing] that increased numbers of illegal 
radio sets are being smuggled into the DPRK from China, and that more people are 
listening to foreign radio broadcasts.”428  
• However restricted their number and activities, the influx of foreign aid workers 
since the mid-1990s has brought some North Koreans a further form of contact 
with the outside world.   
• Officials no longer always enforce laws and regulations. As a result of economic 
hardship, they may be occupied themselves with trying to survive, and reportedly 
are now widely susceptible to bribes. The relaxation applies in particular as regards 
restrictions on movement. Professor Smith told us that “there is more ability to 
move around in the country, if you can walk, that is, because you will not usually 
have access to petrol or cars.”429  
217. As regards the possible political implications of the breakdown in state capacity, 
Professor Smith told us that there was now a “crisis of legitimacy”430 in North Korea, and 
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that she thought that the Government was “very fragile”.431 In her written submission, she 
referred to “signs of instability in North Korea whose outcomes are not at all clear”.432 
Aidan Foster-Carter said that:  
the tensions are growing. The pressures on the regime and its long-suffering people 
are acute, and they grow worse. The fact that the regime has been able to keep things 
under control so far does not mean that it can do it for ever.433      
He noted that “one is beginning to hear reports of people going to Government offices and 
protesting, and not immediately being carted away”.434  
218. Professor Smith was cautious about expecting any manifestations of mass discontent. 
She told us that  
revolutions are not really made by hungry people. Revolutions are made by people 
who have a little bit of a stake in the system and who do not have to worry about 
literally getting enough food to feed themselves and their families at the end of the 
week. Now, in North Korea, with a population of about 23 million people, probably 
about half the country is still worried enough about food, particularly when the 
harvest has run out, in terms of its distribution. The urban areas do not have access 
to their own stores, so this is the top priority. Those people, including the people that 
might in another system be thinking about political change, such as white collar 
workers, teachers, doctors and local government officers working throughout the 
country, are spending their time thinking about food and survival—literally, survival. 
[…] While there are continuing food shortages, there is a lack of legitimacy for the 
Government, but there are also bigger priorities than overturning the Government—
that is, making sure people are alive.435 
Professor Smith said that these considerations probably also applied to the military, at the 
“foot soldier” level.436 
219. Rather than revolutionary change, Dr Kong suggested that the international 
community should “look to the social transformation of North Korea over a long time 
frame driven by improved living standards, spread of the profit motive and generational 
change (i.e. North Korea as a slow motion replay of China or Vietnam).”437 
Debates within the elite about reform 
220. The second issue identified by Mr Foster-Carter was that of debates within the elite 
about reform.438 Professor Smith told us that “the structure within the North Korean state 
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is not a monolithic entity, contrary to outside conventional knowledge. There are real 
divisions […] there are different interests at stake.”439  
221. On the one hand, Professor Smith said that there were “people from the Foreign 
Ministry and the Ministry for Foreign Trade who travel abroad, and they are fully aware 
that they need to do some sort of deal with the international community”. She said that 
“lots of learning takes place at the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Trade, even at the 
top, and that can be effective when the very big issues are at stake.”  On the other hand, she 
said that “the structure is such that everything that goes in […] must then go through 
another layer, which is the security or the military apparatus [who] […] are not in direct 
touch with foreigners”. Professor Smith said that these figures can access hard currency 
with the partially broken-down state economy as it is, without further reform. Professor 
Smith said that this “powerful layer […] is capable of keeping a block on, or at least 
entering into negotiations that have the effect of, paralysing progress.”440 
222. Our witnesses were in agreement that, for the North Korean regime, the question of 
economic reform was intimately connected to the question of denuclearisation. In Aidan 
Foster-Carter’s words, “one imagines people who are on one side on that issue or the 
other.”441 Dr Kong explained that North Korean decisions on these two issues were 
mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, he said that “a secure external environment 
(centred on improving relations with the US and the opportunities for aid and investment 
that flow from normalisation) is a necessary but insufficient condition for the introduction 
of substantive market reform in North Korea.”442 In Dr Kong’s view, also necessary would 
be “the acceptance of the principle of reform amongst North Korean leaders.” In turn, he 
said, “readiness for substantive reform will reinforce denuclearisation”.443 
223. North Korea introduced some limited economic reforms in 2002, mainly some 
liberalisation of prices. The measures are usually seen now as an attempt by the regime to 
accommodate changes that had already occurred spontaneously, rather than as the launch 
of a new economic course.444 Aidan Foster-Carter said that the measures had “not been 
radical enough to be effective”.445 Moreover, Dr Kong reported that the regime has 
subsequently been seeking to reassert some state control.446 Lord Malloch-Brown likened 
North Korea’s reform steps so far to  
some of the communist reform initiatives of [former Cuban leader Fidel] Castro at a 
certain point, allowing a small enclave for overseas industrial investment and a little 
bit of liberalisation of prices in some areas. However, the fundamental state system is 
still in place.  
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Lord Malloch-Brown did not see prospects for fundamental economic reform in North 
Korea without a change of government.447 
224. Given China’s influence over Pyongyang, and the conspicuous economic growth 
which China has posted in recent years as a result of market reforms and integration into 
the international economy, there has been considerable discussion of the extent to which 
China might act as an economic reform model for North Korea. We already raised this 
issue in our Report on East Asia in 2006.448 For our present inquiry, the FCO’s Stephen 
Lillie told us:  
What the North Koreans have clearly not done is made the Chinese calculation that 
embracing economic reform will ensure the sustainability of their own system. They 
have taken rather the opposite view and fear very much that moving down a real 
process of economic reform would be the beginning of the end.449 
225. Dr Kong concurred that, “historically Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il have been 
lukewarm about Chinese-style market reforms”, because “concerns about loss of economic 
control and social challenges to the regime always outweighed concerns about 
productivity.” Dr Kong also said that “the small size of North Korea and its weak position 
vis-à-vis South Korea means that the North Korean leadership feels more vulnerable than 
its counterparts in China or Vietnam”, making its likely “approach to economic reform 
[…] more cautious.”450 This is the argument also made by the noted North Korea-watcher 
Professor Andrei Lankov, who believes that the regime sees Chinese-style reforms as likely 
to lead to its own demise and takeover by Seoul.451 
226. His views about the regime’s past attitude notwithstanding, Dr Kong told us that 
North Korean leaders now “seem to have reappraised the Chinese experience.” He pointed 
to “Kim Jong-il’s praise for the Chinese model (especially the special economic zones), the 
dispatch of economics students to China, and […] the enticement of Chinese 
entrepreneurs by the North Korean authorities.” Dr Kong identified “grounds for 
expecting North Korea to increasingly copy aspects of Chinese reform.” He noted that 
some of China’s initial reforms were introduced simply to sanction spontaneous non-state 
economic processes, of the kind now underway in North Korea; and that China now has a 
major influence over the North Korean economy, “through its leading role as aid provider, 
trade partner and foreign investor”. China’s share of North Korea’s foreign trade rose from 
28% to 43% between 2001 and 2005. Most importantly, Dr Kong said that “the impressive 
results of China’s modernisation demonstrate to North Korean leaders a route for long 
term regime survival by promoting economic growth without surrendering the monopoly 
of power.”452 
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227. Dr Kong suggested that there were two other possible scenarios for North Korea’s 
economic course apart from major Chinese-style reform. These were: first, to invite limited 
and controlled foreign participation in some areas of the economy, while largely 
maintaining centralised state control; and, second, a “muddling through” model, involving 
simply ensuring continued flows of aid and foreign currency as at present. Dr Kong said 
that a decision to “muddle through” would be most likely to lead Pyongyang to “keep the 
nuclear threat alive as a bargaining counter”. However, he suggested that “even the most 
conservative North Korean leaders are likely to be aware of the limits of muddling 
through”.453 Professor Smith told us that economic development was one of the regime’s 
two core policy aims.454 
228. We conclude that the absence of market reform in the official North Korean 
economy contributes to the international risks which the regime represents, by failing 
to generate incentives for improved relations with the West, and by fuelling the 
regime’s need to generate income from sales of weapons and illegal goods in the 
absence of alternative exports. We further conclude that, although the forces working 
against economic reform in North Korea are powerful, the Government should not 
assume that there is no possibility at all of more meaningful reform under the present 
regime. We recommend that the Government should remain alert so as to identify and 
cultivate any elements in the regime which may be open to further economic reform.  
The succession to Kim Jong-il 
229. The third issue identified by Mr Foster-Carter, and a major one at present, was that of 
the succession to Kim Jong-il. The North Korean leader is 66, and has been believed for 
some time to have health problems. Although there have been extended periods in the past 
when Kim Jong-il has not been seen in public, a renewed flurry of succession speculation 
was prompted when he failed to appear on the 60th anniversary of the founding of North 
Korea, on 9 September 2008, having last been seen in mid-August. Kim Jong-il had 
appeared at the ceremonies marking the 55th and 50th anniversaries. South Korean 
intelligence sources were reported to have concluded that the North Korean leader had 
suffered a stroke. North Korean officials denied that he was unwell.455 
230. On 4 October, official North Korean media reported that Kim Jong-il had again made 
a public appearance, attending a football match. On 11 October, North Korea published 
photographs of Mr Kim, but US and South Korean officials raised doubts that they had 
been taken recently. Kim Jong-il reportedly did not appear on 10 October at the 
ceremonies marking the anniversary of the foundation of the ruling Korean Workers’ 
Party.456 The North Korean authorities published further photographs of Mr Kim in early 
November.      
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231. Aidan Foster-Carter told us that Kim Jong-il was handling the succession issue very 
differently to his father. When Kim Il-sung was the age that Kim Jong-il is now, Mr Foster-
Carter said, the latter’s “dauphinhood, if there is such a word, was already being 
arranged”.457 Kim Jong-il was publicly groomed for the leadership through a succession of 
official positions over a long period. As leader, however, Kim Jong-il now reportedly bans 
discussion of the succession issue even in private.458 None of his children appears to have 
been picked as the future leader. The speculation amongst commentators in September 
2008 about a post-Kim Jong-il North Korea included scenarios for another dynastic 
succession, the elevation of a senior civilian official not belonging to the Kim family, some 
form of collective or mixed leadership, a military takeover, and a breakdown of central 
authority, with local officials taking control of their own areas.459 Aidan Foster-Carter 
summed up the lack of certainty about the succession by saying, “If [Kim Jong-il] were to 
have the heart attack tomorrow […] all bets for North Korea are off”.460   
232. In an article published even before the latest speculation surrounding Kim Jong-il’s 
health, the former Director for Asian Affairs at the US National Security Council, Victor 
Cha, said: “Is there a plan in place if something happens in North Korea tomorrow? The 
answer is no.”461 Professor Smith told us that “there has been some discussion in the 
United States and South Korea of contingency planning”,462 but in September The 
Economist reported that “Chinese, American and South Korean officials admit in private 
[that] so far they have drawn up only the sketchiest contingency plans among 
themselves.”463 Our impression from our visit to the region was also of uncertainty 
surrounding possible scenarios.  
 
233. Professor Smith recommended that “the UK Government should work with its 
European partners in the EU to establish a contingency framework of support to regional 
partners in the event of a major public order and/or humanitarian crisis in the Korean 
peninsula.”464 In its “Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia”, 
approved in 2005 and published in 2007, the EU Council identified stability on the Korean 
peninsula as a key EU interest in the region.465  
234. Given North Korea’s possession of WMD materials, we conclude that the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding possible future political developments in the country is 
worrying. We conclude that, given the lessening in the regime’s social control since 
North Korea’s last leadership succession, and the apparently enhanced likelihood that 
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Kim Jong-il is suffering from health problems, the international community should 
have a set of co-ordinated plans in place for sudden change in the situation in North 
Korea. We further conclude that, although the parties to the Six-Party Talks would be 
the lead states in any international response, the UK and the EU would be likely to be 
called upon to assist and would have an interest in doing so. We appreciate that there 
are reasons why it may be sensible not to discuss plans in public, but we recommend 
that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide assurance that such 
planning is being undertaken.  
North-South Korea relations 
235. South and North Korea technically remain at war. No peace agreement has ever been 
reached bringing the Korean War formally to an end. Fundamental security arrangements 
on the Korean peninsula continue to be governed by the Armistice signed in July 1953 
between UN Command (Korea) on the one hand, and the North Korean and Chinese 
military commanders on the other. South Korea is a party rather than a signatory to the 
Armistice.  
236. South Korea’s defence posture is directed overwhelmingly against the risk of renewed 
conflict with the North. There have been numerous small-scale clashes and Armistice 
violations between the two sides since 1953, largely as a result of incursions by North 
Korea. We saw for ourselves during our visit that the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) between 
North and South remains tense and heavily militarised. The most recent serious incident 
was a naval skirmish in 2002 in which four South Korean sailors died. We heard during 
our visit that the most likely location for renewed clashes remained the West Sea, where the 
maritime border is disputed and there are key fishing grounds. The FCO’s assessment is 
that another “war between the two Koreas […] [is] unlikely, [but] would have disastrous 
consequences for the Korean peninsula.”466   
237. The two Koreas have in principle been officially committed to consensual 
reunification at least since a declaration to that effect in 1972. The nature of the policy 
which should be pursued towards the North so as to facilitate that ultimate goal has been a 
central controversy in South Korean politics in recent years.  
Beyond the “sunshine policy” 
238. After taking office in 1998, former liberal President Kim Dae-jung launched South 
Korea’s first policy of concrete engagement with the North, known as the “sunshine 
policy”. Kim Dae-jung’s successor, former President Roh, essentially persisted with the 
approach. Under the “sunshine policy”, South Korea sought to cultivate the North, and 
extended economic assistance. The policy saw the holding of the first North-South 
summits, in Pyongyang in 2000 and 2007, between Chairman Kim Jong-il and former 
South Korean Presidents Kim and Roh, respectively. The policy has also involved visits 
between some of the families left divided by the North-South border; the provision of food 
aid, fertiliser and other economic assistance by the South to the North;467 the 
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encouragement of bilateral trade; the opening of two major South Korean-funded 
economic projects in the North, the Mount Kumgang tourism project and the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex (KIC);468 and the opening of two transit corridors across the 
Demilitarised Zone—in the West to the KIC and Kaesong city, and in the East to Mount 
Kumgang—allowing some controlled access for South Koreans into the North. At their 
summit in October 2007, shortly before President Roh left office, he and Chairman Kim 
agreed on a number of further co-operation projects. Former South Korean President Kim 
was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2000 partly for “his work […] for peace and reconciliation 
with North Korea”.469   
239. One of our witnesses, Dr Hoare, has characterised the “sunshine policy” as  
essentially an acceptance that the DPRK was not about to suddenly disappear […] 
instead of ‘unification policy’ the government would begin to talk about ‘policy 
towards the North’. There would be no attempt to undermine the North.470 
240. While the “sunshine policy” accepted North Korea’s existence, it was seen by some of 
its supporters as a means of encouraging change in the nature of the North Korean regime 
that might eventually facilitate any reunification. The FCO told us that: 
South Korea hopes that by exposing the DPRK to outside influences, and improving 
basic infrastructure, the regime will see the benefits of engagement and becoming a 
responsible member of the global community.471 
241. South Korea’s new conservative President, Lee Myung-bak, came to office in February 
2008 promising a different approach to the North. He held out the prospect of greater 
economic engagement, with the aim of raising per capita income in North Korea to $3,000 
a year. However, unlike his liberal predecessors, President Lee proposed to make 
engagement with the North conditional on the North’s steps towards denuclearisation.472 
President Lee also proposed to take account of North Korea’s human rights performance. 
As noted earlier, under President Lee South Korea voted in favour of the March 2008 
resolution at the UN Human Rights Council prolonging the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur for human rights in North Korea. The Lee Administration said that 
humanitarian aid to the North would continue, but only if Pyongyang requested it. 
Implementation of other co-operation initiatives would depend on the North’s behaviour, 
and on an assessment of their value to and support in the South. President Lee’s new 
approach cast doubt over the implementation of the projects agreed between his 
predecessor and Chairman Kim at their October 2007 summit.  
242. Dr Swenson-Wright told us that, whereas former President Roh had seen 
“engagement, in and of itself, as in turn producing success in terms of proliferation and 
nuclear discussions”, President Lee’s approach represented “a reversal of the 
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sequencing”.473 Supporters of President Lee’s new policy, in both the political class and the 
electorate, typically felt that his predecessors’ unconditional approach had not stopped the 
North Korean regime from developing a nuclear bomb, from remaining largely unchanged 
domestically, or from remaining fundamentally antagonistic to the South.474 Instead, some 
argued that the “sunshine policy” had merely propped up the regime, through food aid and 
hard currency, while reducing pressures for change. Lord Malloch-Brown indicated that 
the South’s tougher stance under President Lee was likely to be helpful, because it 
“increase[d] the need to hold the North to an even higher standard of verification of its 
actions”475 in the nuclear field. 
243. Our witnesses stressed that President Lee was not proposing to abandon engagement 
with the North altogether. Dr Swenson-Wright told us that “on the commitment to 
reaching a positive outcome, [former President Roh and new President Lee] are not that 
far apart”.476 Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the Government saw “the basic policy as 
remaining unchanged, but with a good dose of scepticism […] the impact of the new 
President, if anything, will be to make things move more slowly and cautiously.”477  
244. President Lee’s new stance provoked a fierce reaction from Pyongyang. At the end of 
March 2008, North Korea expelled South Korean officials from the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex, and suspended official contacts with the South. It did not ask Seoul to provide it 
with food and fertiliser aid. A football World Cup qualifying match in late March between 
the two Koreas had to be moved from Pyongyang to Beijing, after the North refused to play 
the South’s national anthem. 
245. In his address to the opening session of the new National Assembly in mid-July, 
President Lee said that “dialogue between the two Koreas must resume”, including 
dialogue on the implementation of projects agreed between Chairman Kim and former 
President Roh at their October 2007 summit. President Lee also offered renewed 
humanitarian aid and said that “inter-Korean relations should transcend changeovers in 
administrations”.478 However, what appeared to be President Lee’s shift to a more 
conciliatory stance was overshadowed by the shooting immediately before the speech of a 
South Korean tourist by a North Korean guard at the Mount Kumgang resort. North 
Korea did not co-operate with South Korea’s calls for an investigation into the incident, 
and in August it expelled South Korean workers from the resort. South Korea suspended 
tours to Mount Kumgang. At the opening ceremony for the August 2008 Beijing Olympics, 
the teams from the two Koreas marched separately for the first time since the 1996 
Games.479      
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246. Professor Smith enumerated what she saw as the benefits from South Korea’s 
engagement policy over the last decade. She told us that:  
• “there is absolutely no doubt that many more North Koreans would be dead if it 
was not for South Korean assistance”; 
• family reunions were “a huge achievement on a very personal and individual level”; 
• increased contact had produced “increased understanding at some levels” in the 
two societies; and  
• the maintenance of various channels of communication between North and South 
had produced greater “security predictability”; “the complete unpredictability of 
North Korea is long gone”, she judged.480 
Dr Hoare similarly told us that the “sunshine policy” had been a “success”. He said that 
South Korea’s insistence on keeping open contacts with the North after Pyongyang’s 
missile and nuclear tests in 2006 had facilitated the re-launch of the Six-Party Talks. He 
also told us that he believed that “there is now […] a pro-South Korean constituency in the 
North, which will not willingly see the benefits it receives thrown away.”481  
247. Our witnesses also pointed to weaknesses of South Korean engagement policy so far. 
Professor Smith said that there had “not been enough paybacks on a political level”.482 She 
also suggested that there had not been enough soundly-based economic development, as 
opposed to politically-driven projects and humanitarian aid.483 Aidan Foster-Carter 
similarly suggested that South Korean engagement had not so far produced business 
conditions in the North sufficient to encourage South Korean firms operating on a normal 
commercial basis to wish to do business there.484  
248. On 1 October 2008, North and South Korea had their first official contacts since the 
Lee Administration took office. Military officials held a reportedly unproductive meeting, 
at the North’s instigation.485  
249. Dr Hoare, who as chargé d’affaires opened the British Embassy in Pyongyang in 2001, 
at the height of international optimism over the “sunshine policy” in the wake of the first 
North-South summit, said that the rationale for the UK’s decision to open diplomatic 
relations with Pyongyang was “to help the South Korean Government in their relations 
with North Korea.”486 Professor Smith told us that supporting North-South engagement 
was “something that the UK Government should still see as the centre of their priorities in 
the security realm in their relations with South Korea, supporting, though not blindly”.487 
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250. We conclude that a breakdown in relations between North and South Korea would 
bring to an end opportunities for valuable human contacts, and increase insecurity on 
the Korean peninsula. We further conclude that it is legitimate for South Korea to 
attach conditions to its co-operation with the North. We recommend that the 
Government should continue to support North-South engagement. 
251. Dr Hoare told us that, thanks to the greater accessibility of the North and information 
about it which had been secured under the “sunshine policy”, the country was now “viewed 
far more realistically” in the South.488 Elsewhere, he has written that this greater knowledge 
has had a “sobering effect on those who might have sought early reunification of the 
peninsula”.489 The difficulties which Germany has encountered under its reunification 
model have also contributed to a lessening of enthusiasm for reunification in Seoul. The 
Bank of Korea has estimated that, whereas the ratio of GDP per capita in West Germany 
compared to East Germany was around two-to-one, the figures for South compared to 
North Korea are around 17-to-one.490 Given South Korea’s ambitions for its own economy, 
it appears that the costs of reunification are not ones which Seoul would be keen quickly to 
bear. During our meetings there, we encountered no concrete plans for reunification, and 
no sense that this was considered to be a realistic prospect in the near future. 
252. Aidan Foster-Carter drew our attention to a geoeconomic and geopolitical dimension 
to the debate about South Korea’s engagement policy. Mr Foster-Carter regards South 
Korea and China as “rivals for influence in Pyongyang”.491 He said that “there is great 
concern in South Korea […] that the Chinese have been buying up all the minerals in 
North Korea”. He suggested that, while South Korea might wish to try to use a policy of 
holding back on economic co-operation with the North in order to secure greater progress 
on denuclearisation, “there is powerful geopolitical and geoeconomic pressure to get in 
there and stop the Chinese, regardless of the nuclear issue”.492 We heard during our visit to 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex, for example, that the South Korean company behind the 
project, Hyundai Asan, was not making a profit from it but hoped to be in an advantageous 
position in North Korea as and when that country opened up to international business.  
Kaesong Industrial Complex and the South Korea-EU Free Trade 
Agreement 
253. The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is the flagship project of South Korea’s 
“sunshine policy” of engagement with North Korea. When we visited the complex, in May 
2008, we were the first UK parliamentarians to do so.493  
254. The KIC is in North Korea, just north of the Demilitarised Zone, and uses North 
Korean labour. The KIC was initiated and is being developed by the South Korean firm 
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Hyundai Asan, which paid the North Korean regime $500 million for a 50-year lease on 
the land. Hyundai Asan sells the land use rights on to firms establishing operations at the 
complex. (Hyundai Asan is also behind the parallel Mount Kumgang tourism resort, where 
it also paid Pyongyang $500 million for the land use rights.) The KIC is open to firms of 
any nationality, but non-South Korean firms wishing to operate in the complex must have 
a subsidiary in the South and establish a joint venture with a South Korean firm.  
255. The KIC is supported administratively and politically by the South Korean 
Government, which gives favourable tax treatment to the South Korean firms operating 
there. Transfers of goods between South Korea and the KIC are free of customs duty. South 
Korea provides the KIC’s electricity supply and has financed the infrastructural 
developments allowing access to the site across the Demilitarised Zone.   
256. Production at the KIC started in 2004. At the time of our visit in May 2008, we were 
told that around 250 firms had committed to establishing operations at the complex, all of 
them from South Korea apart from one each from China, Germany and Japan (with 
discussions on possible involvement also underway with one firm each from France and 
the US). Around 70 firms had actually started operations, employing around 26,000 North 
Koreans and 1,000 South Koreans. The firms at the KIC are engaged overwhelmingly in 
light industry, producing mostly for the South Korean market. Production at the KIC in 
2007 was worth $185 million, up from $15 million in 2005. Under Hyundai Asan’s plans, 
by 2020 the KIC would be employing perhaps 300,000-350,000 North Koreans and 
producing goods worth $20 billion, hosting more sophisticated production than at present 
and expanding to become a new “mini-city” including accommodation for some of its 
workers.494 However, expansion of the complex is not taking place at the pace foreseen by 
Hyundai Asan, and the KIC is now one of the projects where future development is in 
doubt following the changes in North Korea policy made by South Korean President Lee.  
257. Our understanding from our visit was that supporters of the KIC view it as offering 
advantages to all parties. For the North Korean regime, the KIC is a source of hard 
currency. For South Korean governments pursuing the “sunshine policy”, the project 
offered economic development of the North and its exposure to South Korean business 
practices—as well as a means of improving South Korean competitiveness through access 
to lower-cost production. For South Korean firms, the KIC offers labour at a fraction of its 
cost in South Korea495 but less than an hour from Seoul. Our impression from the factories 
we visited was that South Korean firms operating at the KIC were using labour-intensive 
production processes which they might not find economic to employ at home.   
258. As regards the hopes of its supporters that the KIC might encourage economic reform 
and opening in North Korea, Professor Smith suggested that project might push both ways. 
On the one hand, she pointed out that “South Koreans come in, talk to North Koreans and 
show them new economic practices as well as just engaging in normal conversation”.496 
However, she also made the point that “in many ways, the Kaesong enterprise can 
reinstitute the old social and political controls that were prevalent in North Korea” before 
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they began to break down.497 Professor Smith said that “in Kaesong, the paradox is that 
with South Korean investment, which is properly and efficiently organised, the old systems 
can be reinstituted.”498 Overall, Professor Smith said that “politically […] it is a good thing 
that all this engagement takes place, but economically it acts as a subsidy for some very old-
fashioned ways of operating in North Korea.”499 Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the KIC 
“is not indicative of a willingness to open up the economy as a whole. It is an opportunity 
of limited value. It is not the doorway to political and economic change in North Korea.”500  
259. The KIC is controversial internationally mainly because of conditions for its workers. 
Firms operating at the KIC do not employ or pay their North Korean workers directly. 
Rather, firms approach the management committee on the South Korean side, known as 
KIDMAC, with requests for workers. KIDMAC transmits such requests to its North 
Korean counterpart, which supplies the workers. We understood during our visit that only 
workers regarded as politically reliable would be given employment at the KIC, given that 
the jobs bring both contact with South Koreans and high wages, by North Korean 
standards.501 Firms operating at the KIC are able to reject workers supplied by the North 
Korean authorities who prove unsuitable. We heard that there had been a very few cases of 
the North Korean authorities removing workers from jobs at the KIC for political reasons.  
260. Firms at the KIC transfer around $70 per month per worker to the North Korean 
authorities. (Salaries for equivalent workers in South Korea would be perhaps $1,500-
$2,000.) Of the $70, we were told during our visit that 30% is retained by the North Korean 
authorities to cover social security costs. Of the rest, 50% is transferred to the workers in 
cash, in North Korean won converted at the official exchange rate (140-160 won to the 
dollar at the time of our visit in May, as opposed to the unofficial rate of around 4,700 to 
the dollar). The other half of the amount due to the workers can be drawn down in return 
for goods at special shops provided for this purpose in the KIC. Workers are paid indirectly 
despite the fact that the KIC labour law provides for direct payment. We were told during 
our visit that direct payment and employment may be implemented in future.  
261. The FCO told us that the transfers of hard currency to the North Korean regime 
which are taking place as a result of the KIC project “may not contravene” UN Security 
Council Resolution 1718 of 2006, which banned member states from making funds 
available to entities supporting North Korea’s WMD programmes. However, the FCO 
noted that the “lack of transparency” surrounding the transfers was “problematic”.502  
262. The FCO told us that “concerns have been raised by a number of human rights 
organisations about the absence of basic workers’ rights”503 at the KIC. For example, 
Human Rights Watch judges that “the law governing working conditions in the KIC falls 
far short of international standards on freedom of association, the right to collective 
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bargaining, sex discrimination and harassment, and harmful child labour”.504 There are no 
trade unions or collective agreements at the KIC, and no meaningful workers’ 
representation.505 The legal position is complicated because South Korea is a member of 
the International Labour Organisation, but North Korea is not.   
 
263. Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International told us that “the work conditions in the 
[KIC] are, relatively speaking, fairly good”, that “many North Koreans would like to work 
at Kaesong”, and that overall the “net gain may be in the favour of the North Korean 
workers”.506 On the basis of the figures we were given during our visit, the wage received in 
won and in kind by workers at the KIC is equivalent to 6,860-7,840 won a month, whereas 
we understand that average earnings in North Korea are around 3,000-5,000 won a month. 
Ms Muico also said that “we cannot be complacent” and that “a lot more needs to be done 
in Kaesong to make the labour situation better”.507 Lord Malloch-Brown called the 
conditions at the KIC “unacceptable, even if a little better than the rest”; they reflected, he 
said, “a bit of a Faustian pact”.508 
264. Conditions at the KIC are a policy issue for the UK and the rest of the EU because of 
the current negotiation of the South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA).509 In the 
course of the negotiations, it will have to be determined whether goods produced at the 
KIC are to be included under the terms of the agreement, alongside goods produced in 
South Korea, and thus given improved access to the EU. Lord Malloch-Brown confirmed 
that South Korea was “pushing for goods that are produced at Kaesong to be covered” by 
the agreement.510  
265. In the negotiations in 2006-07 over South Korea’s FTA with the US, Seoul similarly 
wanted the agreement to include the KIC, but Washington was opposed. Dr Hoare 
reminded us that—at the time, at least—the US was effectively banning trade with North 
Korea.511 In the end, the KORUS FTA did not include the KIC, but it did include an annex 
allowing the two parties to agree in future to extend its terms to cover designated “outward 
processing zones” in North Korea, subject to certain conditions. It is assumed that the KIC 
would count as such a zone. Human Rights Watch has argued that the annex would allow 
“outward processing zones” in North Korea to be included in the FTA while meeting 
labour standards weaker than those required of South Korea.512 Whereas the FTA holds 
South Korea to ILO standards, it provides that “outward processing zones” in North Korea 
are to be considered for inclusion in the agreement only “with due reference to the 
situation prevailing elsewhere in the local economy and the relevant international 
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norms”.513 Human Rights Watch has recommended that the South Korea-US FTA be 
amended so as to require “outward processing zones” in North Korea to meet the same 
labour standards as South Korea in order to be included in the agreement.514  
266. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that if the KIC were to be included in the South Korea-
EU FTA he “imagine[d] that [the Government] would want human rights issues to be 
incorporated into the agreement”.515 Lord Malloch-Brown said that there was a “very 
evident” risk attached to not doing so, namely of “a flood of cheap goods into our markets 
for which there are no workers’ or human rights protections”.516 Lord Malloch-Brown said 
that we could be “absolutely confident” that the KIC was “not going to be allowed in [to the 
South Korea-EU FTA] without a set of conditions to govern it”,517 but he invited us to 
express our view as to the desirable content of those conditions.  
267. Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International told us that there was currently “a 
window of opportunity for South Korean companies and the South Korean Government to 
do more in terms of freedom of association, collective bargaining and best practices [at the 
KIC] using the labour standards of the International Labour Organisation of which South 
Korea is a member”.518  
268. We conclude that the current arrangements for the Kaesong Industrial Complex 
(KIC)—which allow South Korean firms to escape the International Labour 
Organisation standards to which they are subject at home, while providing non-
transparent transfers of hard currency to the North Korean regime—are far from ideal. 
However, we also conclude that the contact between North and South Koreans, and 
exposure of North Koreans to South Korean business practices, which take place at the 
KIC are to be welcomed; and that the KIC offers much better pay and working 
conditions than are available elsewhere in North Korea. We recommend that the 
Government should seek to use the leverage which is afforded by South Korea’s wish to 
see the KIC included in the South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to encourage 
improvements in the position of workers at the KIC, within a context of what is 
realistically achievable, and without jeopardising either the FTA or the continued 
operation and expansion of the Complex. 
UK policy toward North Korea 
269. The UK effectively recognised North Korea when it agreed to admit it, along with 
South Korea, to the UN in 1991. (The UK had recognised South Korea in 1948, and had 
full diplomatic relations with it since 1957.) The UK opened diplomatic relations with 
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North Korea in 2000, and an Embassy in Pyongyang the following year. The UK is one of 
only seven EU Member States to maintain an Embassy there.519 
270. As we noted in the Introduction to this Report, Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the 
Government sees the UK as being in the “second row” of states as regards dealing with 
North Korea, the first row being constituted by the participants in the Six-Party Talks.520 
Our witnesses concurred that the UK did not, and could not be expected to, take a lead role 
on the Korean peninsula.521   
271. Professor Smith, who accepted that the UK had a secondary role with regard to North 
Korea, argued nevertheless that the UK had a comparative advantage regarding the 
international effort to denuclearise that country, which it could usefully exploit more 
actively if it chose to do so. The UK’s advantage, she said, lay in “being both close to the US 
as a valued ally and at the same time having diplomatic relations with the DPRK”. The 
UK’s diplomatic relations with Pyongyang involve not only maintaining an Embassy there, 
but also hosting what Professor Smith called “high-level ambassadors” heading the North 
Korean Embassy in London.522   
272. Professor Smith said that the UK should use its position to support confidence-
building between the US and North Korea. She said that “there [was] still a lack of trust 
between the two major protagonists” which made negotiations difficult.523 Dr Kong made 
the same point.524 Professor Smith suggested that the UK could in particular facilitate 
“track-two” meetings, at which policy-makers and academics could discuss security 
matters, perhaps organised in terms of the themes being tackled in the working groups of 
the Six-Party Talks. Professor Smith recognised that this would require a commitment of 
FCO resources.525 However, she said that the UK was “in a very privileged position, in 
terms of its relationships with the key players, to provide forums for that sort of trust-
building exercise”, and that “supporting confidence-building between the two major 
protagonists is […] the single most important thing that the UK Government could do in 
the short term to facilitate denuclearisation in the Korean peninsula.”526 
273. We conclude that, while the UK is not in the frontline of the international effort to 
secure North Korea’s denuclearisation, it occupies a special position as a close US ally 
which has diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. Especially given the difficulties into 
which the denuclearisation process ran in August-September 2008, we recommend that 
the Government should ask both North Korea and the US whether, coming to the 
process as a fresh element, it could facilitate any meetings which would help to 
strengthen the process.  
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274. Professor Smith said that a further important element of the UK’s position with 
respect to North Korea was its membership of the EU. She said that the EU had been “very 
active” in North Korea, in humanitarian and development aid, and in political discussions 
where possible, on issues such as human rights. However, Professor Smith said that the 
European Commission was currently taking the lead, and that there was “room for a 
political leadership role to be played”. She suggested that the UK would have a comparative 
advantage in potentially taking this role, because of its relationships with the US and North 
Korea.527 Among the other large EU Member States, for example, France does not have 
diplomatic relations with North Korea.528 The UK is also the only EU Member State to be a 
permanent member of UNCMAC, the delegation of UN Command (Korea) to the Military 
Armistice Commission in Korea.529 
275. The EU Council has set out its priorities for the Korean peninsula, among other parts 
of the region, in a set of East Asia Policy Guidelines agreed in 2005 and published in 2007. 
The FCO told us that the Guidelines were “a step forward in [its] efforts to achieve a 
coherent and strategic EU approach to East Asia.”530 
276. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the Government’s top priority with regard to North 
Korea was to bring that country 
more fully into the global community […] so that the range of more normal 
pressures starts to have effect and the regime engages, gets a little richer, gets a 
glimpse of a better future for itself and its people in the world, and becomes 
amenable to pressure and dialogue as it engages.531 
The stated aim of Government policy is to “work for positive change in the DPRK by 
exposing the country to external thinking and alternative models of economic and social 
organisation.”532 
277. Dr Hoare, along with several other of our witnesses, supported the principle of 
engagement with North Korea:    
By dealing directly with the North Koreans, we learn more than we would if we were 
not there. By showing them, in however small a way, that the outside world has 
lessons for them to learn, by exposing their officials and students to that outside 
world and by giving an alternative to the closed society in which they live, we are 
helping to modify North Korean behaviour and policies. It is not going to be an easy 
or quick process, but it is underway […] We may not make great advances, but we 
will certainly not help if we back away.533 
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278. Since the opening of the British Embassy in Pyongyang in 2001, there has been a 
partial drawing back on the part of the Government from the policy of engagement. After 
North Korea announced that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in 2003, the UK “halted any bilateral activity, which might be seen to directly 
support the DPRK regime, e.g. economic/technical assistance and trade promotion.” The 
FCO told us that the Government had made clear to North Korea that “relaxation of these 
restrictions will not be considered without progress on the nuclear issue and also on 
human rights concerns.”534 The Government now describes its policy as being one of 
“carefully targeted engagement”.535 
279. Dr Hoare summarised British policy by saying that the UK had established diplomatic 
relations with Pyongyang in order to support the South in its “sunshine policy” of 
engagement with the North, as noted above;536 but that since the nuclear crisis of 2002, “the 
North Korean nuclear issue has overshadowed that initial initiative, and that has led [the 
UK] away from a position of developing our engagement with North Korea.”537 
280. Professor Smith told us that one casualty of the policy shift had been Government 
funding for universities to engage in academic training and exchange with North Korea.538 
She recommend that the Government should reconsider this position, as  
all concerned parties in the efforts to encourage North Korea to normalise its 
relations with the rest of the world have considered education and training to be a 
fundamental prerequisite to equip the next generation of North Korean leaders with 
the foundation for interaction with the rest of the world.539 
281. We discussed with Lord Malloch-Brown and Stephen Lillie why there were no North 
Koreans studying in the UK on the FCO’s Chevening scheme.540 Mr Lillie said that “the 
difficulty so far has been for the North Korean side to identify the right sort of person with 
the right level of English”. Mr Lillie said that the FCO had indicated a willingness to be 
flexible on the English language requirement if Pyongyang could nominate otherwise 
suitable people. However, Lord Malloch-Brown said that he did “not think that there [was] 
the political will on [North Korea’s] side for [the] kind of opening up” involved in sending 
students to the UK, whether on the Chevening scheme or other university programmes. 
He said that the problem was that North Korea was “a paranoid regime that really does not 
want people to go abroad.” 541  
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282. Professor Smith told us that “the North Korean Government has […] agreed to 
permit students to attend UK universities if funding can be found for them”.542 She said 
that it was  
North Korea’s top policy priority to get its people out and educated in degree 
courses, not just short-term courses, outside the country […] That runs counter to 
the myth that the North Koreans will never let anyone out. They will now, if we can 
find the funding to do it.543 
283. Aidan Foster-Carter said that “encourag[ing] [North Korea] to send people over” to 
the UK should be the Government’s top priority regarding the country. He said that the 
Government should try “to get as many North Koreans over […] as possible […] the 
coming people, the students and so forth […] the more younger North Koreans we can get 
[to the UK] and expose to the West, the better.”544 
284. The British Council has been working in North Korea since 2003. It has three teachers 
running programmes of English and teacher training in three Pyongyang universities, of 
whom two were in post when we took evidence from Lord Malloch-Brown in July.545 The 
programmes include visits to the UK for the students involved. The British Council told us 
that this scheme had the potential to expand both geographically and in terms of the topics 
taught. The scheme was last extended in May 2008.546 The British Council also arranges 
English-language training in the UK for middle-ranking North Korean officials.547  
285. The BBC World Service does not have a Korean-language service and does not 
broadcast into North Korea. Given conditions there, the BBC World Service assesses that, 
technically, short-wave radio would be the “only feasible option” for delivering Korean-
language broadcasts into North Korea. The BBC World Service judges that    
such a service might reach a few hundred senior officials (who are likely to 
understand English and have access both to satellite TV and the internet anyway) 
and a small number of North Korean civilians who are prepared to risk extremely 
severe punishment.548  
In the FCO’s words, the World Service has therefore concluded that “it would be difficult 
to make a robust business case for this service in the current financial climate and given the 
difficulty in measuring impact.” The FCO noted that the US stations Voice of America and 
Radio Free Asia, which do broadcast in Korean into North Korea, do not have to justify 
audience numbers in the same way as does the BBC World Service. The FCO stated that it 
was “likely, therefore, that the US [would] continue to lead the way forward in this area.”549 
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286. As regards trade with North Korea, the FCO noted that some of the UK’s EU partners 
“argue that trade relations are an important part of bringing the DPRK out of its isolation”, 
in contrast to the UK’s decision not to conduct trade promotion activity regarding North 
Korea. The FCO said that its position was to bring the trade policy “under review if there is 
significant progress on the nuclear issue.”550 
287. We conclude that the Government is correct to make the aim of exposing North 
Korea’s people to alternative ways of life its top policy goal with regard to engagement 
with that country. However, we also conclude that the restrictions on relations which 
the Government has introduced, to try to leverage progress on denuclearisation and 
human rights, may be undercutting this goal. We recommend that the Government 
should think more creatively about ways in which it might increase contacts with North 
Koreans without simply benefiting the regime’s elite. We recommend that the FCO 
should discuss with interested higher education institutions possibilities for hosting 
North Korean students.  
288. We conclude that the work that the British Council is doing in North Korea is to 
be commended. We recommend that the British Council should expand its work there 
if possible.   
289. As already noted, not all EU Member States which have diplomatic relations with 
North Korea actually maintain an Embassy in Pyongyang (the others typically cover the 
country from China). The British Embassy in Pyongyang is not an easy Post to maintain 
or, for its UK-based staff, in which to serve. We cited earlier in this Report the view of 
Amnesty International that the UK’s presence in Pyongyang is valuable from a human 
rights perspective.551 During our visit to Japan, our interlocutors expressed appreciation of 
the British Embassy’s work in relaying information to the Japanese Government and in 
raising in Pyongyang the issue of the Japanese abductees.552   
290. We conclude that the existence of a British Embassy in Pyongyang brings 
diplomatic benefits to the UK, in terms of both bilateral dealings with North Korea and 
the UK’s position in regional and international North Korea policy, and we 
recommend that its staffing and resources should reflect its value. 
The UK in UN Command (Korea) 
291. UN Command (Korea) was established in 1950 under UN Security Council 
Resolution 84, to defend South Korea from the North Korean attack and restore peace and 
security to the Korean peninsula. UNSCR 84 established that the UN force would be under 
US command. During the Korean War, 16 “sending states” contributed combat forces to 
the UN Command, including the UK.  
292. The UN Command is one of the signatories to the 1953 Armistice, along with the 
North Korean and Chinese militaries. These parties have joint responsibility for 
maintenance of the Armistice, in particular as it applies to the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) 
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between North and South Korea. The Armistice provided that the parties were to exercise 
their joint responsibilities through a Military Armistice Commission (MAC), which was to 
comprise five senior officers each from the Korean War’s two sides. The UN Command 
side of the MAC, known as UNCMAC, comprises two officers from South Korea, one 
from the US, one from the UK (as the Senior Commonwealth member), and one from the 
Command’s other sending states in rotation. In 1991, the UN Command—effectively the 
US—nominated a South Korean officer to be the senior UNCMAC representative. North 
Korea rejected this, on the grounds that South Korea was not a signatory to the Armistice. 
North Korea and China formally withdrew from the MAC in 1994, although lower-level 
meetings between military officers continue to take place.   
293. The UK is represented on UNCMAC by the British Defence Attaché in Seoul. 
UNCMAC members also each have a national liaison officer to UNCMAC. This is not a 
full-time post. Until March 2008, the UK national liaison officer was the Naval Attaché at 
the Seoul Embassy. The navel attaché post there has now been withdrawn, as part of the 
global retrenchment of the UK’s network of defence attachés consequential on the FCO’s 
decision to withdraw funding for these posts.553 The UK liaison officer to UNCMAC is 
now a civilian diplomat, namely the Political Counsellor at the Seoul Embassy. We 
understand that there are some military inspections conducted by UNCMAC in which 
civilians—and thus the UK liaison officer—cannot participate, but that several other UN 
Command member states also have civilians as their liaison officers. Lord Malloch-Brown 
told us that the Government did “not accept the proposition that [the Naval Attaché’s 
replacement by a civilian official] […] is a downgrading”. Indeed, the Minister argued that 
“by having both the Defence Attaché and the Political Counsellor, we have a broader array 
of talents on the committee, because we have both the military and the political foreign 
policy side.”554  
294. In the longer term, the fate of the Military Armistice Commission is tied to that of the 
Armistice agreement which established it. North Korea has already made proposals that 
the MAC be replaced by bilateral North-South or trilateral North-South-US bodies; such 
proposals are commonly held to be closely linked to Pyongyang’s wish for a peace treaty 
with the US to replace the Armistice and bring the Korean War formally to an end, as part 
of the normalisation of bilateral relations for which it hopes.555 North Korea’s effective 
withdrawal from the MAC, and from another of the Armistice bodies, the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission (NNSC), is often seen as part of an effort to weaken the 
Armistice institutions.556 In their summit declaration of October 2007, Chairman Kim and 
former South Korean President Roh agreed to work for a “peace regime” to replace the 
Armistice, but the FCO told us that President Roh’s successor, President Lee, has “as yet 
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[…] shown no particular rush towards the negotiation of a peace treaty with his northern 
counterpart”.557        
295. According to the FCO, the UK’s membership of UNCMAC means that it “continue[s] 
to have a role in upholding peace and security on the Korean peninsula”.558 Lord Malloch-
Brown told us that the UK “remain[ed] committed” to UNCMAC, but that he was “not 
quite sure what longer-term plans” there were for the UK’s role on it.  Lord Malloch-
Brown left open the question of “whether there would be a UK role” if a peace agreement 
were ever to replace the Armistice. He said that “primary responsibility” lay with the states 
participating in the Six-Party Talks.559  
296. We conclude that the UK’s participation in the UN Command Military Armistice 
Commission represents an important British commitment to peace and security on the 
Korean peninsula, and we recommend that it should be maintained.  
Military issues  
297. Under the Korean peninsula’s current security architecture, in the event of renewed 
military conflict between North and South the UN Command would arguably retain 
ultimate responsibility for the defence of South Korea and the restoration of peace and 
security, because UNSCR 84 remains in force. In a “Joint Declaration Concerning the 
Korean Armistice” in 1953, the UN Command’s 16 sending states—including the UK—
stated that “if there is a renewal of the armed attack […] we should again be united and 
prompt to resist”.560 However, this declaration is not legally binding, and of the 16 original 
sending states, only the US has made a formal commitment to participate in a renewed 
military defence of South Korea, and only the US maintains forces there. The FCO’s 
Stephen Lillie told us that “the basis for the security of South Korea is not the UN 
Command, but the US-ROK mutual defence treaty”, and that “it has always been [the 
UK’s] assumption and understanding that in the case of a war, it would be the US and 
ROK combined forces that would be activated, at least in the first instance.”561  
298. Speaking in January 2007, the then UN Commander, General Bell, said that the UN 
Command “must maintain the capability to support the ROK-US Alliance with UN 
Forces, equipment and supplies”.562 Lord Malloch-Brown similarly told us that the UN 
Command “is vital because it allows the transit of reinforcements and equipment through 
Japan if they are needed.”563 
299. In the framework of their bilateral military relationship, the US and South Korea 
agreed in 1978 that, in the event of a renewal of hostilities, wartime operational command 
would not be held by the UN Command, but by the new US-South Korean Combined 
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Forces Command (CFC). This might have raised the prospect of an operational “gap” 
opening up between the responsibility on paper of the UN Command on the one hand, 
and the effective responsibility on the ground of the joint US/South Korean forces on the 
other. This was prevented because a single US General was always “triple-hatted” as 
Commander of the UN Command, Commander of the CFC, and Commander of US 
Forces Korea. However, as part of the South Korean forces’ long-term attainment of 
greater operational independence from their US allies, Seoul and Washington have agreed 
that the CFC is to be disbanded in 2012.564 At that time, South Korea will take sole wartime 
operational command of its forces.  
300. In his January 2007 remarks, General Bell said that the transfer of wartime operational 
command from the US to South Korea threatened to create a “military authority-to-
responsibility mismatch for the United Nations Command”, because the UN 
Commander—whom UNSCR 84 requires to be from the US—would no longer have direct 
operational authority over the South Korean armed forces in the event of war.565 This is 
potentially significant given that the US is withdrawing many of its forces further south 
into South Korea, leaving the frontline forces near the North Korean border 
overwhelmingly South Korean.566 General Bell said that the situation in prospect in 2012 
would potentially “make it impossible to credibly maintain the Armistice”.567  
301. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the transfer of operational wartime command to 
South Korea in 2012 will “not get in the way of the UNC, […] which will retain 
responsibility for maintaining the Armistice. That will remain under US control.”568 Mr 
Lillie implied that the US and South Korea would come to an arrangement about their 
future military co-operation and command structures, and he said that the Government 
“would accept the judgement of the United States forces that that is an acceptable 
arrangement, which fully meets their security requirements.”569 
302. In a follow-up letter to Lord Malloch-Brown’s oral evidence, the FCO told us that:  
the UNC has kept participating states informed of arrangements for reconfiguration 
of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in the run-up to 2012 through monthly 
meetings with the relevant Ambassadors in Seoul. The new Commander of the CFC 
has also publicly committed to continue this process as plans develop.570 
In September 2008, the UNC’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General John Weida, visited all 
the Command’s sending states to brief officials. The Chairman of the Committee met the 
General during his stay in London. On the basis of the information which is now available, 
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it is clear that, in the event of renewed conflict with the North post-2012, US and UNC 
forces would take a supporting role under overall South Korean command. However, the 
contributions of sending states would remain, subject to national caveat, under the same 
direct command relationship with the United States as at present. The UNC is taking steps 
to try to secure greater participation from its sending states in exercises in preparation for 
the post-2012 arrangements, with the aim of increasing contact between the sending states 
and the South Korean military in particular.  
303. UNCMAC maintains a Joint Duty Office in the Joint Security Area (JSA) at 
Panmunjom. The Joint Security Area is the area in the Demilitarised Zone—straddling the 
demarcation line between the two sides—where the Armistice bodies meet and other 
military and humanitarian contacts between the two sides in the Korean War may take 
place. We visited the JSA during our trip to South Korea in May. The UK has on occasion 
sent junior officers to do tours of duty in the UNCMAC Joint Duty Office on an ad hoc 
basis. Mr Lillie told us that the “provision of junior officers […] is very much an additional 
supporting role to help […] the South Korean forces”571 (who make up the bulk of 
UNCMAC’s special security force for the JSA). In correspondence following our visit to the 
JSA, the FCO confirmed the information that we had received there, namely that 
“commitments elsewhere have meant that [the UK has] not had officers available for the 
attachment since January 2008”.572 The FCO told us that the “Government remains willing 
to continue this arrangement when capacity allows”.573 
304. The UN Command has a Rear Headquarters in Japan. Under the 1954 status of forces 
agreement (SOFA) between the UN Command and Tokyo, the UN Command is allowed 
to use seven bases in Japan. The SOFA also specifies that the UN Command is to provide 
an international officer at its Rear Headquarters. The UK previously provided the 
international officer, but in 2007 it decided to withdraw its permanent post. During our 
visit to the region, we heard that the UN Command’s sending states had agreed in principle 
to provide the officer in rotation, but we encountered some uncertainty about the 
provision of the officer after the tour of the duty of the initial Thai officer finished at the 
end of 2008. In subsequent correspondence, the FCO told us that Turkey and then France 
had agreed to provide the officer after Thailand, and that the UK had committed to 
providing the officer in 2015.574  
305. We conclude that although there had been some risk of a disjunction opening up 
between the evolution of the bilateral South Korean-US military relationship and the 
formal responsibilities of the wider UN Command for peace and security on the 
Korean peninsula, under UN Security Council Resolution 84 and the Armistice 
Agreement, the UN Commander and his team are making efforts to avoid this risk, and 
that this is to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should participate 
actively in UN Command preparations for the transfer of operational wartime 
command to South Korea in 2012.     
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306. We conclude that the Government’s continued willingness to send officers to serve 
in the UNCMAC Joint Duty Office and at the UNC Rear Headquarters in Japan is a 
welcome expression of the UK’s commitment to the UN Command. We conclude that 
the agreement reached among the Command’s participating states to ensure the 
continued provision of an international officer at Rear Headquarters is to be 
particularly commended.   
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4 Japan and South Korea: International 
roles 
307. Japan and South Korea are both expanding their international roles. The FCO told us 
that the two countries are “major ‘like-minded’ partners for the UK”, with “a number of 
common objectives in international issues”.575 Among these, the FCO highlighted 
international security, climate change and poverty reduction.576 
308. In financial terms, Japan plays a major international role. Japan is the largest aid 
donor in Asia and the fifth-largest in the world.  It is the second-largest contributor to the 
UN budget after the US.  However, Japan’s international financial muscle is not matched 
militarily. Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution renounces war and disallows the possession of 
armed forces. Japan maintains forces which are self-defence forces (SDF) only, and its 
current interpretation of the constitution restricts its ability to participate in UN 
peacekeeping missions and to engage in military co-operation with any countries other 
than the US. In recent years, against strong domestic opposition, specific legislative 
approval has been given for SDF ground and air forces to be deployed to Iraq, and for SDF 
naval forces to provide fuel to coalition vessels operating in the Indian Ocean in support of 
the US operation in Afghanistan. More ambitious proposals to reduce the constitutional 
constraints on Japan’s ability to participate in UN peacekeeping and international military 
missions have so far come to nothing. The Japanese government is also pursuing a 
proposal, supported by the UK, that Japan should acquire a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council.577 
309. South Korea began to emerge internationally as it moved away from authoritarian 
rule in the late 1980s, a shift encapsulated in Seoul’s hosting of the Olympic Games in 1988. 
In the security sphere, South Korea has remained focused on developments on the Korean 
peninsula and its immediate region, but the overall improvement in North-South security 
relations over the last decade—plus South Korea’s increased economic and military 
capacities—have allowed Seoul to turn towards greater international engagement. 
President Lee is now promoting the notion of “Global Korea”.  
International military missions 
Japan 
310. Following the trauma of defeat in 1945—the only significant military defeat in the 
country’s history—strong pacifist and anti-militarist sentiment developed in Japan. Article 
9 of the 1947 Constitution renounces war as an instrument for settling international 
disputes and declares that the country will never again maintain “land, sea or air forces or 
other war potential”.  
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311. In the initial post-war period, Japan was wholly dependent on the US occupation 
forces, aided by a small number of police, for its security. In 1950 most occupation forces 
were transferred from Japan to take part in the Korean War, prompting anxiety among 
some conservative politicians about Japan’s capacity to defend itself. In 1952 the US and 
Japan signed the Mutual Security Assistance Pact, under which US forces would defend 
Japan against external aggression, while Japanese forces would deal with internal threats 
and national disasters. In 1960 the US-Japan Security Treaty was signed; this reconfirmed 
the pledge by the US to defend Japan (while imposing no reciprocal duty on the Japanese 
to defend the US). 
312. With US approval, the Japanese Government in 1954 created the Self-Defence Force 
(SDF). Military terminology was (and still is) avoided as far as possible, so the new armed 
forces were named the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defence 
Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) rather than the army, navy and air 
force. Successive Japanese governments have maintained that the Constitution permits 
Japan to maintain a minimum level of armed strength commensurate with self-defence. 
313. Japan’s “Basic Policy for National Defence”, adopted by the Cabinet in 1957, sets out 
six guiding principles: 
1.  Maintaining an exclusively defence-oriented policy.  
2. To avoid becoming a major military power that might pose a threat to the world. 
3. Refraining from the development of nuclear weapons, and to refuse to allow 
nuclear weapons inside Japanese territory. 
4. Ensuring civilian control of the military. 
5. Maintaining security arrangements with the United States. 
6. Building up defensive capabilities within moderate limits. 
314. In recent years, and particularly since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
US, there has been much debate in Japan about the future role of the Self-Defence Forces. 
In its memorandum to the Committee, RUSI commented: 
Japan is at a crossroads. It has been shifted by events, by its main ally, and by its 
leaders, from its Cold War position of strong economic policies combined with 
passive security and foreign policies. Although policy-makers display a desire to be 
involved in world affairs like a “normal” country, there remain significant sections of 
Japanese society uncomfortable with the implications of the changes.578 
315. For most of the history of the Self-Defence Force, the Japanese Government 
interpreted its function as being strictly restricted to the defence of the home islands. This 
definition excluded participation in peace-keeping missions. 
316. Since the 1990s there has been a change of thinking, prompted by the following 
changes in Japan’s security environment: 
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• Criticism levelled at Japan during the first Gulf War for “cheque-book diplomacy”, 
i.e. offering financial support rather than risking its own troops in combat or 
peacekeeping operations 
• China’s missile-firing and troop exercises, the discovery of submerged Chinese 
submarines near Okinawa, and China’s successful Anti-Satellite Test in January 
2007 
• The launch of North Korean missiles over Japanese airspace in 1998, the North 
Korean nuclear crisis, and the discovery that Japanese citizens had been abducted 
from the Japanese mainland by special teams of North Korean agents 
• The wish to support the United States in its “war on terror”. 579 
317. RUSI comments that “policy-makers now seek to normalise Japan’s military status in 
two different ways: as a reliable partner with its main ally the US, and as a responsible 
member of the United Nations”.580 
318. In December 2004 the Japanese Government adopted new National Defence 
Programme Guidelines, taking into account the new global situation. Dr Swenson-Wright 
described this as “a major overhaul of Japan’s national security doctrine”, intended “to shift 
Japan’s approach to security from a rather narrowly regionally-defined role to a much 
more self-consciously global role, harmonising its capabilities with America’s global force 
posture review”.581 In January 2007, in recognition of this enhanced role, the Japan Defence 
Agency was upgraded to being a fully-fledged Defence Ministry.582 
319. Since 1992, Japan has taken part in non-military peacekeeping (PKO), election-
monitoring (EMO) and disaster relief (DRO) operations, to a total of 21 countries. 
However, RUSI claims that  
Japanese peacekeeping forces are still hobbled by Diet-imposed rules, related to 
interpretation of the pacifist constitution. According to a Japanese government 
official, restrictions placed on Japanese PKO missions make them frustrating 
partners for other countries.583 
320. Japanese forces have also, more controversially, been deployed abroad in support of 
the US “war on terror” and of coalition forces in Iraq. Two pieces of legislation have 
enabled this. One is the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, passed shortly after the 
events of 11 September 2001. It allows deployment of Self-Defence Forces to take part in 
co-operation and support activities, search and rescue activities, and disaster relief for 
affected people. Under this law, Japanese supply vessels and Aegis destroyers have since 
2001 provided fuel to coalition vessels operating in the Indian Ocean in support of the US 
operation in Afghanistan. This deployment was briefly suspended from November 2007 to 
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January 2008 after the DPJ used its upper-house majority to block the renewal of the 
enabling legislation. An extension to the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was then 
pushed onto the statute book by then Prime Minister Fukuda in January 2008 against the 
wishes of the upper house, employing a rarely-used procedural device roughly equivalent 
to the Parliament Act in the UK, and the deployment was resumed.584 In October 2008 the 
lower house of the Diet approved legislation further to extend the deployment until 
January 2010.585 
321. In July 2003 the Diet passed an “Iraq Reconstruction Law”. This was used by former 
Prime Minister Koizumi, against strong domestic opposition, to deploy 550 ground SDF 
personnel to Iraq between 2004 and 2006. Japan also maintains an airlift mission there. 
Japan’s participation in international military missions 
Afghanistan 
Operating Enduring Freedom 
Ongoing since 2001: Japanese vessels (1 tanker and 1 escort destroyer) are refuelling coalition 
vessels conducting interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean (apart from a break in 
November 2007—January 2008 owing to an opposition block on the enabling legislation in 
the upper house) 
Japan is also a major funder of the international humanitarian and reconstruction effort in 
Afghanistan, to the tune of $1.2 billion since 2002  
Iraq 
2004-06:  550 ground troops deployed to southern Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance 
Ongoing: Intra-theatre airlift mission (3 C-130 transport aircraft), currently authorised until 
July 2009 
Japan has disbursed $1.5 billion in aid to Iraq and signed agreements for development loans 
totalling up to a further $2.1 billion 
UN operations 
Nepal 
Ongoing since 2007: Six troops with UN military observer mission (UNMIN) 
Golan Heights 
Ongoing since 1996: Two staff officers plus 43-strong transport unit with UN peacekeeping 
mission (UNDOF) 
In East Timor, Japan has recently completed participation in a mission, which follows two 
earlier missions as follows:  
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2007-2008: Two civilian police officers and support staff with UN Integrated Mission in 
Timor-Leste (UNMIT) 
2002-2004: c. 680 military engineers and 10 staff officers with the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), followed by the post-independence UN Mission 
of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) 
1999: Three civilian police officers plus support staff with the pre-independence UN Mission 
in East Timor (UNAMET) 
Other completed peacekeeping operations include: Cambodia (600 engineers, 8 ceasefire 
observers, 75 police officers, plus support ships, 1992-93); Mozambique (5 staff officers and 
48-strong transport unit, 1993-95); and Rwanda (humanitarian support, 1994)  
 
322. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law is due to expire by January 2009. The 
government has proposed the introduction of a new permanent law to remove the 
requirement for the Diet to give case-by-case approval to SDF deployments overseas. 
323. The amendment of Article 9 itself has been much discussed. As presently interpreted 
by the cabinet, it allows Japan to exercise a right to self-defence, but not to participate with 
other states in collective defence. There is strong public feeling in favour of Article 9, but an 
equally strong feeling in the ruling LDP that it needs to be changed. The LDP has drafted a 
revision of the Japanese Constitution, amending the Article, but to be enacted the bill 
needs approval by two-thirds majorities in the two Houses and a majority of the popular 
vote in a referendum. Former Prime Minister Koizumi tried but failed to secure enactment 
of a similar proposal. The LDP accepts that amending the Constitution is now a longer-
term prospect, not likely to be achieved within the next five years. The immediate debate, 
accordingly, is about how to remove restrictions on peace-keeping deployments within the 
current Constitution. 
324. Japan’s defence capability is structured around the alliance with the US. Japan does 
not possess aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines or large transport aircraft such as 
the C-17. This would limit her capacity to play a major military role in large-scale missions 
such as ISAF in Afghanistan or Operation Enduring Freedom. If a political decision were 
taken to participate in such missions, the procurement implications would need to be 
explored. During our visit to Japan, we were told that Japan would certainly have the 
technical capacity to build, for instance, large submarines or carriers comparable to the 
UK’s Invincible class. 
325. In its written evidence, the FCO stated that the Government “would like to see Japan 
doing more [on international peacekeeping] despite the constitutional constraints, and has 
lobbied for a greater contribution in Afghanistan and Africa among other places”.586 The 
FCO says that the UK’s “primary security co-operation objective” regarding Japan is to 
“help build Japan’s capacity for joint operations, particularly in the area of peace support 
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activities combining civil and military effects”.587 Lord Malloch-Brown told us that it was 
very much in the UK’s interest to encourage Japan, 
within the limitations of article 9 of their post-war constitution, to become active in 
peacekeeping missions such as Afghanistan […]. We do not want Japan to skulk 
back into itself, disappointed by its lack of a global role or recognition of that global 
role, or to be thrown off balance by its increasingly competitive relationship with 
China.588 
326. We conclude that Japan has offered valuable support to the international 
community through its very generous funding of peacekeeping and reconstruction 
activities, not least in Iraq and Afghanistan. We further conclude that the Japanese 
Government has displayed political courage in deploying Japanese ground and air 
forces to Iraq, and Japanese naval forces to assist in refuelling coalition vessels 
conducting operations in the Indian Ocean, and that these deployments are to be 
welcomed. We recommend that the Government should continue to engage with Japan 
as a co-operative partner in promoting international security and the fight against 
terrorism, and to encourage Japan to expand its participation in UN peacekeeping and 
international military missions as far as permitted by its Constitution to do so. 
South Korea 
327. South Korea has the world’s sixth-largest army and spends more on defence per capita 
than the UK.589 South Korea does not have Japanese-style constitutional limitations on the 
use of military force or its deployment overseas. The FCO told us that South Korea’s 
“desire to play a greater role on the international stage and to maintain its alliance with the 
US has led to South Korean soldiers being sent overseas to play a valuable and important 
role in the last six years”.590 
328. South Korea deployed forces to the US-led operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq: 
• In Afghanistan, South Korea deployed around 50 army medics and 150 engineers 
between 2002 and December 2007, with the loss of one soldier. Seoul ended the 
deployment a year before its scheduled conclusion, after Afghan militants 
demanding the troops’ withdrawal kidnapped a group of South Korean 
missionaries and killed two of them. A small number of South Korean military and 
civilian personnel are now in Afghanistan as part of a Provincial Reconstruction 
Team based at Bagram Airbase.  
• In Iraq, South Korea was at one point the third-largest contributor of troops to the 
US-led Multinational Force, with 3,000 soldiers deployed. South Korea now has 
around 650 troops in Iraq, deployed in Irbil under US command as part of the 
Force’s Multinational Division North until the end of 2008.   
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329. During his visit to Seoul in August 2008, US President Bush asked South Korea for “as 
much non-combat help as possible”591 in Afghanistan. In response to the US request, South 
Korea may send more personnel to the Provincial Reconstruction Team, and despatch 
police officers to conduct training.592 President Bush did not request a further South 
Korean military deployment in Afghanistan, despite speculation in advance of the summit 
that he would do so. It is assumed that President Lee would currently find such a request 
too sensitive domestically, given anti-American sentiment in Seoul surrounding the beef 
import row, and the way in which South Korea’s previous deployment in Afghanistan was 
brought to an end.593 The FCO noted that there was a possibility that the South Korean 
Navy might participate in Combined Task Force 150, a multinational naval force 
conducting counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations in the Middle East and Indian 
Ocean as part of the US operation in Afghanistan.594 As regards Iraq, the US has been  
reported as wanting to see South Korea extend its deployment in Iraq beyond the end-2008 
deadline currently mandated,595 but the Defence Ministry in Seoul was quoted in 
September as ruling this out, and the end of the deployment appeared to be confirmed by 
late October.596 
330. South Korea has contributed troops to several UN peacekeeping operations. 
Deployments include over 300 troops with the UN mission in Lebanon since July 2007—
extended for another year in July 2008597—and small numbers of police deployed with the 
UN missions in Sudan and East Timor. South Korea also has small numbers of military 
observers with the UN missions in Georgia, Kashmir, Liberia and Nepal. Among 
completed South Korean deployments, South Korea contributed to UN peacekeeping 
missions in Somalia, Angola and Western Sahara, and a South Korean served as 
Commander of the UN mission in Cyprus in 2001-2003. In 2008, the possibility of South 
Korean participation in the UN mission in Darfur is under active consideration in Seoul.  
331. The FCO identified South Korea as having “modern and capable defence forces”, and 
therefore as possessing “considerable potential as a substantial contributor to international 
peacekeeping operations”.598 It added that “the UK’s primary defence relations objective 
[in the country] is to persuade South Korea to contribute more to global PSO [peace 
support operations]”.599 South Korea is expected to create a force of 1,000 for participation 
in UN operations by the end of 2008, expanding to 2,000 by 2012. However, the FCO also 
noted that South Korea’s regional security responsibilities have always taken precedence 
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over any wider international role, and that the conscript nature of the country’s armed 
forces acts as a further constraint on overseas deployments.600    
 
332. Deployments of South Korean forces overseas require specific annual approval from 
the National Assembly. The FCO told us that legislation was likely to be proposed that 
would allow South Korea to deploy forces to UN-mandated missions without such 
approval. The FCO said that such legislation would “facilitate rapid deployment of Korean 
forces on UN PSO”601 and help to “enhance Korea’s ability to contribute to global PSO”,602 
although it noted that similar proposals had failed on three previous occasions to go 
through the legislature.603 We heard in Seoul that the possible legislation might also apply 
to missions other than those taking place under UN mandates.  
333. We conclude that South Korea’s growing willingness and ability to deploy its 
forces in international peacekeeping and peace support operations are to be welcomed. 
We further conclude that South Korea continues to make valuable contributions to the 
international efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq in which the UK is also engaged. We 
recommend that the Government should continue to encourage South Korea to 
participate more extensively in international peacekeeping and peace support 
operations and to enhance its capacities to do so.   
Climate change   
Japan 
334. Action on climate change has been one of the major themes of Japan’s G8 Presidency. 
Former Prime Minister Fukuda announced at the Davos World Economic Forum in 
January 2008 that he would follow his predecessor Mr Abe’s proposal that the world 
should reduce total greenhouse emissions by half by 2050 (“the 50/50 proposal”). Mr 
Fukuda put forward the following programme to achieve this:   
• Japan would agree to set a post-Kyoto “quantified national target”, which could be 
based on a bottom-up system of industry-based targets. However, the 1990 Kyoto 
base year “must” be reviewed: it is argued that Japan’s 6% emissions reduction 
target under Kyoto was unfair because it did not recognise the energy-efficiency 
gains Japan had already made. 
• The “Cool Earth Partnership” will offer $10 billion of economic assistance to 
developing countries, to encourage them to reduce their emissions.  
• Japan proposes to set up a new multilateral fund jointly with the US and UK. 
• Japan will invest $30 billion in energy research and development over the next five 
years. 
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335. As regards the setting of overall national targets for emissions reductions, the FCO 
reports that Japanese representatives “coordinated their position very closely with the US” 
at the UN Bali meeting in December 2007 and “were consistently among the back 
markers” in resisting further mention of short-term emissions reduction targets for 
developed countries.”604  Dr Swenson-Wright told the Committee that: 
Japan is trying to present itself as a mediating force between the European Union—
with its preference for some sort of top-down, unified set of standards to deal with 
climate change, as well as a system of emissions trading—and the United States, 
which we know is very sceptical about the merits of binding national targets.605 
336. Dr Swenson-Wright noted that tension between Japan’s Environment Ministry, which 
favours more radical action on climate change, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry which favours a stance based on voluntary agreements, has led to “a reluctance to 
set formal targets or to establish a clear time frame”.606 Dr Swenson-Wright judged that 
climate change should be the FCO’s top priority with Japan and identified the issue as 
“probably the area in which there is the most opportunity to enhance and develop the 
bilateral relationship”.607    
337. On 23 April 2008 a joint Japan-EU statement was issued following the annual summit 
between EU and Japanese leaders in Tokyo. On climate change the leaders accepted that 
“setting mid-term quantified national emissions reduction targets is an essential element of 
[…] a fair and flexible framework in which major economies participate substantially”. The 
EU and Japan undertook to ensure that the forthcoming G8 summit would contribute to 
reducing emissions. They stressed that “a highly ambitious and binding international 
approach is required to deal with the scale and urgency of the climate change challenge”.608  
European Commission President Barroso welcomed the joint statement, saying that on 
climate change it represented a “convergence” between the positions of the EU and 
Japan.609 
338. The G8 leaders met in Hokkaido in July 2008 and agreed the following statement of 
“vision”: 
We seek to share with all parties to the UNFCCC [the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change] the vision of, and together with them to consider 
and adopt in the UNFCCC negotiations, the goal of achieving at least 50% reduction 
of global emissions by 2050, recognising that this global challenge can only be met by 
a global response, in particular, by the contributions from all major economies, 
consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. 
 
604 Ev 62 
605 Q 6 
606 Q 6 
607 Q 19 
608 Council of the European Union press release 8771/08 (Presse 111), Brussels, 23 April 2008 
609 “Japan, EU leaders call for ‘highly ambitious’ climate goals”, AFP, 23 April 2008 
 
Global Security: Japan and Korea    115 
339. Then Prime Minister Fukuda interpreted the G8 statement as giving support to, or at 
least not being incompatible with, three of Japan’s goals: 
• The target of a 50% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. 
• The desirability of setting different industrial sectors different targets with the aim 
of preserving competitiveness. 
• That the baseline year should be the present rather than 1990, which Japan argues 
effectively penalises her because she, unlike most other countries, had already made 
good progress in achieving energy efficiency by that date.610 
340. On the final day of the meeting the G8 leaders were joined by the leaders of eight 
“emerging economies”, and all 16, comprising a ‘Major Economies Meeting’ (MEM), 
agreed a further statement.611 Environmental campaigners denounced both the G8 and 
MEM conclusions as being vague and unspecific, pointing out that none of the “big 
polluters”—the United States, India and China—had given binding undertakings that they 
would take particular steps to achieve the “50/50” goal.612 
341. We recommend that the Government should, with its EU partners, continue to 
work with Japan to develop a common approach on developing realistic proposals for a 
reduction in emissions and other measures to tackle climate change. 
South Korea 
342. Per capita, South Korea is one of the OECD’s largest greenhouse gas emitters,613 and 
the world’s ninth-largest overall.614 Lord Malloch-Brown noted that South Korea “has one 
of the bigger emissions footprints around”.615 This is largely owing to the way in which 
South Korea’s economic development since the 1960s has been based on heavy industries.  
343. South Korea occupies what the FCO described as an “anomalous” position in the 
current international regime against climate change.616 Under the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Convention’s subsequent—legally 
binding—Kyoto Protocol, South Korea is not among the industrialised countries which are 
committed to reductions in their greenhouse gas emissions (so-called “Annex I” 
countries). This is despite the economy’s size and status as an OECD member. Given South 
Korea’s position, the FCO told us that the country had “a potential role to play in bridging 
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the gap between developed and developing countries”617 which has become evident in the 
discussions about a successor regime to the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012.     
344. The FCO reported conflicting indications regarding South Korea’s likely action 
against climate change. On the one hand, the FCO said that “the South Korean 
Government and business are increasingly preparing for […] the possibility of taking on 
board a commitment post-2012”.618 It also noted that “some South Korean officials have 
expressed strong interest in carbon pricing and trading”, and that in December 2007 the 
South Korean Government had announced plans to boost renewable energy use. 619 On the 
other hand, the FCO also noted “widespread scepticism” about carbon pricing and trading, 
and “concerns over negative impacts on competitiveness” which “pose a considerable 
obstacle” to stronger action.620 The FCO concluded that “economic growth will remain the 
highest priority” for the new South Korean Administration, although it also noted 
“indications that the new Government may react to growing international pressure with a 
more constructive approach on climate change policy”.621 
345. Dr Hoare was somewhat sceptical about prospects for strong South Korean action on 
climate change. He told us that “South Korea often pays lip service to such things”, but that 
there was “pressure […] still for economic development and growth [which] […] tends to 
override other considerations”. Dr Hoare suggested that little in President Lee’s ambitious 
economic plans “seems to take much account of the climatic consequences of such a push 
for growth”.622  
346. South Korea’s energy needs are likely to be a major consideration in its evolving 
approach to climate change issues. South Korea is almost entirely dependent on imports 
for its energy supplies: the FCO noted that the country is the world’s fourth-largest 
importer of oil and second-largest importer of liquid natural gas,623 and according to 
President Lee its energy self-sufficiency rate is around 5.0%.624 High international energy 
prices are bringing home the implications of this dependence: the costs of South Korea’s 
imported oil were reported to have risen by 60% in the first half of 2008, and the country is 
among those to have seen protests over the price of fuel.625 
347. In late May 2008, Environment Secretary Hilary Benn signed Memorandums of 
Understanding in Seoul with the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy, on co-operation between the UK and South Korea in areas relevant 
to climate change including the economics of climate change, clean development 
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mechanisms, low carbon technologies and emission trading schemes. The UK and South 
Korea are to produce a list of collaborative projects within six months.626 
348. At the G8 summit in July hosted by Japan, at which he was invited to address the 
expanded session on climate change, President Lee said that South Korea would 
“vigorously support” the goal agreed by the G8 of halving global greenhouse gas emissions 
by 2050, and that Korea aimed to “play a bridging role between developed and developing 
countries”. He also said that South Korea was “in the process of building national 
consensus” and that he hoped in 2009 to announce a national emissions reduction goal for 
2020. President Lee said that the aim should be to “harmonise economic growth with 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions”.627 In his blog, the British Ambassador in Seoul, 
Martin Uden, said that President Lee’s speech “amount[ed] to a clear step forward by his 
government in their consideration of how Korea should tackle climate change”.628  
349. In his opening address to the new National Assembly later in July, and especially in his 
speech on the anniversary of South Korea’s foundation in August, President Lee went 
further in developing a climate change agenda. He heralded an “environmental revolution” 
and an “age of new energy”, and he announced the need for a “paradigm shift” in South 
Korean economic development. President Lee said that “low carbon, green growth” should 
be “the core of the Republic’s new vision”. President Lee suggested that the development of 
green technologies would be a source of growth and jobs. He promised a package of 
follow-up measures, and a framework law on climate change.629  
350. In his August address, President Lee targeted an energy self-sufficiency rate of 18% by 
the end of his term in 2012.630 South Korea is addressing the energy independence issue 
partly by expanding nuclear power generation, and by beginning to develop its own energy 
extraction and delivery involvement overseas, in Africa, the Arctic and Antarctic, Central 
Asia, the Middle East and Iraq. In addition, President Lee has announced a further increase 
in funding for research and development of “green” technologies including new and 
renewable energy, aiming to increase the latter’s share in South Korea’s total from 2% at 
present to over 11% in 2030.631 
351. We conclude that recent signs that South Korea is coming to see efforts to mitigate 
climate change as a potential source of growth, not an obstacle to it, are greatly to be 
welcomed. We recommend that the Government should continue to encourage South 
Korea to develop its efforts against climate change, focusing on the potential which the 
development of “green” technologies offers for the country to exploit its industrial and 
technological strengths to boost growth and reduce energy dependence, but still aiming 
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to secure a concrete national emissions reduction commitment which would help 
towards the achievement of a global Kyoto successor agreement in 2009. We  
recommend that the Government should ensure that British companies are aware of 
opportunities for climate change-related projects which open up in South Korea. We 
further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should update 
us on progress regarding the implementation of the bilateral Memorandums of 
Understanding on climate change co-operation which were signed in May 2008.     
Development assistance 
Japan 
352. Japan’s aid budget has declined in recent years, and Japan has slipped from being the 
world's largest single aid donor in absolute terms to being the fifth-largest. According to 
OECD statistics, Japan’s net Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2007 was $7.69 
billion (compared to $21.75 billion from the US, $12.27 billion from Germany, $9.94 
billion from France, and $9.92 billion from the UK).632 Most Japanese aid has traditionally 
gone to Asia and the Pacific, particularly China, and Indonesia and other ASEAN states. 
The FCO states that: 
Japan was a significant contributor to the aid efforts after the tsunami, giving $500 
million as well as providing logistical help on the ground. However, Japan has 
reduced its aid budget in recent years, reflecting economic difficulties and growing 
political opposition to the scale of grant aid offered to China.633 
353. Japan’s development policy is marked by an increasing number of partners for the 
government. These include other donors and international organisations, where Japan has 
links not only with traditional donors such as the UK and France but also emerging donors 
such as South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand.  
354. Despite the overall decline in Japan’s aid budget, the proportion allocated to Africa is 
increasing.634 Japan hosted a major conference on development for African countries at the 
end of May 2008, as part of the build-up to the G8 summit in July. This was the fourth 
Tokyo International Conference on Africa (TICAD IV). Japanese policy in Africa is to 
focus on countries with good governance and few natural resources. 
355. The Japanese are very conscious of the growing influence of China in Africa. When 
we visited Tokyo, we were told that Japan has no wish to compete with China in accessing 
natural resources in Africa, and lacks the resources to do so, but that it aimed to ensure that 
China at least does not undermine what Japan is doing. 
356. Giving oral evidence in early July 2008, shortly before the G8 summit, Lord Malloch-
Brown told us that: 
 
632 OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, “Net Official Development Assistance in 2007”, in “Development Aid in 
2007 Tables and Graphs”, 4 April 2008, via the statistics section of the DCD webpage at www.oecd.org  
633 FCO Japan country brief, April 2008 (not reported to the House) 
634 The share of Japan’s gross national income spent on development aid to Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to increase 
from 0.04% in 2004 to 0.05% in 2010; DATA (Debt AIDS Trade Africa), The DATA Report 2007, p 24 
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The Japanese have also done pretty well on development. They had the Tokyo 
international conference on African aid, which discussed Japan-Africa development.  
It was quite a success, and that has given new momentum to development issues as 
we come into the G8 meeting.635 
357. We conclude that Japan continues to play a positive role with regard to 
development issues. We recommend that the Government should continue to work 
with Japan in the G8 and other forums to press for the implementation of the 
Millennium Development Goals. 
South Korea 
358. The FCO characterises South Korea as “a key emerging donor with a great deal of 
promise” and said that South Korea had “the potential to have considerable impact on the 
world stage” in this field.636 South Korea established its first fund for overseas aid in 1987. 
In 2007, it provided overseas development assistance (ODA) equivalent to around 0.09% of 
gross national income (GNI) (compared to 0.36% for the UK).637 The FCO reported that 
Seoul plans to increase this to 0.15% of GNI by 2010 and 0.25% by 2015. If these plans were 
to be realised, by the end of the period South Korea would be among the ten largest donors 
in volume terms among members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC).638 South Korea is not yet a DAC member, but at the end of September 2008 it 
completed with the OECD the review process which precedes accession to the body, and 
Seoul hopes to join the Committee by 2010.639 In his August 2008 address, President Lee 
had reaffirmed his intention of increasing South Korea’s ODA, as part of his goal of 
making South Korea “an advanced country” enjoying “respect in the international 
community”.640   
359. The FCO told us that South Korea “looks to the UK as a role model for ODA work 
and has established a close working relationship with the Department for International 
Development” (DFID).641 DFID holds an annual policy dialogue with South Korea’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The FCO said that this “is a key partnership for the 
UK in terms of increasing aid volumes, effectiveness and co-operation.”642 
360. We conclude that, from a low base, South Korea’s growing willingness and 
capacity to contribute to overseas development assistance are to be welcomed. We 
further conclude that the Government is correct to encourage and co-operate with 
 
635 Q 131 
636 Ev 69 
637 Ev 69 [FCO]; OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, “Net Official Development Assistance in 2007”, in 
“Development Aid in 2007 Tables and Graphs”, 4 April 2008, via the statistics section of the DCD webpage at 
www.oecd.org  
638 Ev 69 [FCO] 
639 Ev 69 [FCO]; “Korea set to join OECD aid panel”, Korea Herald, 30 September 2008 
640 “Address by President Lee Myung-bak on the 63rd anniversary of national liberation and the 60th anniversary of the 
founding of the Republic of Korea”, 15 August 2008, via www.english.president.go.kr 
641 Ev 69 
642 Ev 69 
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South Korea in this area and recommend that it should continue to do so, as an 
opportunity to shape the development practice of a potentially important donor.  
United Nations 
Japan 
361. Japan, with the support of the UK, is seeking to acquire a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council. Japan’s permanent membership has been mooted as part of a potential 
reform aimed at making the body more representative. In 2004 Japan, together with Brazil, 
Germany and India, collectively known as the ‘G4’ countries, put forward a proposal for six 
new permanent seats (for the G4 themselves plus two for Africa), and four new temporary 
seats. Supporters of Japan’s bid argue that it would reflect the country’s economic strength 
and also be a welcome further step in the ‘normalisation’ of Japan’s role in the international 
community. They also note that Japan currently contributes more to UN funding than four 
of the five existing permanent members, supplying nearly a fifth of the total UN budget.643 
(In 2006 the United States contributed 22% of the budget ($383 million), Japan 19.4% 
($332 million), Germany 8.7% ($147 million), the United Kingdom 6.1% ($104 million) 
and France 6.0% ($102 million).)644 
362. However, permanent Japanese membership of the Security Council is opposed by 
some countries, not least by China. When the issue last came to a head at the World 
Summit in 2005,645 the Chinese lobbied vigorously against the G4 proposal. The proposal  
was also opposed by the United States, and it was not adopted. Although Lord Malloch-
Brown described achieving permanent membership of the Security Council as “an 
extraordinarily high priority for Japanese foreign policy”,646 we were told during our visit 
to Japan that this aspiration is modified by a realistic assessment that in the short to 
medium term a more likely outcome is an interim compromise on Security Council 
membership which would entail the creation of a new category of ‘semi-permanent’ 
members which could be re-elected at fixed intervals. The recent improvement in Sino-
Japanese relations647 may lead to a renewed attempt by Japan to secure China’s support on 
648this issue.  
363. It is accepted within Japan that permanent membership of the Security Council, if this 
were to be secured, would entail carrying a heavier burden of international responsibilities, 
in relation to peace-keeping missions and diplomatic activity. Dr Swenson-Wright told us 
that the efforts made by the Japanese Government in ensuring the passage of two key 
Security Council resolutions (Resolutions 1695 and 1718, in response, respectively, to 
North Korea’s launch of ballistic missiles in July 2006 and its detonation of a nuclear device 
 
643 Q3 
essional Researc644 Congr h Service, “United Nations Regular Budget Contributions: Members Compared, 1989-2006”, 
h-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly held on 14-16 September 2005 
t]. 
January 2008, p 20 
645 The Hig
646 Q 136 
647 See paras 43-6 above. 
648 See Q 4 [Dr Swenson-Wrigh
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in October 2006)649 reinforce its argument for permanent membership. Dr Swenson-
Wright added that he did not see any contradiction between Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution and Japan enhancing its role in the UN.650 Lord Malloch-Brown set out the 
Government’s position on this issue: 
all assume that the 
651
ility to make continuing contributions 
to the finances and work of the United Nations. 
udience that it had been a UN force 
h ad defended South Korea in the Korean War.654  
 
We are very clear that we strongly support [Japan’s] membership of the council. 
Because it is the second largest economy in the world, it is the second largest 
contributor to peacekeeping operations. On the simple Boston tea party principle of 
no taxation without representation, it seems inherently unfair that Japan is being 
asked to pay ever larger portions of a growing global peacekeeping bill but has no 
direct say over it. It has made Japan rather recalcitrant on the expansion of 
peacekeeping, and grumpy about it. It has turned Japan into budget cutters and all 
the rest of it. We are losing its support in the same way that we are, on a smaller scale, 
losing Germany’s, and that has a real cost, because I think that we 
multilateral portion of global peacekeeping is likely to increase.  
364. We conclude that, although the process of United Nations reform is currently 
stalled, the Government is right in principle to support Japan’s case for a permanent 
seat on the Security Council, on grounds of Japan’s economic strength, size of 
population, commitment to democracy, and ab
South Korea 
365. An important element in South Korea’s international emergence has been the 
appointment of its former Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon as UN Secretary-General, from 
January 2007. The FCO said that the appointment “was viewed by many as heralding 
South Korea’s arrival on the world stage.”652 We have held meetings with Mr Ban during 
both our visits to the UN in New York since his appointment, in October 2007 and 2008. 
Mr Ban has urged greater South Korean engagement with the UN, and in particular has 
encouraged more South Koreans to take up positions with the organisation (where they are 
under-represented).653 During a visit to Seoul in July 2008, Secretary-General Ban also said 
that he was “somewhat ashamed” that South Korea did not contribute more to UN ODA 
funds or UN peacekeeping operations, reminding his a
t at h
366. The FCO describes South Korea—like Japan—as a “committed” member of the 
UN.655 Since 2006, South Korea has been among the 15 largest contributors to the UN 
regular budget, accounting for a 2.2% share.656 It is responsible for a similar share of the 
649 See paras 111, 154 above.  
med’ Ban chides homeland over UN effort”, Financial Times, 5 July 2008 
650 Q 3 
651 Q 136 
652 Ev 67 
653 “UN chief Ban makes emotional return to homeland”, Chosun Ilbo, 5 July 2008 
654 “’Asha
655 Ev 56 
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budget for UN peacekeeping.657 However, having paid off large arrears in 2007, South 
Korea is again reported to be accruing a growing debt to the organisation, largely as a result 
658
ere being shaped partly by his experiences of 
d seek to engage South Korea fully with the UK’s ideas for UN 
reform.      
n commercial whaling. The UK opposes all lethal whaling. The 
DEFRA website states: 
IWC as an effective organisation for the conservation of whale stocks world-
ly called both organisations “eco-terrorists” 
o are acting “illegally and dangerously”.661 
 
of the burgeoning costs of UN peacekeeping.   
367. The FCO told us that South Korea was “fully committed to the UN reform agenda, 
and the need to shape a more efficient, effective and responsible UN, headed by a 
Secretary-General empowered to run it.”659 We heard in Seoul that Secretary-General Ban’s 
efforts to reform the UN organisation w
reforming the Foreign Ministry in Seoul.  
368. We conclude that South Korea’s support for the UN and for UN reform is to be 
welcomed. We recommend that the Government should continue to encourage South 
Korea to enhance its tangible commitment to the UN. We further recommend that the 
Government shoul
Japan and whaling 
369. Whaling is one of only two issues highlighted by the FCO in its written evidence as 
points of contention between the UK and Japan (the other being the death penalty).660 
Under the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, states parties have the right to 
conduct “scientific” whaling. Pointing to this right, Japan continues to carry out large-scale 
lethal whaling in the Antarctic and North Pacific. Japan also works actively to recruit 
developing countries at the International Whaling Commission (IWC) which will back its 
wish to end the ban o
The UK Government will continue to make our opposition to whaling known to 
Japan at every appropriate opportunity and argue that they undermine the credibility 
of the 
wide. 
370. Japan’s whaling activities in the Antarctic have recently been the source of 
controversy. The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and Greenpeace both sent ships to 
the region in an attempt to harass the Japanese fleet. They claim that they saved up to 500 
whales (Japan failed to meet its target of 850 minke whales and 50 fin whales. It had, under 
pressure from Australia, already pledged not to hunt for 50 humpback whales).  Japan’s 
Institute for Cetacean Research has previous
wh  
371. Dr Swenson-Wright commented that the commitment to whaling remains quite 
strong in Japan: “it is presented as driven by scientific research interest, but the reality is 
657 “Korea’s UN tab accumulating, again”, Korea Herald, 4 July 2008 
658 “Korea’s UN tab accumulating, again”, Korea Herald, 4 July 2008 
ists race to hunt down whalers”, The Guardian, 11 December 2006 
659 Ev 67 
660 See paras 379-87 below.  
661 “Activ
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that it is still an important part of domestic political culture”.662 He noted some signs that 
the Japanese Government might be amenable to influence on this subject (for instance, the 
undertaking in respect of humpback whales referred to above), but he added that “it is 
te difficult to see how the British Government can persuade Japan to undertake what 
ed that it was important to 
 on depleting natural resources, there were coastal communities in Japan whose 
iv l hood depended on whaling, and the Government had to take their wishes into 
s that Japan should 
ly on this issue, and to pursue all means at its disposal of dissuading the 




would be a major cultural shift” by abandoning the consumption of whalemeat..663 
372. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that, despite the UK’s friendship with Japan, it differs 
with it “very fiercely” on the issue of whaling. The Government had expressed “our 
abhorrence of this activity and we go on fighting”. He add
ensure that any restructuring or reform of the International Whaling Commission should 
not be “a cover for emasculating its anti-whaling position”.664 




374. The most recent annual  meeting of the International Whaling Commission, held in 
June 2008 in Chile, ended without agreement on key issues such as Japan’s demand that 
the global moratorium on commercial whaling be at least partially lifted to allow hunting 
in coastal waters, or on the opposing demand of anti-whaling nation
halt its scientific whaling programme in the Antarctic. Nonetheless there was a 
commitment to continue dialogue between the participating states.665 
375. We conclude that support for whaling is culturally entrenched in Japan, and that 
this state of affairs is unlikely to alter in the short term. We further conclude that, 
notwithstanding this, the Government is right to lobby its Japanese counterparts 
vigorous
662 Q 18 
663 Q 18 
664 Q 149 
665 “Whale meet ends with peace agenda”, BBC News online, 27 June 2008 
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5 Human rights in Japan and South Korea  
376. In its new strategic framework, announced in January 2008, the FCO reaffirmed that 
the promotion of human rights was one of its aims. Human rights promotion forms part of 
the larger FCO policy goal—now one of only four—of “preventing and resolving 
conflict”.666 
377. In 2008, both Japan and South Korea were among the first countries to have their 
human rights performances reviewed under the new Universal Periodic Review process, in 
the framework of the UN Human Rights Council established in 2006.667  
Death penalty in Japan and South Korea 
378. Japan and South Korea both retain the death penalty. South Korea has not carried out 
an execution since 1997. As a result, human rights organisations classify it as a de facto 
abolitionist state.668 Japan continues to make regular use of the death penalty.  
Japan 
379. In Japan, executions are carried out by hanging. They are typically held in secret, 
usually during periods when parliament (the Diet) is in recess or on national holidays.669 
Amnesty International states that “prisoners are only informed hours before their 
executions, and their families receive no notice of their imminent execution. This practice 
means that prisoners live with the constant fear of execution.”670 During our visit to Japan 
we were told that the real, but unacknowledged, reason for executions being carried out 
with very little notice is to minimise the possibility of suicides. 
380. The UN Committee against Torture, in May 2007, stated that “unnecessary secrecy 
and arbitrariness surrounding the time of the execution” and “the psychological strain 
imposed upon inmates and families by the constant uncertainty of the date of the 
execution” could also be considered torture, requesting that Japan should immediately 
introduce a moratorium on executions.671 
381.  In September 2005, Justice Minister Seiken Sugiura announced a moratorium on 
executions. However, his successor, Jinen Nagase, reversed this policy. In December 2006, 
four men were executed (including a man aged 77 and another aged 75). In 2007, nine 
executions were carried out, including one of a man reportedly suffering from mental 
illness. In 2008, to the time of agreeing this Report, there have been 15 executions, of which 
 
666 HC Deb, 23 January 2008, col 52WS; FCO, “Better World, Better Britain”, mission statement, February 2008; FCO, FCO 
Departmental Report 1 April 2007-31 March 2008, Cm 7398, May 2008, p 16; FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 
2007, Cm 7340, March 2008, pp 7-9 
667 We considered the new Human Rights Council most recently in our Human Rights Annual Report 2007, Ninth Report 
of Session 2007-08, HC 533, paras 13-19 
668 See the websites of Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org, and the anti-death penalty NGO Hands Off Cain,  
www.handsoffcain.info 
669 Q 66 
670 Amnesty International Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review: Japan, 22 January 2008 
671 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Japan, May 2007, para 19 
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five took place after a new Justice Minister, Okiharu Yasuoka, took up his post in 
August.672 Whether the replacement of Mr Fukuda by Mr Aso as Prime Minister in 
September 2008 will lead to any change in Japanese policy towards the death penalty is not 
s yet known. 
ecades; one 
674
litionist members of parliament are planning to submit an 
b l tion bill to the Diet.676 
 be applied where 
red that if these matters were 
r  widely known, public attitudes might begin to change. 





382. It is believed that, as of September 2008, around 100 prisoners are on death row in 
Japan.673 Due to the slowness of the legal process, some have been there for d
man, Okunishi Masaru, was sentenced to death in 1961 and is now aged 82.   
383. The FCO told us that the UK, through the EU, “regularly takes this up with the 
Japanese Government, although there is still overwhelming support for capital punishment 
in Japan”.675 A 2005 Japanese Government poll found that over 80% of the public is in 
favour of executions with only 6% calling for capital punishment to be abolished. However, 
the FCO reports that abo
a o i
384. During our visit to Japan, we were informed by Japanese government sources that the 
reason for the increase in use of the death penalty is that formerly the penalty could only be 
applied in cases where there were multiple victims, whereas now it can
there is a single victim if the nature of the crime is particularly heinous. 
385. During our visit we also met representatives of the Japanese Federation of Bar 
Associations, which has a human rights campaigning role. They argued that the Japanese 
public are ignorant about the circumstances surrounding the death penalty—how those 
sentenced to death are not entitled to defence lawyers on legal aid after their initial 
conviction; and how executions are carried out with minimal notice to the person 
sentenced and no notice to his or her family. They conside
mo e
386. Giving evidence to us in early July, Lord Malloch-Brown was asked why the UK 
continues to take up the issue of the death penalty with Japan, despite the fact that far 
worse abuses
replied that: 
It has been a long-standing priority of British foreign policy to lecture everybody on 
the death penalty. Japan is in no way singled out. Even the Americans get their ears 
bent by us on that one. For countries where it is much more horrendous, such as 
China, the death penalty is always part of our dialogue, along with all the other 
issues. I think that the feeling is that in Japan, precisely because it is a d
are pushing on more of an open door, and it is worth keeping going.  
672 “Japan executes three on death row”, BBC News online, 11 September 2008 
673 Ibid. 
674 Amnesty International Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review: Japan, 22 January 2008 
675 FCO website, country profile: Japan (reviewed July 2008), at www.fco.gov.uk 
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387. We conclude that, although there is undoubtedly a high level of public support for 
the death penalty in Japan, the moratorium on its use in 2005-06, under Justice 
Minister Sugiura, demonstrates that the Japanese Government is not necessarily 
immovable on this subject. We recommend that the Government should continue to 
convey its views on the death penalty to Japan, both directly and through EU channels; 
and that it should encourage the Japanese Government, if it remains committed to the 
death penalty, to reform the system so as to eliminate the unnecessary secrecy and 
arbitrary delay to which attention has been drawn by the UN Committee against 
eneral Assembly in December 
0 7 on the successful resolution—co-sponsored by the EU—which called for a 
entence from the statute 
o k altogether. Such initiatives have always been stalled in Parliament. The most recent 
o young girls. The FCO told us that there 
679
th penalty”. However, she felt that “even Lee Myung-bak would 
hesitate to break [South Korea’s] 10-year good performance” by reverting to use of the 
death penalty.685  
 
Torture. 
South Korea  
388. In the FCO’s words, “the death penalty is a divisive and controversial issue in South 
Korea”.678 The country abstained in the vote in the UN G
2 0
moratorium on the death penalty, with a view to abolition. 
389. Against the background of South Korea’s non-use of the death penalty in recent years, 
there have been a number of legislative initiatives to remove the s
b o
bill expired with the end of the previous Parliament in May 2008.  
390. Death sentences continue to be passed, for example in June 2008 on a man convicted 
of kidnapping and murdering a woman and tw
were 64 people on death row in South Korea as of October 2007,  although the figure had 
reportedly fallen to 58 as of November 2008.680  
391. The new President, Lee Myung-bak, has said publicly that he favours the death 
penalty. Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International described this to us as 
“worrying”.681 In Spring 2008, Prime Minister Han Seung-soo said that legislation would 
be introduced in the Autumn introducing stiffer penalties, possibly including the death 
penalty, for those convicted of some child murders.682 A poll of incoming members of the 
new National Assembly found 46% in favour of retaining the death penalty, and 40% 
abolitionist.683 A public opinion poll of 3,000 South Koreans conducted for the Prime 
Minister’s office found 70% in favour of retention.684 Ms Muico said that a number of 
serious recent crimes had “tested” the judicial system and provoked “a lot of discussion in 
the media on the dea
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392. The Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review of South Korea’s 
human rights performance, in May 2008, included a recommendation that the country 
should “progress towards the abolition of the death penalty” and pass the relevant 
legislation in the new National Assembly.686  
393. Ms Muico told us that formal abolition of the death penalty in South Korea “could 
[…] have a positive knock-on effect”. She referred to abolitionists elsewhere in East Asia—
including Japan—who were looking to South Korea to “be seen as a role model for other 
countries in the region”.687 
394. The FCO told us that the Government would “continue to take every opportunity to 
encourage the South Korean government to abolish the death penalty”.688 In the Report of 
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review of South Korea, the UK was one of 
the states to call on the new National Assembly to pass abolitionist legislation; and in its 
Human Rights Annual Report 2007, the FCO noted that the British Ambassador in Seoul 
had made a keynote speech on the issue on the occasion of the World Day Against the 
Death Penalty in October 2007.689 The Ambassador repeated this in October 2008.690  
395. We conclude that South Korea’s 10-year record as a non-user of the death penalty 
is to be welcomed. While we recognise that the issue is subject to considerable domestic 
debate in South Korea, we recommend that the British Government should continue to 
encourage the new Administration and National Assembly in Seoul to move to formal 
abolition, as one of the priorities in the Government’s human rights work with South 
Korea. We further recommend that in its response to this Report the Government 
should update us on prospects for passage of abolitionist legislation in the new 
National Assembly.  
“Substitute prison” system in Japan 
396. Under Japan’s daiyo kangoku system (the phrase literally means “substitute prison”), 
suspects can be held without charge in police cells for up to 23 days. Amnesty International 
states that this system “facilitates the extraction of ‘confessions’ under duress”. Its adds that: 
suspects are solely under the control of the policy; there are no rules or regulations 
regarding the duration of interrogation; lawyers’ access to clients during questioning 
is restricted; and there is no electronic recording of interviews by police.691 
Amnesty further claims that it has evidence of ‘confessions’ being obtained through 
measures such as “beatings, intimidation, sleep deprivation, questioning from early 
morning till late at night, and making the suspect stand or sit in a fixed position for long 
 
686 “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Republic of Korea”, document A/HRC/8/40 for the UN 
Human Rights Council, Eighth Session, 29 May 2008, recommendation 20 
687 Q 60 
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689 FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2007, Cm 7340, March 2008, p 117 
690 “World Death Penalty Day – an opportunity for Korean leadership”, text of speech, and “World Day Against the 
Death Penalty”, Ambassador’s blog, both 13 October 2008, via www.uk.or.kr 
691 Amnesty International Report 2007, via www.amnesty.org 
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periods”.692 Ms Norma Kang Muico of Amnesty International told us that suspects can be 
interrogated for 16 hours continuously at night time.693 
397. In 2006 there were amendments to legislation concerning daiyo kangoku, providing 
for detainees to be informed of some of their rights and for lawyers to be appointed, but 
only after charges have been brought. 
398. The UN Committee against Torture stated in May 2007 that it was: 
deeply concerned at the prevalent and systematic use of the ‘daiyo kangoku’ 
substitute prison system for the prolonged detention of arrested persons even after 
they appear before a court, and up to the point of indictment. This, coupled with 
insufficient procedural guarantees for the detention and interrogation of detainees, 
increases the possibilities of abuse of their rights, and may lead to a de facto failure to 
respect the principles of presumption of innocence, right to silence and right of 
defence.694 
399. In May 2008 the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review working 
group on Japan issued a report. The working group noted that several countries, including 
the UK, had urged that the daiyo kangoku system should be changed to bring it into line 
with international norms.695 Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the Government had 
“significant disquiet” about the system in its present form.696 
400. During our visit to Japan, we were informed by government sources that the daiyo 
kangoku process is subject to judicial scrutiny. The initial arrest warrant has to be issued by 
a judge, and a court has to renew the detention on the third and 13th days after arrest. If 
needed, the state will pay for a state-appointed counsel to represent the accused. We were 
told that safeguards for the suspect along the lines of those in the UK’s PACE Acts would 
not be appropriate in a Japanese context, because in Japan there is much less scope for the 
police to collect evidence by means other than interrogation. Wiretapping is not allowed in 
routine cases (only a handful of wiretaps are permitted each year); eavesdropping is not 
allowed, nor decoy investigations, nor undercover police agents infiltrating an 
organisation, nor plea-bargaining. We were told that the only means available for the 
authorities to get at the truth is to persuade the person accused of a crime to disclose the 
facts. Full video-recording of interrogations would be undesirable, it was argued, as it 
would make it more difficult to persuade someone to confess. For instance, it would be 
difficult to get a suspect involved in organised crime to name his superiors if the 
proceedings were being videoed throughout. 
401. The counter-case was put to us by representatives of the Japanese Federation of Bar 
Associations. They argued that the degree of judicial scrutiny in the daiyo kangoku process 
did not in practice prevent suspects being held with little contact with the outside world, 
 
692 Amnesty International Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review: Japan, 22 January 2008 
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subject to constant interrogation aimed at cracking their resistance and making them 
confess. In such circumstances, they claimed, miscarriages of justice are inevitable. 
402. We conclude that there is compelling evidence that the ‘substitute prison’ or daiyo 
kangoku system in Japan involves significant breaches of the rights of suspects, and is 
likely to lead to miscarriages of justice. We further conclude that the reforms to the 
system introduced in 2006 are to be welcomed, but that there remains cause for 
concern. We recommend that the Government should continue to press Japan to 
modify the daiyo kangoku system to ensure that detention procedures are consistent 
with its obligations under human rights law, and in particular to ensure that 
interrogations are subject to some degree of external monitoring in order to prevent 
abuses. 
Other human rights issues in South Korea 
403. Compared to the situation which obtained prior to the advent of democracy in the late 
1980s, South Korea’s human rights record is hugely improved. South Korea has acceded to 
six of the core international human rights instruments and was elected as a founder 
member of the new UN Human Rights Council. An official National Human Rights 
Commission was established in 2001 as an independent body, and in 2007 South Korea 
adopted its first-ever National Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, to run for four years.  
404. Against this background, in its memorandum to our inquiry the FCO did not refer to 
any further human rights issues beyond the death penalty. However, Norma Kang Muico 
of Amnesty International pointed to a number of other continuing concerns. She  
highlighted in particular the issue of migrant workers’ rights, commenting that “the 
situation [was] particularly worrying”, owing to recent “crackdowns” on migrant workers’ 
union leaders. According to Ms Muico, migrant union leaders have recently been subject 
to procedurally incorrect arrests, mistreatment and summary deportation.697 She added 
that the British Embassy in Seoul was aware of this issue, and appeared open to making 
representations to the South Korean Government.698 The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
Working Group Report on South Korea included several recommendations on the issue of 
workers’ rights, some of which Seoul has indicated that it will accept.699  
405. Other issues in South Korea which have been raised by human rights organisations 
include: 
• The limited numbers of people granted asylum or humanitarian leave to remain in 
South Korea (other than North Koreans, who are automatically entitled to 
citizenship).700 
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• The continuing imprisonment of hundreds of conscientious objectors to military 
service, despite the fact that the National Human Rights Commission has in 
principle recognised the right to conscientious objection.701 The UPR Working 
Group Report called on Seoul to decriminalise conscientious objection,702 and it 
included a recommendation from the UK that “active steps be taken to introduce 
alternatives to military service for conscientious objectors”.703 In its response to the 
Report, South Korea said that programmes of alternative service were being 
studied.704   
• The 1948 National Security Law, which remains on the statute books and penalises 
“praising or supporting” North Korea. In its 2008 Annual Report, Amnesty 
International said that in 2007 there were at least eight people detained on the basis 
of charges under the this law which it described as “vague” (an increase from one 
person in 2006).705 As well as a call from North Korea to abolish the National 
Security Law, the UPR Working Group Report included a recommendation from 
the UK that the legislation “be brought in line with international standards 
regarding clarity of criminal law”,706 and from the US that the Law be amended “to 
prevent abusive interpretation”.707 In its response to the report, South Korea 
“reaffirmed that the National Security Law should not be misused or interpreted 
arbitrarily”.708 
406. There was violence between police and demonstrators at some of the mass rallies 
against the Lee Administration in early summer 2008. After a field visit, Amnesty 
International reported that there were some cases in which the police had used excessive 
force and made arbitrary arrests, although Amnesty also said that “generally, both the 
protesters and the police showed remarkable organisation and constraint” and that the 
“protests, and the response to them, generally show the strength of South Korea’s civil 
society as well as its legal institutions”.709 
407. The South Korean Government has raised the prospect of new legislation against what 
President Lee has called “infodemics, a phenomenon in which inaccurate, false 
information is disseminated”.710 During our visit to Seoul, we heard that food safety “scare 
stories” spread especially via the internet were widely considered to have been a major 
factor behind the mass protests against renewed US beef imports (South Korea has some of 
the highest usage in the world of the internet and other new forms of electronic 
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communication). Some internet journalists and bloggers have expressed concerns that the 
Government’s planned measures might infringe on free speech.711  
408. We conclude that South Korea has recorded major improvement in its human 
rights observance since the advent of democracy two decades ago. We welcome this. We 
further conclude that despite these significant improvements, several human rights 
concerns remain, such as the policing of demonstrations, the scope of free speech on 
the internet and the rights of migrant workers. However, we recognise that these issues 
also pose challenges to many other open societies, including the UK. We recommend 
that, in a spirit of partnership, the Government should continue to encourage South 
Korea to address human rights concerns and to ensure that human rights are 
safeguarded in new legislation and its implementation, prioritising the rights of 
migrant workers, the development of alternatives to military service, and reform of the 
National Security Law. We further recommend that the Government should update us 
on the steps which it is taking in these areas in its response to this Report.  
 
711 “South Korea braced for web clampdown”, The Guardian, 5 August 2008 
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6 The UK and Japan and South Korea  
Economic relations 
Japan 
409. Japan is the UK’s largest trading partner outside the US and the EU. British exports to 
Japan grew by 2.8% in 2005 to £3,700 million. Overall, Japan took £8.0 billion of UK goods 
and services in that year. Exports were dominated by three major sectors: chemical 
products, machinery and transport equipment.712 
410. Sir Stephen Gomersall, Chief Executive for Europe of the Japanese company Hitachi, 
and formerly HM Ambassador in Tokyo, told us that British exports to Japan, still the 
third-largest market in the world after the US and the EU, were “relatively, a great success 
story”.713 Lord Malloch-Brown spoke of the “huge opportunity” for British business in 
Japan: “while everybody else is racing off to Beijing, they might even get a bit of a 
competitive break in Japan”.714 
411. However, the FCO cautions that “the [Japanese] market can be confusing, expensive 
and time-consuming”.715  The then Lord Mayor of London, reporting on a visit to Japan in 
2006, noted that “the perception remains that Japan is a ‘difficult’ market for foreigners to 
penetrate”.716 UK Trade & Investment advise that: 
A long-term commitment and market strategy are required to become established in 
Japan. It takes time and patience, but, as many British companies have found, it 
repays the effort many times over.717 
Sir Stephen Gomersall commented that: 
most of the barriers that have impeded foreign exports, particularly western exports 
to Japan in the past, have been taken away one by one, thanks to a combination of 
EU action and bilateral actions.  The market is open, but challenging, and our advice 
to British exporters is that they must do a lot of research before going into the 
market.718 
He added that the three critical factors for success are “presence in the market, quality and 
delivery of the product, and relationships and trust with those with whom they are doing 
business”.719 
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412. Japan is the second-largest source of foreign direct investment into the UK, after the 
US. Over a quarter of all Japanese investment in Europe is in the UK, with nearly 1,500 
Japanese companies investing. Japanese-owned companies employ over 100,000 people in 
the UK. Japanese-owned car plants account for over 50% of UK car production. The FCO 
comments that “there are strong prospects for investment from Japan in the 
pharmaceutical and life science sectors and in ICT (services and software as well as 
equipment).”720 
413. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that “whenever we see anything that might slow down 
Japanese inward investment into Britain, we jump on it like a tiger”.721 He cited in 
particular the Government’s response to fears expressed by Japanese companies about the 
impact of the UK’s new points-based immigration system which came into effect in April 
2008. They were concerned that middle-managers working for Japanese companies 
operating in the UK might fail to gain visas because of their lack  of English language skills. 
Lord Malloch-Brown said that he had joined forces with the Japanese Ambassador to lobby 
the Home Office on this issue.722 A solution was reached which, according to the FCO, 
“preserved the UK’s attractiveness as an investment location without compromising the 
integrity and objectives of the Points Based System: […] intra-company transfers will not 
be required to demonstrate English language ability if they stay in the UK less than 3 
years”.723 
414. There are particular benefits to be gained for the UK in deepening co-operation with 
Japan in the field of science and technology. Japan accounts for about 20% of the world’s 
R&D, with the top 10 Japanese companies investing more in R&D than the UK public and 
private sectors combined. Japan is the UK’s second-biggest partner for research 
collaboration. The FCO argues that “our priorities are aligned, focussing on climate 
change, sustainable energy, healthcare and innovation” and that “access to Japanese 
research facilities and data is also important to maintaining the strength of the UK science 
base, particularly as Japan has invested heavily in advanced research facilities and is a 
participant in major international projects (such as ITER – the experimental nuclear fusion 
reactor)”.724 
415. A joint statement issued by then Prime Ministers Blair and Abe following their 
meeting in London in January 2007 pledged that: 
Japan and the UK will harness their joint efforts in science, technology and 
innovation. Japan and the UK will continue to work together to further strengthen 
their research relationship in the fields of climate change, sustainable energy 
technologies and life sciences.725 
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416. However, the FCO cautions that Japan’s top priority in terms of strengthening R&D 
co-operation is China (with South Korea a close second). In many areas of science and 
technology China appears to have overtaken individual EU countries in terms of the 
number of scientific exchanges and research projects with Japan (the US remaining top 
partner).726 
417. We conclude that the UK’s trading relationship with Japan is of great importance 
to both countries. We recommend that the Government should continue actively to 
encourage British companies to seize the long-term gains that the huge Japanese 
market offers, despite the initial difficulties of penetrating that market. We further 
conclude that the FCO is to be commended for its pro-active approach in encouraging 
Japanese inward investment in the UK, and in particular for its recent successful 
intervention to ensure that the implementation of the points-based visa system did not 
act as a disincentive to Japanese investors. 
South Korea 
418. South Korea counts as one of East Asia’s post-Second World War “economic 
miracles” or “tiger” economies. Having been less developed than the north of Korea under 
Japanese rule, and then devastated by the Second World War and the Korean War, South 
Korea saw rapid economic development from the 1960s. Economic development was 
initially state-led, followed by greater liberalisation and integration into the international 
economy from the 1990s. South Korea joined the OECD in 1996. The South Korean 
economy is now between the eleventh- and fourteenth-largest in the world.727 South 
Korean corporate names that are well-known in the West include Hyundai, LG and 
Samsung. As an indication of the country’s current level of development, during the period 
of our inquiry South Korea was in the news for conducting the world’s first commercial 
dog cloning,728 and sending its first astronaut into space.729 South Korea’s economic 
development has been based mainly on industries such as steel, cars and shipbuilding, 
electronics and semiconductors. Dr Hoare reminded us that “South Korean shipbuilding 
effectively began with British money and know-how”, as, to a lesser extent, did its car 
industry.730 
419. The FCO describes South Korea as a “significant trade and investment partner” for 
the UK.731 South Korea is the UK’s 25th-largest export market, taking goods and services 
worth $2.98 billion in 2006.732 UK exports to South Korea are dominated by whisky, which 
accounted for $222 million alone.733 For South Korea, the UK is the eighth-largest export 
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market, taking goods and services worth $5.64 billion in 2006.734 The most significant 
products among South Korean exports to the UK are mobile phones, ships and vehicles.735   
420. The UK is regularly the largest recipient of South Korean investment into the EU.736 A 
number of South Korean firms have chosen to locate European bases in the UK. For 
example, LG Electronics recently relocated its European product design centre to the 
UK.737  
421. A number of UK firms are prominent in South Korea, particularly in the financial 
services, retail, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, engineering and energy sectors. For example, 
Standard Chartered is the largest single foreign direct investor in South Korea,738 and Tesco 
is now South Korea’s second-largest supermarket chain, having spent nearly £1 billion in 
May 2008 to purchase 36 further stores from a local company.739 Tesco’s South Korean 
operation accounts for around 40% of its overseas profits.740 We were told in Seoul that 
there was generally a positive attitude in South Korea towards British firms.     
422. Despite the internationalisation of the South Korean economy and the inroads made 
by UK firms in particular, the FCO told us that South Korea is “not an easy place to do 
business and there is a degree of anti-foreign business sentiment”.741 We heard in Seoul 
that difficulties facing UK firms include cultural differences, a lack of English language 
competence, the nature of the legal and corporate governance systems and frequent 
changes of government officials. Dr Hoare, as well as interlocutors in Seoul, also agreed 
that doing business successfully in South Korea—as in Japan—tends to require a long-term 
commitment.742 A number of UK firms which have achieved success in South Korea have 
done so by linking up with local companies.  
423. Aidan Foster-Carter told us that the Government’s top priority vis-à-vis South Korea 
should be to continue to encourage it to open its service sectors. Mr Foster-Carter said that 
“South Koreans […] are less well served than they could be in the spheres of education, 
health and legal services” and that the question was one of “straight-down-the-line national 
interest” for the UK.743    
424. For UK firms, the proposed South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) will be 
one of the most important factors governing future access to South Korea. We referred to 
the planned deal in our general discussion of East Asian trade agreements in Chapter Two 
above, and, as it relates to North Korea, also in Chapter Three.744 As we noted in Chapter 
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Two, Dr Hoare told us that such agreements were a useful means of binding South Korea 
into more open trading arrangements.745 With respect to the planned South Korea-EU 
deal, the FCO told us that the UK had a “particular interest” in the “liberalisation of the 
Korean financial and legal services markets, the lifting of indirect ownership restrictions on 
telecoms companies and the elimination of whisky tariffs.”746 Studies of the possible 
agreement suggest that the greatest gains would come in services rather than goods, and 
that without the deal EU services firms could lose out to competitors from countries with 
which Seoul already has preferential trade arrangements.747  
425. We conclude that the South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement which is currently 
under negotiation is a potentially effective means of securing further opening of the 
South Korean economy and improved access for UK firms, and that its early and 
successful finalisation would be of great benefit to the UK and South Korea. We further 
conclude that the FCO is correct to identify the services sector as a key target for further 
liberalisation under the planned agreement. We recommend that in its response to this 
Report, the FCO update us on progress in the negotiations, especially as regards access 
to South Korea’s services markets.   
426. The FCO told us that “defence sales [to South Korea] remain a significant area of UK 
interest”. According to the FCO: 
The South Korean armed forces [...] are likely to offer an increasingly competitive, 
and potentially lucrative, defence market for UK industry. Specifically, the UK hopes 
to encourage greater transparency within South Korean defence procurement 
procedures.748 
South Korea is increasing its defence budget significantly, by 9.7% in 2007 and a planned 
9.0% in 2008, to $27 billion,749 as it takes over greater military responsibilities from its US 
ally and aims to develop greater international peacekeeping capabilities.750 The UK is likely 
to face tough competition in the South Korean defence market from Seoul’s traditional US 
suppliers.    
427. The FCO told us that science and technology research links with South Korea “have 
become an important part of the bilateral relationship”.751 The UK’s science and 
innovation relationship with South Korea is based on a Science and Technology 
Agreement dating from 1985, and is also incorporated into a Science, Technology and 
Innovation Partnership agreed in 2004. A bilateral Science and Technology Joint 
Commission meets every two years under Ministerial leadership.752 Among recent 
successes in the research field, RNL Bio—the South Korean company responsible for the 
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commercial dog cloning announced in August 2008—has invested £65,000 in a stem cell 
research laboratory at Newcastle University, under a research and development 
753
re, we were also made aware 
ooted to tie in with his trip to 
a a  in June 2008 for the G8 Foreign Ministers’ meeting.  
se the ability 
of our Embassy to support British business opportunities in South Korea. 
 
collaboration agreement.  
428. South Korea is one of the countries included in UKTI’s High Growth Markets 
Programme, which aims to help medium-sized UK companies to succeed in target 
markets.754 The FCO told us that “UKTI’s services are […] highly valued by the British 
business community” in South Korea.755 During our visit the
that the work of the Embassy team in Seoul was appreciated. 
429. The Lord Mayor of London visited Seoul in October 2007 to promote the UK model 
of financial sector liberalisation and the services offered by the City of London. In his 
capacity as Special Representative for Trade and Investment, HRH the Duke of York 
visited in early October 2008. However, whereas the FCO’s then Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State, Bill Rammell MP, attended former President Roh’s inauguration in 
2003, no UK Government Minister attended President Lee’s inauguration in February 
2008. When he visited Seoul in late May 2008, the Environment Secretary, the Rt Hon 
Hilary Benn MP, became the first Minister to do so following the change of Administration 
there. Owing to that change of Administration, the South Korean side postponed a 
planned visit by FCO Minister Lord Malloch-Brown in March 2008, and the Foreign 
Secretary also did not make a visit to Seoul that had been m
J p n
430. We conclude that the economic, commercial and research ties which have 
developed between South Korea and the UK are to be welcomed, and that the work in 
this respect of UKTI, the Seoul Embassy and other relevant bodies is to be commended. 
We further conclude that, given South Korea’s level of development and rate of growth, 
and the existence of generally positive sentiment towards UK partners, there is 
considerable potential for the further development of such links. In this context, we 
conclude that the lack of UK Ministerial representation at President Lee’s inauguration 
was regrettable. While we welcome the recent Ministerial and other visits to Seoul from 
the UK that have taken place and are planned, we conclude that a visit by an FCO 
Minister, and the Foreign Secretary in particular, with a significant economic 
component to the trip, would be appropriate, in South Korea’s 60th anniversary year, 
and as the South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement is being negotiated. We recommend 
that the FCO should take every opportunity with its South Korean partners to identify 
an early opportunity for such a visit. We further conclude that the FCO and the 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform should increa
753 UK Trade and Investment, UK Inward Investment 2007-08, July 2008, p 24 
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 Cultural relations 
431. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that his impression was that “Britain is extremely well 
regarded” in both Japan and South Korea.756 Dr Hoare concurred that “there is a lot of 
respect for Britain” in both states.757 However, Dr Hoare suggested that recent closures of 
specialist university programmes in the UK on East Asia, plus a decline in the number of 
UK journalists resident in the region, had “tended to confirm” a view there that the UK 
was “not very interested” in East Asia.758 A number of witnesses also suggested that the 
image of the UK entertained in both Japan and South Korea is often marked by what Dr 
Hoare called “somewhat old-fashioned perspectives”.759 Dr Hoare said that “there […] 
often still is a sentimental picture of a country shrouded in Dickensian fog, populated by 
gentlemen (ladies rarely featured) who maintained high standards of dress and were always 
courteous.”760 Sir Stephen Gomersall referred to “perceptions of Britain as a country of 
castles, Beatrix Potter and that sort of thing”.761 We discuss the work of the FCO and the 
British Council in countering such perceptions in sections on Japan and South Korea 
below.762  
432. We returned in our present inquiry to the question of specialist knowledge in the UK 
of the East Asian region, including its languages. This was an issue at the time of our 
China-focused inquiry into East Asia in 2006 especially because of what were then recent 
decisions to close Durham University’s East Asian Studies Department and curtail 
specialist regional language-based teaching elsewhere. In our 2006 Report, we concluded 
that “the United Kingdom must attain greater proficiency in East Asian languages and 
cultures or face a diminution of influence in a very dynamic region”.763 We recommended 
that the Government should “redouble its efforts to support the teaching of Chinese and 
other East Asian languages in schools and universities”.764 In its response, the FCO focused 
on the learning of Mandarin rather than other regional languages.765  
433. There was some divergence among witnesses to our present inquiry regarding the 
value of knowledge of regional languages to the UK, and especially to UK business. 
Pointing to the scale of UK economic activity in the region, Lord Malloch-Brown did not 
accept that a lack of regional language skills was necessarily impairing UK business.766 
Discussing Japan, Sir Stephen Gomersall suggested that “many young people going there 
pick up the language to a sufficient degree quite quickly” and that English was in any case 
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widely used.767 However, while accepting that “you can do business in most of these 
countries without the language”, Dr Hoare argued that language knowledge “helps you to a 
depth of understanding which is very important”768 and is “an important element to show 
that you are committed to the area and the people with whom you are dealing”, something 
which he said was important for working successfully in East Asia.769  
434. As regards broader knowledge in the UK of East Asia, the British Association for 
Korean Studies identified the “high level of ignorance about East Asia which pervades 
contemporary British society” as “the greatest problem for British policy” in the region.770 
Although sceptical about the need for knowledge of regional languages, Sir Stephen 
Gomersall said that a broader lack of regional awareness and skills was a “disadvantage” for 
business.771 For his part, Lord Malloch-Brown told us that:  
all western countries made a terrible mistake 10 or 20 years ago when they let a lot of 
real regional institutional capabilities in our university system go […] It means that 
fewer people have the language skills and the university-level knowledge of these 
countries than ideally we would want.772  
435. Sir Stephen Gomersall reminded us that, partly in response to lobbying prompted by 
the earlier controversy, in 2006 the Government had launched the Language-Based Area 
Studies initiative.773 The initiative allowed the creation, among other projects, of the White 
Rose East Asia Centre, with £4 million in public funding. This institution is jointly 
supported by the Universities of Leeds and Sheffield.774 Sir Stephen told us that the new 
centre had “eased the problem for quite a white and […] has brought in other groups like 
the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation and the Daiwa Foundation to fund teaching posts 
either at those universities or at secondary schools that will feed them.”775 Sir Stephen said 
that “there is more demand for places, particularly graduate positions, in those universities 
than five years ago”, and that this was a “very healthy sign”.776  
436. Sir Stephen noted that the Government funding for the White Rose East Asia Centre 
is “time-limited”;777 the funding under the Language-Based Area Studies initiative is being 
provided for five years.778 Dr Hoare argued that a “short-term funding approach” towards 
university capacities in the UK often led to repeated crises, as funding streams approached 
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their end, often to be followed by further injections of funding for another fixed period. In 
the case of East Asia, Dr Hoare’s account suggested that among regional partners this 
creates an impression of opportunism, rather than the commitment which he identified as 
important.779 The British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS) also told us that such 
public spending as is taking place is focussed “almost entirely on the Chinese mainland”, 
rather than other areas of East Asia. BAKS called for “guaranteed and continued 
Government support for all branches of East Asian Studies in the nation’s universities”.780 
437. Given the economic and strategic importance which the Government attributes to 
East Asia, and noting the Minister’s acknowledgement of the value of university-level 
specialist regional capabilities, we conclude that the Government should take steps to 
avert any risk of East Asian studies in the UK again facing a crisis. As the initial 
Government core funding for the White Rose East Asia Centre is due to expire in 2011, 
we recommend that the Government should start now to consult with relevant partners 
in the university and private sectors with a view to developing follow-on core funding 
that will allow, as a minimum, the maintenance of UK university-level research and 
teaching on East Asia at its current level. We further recommend that the Government 
should ensure that public support for the development of regional language and other 
skills does not focus unduly on China but gives due weight to Japan and Korea, as 
important economies and cultures in their own right and vital components of China’s 
regional environment. 
438. One area of language knowledge where our witnesses commended the UK’s record in 
East Asia was that of British Ambassadors and other diplomatic staff. Dr Hoare told us that 
the UK has “a long-established tradition of believing that the people on the ground doing 
the job for the Government did need to have the local languages”.781 For example, he noted 
that the UK’s first Korean-speaking Ambassador had recently been succeeded by a second. 
Dr Hoare said that this practice was “important” in the region as it would be interpreted as 
showing “commitment”.782 Sir Stephen Gomersall agreed, saying that the British Embassy 
in Tokyo had “the reputation of being certainly the best in the EU, by a long chalk”, in this 
respect.783 
439. In our Report on the FCO’s 2006-07 Annual Report, we concluded that “high quality 
language training is a vital part of successful diplomacy” and we expressed some concern in 
case the FCO’s recent decision to outsource its language teaching affected its performance 
in this regard.784 In its response to our Report, the Government said that it would “ensure 
that the system of quality control [under the new arrangements] is rigorously managed.”785 
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440. We conclude that the FCO’s practice of ensuring that the UK sends Ambassadors 
to Japan and Korea who speak the language of their host state is to the UK’s diplomatic 
advantage. We recommend that the FCO should continue this practice. 
Japan  
441. Educational links between the UK and Japan are strong in many respects. There are 
currently around 85,000 Japanese students studying English in the UK, and another 8,500 
in higher or further education courses.786 According to the FCO, the JET scheme, which 
takes graduates to teach in Japan, is the largest employer of UK graduates; the UK accounts 
for one-quarter of participants.   
442. However, as regards English language use, the British Council reports that, in Japan, 
“the level of English, especially spoken English, is generally poor, and this is particularly 
true outside Tokyo”.787 The British Council notes that Japanese government policy towards 
English language learning in both state schools and private language schools has not always 
been supportive, although the Council is gearing up for an anticipated decision to make 
English learning compulsory in Japanese primary schools. The British Council in Japan is 
seeking to take advantage of the wish to build English competence, for example by 
partnering with local universities and other institutions to provide in-house English 
tuition. Every week, 11,500 English language learners visit the British Council’s offices in 
Tokyo and Osaka. As well as teaching in the two centres, the Council increasingly works 
through contracts with universities and schools. Most people using the Council’s language 
teaching facilities are in their 20s and 30s, not schoolchildren as in South Korea. They are 
charged about ¥ 3,000 an hour (about £15). When we visited the Council’s Tokyo office, we 
were told that there is not much money available for marketing, but that the English 
teaching activities are self-funding. 
443. Several of our witnesses referred to the “old-fashioned” picture of the UK widely held 
in Japan as elsewhere in East Asia.788 The British Council referred to a need to “bring a 
more accurate and up-to-date view of the UK to Japanese audiences”.789 During 2008, the 
British Embassy in Tokyo and the British Council have been jointly sponsoring “UK-Japan 
2008”, a major public diplomacy campaign to mark 150 years of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries, involving a large number of cultural events and exchanges.790 
The FCO states that the campaign has focussed on highlighting “UK/Japan achievements 
which are contemporary, creative and collaborative in the creative industries, science and 
innovation and the arts—all areas with strong potential for future UK and Japanese 
economic growth”.791 The centrepiece of “UK-Japan 2008” was a Turner Prize 
retrospective held in central Tokyo: the Crown Prince of Japan attended the opening, and 
90,000 people visited the exhibition during its first three weeks. 
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444. The British Council in Japan has contributed to an initiative called the Climate 
Champions Project. This follows a requirement in the Kyoto Treaty that each of its 
signatories should proselytise about the dangers of climate change. The Government has 
sponsored a competition in UK schools to find a climate change ‘champion’, and to roll 
this out worldwide using the British Council. Ten champions, aged 14 to 18, were chosen 
in Japan in early 2008. When we visited the British Council offices in Tokyo we were told 
that they were highly articulate young people who received a reasonable amount of TV 
coverage in Japan, and that three of them were later chosen to visit London to convey their 
environmentalist message back to the UK. 
445. We recommend that in its reply to this Report, the Government should set out its 
assessment of the scope for expanding the British Council’s role as a provider of 
English-language teaching in Japan, to cater for the large market of young people 
seeking English-language skills. We further recommend that the Government should 
continue to make efforts in its cultural promotion work in Japan to emphasise the UK 
as a modern, creative, technologically advanced country, and that it should, where 
appropriate, utilise the UK’s status as Olympic host nation in 2012 as way of 
highlighting this. We conclude that the British Council in Japan is to be commended 
for its emphasis on working with young people to deal with the challenges of climate 
change.  
South Korea 
446. Dr Hoare gave us a mixed picture of the UK’s profile in South Korea. On the one 
hand, he said that the UK had “never had a very strong presence” in Korea, with the US 
always having the greater imprint and some other European countries creating a greater 
impression more recently.792 On the other hand, he commented that South Korea  
regards Britain with a certain degree of respect because of [its] historical role in East 
Asia, as well as with a certain amount of gratitude because [it was] one of those 
countries that came to its aid during the Korean War. It also regards [the UK] as a 
leading European power that is worth cultivating.793 
447. A high value is placed on education in South Korean society, but, as the British 
Council told us, “there is a wide perception that the public education system is failing to 
prepare young people effectively for employment”.794 As a result, South Koreans “spend 
more per capita on private education and send proportionally more students abroad for 
study than any other nation in the OECD”.795  
448. Educational links between South Korea and the UK are substantial. There are 
currently around 20,000 South Koreans studying in the UK.796 The FCO has awarded 
around 800 of its Chevening scholarships to South Koreans over the past 20 years, enabling 
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them to pursue postgraduate study in the UK; around 30 South Koreans will take up these 
scholarships in 2008.797 Dr Hoare told us that “schemes like the Chevening scholarships 
have had a very strong impact”.798 South Korea’s Prime Minister, Dr Han Seung-Soo, is a 
former Chevening scholar.  
449. The British Council is seeking to attract more South Koreans to UK universities, for 
various types of study and contact.799 In pursuing South Korean students, UK universities 
face strong competition from their US counterparts, especially, and also from Australia, 
among English-speaking countries. Chinese universities are also an increasingly popular 
destination for South Korean students. During our visit, we were told that South Koreans 
can sometimes feel that UK universities are only interested in attracting them because of  
the funding which they bring.  
450. South Koreans often have high levels of English language education on paper, but—as 
the British Council put it—they “are increasingly conscious of their relative inability to 
communicate effectively”,800 and devote huge private resources to extra tuition.801 
President Lee is launching a major drive to raise South Koreans’ English competence, as 
part of his effort to boost South Korea’s economic competitiveness and enhance its global 
profile. The new South Korean Government has allocated $4.2 billion for enhanced English 
language teaching provision in state schools in coming years.802  
 
451. The British Council’s English-teaching programme in Seoul is already one of its 
largest worldwide.803 The British Council told us that, given the ambitions of President Lee 
and his Government, “there is a clear window of opportunity for the British Council to 
establish [itself] as a principal source of support and advice to the new South Korean 
Government in the area of English education, and we intend to invest significant resources 
in demonstrating the UK’s leading position in this area”.804 In its memorandum to our 
inquiry, the British Council detailed a range of new partnerships and schemes though 
which it is seeking to enhance its position in South Korea’s English teaching sector.805 The 
point was made to us in Seoul that, while South Koreans might be inclined to look first to 
the US for English language exposure, the US does not have a single official English 
language teaching agency equivalent to the British Council.     
452. Dr Hoare suggested that, as a result of the British Council’s focus on English language 
training in South Korea, “some of the other things that go into the pot marked ‘culture’ 
797 “UK welcomes Korean students – scholarships presented to 30 young Koreans”, press release, British Embassy, Seoul, 
18 June 2008, via www.uk.or.kr 
798 Ev 79 
799 Ev 90 [British Council] 
800 Ev 89 
801 “Push for intensive English teaching at school worries S Korea’s parents”, Financial Times, 30 April 2008; “Slower pace 
would help Seoul to grow faster”, Financial Times, 6 August 2008 
802 Ev 89 [British Council]; “Push for intensive English teaching at school worries S Korea’s parents”, Financial Times, 30 
April 2008 
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have been rather neglected”.806 His view was that “Germany and France have often made a 
bigger cultural impact in South Korea than Britain” and that the UK “is seen not to be as 
dynamic as some of our European partners”.807  
453. Dr Hoare recognised that the FCO and the British Council were making “strenuous 
efforts” to promote British culture in South Korea and to counter out-of-date views of the 
UK.808 The UK ran a promotional campaign in South Korea in 2007, partly to mark the 
50th anniversary of the establishment of the British diplomatic presence there.809 The 
British Council told us that its work in Seoul would include participation in the Council’s 
international “Creative Cities” programme, in order to take advantage of the interest of 
many South Korean cities in arts programmes as a mechanism for urban development and 
international promotion.810 
454. The British Council told us that it was also focusing on climate security in its work in 
South Korea. The Council said that it was aiming to “raise awareness of the crucial 
importance of reducing greenhouse gas emissions”, primarily among young people.811   
455. We conclude that the British Council is correct to identify the potential for 
increase in the take-up of UK education services among South Koreans, especially in 
light of the Lee Administration’s push to enhance English language provision in South 
Korea’s state schools. We recommend that the British Council should continue to 
pursue these opportunities, while ensuring that UK universities are aware of the need 
to demonstrate the value of UK study in a tough South Korean market. We further 
recommend that, inasmuch as resources allow, the British Council should seek to 
increase its British cultural promotion work in South Korea, since the existence of a 
modern and dynamic cultural profile will contribute to the attractiveness of the UK 
educational offer. Given South Korea’s history as an Olympic host nation and its strong 
showing at the 2008 Games, we recommend that the British Council should consider 
capitalising on the approach of the 2012 London Games as a means of giving focus to 
this objective.  
456. As we noted in our chapter on North Korea above, the BBC World Service does not 
run a Korean-language service.812 The BBC World Service’s English-language radio 
broadcasts are available in South Korea via a local English-language FM station in Seoul, 
and via mobile, digital and online services nationally. BBC World television is available in 
3.6 million households and 13,000 hotel rooms, through a number of pay-TV services.813 
As in Japan, BBC Global News told us that BBC World “aims to increase distribution” in 
South Korea.814 
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457. We recommend that BBC World television should continue to seek opportunities 
to increase its distribution in South Korea.  
 
146    Global Security: Japan and Korea 
 
Annex 
Foreign Affairs Committee Visit to Japan and the Koreas,  
11-15 May 2008 
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Mr John Horam 
Mr Eric Illsley  
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 Sandra Osborne 
Mr Greg Pope  
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Sir John Stanley 
Ms Gisela Stuart 
 
Tokyo 
Sunday 11 May 
Briefing dinner hosted by HMA Sir Graham Fry with Embassy staff 
Monday 12 May 
Meetings with: 
Mr Koji Tsurouka, Director-General, Global Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Mr Etsuro Honda, Deputy Director-General, European Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Mr Akitaka Saiki, Director-General, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Mr Koro Bessho, Director-General, International Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Mr Itsunori Onodera, Senior Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Mr Shigeru Ishiba, Minister of Defence 
Mr Masaru Tsuji, Director-General for International Affairs, Ministry of Defence 
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Dinner hosted by HMA Sir Graham Fry. Guests: 
Mr Ian de-Staines OBE, Executive Director, British Chamber of Commerce, Japan 
Mr Joseph R. Donovan, Jr., charge d’affaires, US Embassy 
Dr Kuniko Inoguchi, Member of the House of Representatives  
Mr Shintaro Ito, Member of the House of Representatives 
Mr Andrew Mankiewicz, President, British Chamber of Commerce, Japan 
Mr Stuart Milne, President and Chief Executive Officer, Country Manager Japan, 
HSBC Ltd 
Ambassador Nishimura Mutsuyoshi, Special Adviser to the Cabinet (Prime 
Ministerial adviser on climate change)  
Professor Koichi Nakano, Sophia University 
Mr Kotoro Tamura, Member of the House of Councillors 
Dr Taizo Yakushiji, Executive Member, Council for Science and Technology Policy, 
Cabinet Office 
Tuesday 13 May 
Meetings with: 
Mr Chikao Kawai, Director-General, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 
Lunch hosted by David Fitton, Minister at the British Embassy. Guests: 
Dr Chiaki Akimoto, Senior Defence Analyst and Senior Commentator, Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation 
Professor Nobumasa Akiyama, Associate Professor, School of International and 
Public Policy, Hitotsubashi University 
Mr Toru Ando, Editorial Writer, Chunichi Shimbun/Tokyo Shimbun 
Ms Keizo Iizuka, Deputy Political Editor, Yomiuri Shimbun 
Mr Shinji Inada, Political News Section Staff Writer, Asahi Shimbun 
Mr Hiroshi Komatsu, Political News Editor, Mainichi Shimbun 
Mr Kenro Nagashi, Foreign News Editor, Jiji Press 
Mr Ryoichi Nishida, International News Editor, Sankei Shimbun 
Mr David Pilling, Tokyo Bureau Chief, Financial Times 
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For the remainder of the visit, the Committee split into two groups 
Further programme in Japan, Mr Illsley and Mr Pope only: 
Tokyo 
Tuesday 13 May 
Meetings with: 
DPRK Abductee Family Association 
Mr Kotaro Ohno, Director-General, Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice 
Jason James, Director, British Council in Japan 
Wednesday 14 May 
Meeting with the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (Ms Maiko Tsugahari, Staff 
Attorney, and other members) 
Tour of Fujitsu Forum, an annual display of new products and technologies 
Osaka 
Wednesday 14 May 
Briefing from Chris Stuart, HM Consul-General, Osaka 
Thursday 15 May 
Visit to Osaka Detention Centre and meeting with Mr Masahiro Katou, Warden 
Kyoto 
Thursday 15 May 
Visit to Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International and meeting with 
Dr Yasuo Hirata, President, and Dr Nick Campbell, Chief Researcher, Department of 
Acoustics and Speech Research 
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Programme in the Koreas for the remainder of the Committee 
Seoul 
Wednesday 14 May 
Briefing from HMA Martin Uden and Embassy staff, HMA to Pyongyang John Everard, 
and Ian Simm, Director, British Council, South Korea 
Meetings with: 
Mr Kim Sung-hwan, Vice Foreign Minister 
Mr Kim Ha-joong, Minister of Unification  
Professor Lee Jae-Joung, former Minister of Unification  
Mr Kang Chol-hwan, North Korean defector and journalist 
Ms Kay Seok, North Korea Researcher, Human Rights Watch 
Major General John A. Weida, Deputy Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/US 
Forces Korea, and US colleagues  
UK business representatives: Mr Chris Hollands, Executive Vice President, Standard 
Chartered; Mr Simon Cooper, HSBC; Mr Michael De Vere, Standard Life 
Dinner hosted by HMA Martin Uden. Guests: 
Mr Park Jin, National Assembly Representative  
Mr Hong Jung-wook, National Assembly Representative  
Ms Song Young-sun, National Assembly Representative  
Thursday 15 May 
Visit to Kaesong Industrial Complex, North Korea, accompanied by HMA Martin Uden 
and HMA John Everard: 
Briefing from Mr Dan Byun, Hyundai Asan 
Briefing from, and lunch hosted by, Mr Shin Un-sang, Chairman, Kaesong Industrial 
Management Committee 
Visits to Shinwon factory and Taesung Hata factory 
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Visit to Joint Security Area (Panmunjom), Demilitarised Zone, South Korea: 
Briefing from Commander Dignan, UN Command Joint Duty Officer 
Briefing from Major Johann Larsson, Secretary, Swedish Contingent, Neutral 
Nations Supervisory Commission 
 
Global Security: Japan and Korea    151 
Formal Minutes 
Wednesday 12 November 2008 
Members present: 
Mike Gapes, in the Chair 
Sir Menzies Campbell 
Mr Fabian Hamilton 
Mr David Heathcoat-Amory 
Mr Eric Illsley 
Mr Paul Keetch 
 
 Mr Malcolm Moss 
Mr Ken Purchase 
Sir John Stanley 
Ms Gisela Stuart 
 
 
The Committee deliberated. 
Draft Report (Global Security: Japan and Korea), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read. 
Ordered, That the Chairman’s draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 53 read and agreed to. 
Paragraph 54 read, amended and agreed to. 
Paragraphs 55 to 122 read and agreed to. 
Paragraph 123 read, amended and agreed to. 
Paragraphs 124 to 162 read and agreed to. 
Paragraph 163 read, amended and agreed to. 
Paragraph 164 read and agreed to. 
Paragraph 165 read, amended and agreed to. 
Paragraphs 166 to 176 read and agreed to. 
A paragraph—(Sir John Stanley) —brought up, read the first and second time, and inserted (now 
paragraph 177). 
Paragraphs 177 to 226 (now paragraphs 178 to 227) read and agreed to. 
Paragraph 227 (now paragraph 228)  read, amended and agreed to. 
Paragraphs 228 to 266 (now paragraphs 229 to 267) read and agreed to. 
Paragraph 267 (now paragraph 268) read, amended and agreed to. 
Paragraphs 268 to 288 (now paragraphs 269 to 289) read and agreed to. 
Paragraph 289 (now paragraph 290) read, amended and agreed to. 
Annex agreed to. 
Resolved, That the Report, as amended, be the Tenth Report of the Committee to the House. 
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Ordered, That the Chairman make the Report to the House. 
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions 
of Standing Order No. 134. 
Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report. 
[Adjourned till Wednesday 19 November at 2.00 pm. 
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Oral evidence
Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee
on Wednesday 19 March 2008
Members present:
Mike Gapes (Chairman)
Rt hon. Sir Menzies Campbell Mr. Malcolm Moss
Mr. Fabian Hamilton Sandra Osborne
Rt hon. David Heathcoat-Amory Rt hon. Sir John Stanley
Mr. John Horam
Witness: Dr. John Swenson-Wright, Lecturer in Japanese Politics and International Relations, East Asia
Institute, University of Cambridge, and Associate Fellow, Chatham House, gave evidence.
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon. Thank you, Dr.
Swenson-Wright, for being our ﬁrst witness in this
new inquiry on global security, Japan and Korea.
Members of the public, will you please switch oV
your mobile phones, or put them on silent? Thank
you. This inquiry is a follow-up to other inquiries
that we have done on global security, including one
on South Asia and one on East Asia. The East Asia
one focused mainly on the People’s Republic of
China and its neighbours, so we thought that there
was an opportunity to have an inquiry that looked
at Japan and Korea in greater detail. They were
touched on in our previous report, and this gives us
an opportunity to go further into the issues. I begin
by asking for your assessment of the Japanese
domestic debate on Japan’s role in the world and
how it is changing.
Dr. Swenson-Wright: Probably the most important
thing to say, in looking at Japanese security policy
as it is perceived domestically, is that there has been
a gradual evolution in Japanese foreign and
security policy dating from the mid-1990s. Part of
that has been prompted by the perceived threat
from North Korea—in particular, the launch of the
Taepodong medium-range ballistic missile in 1998.
In the words of one former bureaucrat, in a sense,
it pulled Japan out of its post-war cocoon. It made
the Japanese public in particular aware of their
vulnerabilities. We have seen a steady, incremental
shift to a more proactive foreign and security
policy. Gradually, some of the normative
constraints, such as the post-war paciﬁsm that has
been reﬂected perhaps most powerfully by article
9—the so-called peace clause—of the Japanese
constitution, have begun to be questioned and
challenged. It is also partly an attempt to provide
a corrective to the legacy of the ﬁrst Gulf war, when
Japan’s bureaucrats and politicians felt that Japan
was caught in a diYcult position, having provided
substantial ﬁnancial assistance, but perceived not
to be a major player in its commitment to security
interests. There has been a strong eVort to avoid
repeating those mistakes. Fundamental new
legislation was introduced in 2001 and 2003,
providing the opportunity for Japan’s ground self-
defence forces to be deployed to Iraq. That was an
unprecedented development, as it was the ﬁrst time
that ground self-defence forces had been deployed
to a conﬂict zone. Also, importantly in terms of
domestic political debate in the Japanese Diet,
maritime self-defence forces were deployed to assist
in Operation Enduring Freedom, providing
logistical support and refuelling capabilities to the
allied eVort in Afghanistan. That all represents an
important shift in how security is deﬁned and
pursued at a policy level. Some if it also reﬂects the
importance of personalities. Former Prime
Minister Koizumi took a number of important
political risks in identifying himself so closely with
the American allied eVort in Iraq. More
fundamentally, with regard to the long-term
development of Japan’s security policy, it is also a
reﬂection of important institutional change in
Japan. As you may know, the Japan Defence
Agency has been transformed into a fully ﬂedged
Ministry, reﬂecting the greater emphasis placed on
defence matters in Japan’s decision-making
context. There was a major overhaul of Japan’s
national security doctrine in 2004 with the
publication of the national defence programme
guidelines. The emphasis in those has been to shift
Japan’s approach to security from a rather
narrowly regionally-deﬁned role to a much more
self-consciously global role, harmonising its
capabilities with America’s global force posture
review. The key watchwords are ﬂexibility and
mobility, ensuring that Japan’s defence forces can
be deployed in a range of scenarios and
circumstances to assist the United States—not only
regionally, but globally. In that context, there has
been much more active collaboration between
Japanese and American forces since May 2006,
with the articulation of a new road map. I can go
into that in more detail if you like, explaining the
background to some of those changes.
Q2 Chairman: Thank you. You mentioned article 9
of the constitution, and you also mentioned former
PrimeMinisterKoizumi.Of course, since then, there
has been Mr. Abe and now Mr. Fukuda. Do you
think that the Fukuda Government will pursue
prospects to amend that article?
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Dr. Swenson-Wright: It is quite unlikely at this stage.
Mr. Abe put in train a constitutional process to
allow provision for constitutional reform in a range
of diVerent areas, but it must be emphasised that
that is a long-termproposition.We are talking about
four or ﬁve years. It is also fair to say that Mr.
Fukuda’s current concerns are much more
domestically orientated, because of the diYcult
domestic political balance with the opposition party,
the Democratic Party of Japan, controlling the
upper House. Mr. Fukuda’s priorities have to be
domestic. Also, in terms of his own foreign policy
priorities, he is a man who seemsmuch less willing—
much less eager—than his predecessor to force the
constitutional change argument. In a sense, he does
not need to do so immediately. There are practical
measures that can be taken to allow Japan to
continue to demonstrate its commitment to its
relationship with the United States without
necessitating constitutional change. Some of the
hallmark issues associated with PrimeMinister Abe,
such as the plan to introduce a national security
council, have fallen by the wayside. I think that most
observers see that as a reﬂection of the cautiousness
of Mr. Fukuda, who is much less inclined to pursue
that particular area.
Q3 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: On the question of the
UN Security Council, Japan wants to become a
member, and it is supported by the United
Kingdom, but membership requires a forward
policy on world security. Is that compatible with
article 9? I understand that, in 1945, the world
thought that it had seen quite enough of the
Japanese army, but that is more than 60 years ago.
If Japan wants to play a world role in the Security
Council, do you think that that is possible given the
existence of article 9?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: Yes. I do not see any
contradiction between article 9 and Japan enhancing
its role in the UN. We have seen that already, for
example, in the very deliberate eVorts that the
Japanese Government made in ensuring the passage
of two key UN Security Council resolutions—
resolutions 1695 and 1718—in response to the July
2006 launch of ballistic missiles from North Korea
and of course, most importantly, most symbolically
and, from Japan’s point of view, most worryingly,
the detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea
in October 2006. Japan’s behind-the-scenes eVorts
to put together a diplomatic coalition to deal with
that security threat is precisely the sort of activism
that I think reinforces its argument—it is not a new
argument, of course—for why it ought to have a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. That
argument is driven not only by Japan’s perception
and argument that it is doing more in the security
context, but, very importantly, by the fact that
Japan is one of the most signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
contributors to the UN. Some would say that Japan
is the most reliable contributor, given that it
routinely presents about 20 per cent. of the UN
budget. Given that commitment, Japan feels—quite
legitimately, I think—that it ought to have more say
in the running of the organisation.
Q4 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: You mentioned
examples, but they are regional. If Japan was on the
Security Council, would it take a global perspective
or would it use its membership as a foil to China and
others, and pursue a Paciﬁc-oriented set of
concerns?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: There has been a very
important shift, with the change in leadership from
Abe to Fukuda, to a much more constructive
approach to Sino-Japanese relations. As I am sure
you know, the initial bid for a seat on the Security
Council, which emerged under Koizumi’s
leadership, included a four-state proposition,
involving Germany, Brazil, India and Japan.
AlthoughWashington paid general lip service to the
idea of a Japanese position, there was a real feeling
thatWashington’s commitment was somewhat half-
hearted—principally because Washington felt
reluctant to open the Pandora’s box of UN Security
Council reform on such a grand scale. Of course, the
other opposition came from China. There are some
indications at the moment that, with Sino-Japanese
relations having improved and with China talking
about possibly entertaining an Indian bid for
Security Council membership, the Japanese might
go back to the Chinese and solicit their support. It is
too early to say, but I think that we will see further
eVorts by Japan to enhance its position, at least in
the diplomatic context. As I said, there are many
areas where the nature of US-Japan security
co-operation is already much more global in focus.
There is much more ﬂexible deployment of Japanese
forces in combination with the United States, and I
would see that global approach continuing.
Q5 Sir John Stanley: As you know, the Committee,
in an earlier stage of its global security inquiry, has
visited both China and Taiwan. If there should be
American military deployments or military
operational action at any time in the future to
safeguard the independence of Taiwan, what would
be Japan’s role in facilitating the use of American
bases in Japan for that purpose? Have you any
reason to believe that the Japanese, in addition to
making it easy for the Americans to use their bases
in Japan in that context, might wish to give active
military support to conventional activities by the
Americans to ensure the independence of Taiwan?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: Probably the easiest thing that
one can say at this stage is that the Japanese defence
establishment and the political establishment would
dearly wish to avoid that scenario developing. They
would see it as drawing them into a conﬂict that
could potentially extend far beyond their borders.
Their preference has been to emphasise the
importance of reaching a political solution. In
February 2005, unusually for Japan, the Japanese
Government, together with the United States,
signalled the importance of reaching a diplomatic,
peaceful resolution to the China-Taiwan conﬂict. As
part of that redeﬁnition of the US-Japan security
relationship, there have been early stages of joint
training between Japanese and American forces,
with the potential contingency of a crisis in the
Taiwan straits. But that is a long way from arguing
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in support of active military co-operation. That
would be seen as provocative, for obvious reasons,
and would undermine the eVorts of the Fukuda
Government to enhance their relationship with
China—a relationship that is important for a range
of reasons. It is fair to say that the Japanese political
establishment is also split about how best to manage
its relationships with Taiwan and China, so it is far
easier, from its point of view, to try to oVset the
possibility of such a security crisis emerging. Some
have speculated that Japan’s eVorts to develop
missile defence in closer collaboration with the
United States, particularly the deployment of more
mobile Aegis destroyers, which form a critical part
of the new missile defence structure, might, at some
point, be directed towards dealing with a conﬂict in
the Taiwan straits. I think that that argument is
overstated, but, in terms of perceptions, it fuels some
of the dynamic between China and its regional
neighbours. From Japan’s perspective, China
represents a real and present danger in terms of its
ballistic missile capabilities. The Japanese
establishment would wish to avoid intervening
directly in support of the United States, but whether
it could avoid doing so is debateable, because
American forces would clearly have to be deployed
from Japan, principally from Okinawa. It is almost
inconceivable that the Japanese Government could
veto such an action on the part of the United States.
Q6 Mr. Horam: What eVect, if any, will Japan’s
presence in the G8 have on its international role?
Dr. Swenson-Wright:TheG8 oVers an interesting set
of opportunities for Japan, particularly in the
context of climate change. Prime Minister Fukuda
clearly wants the Hokkaido summit in July to be a
success. In part, that reﬂects the logic of domestic
politics in Japan—there is talk of a possible lower
House election in the autumn, and success in
managing the G8 summit, however one chooses to
deﬁne that in policy terms, is important for Japan. It
also reﬂects the personal preferences of Fukuda,
who, as a young man in the 1970s, was secretary to
his father, the then Prime Minister, Takeo Fukuda.
He had anticipated managing the 1979 G8 summit,
but was unable to participate because of political
change within Japan. The sense of frustration on the
part of Fukuda Jr. partly explains his commitment.
What would Prime Minister Fukuda do? We have
already seen some important indicators. He gave a
signiﬁcant talk at the Davos forum in late January,
when he set out the potential environmental policy
proposals that Japanwould like to be taken up at the
G8 summit. My analysis suggests that Japan is
trying to present itself as a mediating force between
the European Union—with its preference for some
sort of top-down, uniﬁed set of standards to deal
with climate change, as well as a system of emissions
trading—and the United States, which we know is
very sceptical about the merits of binding national
targets.The Japanese have proposed some sort of
bottom-up system in which industry-based targets
would be set as a means of moving towards the
Kyoto and post-Kyoto targets, which are being
debated at themoment. Unfortunately, the diYculty
for the Prime Minister is that because of tensions
within his Government and divisions within his
Cabinet between the Environment Minister and the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, he has
been reluctant to set formal targets or to establish a
clear time frame. The Japanese establishment is
questioning the merits of the 1990 baseline for
discussions on climate change. By doing so,
opposition is potentially being generated in
European circles. There are even doubts about
Japan’s ability to meet its 6% reduction target under
the existing Kyoto framework. However, despite
those problems there are very real areas where Japan
can demonstrate its willingness and ability to lead
and to make a diVerence. Under the proposal made
by Prime Minister Fukuda at Davos, Japan will
provide some $10 billion-worth of economic
assistance over the next ﬁve years, targeted at
developing countries, in an eVort to reduce their
emissions. There has been a great deal of stress on
the importance of harnessing Japan’s technical
expertise in this ﬁeld, particularly in conjunction
with countries such as China. Again, that reinforces
the eVort by the Fukuda Government to enhance
their bilateral relationship with Beijing. There is
much talk of alternative uses of energy, solar power,
measures to mitigate the eVects of natural disasters
associatedwith global warming and better control of
water resources. In typical Japanese fashion, those
initiatives are being realised through a combination
of grants and loans and a set of diVerent incentives.
It is quite striking when one contrasts the level of
commitment on the part of Japan, with its $10
billion, with what theUnitedKingdom is proposing.
Japan is prepared to take a lead and clearly feels that
this is an important opportunity. When we think
about the G8, it is worth emphasising that there are
non-environmental opportunities where Japan can
aVord to lead. In a sense, that relates to the earlier
question about its security role and its ability to
make the case for a prominent position in theUnited
Nations. The initiative that is most relevant to that
is the global partnership against the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, which was ﬁrst
introduced in 2002 at the Canadian G8 summit.
Japan has played an important role in encouraging
denuclearisation, often behind the scenes and in a
low-proﬁle context. Again, that is emblematic of
Japan’s diplomatic style. It has been at the forefront
of eVorts to dismantle Russian submarines through
the Star ofHope programme. Japan has also been an
active player in broadening the range and number of
participant countries beyond the G8 framework and
bringing in non-G8 states as part of that initiative.
That sort of technical experience is invaluable not
only in the context of the former Soviet states, but in
the context of North Korea—a very live issue for
Japan. If the Six-Party Talks were to continue along
the route that we see at themoment and if Japan was
able to realise andmanage its domestic opposition to
closer relations with North Korea, one could see a
very valuable role for Japan in providing technical
assistance, perhaps in conjunction with the United
Kingdom. There is a range of areas where Japan’s
past eVorts could be applied in a future context—
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even in the context of China—for example,
regarding non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction,
such as chemical and biological weapons. Japan has
played an important role in decommissioning
stockpiles of chemical weapons left over from world
war two. It has important technical expertise that
could be applied in a variety of diVerent contexts.
Q7 Mr. Horam: Brieﬂy, how far do you feel that
Japan’s stand on climate change and environmental
matters is driven by its energy requirements?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: That is a very important part
of its agenda, although its energy requirements cross
a range of policy issues. The immediate context in
which one would expect to see a more developed set
of initiatives is enhancing and using nuclear power
to deal with energy needs. Japan has been less
proactive and less willing to embrace such initiatives.
Its approach to its own energy demands involves
closer relations with China, because of the need to
develop access to oil and natural gas resources in the
East China Sea. It also aVects its relationship with
Russia and, importantly in the context of non-
proliferation measures, its relationship with Iran.
Japan has been trying to develop access to the very
substantial resources of the Iranian oil ﬁelds, and
some of that has been qualiﬁed and constrained by
diplomatic realities and pressure from the United
States. Given the importance of maintaining access
to diverse energy supplies, Japan is perhaps taking a
more ﬂexible approach in its relations with Iran than
it otherwise might, and the Iranians have certainly
been lobbying the Japanese Government to
reconsider their position on that issue.
Q8 Mr. Hamilton: The Foreign and
Commonwealth OYce has said that the success of
Japan, and also SouthKorea, in ensuring stability in
East Asia “will depend on their close relations with
the US”. It also notes that Prime Minister Fukuda
has said that Japan’s alliance with theUS “should be
used to leverage an enhanced Japanese role in Asia
to boost relations with China and the Republic of
Korea.” Could you give us an outline of the current
state of security relations between the US and
Japan?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: The security relationship is
broadly very positive. In fact, some former members
of the Bush Administration who were closely
involved with relations between the two countries
would argue that it is the best that it has ever been.
Certainly, if one takes most of the conventional
indicators, it is easy to see why that argument would
be made. The US remains the linchpin of Japan’s
security strategy, both in the region and in its
evolving more global role. There are some 53,000
American troops in Japan, which is a very real and
substantial presence. There has been a substantial
enhancement of security co-operation between
Washington and Tokyo through the road map that
I mentioned, and we have also seen at the diplomatic
level a real eVort by PrimeMinister Fukuda to build
on the success achieved by PrimeMinisters Koizumi
and Abe. I think that the November summit of last
yearwas a success. The BushAdministration and the
President himself provide rhetorical support on the
critical issue of the fate of Japanese abductees, which
again is a very important political concern for the
current Japanese Government. A new host nations
accord agreement has been signed. With regard to
ballistic missile defence, there have been substantial
developments in testing key technologies. Thanks to
some agile footwork within the Diet, we have also
seen the ability of the Liberal Democratic Party
Administration to re-extend the deployment of
maritime self-defence forces to the IndianOcean and
to reassure Washington, which had looked at that
political issue as something that would potentially
destabilise the relationship. We have also seen much
more enhanced collaboration between Japanese
military forces and their American counterparts in a
series of exercises in the Paciﬁc. Importantly, that is
not limited to theUS and Japan, but is now bringing
in other nations such as Australia, Britain, France,
New Zealand and Singapore. Having said that, I
think that there are some very important potential
irritants in the relationship that could complicate
how it develops in the future. With regard to North
Korea, I certainly think that there is a private worry
on the part of the Japanese Foreign Ministry—it
might be reluctant to say this publicly—that
Washington’s commitment to solving the North
Korean nuclear problem is perhaps not as strong as
it would like. It worries, for example, that as part of
the necessary arrangements to provide incentives to
North Korea, the US is about to de-list the country
as a state sponsor of international terror, in eVect
undercutting Japan’s negotiating position with
North Korea and potentially creating very
signiﬁcant problems domestically. While
Washington worries about the very evident
proliferation risk posed by North Korea, from the
vantage point of Tokyo, the principal security
concern is about ballistic missiles. That is not to say
that that the nuclear issue is not important, but the
ballistic missile threat from North Korea is equally
important and, in certain quarters, there is a feeling
that that concern has been insuYciently emphasised.
It is also important to recognise that making those
very ambitious security changes in the defence
relationship between theUS and Japanwill cost a lot
of money. The simple redeployment of 8,000
marines from Okinawa to Guam, which is due to
take place over a four-year period, is due to cost
some $26 billion. When you consider that the
Japanese annual defence budget is about $45 billion,
you can see why that will impose a huge constraint
on Japan at a time when its economy is suVering.
Past American Defence Secretaries have been
assiduous in pushing Japan to show a willingness to
dig into its pockets to support such initiatives.
Defence planners worry that their abilities to meet
the broader roles and missions that are part of the
new road map might be constrained by very real
ﬁscal pressures. The defence establishment is
legitimately concerned about that. In terms of
building an eVective defence relationship, one area
on which the two countries have been moving closer
together since the 1980s is sharing critical defence
technology. During the past 20 or 30 years, there
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have been periodic ﬂash points of tension where
there has been a debate over the merits of sharing
technology, partly because American defence
contractors worry about the possible leakage of such
technology into the civilian sector. A similar
controversy arose recently over the American
decision to prevent the export of F-22 Raptor ﬁghter
planes to Japan, again suggesting a certain degree of
caution from Washington in its willingness to work
actively with its Japanese partners. Politically
speaking, in an echo of the mid-1990s, when a very
damaging rape case onOkinawa threatened to derail
the relationship, we have, alas, seen a similar event in
the last month or so. Having said that, the political
communities on both sides have learned how to
manage such tensions and, for now at least, they
have been able to contain the problem. There are
other issues that are less germane to security per se,
and more to do with domestic politics, both in
Tokyo and in Washington. The US Congress has
been keen to single out Japan for criticism because of
its failure to address the interests of former comfort
women. In the process, that raised diYcult historical
issues that bedevil Japan’s relationships with not
only the United States, but, most importantly,
China and South Korea. Those are areas that will
need to be addressed in the future and although there
is a will on both sides to manage the relationship,
important areas of uncertainty remain. From
Tokyo’s perspective, the other area of uncertainly is
the likely outcome of the next presidential election.
Rightly or wrongly, policy makers in Tokyo tend to
assume that Republican Administrations are more
sympathetic to Japan. Democrat Administrations
have, in the past, been willing to play the trade card,
and there is a nervousness due to uncertainty about
what might happen in November.
Q9 Mr. Hamilton: Thank you for that
comprehensive reply. Do you think that the close
relationship between Japan and the United States is
helpful to Japan in pursuing its regional relations?
Despite all that you said, it is still a very close
relationship—there are 53,000 US troops stationed
in Japan, so it has to be close. How helpful is that to
Japan in its regional ambitions?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: It is obviously critically
important in providing Japan’s immediate security
guarantee. The nuclear umbrella that the United
States oVers Japan is essential as a deterrent
strategy, and one can imagine the consequences of
removing or qualifying that. Fortunately, there is no
move on either side to question that relationship.
Japan does not have many choices in terms of where
else it could go. We have seen a willingness to
explore the possible development of a more ﬂexible
defence posture regarding not only enhancing its
relationship with the United States, but thinking
about new partnerships. In March last year, Japan
entered into a new security partnership for the ﬁrst
time—in this case with Australia—which signiﬁed
its desire for more ﬂexibility. Under the Abe
Administration, there was talk of a new
quadrilateral relationship to bring together the
United States, Australia, Japan and India. That
signiﬁed a new political assertiveness and ambition
on the part of certain members of the LDP, in
particular the then Foreign Minister, Taro Aso.
That idea is now well and truly dead, partly because
of political change in Australia and the emergence of
the Rudd Administration, who worry that moving
to a more ﬂexible defence posture of the type that I
have described will be perceived by the Chinese as
confrontational and as signalling a new containment
strategy. As a result, there has been a movement
away from this more ambitious agenda. The fact
that the Japanese political establishment and certain
politicians are willing to explore those new
structures demonstrates, I think, a desire to enhance
Japan’s security options.
Q10 Sandra Osborne: With this recent rape case, to
what extent are the views of the Japanese public
reﬂected in the attitudes of the Government towards
the US? I understand that there is anti-US
sentiment. Is there a view that the US military
should get out of Japan, or is the attitude
consensual?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: It is a local issue for the
residents of Okinawa, who represent 1% of the total
land mass of Japan and accommodate 65% of all
American forces. It is easy to see why this is a very
diYcult issue, but even in Okinawa there is a trade-
oV between those constituents who are opposed to
the American presence and local businesses that
beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from the economic stimulus that
comes from that presence. On the whole, Japanese
public opinion remains consistent towards the
United States. If you look at it over the post-war
period, you see very little ﬂuctuation in general
attitudes towards the United States, which for the
most part remain very favourable. Of course, these
sorts of incidents are disruptive. What is important
in the Japanese context is that the guilty party—or
in this case the guilty Government, by association at
least—is seen to respond sympathetically and
quickly, and to oVer apologies. Secretary of State
Rice and Thomas SchieVer, the American
ambassador in Tokyo, moved very quickly—within,
I think, three days—to travel to Okinawa in the case
of the American ambassador to meet, the family of
the victim and to oVer apologies. That has helped to
diVuse a lot of those tensions. Where public opinion
is much more volatile is in relations with China, and
also with South Korea.
Q11 Chairman: May I ask you about China? There
was clearly strong hostility and opposition in China
when the previous Prime Minister Koizumi went to
the Yasukuni shrine. There were demonstrations—
almost riots at some point. What is Japanese public
opinion, and also Japanese political opinion, with
regard to internal Chinese issues? It might be too
early, but could you perhaps comment on Tibet, and
also on the Taiwan question in Japanese politics?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: In terms of Japanese public
opinion and attitudes towards China, there is no
doubt that the demonstrations in the mid-1990s and
the signiﬁcance of the history issue have been a
source of tension. The Japanese public’s attitude
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towards China is not that dissimilar to the American
public’s attitude towards Japan in the 1980s. That
attitude is based on a fear of China’s economic
potential, and on the perception that it is growing
ineluctably and will eventually take over Japan’s
dominant economic position. That is the principal
fear on the part of the Japanese public. The media in
Japan do not help, particularly popular media,
whether it is manga cartoons or some of the more
sensationalist press that is keen to demonise and
stereotype the Chinese. That feeds into this almost
symbiotic relationship between nationalist
communities in China and Japan. There are
certainly outspoken politicians who are quick to
point out the political shortcomings and democratic
deﬁciencies of the Chinese Government. They are a
vocal force, but not necessarily a representative one.
In fact, if you look at the eVorts—and not only those
of the LDP and PrimeMinister Fukuda—to rebuild
the political relationship with China, you can see
that they continue the important progress made by
Mr. Abe. If you combine that with the eVorts of the
Democratic party of Japan— Ichiro Ozawa, the
leader of the Democratic party, has travelled with
other members of his party to Beijing for important
meetings with the Chinese leadership—there is a
healthy pragmatism and recognition that this is a
relationship that needs to work. It is often
characterised as a hot economic relationship and a
cool political relationship. The economic
relationship continues to work in a constructive
way, and business interests remain committed to
developing their presence. China is now Japan’s
most important trading partner, and the rate of
increase in Japanese inward foreign direct
investment to China is striking. That does not
minimise the importance of other tensions,
particularly in the defence context. The defence
agency, as it was before it became a ministry, has,
over time, emphasised the potential security risk
posed by China. There is concern about submarine
and naval incursions into Japanese territorial
waters, and, as I said, about China’s real ballistic
missile capabilities. All of that has been an issue, but
we have seen substantial improvement in the
relationship in the past three or four months. That
partly reﬂects person-to-person diplomacy. There
was the visit of the Chinese Premier who, for the ﬁrst
time, addressed the Japanese Diet last spring.
Importantly, in terms of addressing some of the
historical issues that feed the domestic debate, Prime
Minister Fukuda’s visit to China was welcomed by
the Chinese authorities, and he was given the
opportunity to give a live public address on
television—he was only the second leader to do so,
President Bush being the ﬁrst in 2005. Prime
Minister Fukuda addressed the students of Beijing
University, and spoke explicitly about having “the
courage and wisdom to repent what we must
repent.” It was an important and deliberate eVort to
address the history issue head-on. As you know,Mr.
Fukuda made a clear commitment not to visit
Yasukuni shrine, taking some of the diYcult
political tensions out of the equation. Prime
Minister Fukuda’s counterpart, Hu Jintao, is due to
visit Japan in April or, more likely, May. That will
be the ﬁrst time since 1998 that a Chinese leader has
visited Japan and, again, there is a perception that
that will provide a useful opportunity to cement the
relationship at a practical level. One thing I would
emphasise in this new dynamic, which perhaps
exposes a strategic weakness in Japan’s approach to
foreign policy, is that the Prime Minister has been
quick to emphasise the commonality between China
and Japan at a cultural level. During his visit, he
went to Confucius’s home town, and there was talk
of emphasising Asian values, minimising what in the
past was a clearer highlighting of democratic,
political issues. Foreign Minister Aso sought to
articulate a much more ambitious security and
political agenda when he talked about constructing
a new arc of freedom and prosperity in the region.
That idea has now been put very much on the back
burner, and Mr. Fukuda has attempted to reorient
Japan’s posture towards Asia, particularly China.
There are many other important elements in the new
partnership. The Chinese ambassador to Japan, Cui
Tiankai, talked about the importance of building a
new strategic, reciprocal relationship, and we have
seen unprecedented port visits by Chinese warships
to Japan. We have heard talk of possible trilateral
co-operation between China, the United States and
Japan, looking for new security structures,
particularly to address Japan’s concerns about
North Korea. There is increasing recognition in
Tokyo of the fact that China is an important
mediator in dealing with North Korea and thus a
valuable partner. The economic relationship
remains important to both sides. As for problematic
issues, we have mentioned Taiwan, which remains a
concern. Both contenders in the Taiwan election
have travelled to Japan on a number of occasions
and are looking to shore up their support among a
diverse political environment in which there are
constituencies in both parties that align with either
China or Taiwan. The oil and energy issue
surrounding the debate about access to the Senkaku
islands seems to be moving towards a successful
resolution, but it is important to emphasise that this
is a resolution only in terms of energy security, and
joint access and development of those oil and
natural gas reserves. The Chinese sound positive,
but they have not compromised on the critical issue
of sovereignty, which remains a ﬂashpoint not only
between China and Japan, but between Taiwan and
Japan. Lastly, and perhaps most strikingly in terms
of the ability of unexpected events to derail bilateral
relationships, there is the controversy surrounding
food poisoning. Chinese dumplings have been
identiﬁed as responsible for a number of high-proﬁle
food poisoning cases. This is not a trivial matter
when one considers that China, after the United
States, is perhaps the most important supplier of
imported food to Japan, supplying about 60 % of its
frozen food imports. The fallout is verging on mass
hysteria and is not inconsequential, both
economically and politically, with accusations of
bad faith on the part of both Governments. The
Japanese Government are accusing the Chinese
Government of covering up information relating to
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the origins of the problem, and the Chinese
Government are suggesting that the problem might
have originated in Japan or was possibly an act of
sabotage deliberately intended to derail the bilateral
relationship.
Q12 Mr. Moss: May I return to relations with
North Korea, which you touched on when
answering the question on US-Japan relations? In
your opinion, would Japan be prepared to normalise
relations with Pyongyang if there were an
international settlement on the North Korean
nuclear issue, even if there was not some kind of
movement regarding the issue of the abductees?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: If they can ﬁnd a formula for
dealing with the abductee issue, I think that there is
a very real possibility that Japan would be prepared
to entertain normalisation. After all, it was Prime
Minister Koizumi who on two occasions took what
at the time were very real political risks in visiting
Pyongyang in 2002 and 2004. Mr. Fukuda, who in
his time as Chief Cabinet Secretary was often
referred to as a shadow Foreign Minister, took a
great deal of interest in the relationship with North
Korea, and his public remarks to date suggest that
he is adopting a much more pragmatic approach
than did his predecessor. As I am sure you are aware,
Mr. Abe was very much constrained because he had
legitimised himself in terms of popular support by
taking a very hawkish position onNorthKorea, and
we see in PrimeMinister Fukuda a desire to develop,
in his words, a comprehensive approach to dealing
with North Korea, so I think that the simple answer
is yes. Even public opinion in Japan is much more
ﬂexible, or at least ambivalent, on the importance of
emphasising the abductee question. The key issue, of
course, is how best to eVect that change. In this
context, relations with South Korea oVer a new
opportunity, not only with regard to co-operation
between Seoul and Tokyo in developing a more co-
ordinated approach towards North Korea, but in
bringing in the United States to address security
interests through the reactivation of bodies such as
TCOG, the trilateral co-ordination oversight group
and thinking politically of possible solutions. Of
course, Japan will need to be an important part of
any long-term solution, principally because it oVers,
through normalisation, very real incentives for the
North Koreans. In the 2002 meeting, the talk was of
a package of aid of anything between $5 billion and
$10 billion. When you consider that the North
Korean economy, if one can measure such a thing,
tends to record ﬁgures of about $17 billion for its
GDP, you realise that this is potentially a very
substantial incentive. If the political will is there,
Japan could be a very instrumental player in
eVecting positive change, alongwith these important
initiatives in the ﬁeld of technology and the
proliferation risks associated with North Korea.
Q13 Mr. Moss: Turning next to South Korea, how
has Japan responded to the election of President
Lee, and to what extent do you believe that the
Japanese-South Korean relationship is still
inﬂuenced by Japan’s treatment of regional states in
its colonial and wartime past?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: Generally, the response has
been very positive. As you know, President Roh was
seen from Tokyo’s perspective as being over-willing
to play the history card over territorial diVerences
and to use the vexed question of history text books
as a means of securing domestic support on the
home front. I think that that might be an overstated
argument, and one has to understand that there are
very real cultural diVerences between Japan and
South Korea that feed this perception on both sides.
Similarly, on the Japanese side, local politics has
often intruded to complicate the bilateral
relationship without necessarily reﬂecting a hostile
approach on the part of the Government. Lee
himself, the new incoming president, is seen in
Tokyo as a pragmatist. It does not hurt that he was
born in Osaka, and so there is immediately a
Japanese connection. It is striking that Prime
Minister Fukuda chose to attend the inaugural
ceremonies on 25 February and was one of the ﬁrst
foreign leaders to have ameeting with President Lee.
There is talk of a visit by President Lee to Japan in
April. The new ForeignMinister, YuMyungHwan,
was the former ambassador to Japan, so what the
Japanese like to refer to as pipes—the personal ties
that bring these two constituencies together—have
been potentially enhanced in a very important way.
The previous Administration was dominated by
members of the so-called 386 generation—
individuals in their 30s who were born in the 1960s
and attended universities in the 1980s—who were
seen as not having those very important personal
ties. The fact thatwe see a new generation or an older
generation of individuals shaping policy towards
Japan and Korea oVers important opportunities.
Just as we have seen in the case of Sino-Japan
relations a willingness on the part of politicians on
both sides of the political aisle to travel to China to
rebuild relations, so, too, we have seen a similar
pattern on the part of Japan-Korea relations. There
is even talk—ambitious talk, it has to be said—of
building a new tunnel between Japan and South
Korea, which at 200 km would be a major
engineering undertaking, dwarﬁng by far our own 50
km link with France. While all that is a positive
change, there are possible areas where one might see
points of tension alongside the co-operation. Lee is
perceived as a business man and a tough negotiator.
He has set his own agenda on economic growth very
ambitiously: the so-called 747 strategy of ensuring
7 per cent. growth in the economy, doubling per
capita income to the level of $40,000 per person, and
establishing South Korea as the world’s seventh
largest economy. That means that there will
inevitably be tensions in the economic relationship
between the two countries. It was in 2004 that the
two countries last talked meaningfully about the
possibility of building a free trade agreement or an
economic partnership agreement between them.
Those negotiations have since stalled. They may be
reopened, but therewill be diYculties, particularly in
the agricultural sector, in rebuilding the relationship
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in a constructive way. Finally, one area which
sometimes gets neglected in the bilateral relationship
is the importance of cultural exchange—soft
power—on the part of both countries. Just as there
has been in the past ﬁve or 10 years a Korean wave
of cultural products—ﬁlms, books and music—that
has ensured the growing popularity of Korea among
ordinary Japanese, so, too, quite interestingly, there
is now a Japanese wave. There is a similar level of
interest on the part of ordinary Koreans in Japanese
culture. That has to be a good thing, albeit a force
that will have at best only a gradual, but hopefully
sustained, impact on the bilateral relationship.
Q14 Sir John Stanley: During the recent
presidential election in South Korea, President Lee
gave a ﬁrm impression that he would be taking an
altogether tougher line with Chairman Kim Jong Il
if he was elected President. Indeed, I understand that
President Lee’s Korean nickname is the bulldozer.
Do you anticipate that there is going to be signiﬁcant
change in policy towards theDPRKunder President
Lee, or is he as determined as his predecessor to try
to achieve a peaceful reuniﬁcation of the Korean
peninsula?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: I am hesitant to express a view
on this issue because there are two much better
qualiﬁed colleagues behind me who I am sure will
address that question much more persuasively than
I can. My sense is that Lee’s approach is one of
pragmatism and conditionality. There is the
potential for a much more enhanced relationship
with North Korea, provided progress is secured on
the nuclear issue, and there is talk of expanding
economic co-operation zones and of sending more
economic assistance, in eVect tightening the
relationship between the North and the South. The
distinction is between that approach and the
approach of his predecessor, who saw engagement,
in and of itself, as in turn producing success in terms
of proliferation and nuclear discussions. We have a
reversal of the sequencing. On the commitment to
reaching a positive outcome, the two men are not
that far apart.
Q15 Sir John Stanley: You referred earlier to the
dispute between Japan and China and Taiwan in
relation to certain islands. As you know, there is also
signiﬁcant dispute between the Republic of Korea
and Japan on islands.Would you like to give us your
assessment of whether there is any chance of
resolving the sovereignty issues in relation to those
islands? Could it produce actual hostilities between
the Republic of Korea and Japan?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: The sticking point is on the
mechanism proposed by the two sides for resolving
the matter. Neither side accepts the proposal of the
other—in the case of Japan, the willingness to go to
international arbitration. There is complete
reluctance on the part of the South Korean
Government, who see the territory as legitimately
Korean, so it is hard to see how diplomatic
accommodation can be reached.
It is also important to emphasise that, in popular
sentiment, this is much more of a live issue in Korea
than in Japan. Your average Japanese member of
the public, I am tempted to say, is little exercised by
the fate of Takeshima, or Dokdo as it is known to
the Koreans. It was striking that when the issue
ﬂared up—I think that it was in the spring of 2004,
when the Shimane Prefecture decided to announce
that henceforth 19 February would be Takeshima
day—there was a very muted response on the part of
the Japanese media and Japanese public opinion. By
contrast, we have seen demonstrations, the burning
of Japanese ﬂags and attacks on the Japanese
embassy in South Korea. It is hard to see how any
politician in South Korea, however pragmatic he
might be, would bewilling to court public discontent
by suggesting any sort of compromise on the
territorial issue. I am afraid that it will continue to
bedevil the relationship, but we may see the leaders
being willing to ﬁnd some formula for avoiding such
unexpected ﬂare-ups. The problem is that they often
occur at local, not national, level.
Chairman: Can we ask questions about the regional
security position and the Six-Party Talks?
Q16 Sir John Stanley:Could you tell us whether the
Japanese Government, in your view, are quite
content for the US to take the lead in the Six-Party
Talks, or whether it has particular requirements that
it sees as fundamental to the outcome?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: The bottom line from Tokyo’s
perspective is progress on the abductions on the one
hand and, as I suggested earlier, the question of the
ballistic missile threat from North Korea. Japan is
willing to support what the February agreement
represents and the mechanisms for ensuring closer
engagement with North Korea. We now have
diVerent working groups that can address a range of
issues, such as the possibility of a peace treaty and
the possibility of some sort of regional security
architecture, but Japan has made it very clear that it
will maintain its existing sanctions and that it will
not provide economic material assistance directly to
North Korea unless and until the abduction issue
and full normalisation are realised. There is very
little that Japan can be seen to be doing directly to
enhance the Six-Party Talks process, and that is a
danger for Japan. The danger is that it will be seen
to be isolated. Pyongyang has been quite eVective in
the past in attempting to divide Japan from the other
members of the Six-Party Talks, insisting that
Japan’s interests should not be represented and, in
some cases, insisting that Japan should not
participate in those negotiations. One thing that the
Bush Administration, particularly Christopher Hill,
have insisted on is ensuring that there is continuing
discussion on a regular basis with counterparts in
Japan. There has been clear and persistent refusal to
accept pressure from the North Koreans. There has
to be a multilateral solution that involves all the
key parties.
Chairman:Finally, can we ask some questions about
the UK and Japan?
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Q17 Sandra Osborne: How would you characterise
the image of, and attitudes to, the UK in Japan?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: Very positive. It is often said
by Japanese diplomats that, in a sense, the problem
with the UK-Japan relationship is that there is no
problem. It is a very harmonious relationship. There
are no tensions or diYculties. Culturally, there are
clearly very close ties between the two countries. We
have seen a regular ﬂow of tourists, language
students and young Japanese people attracted by the
culture of London and the wider UK. It is probably
fair to say that, on the part of young people in the
UK, interest in Japan seesaws alongside interest in
China. We see that in an educational context. There
has inevitably been a dip in the number of students
enrolling in Japanese studies programmes, but
broadly I think that there has been a great deal of
interest in, and sympathy for, Japan at many
diVerent levels. Similarly, in Japan, there is a great
deal of interest in, and enthusiasm for, British
culture. Some of that has, of course, been the
product of close political ties, particularly between
former Prime Ministers Blair and Koizumi, who, to
the best of my knowledge, had a very good working
relationship. Prime Minister Blair was seen as an
important—perhaps it is going too far to say
inspirational—ﬁgure in Japanese political circles,
and he was certainly very popular. Political culture
in Japan has changed, particularly under Koizumi.
Personality politics matters much more, as does the
ability to command the media—the bully pulpit of
television has been very important. One of the
problems that I think that Mr. Fukuda might have
in the long term is that he is not a natural performer
like Koizumi. The Japanese public are probably
looking formore of that dynamic style of leadership.
Q18 Sandra Osborne: In spite of that, the Foreign
and Commonwealth OYce cites a couple of issues
about Japan’s whaling activities and use of the death
penalty.What leverage do you think that theUKhas
in trying to make the case against those to the
Japanese Government?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: It is quite diYcult to see how
the British Government can persuade Japan to
undertake what would be a major cultural shift. The
commitment to whaling remains quite strong. As
you know, it is presented as driven by scientiﬁc
research interest, but the reality is that it is still an
important part of domestic political culture. The
consumption of whale meat continues in Japan. As
I understand it, there has been some willingness on
the part of the Japanese Government, in the face of
international pressure, particularly from Australia
and its new ForeignMinister, to reassess some of its
whaling activities. For example, originally there
were plans to include in this year’s catch—if I can
put it in those terms—some 50 humpback whales,
but the Japanese Government have decided to roll
back from that owing to concerns raised by the
international community, including national
Governments and non-governmental organisations
in particular. I suspect that raising the issue in public
forums and highlighting the concerns of a wide
range ofGovernments provides the best opportunity
for the British Government to at least try and
contain the problem, but it would be over-ambitious
to assume that we can really change the culture. As
for the death penalty, again I think that there are
deep cultural reasons why it remains very much an
active part of Japan’s legal culture. There have been
a number of high-proﬁle cases of very sensational
murders involving young children. Japan is a culture
that believes in retributive punishment to meet the
needs of the victims. Once again, I think that the
most useful vehicles for eVecting constructive
change in Japan on such issues—and I think that
there is a case for eVecting constructive change,
particularly in the way that prisoners on death row
are treated—are organisations such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch. The
British Government’s commitment to such activities
could be quite constructive and helpful.
Q19 Sir John Stanley: If you were the British
Foreign Secretary’s personal foreign policy adviser
on Japan, what would you tell Mr. Miliband should
be his top British Government foreign policy
priorities towards Japan?
Dr. Swenson-Wright:Climate change is probably the
area in which there is the most opportunity to
enhance and develop the bilateral relationship with
Japan, taking advantage of the fact that Prime
Minister Fukuda has clearly given a very important
rhetorical commitment, as well as a ﬁnancial one, to
enhancing Japan’s role in eVecting positive climate
change. It is an area where a lot more could be done.
A secondary priority, perhaps, would be supporting
Japan’s wider security role. Under Prime Minister
Abe, there was talk of an out-of-area support role
for Japan with NATO, and those areas could be
further explored.
Q20 Sir Menzies Campbell: Please forgive my
absence for the whole of your evidence. I had
another engagement, but I shall read the transcript
carefully. Both whaling and the death penalty are
issues on which United Nations conventions exist.
Japan has a long-term aspiration of permanent
membership of the Security Council. Is there any
sense among the Japanese, particularly in the
JapaneseGovernment, that a reluctance to adhere to
those conventionsmight stand in theway of realising
that aspiration?
Dr. Swenson-Wright: I have not seen it actively
discussed in public discussions or the media.
Presumably, it is an area where professional
diplomats are aware of the potential weaknesses of
Japan’s position, but as a public issue, I would say
that it is not something on which there has been
much informed discussion or debate.
Chairman: Dr. Swenson-Wright, thank you very
much. This has been extremely useful and we thank
you for your time. We will pause for two minutes
while we move the table around for the next
witnesses.
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Q21 Chairman: Good afternoon, Professor Smith
andMr. Foster-Carter. Thank you for taking part in
our ﬁrst day of taking evidence in our inquiry,
“Global Security: Japan and Korea”. I think that
you listened to the earlier part of our session. In this
session, we will focus on the Korean peninsula, but
there are clearly questions that go much wider than
that. May I begin by asking you about the position
with regard to North Korea’s nuclear programme?
Professor Smith, how do you assess the current state
of the nuclear programme and capability, and why
do you think North Korea has pursued a nuclear
weapons programme?
Professor Smith: Thank you for inviting me to this
meeting. In answer to the ﬁrst question on the
current state of North Korea’s nuclear programme,
I shall base my answer on discussions that I had with
the State Department a few weeks ago in
Washington DC and on information from the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, with
whose staV working on North Korea I have worked
for a while. My view is that in terms of the
relationships between the major protagonists, the
United States and theDemocratic People’s Republic
of Korea—North Korea—the technical issues are
under way regarding the negotiations on
denuclearisation. I think that the Americans have
had their experts in North Korea on it. In fact, I
know that they have had their experts in North
Korea. The North Koreans have been talking to the
United States and, from my own information,
people in the United States and in the DPRK think
that at the technical level denuclearisation is
proceeding as expected under the recent agreement
at the last round of the Six-Party Talks. On the
political level, there is still a lack of trust between the
two major protagonists. Whatever one party says,
the other party does not believe, or there are sections
within the Governments and polities of both parties
that put pressure on other sections. That is not the
only issue, but it makes negotiations diYcult. The
United States is unhappy that North Korea has not
given a complete rendering of its nuclear facilities,
and that is still under negotiation.Negotiations have
not broken oV, which is very important. Chris Hill,
the Assistant Secretary of State, who is responsible
for the negotiations, is still fairly pragmatic and even
optimistic. I am putting words into Chris Hill’s
mouth as I have not met him, at least not recently.
The North Koreans are upset because they consider
that the terms of the agreement from their
perspective that there would be moves to take them
oV the list of states sponsoring terrorism and
movements towards normalisation in relation to the
United States—have not been fulﬁlled. It is those
political aspects on both sides of the agreement that,
in terms of the denuclearisation programme that has
come out of the Six-Party Talks, are the key
pertinent issues. Given that there was conﬁdence on
both sides, I think that the technical issues will be
resolved.
Mr. Foster-Carter: I do not disagree with any of
that, I shall just add one or two points to perhaps
render it concrete. May I start by saying thank you
very much for having me back? It was about two
years ago that I was last here and I was looking over
the comments that I made at the time, which looked
extraordinarily inarticulate when written down. We
were all exercised by two things: did the North
Koreans have the bomb, and did the Americans
have a policy towards North Korea? Things have
moved on both those fronts; we know that theNorth
Koreans have the bomb and the Bush
Administration, rather belatedly, has acquired a
policy. Statements about horses and stable doors
may spring to mind. I agree entirely with Professor
Smith—am I allowed to say Hazel in the informal
21st century?—about the diVerence between
technical and political issues. On the technical issues,
we both agree that they apply only to the nuclear
programme that the North Koreans admit is based
on plutonium, about which they have sometimes
boasted. That is underway; it is canned. The political
issues, which are a little depressing, are twofold: the
ﬁrst is the American suspicion that the North
Koreans have in the past done things that appear to
suggest that they were pursuing a separate
programme based on enriched uranium. That has
been on the go for a long time. The second issue is
an entirely new one, as of last September, when the
Israelis bombed a mystery facility in Syria, where
there was a strong suspicion, strengthened by the
tight-lippedness of almost everybody in Jerusalem,
Washington and elsewhere, that there may have
been nuclear proliferation. The political diYculty, as
I understand it, although I, too, am making
inferences, is probably a very great disappointment
to Chris Hill. He has worked incredibly hard, and
has been given a great deal of rope to produce an
agreement. The problem seems to be that North
Korea was supposed to produce a declaration on the
UEP—uranium enrichment programme—by the
end of December and it missed that deadline. That
is the formal position, but I understand the practical
position is that the North Koreans are not moving
on from a formal denial: “We never did either of
these things. We’ve never had highly enriched
uranium, we’ve never done anything with the
Syrians.” I call that their Bart Simpson moment—
you know the famous line: “Didn’t do it, nobody
saw me, can’t prove a thing.” Hill has explained the
situation very carefully, and heavyweight people like
Dr. Kissinger have been wheeled out in meetings
with North Koreans in New York to explain that
when we come to it, a comprehensive declaration
must be just that; you really have to, forgive me, fess
up. You really have to say everything, it is not
enough to say “We’re not doing it any more—
honest, guv.” To build the trust, which Hazel rightly
mentions is lacking, there has to be a full confession.
There are curious parallels with the abductions from
Japan, but I will not go in to that. When the North
Koreans manage a confession, it is a rare thing.
Those are the political diYculties, as I understand
them. I worry about how they will be transcended,
and I worry forMr. Hill’s position, but perhaps that
takes us further.
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Q22 Chairman: What would make the North
Koreans explicitly come to a point of abandoning
the programme and admitting that they have had
such a programme? Would that depend on the US
going beyond the process of engagement to a more
formal recognition and more formal diplomatic
relations? Is that the sticking point?
Professor Smith: There are two issues. One is the
broader issue that the North Koreans have been
saying, at least since the ﬁrst nuclear crisis of 1993-
94, that they want normalisation of relations with
the United States. In their terms, that means much
more than being able to trade with each other. There
is not much that they could get from the United
States, because it is a bit too far away, apart from a
bit of food.Most of their tradewould still come from
the region. Mainly, they see it as a security
guarantee. If there was some form of normalisation,
in their view it would mean that they were not going
to be invaded or bombed. In the past, there has been
a lot of discussion about whether theNorthKoreans
are paranoiac. They probably are, but from their
perspective, they have seen the Iraq war and the
rather belligerent approach to Iran, which is one of
the two countries on the axis of evil list. They
considered that they were at risk of two things:
military action being taken against them in some
way, and regime change through diVerent ways of
trying to undermine the regime—something which
they still consider a risk. I do not know whether it is
possible to achieve what the North Koreans want,
given that many people do not want to give that sort
of guarantee. Until they are sure that the regime will
be safe—that is the Government with Kim Jong Il in
charge and the structure around them—they are not
likely to do anything about the wholesale
abandonment of what they consider to be their
trump card, which they call their nuclear deterrent.
They want normalisation, but in the broadest sense:
they want a security guarantee.
Mr. Foster-Carter: Again—I am not disagreeing,
but I hope just amplifying the point—in so far as the
North Koreans see things that way, and I agree that
they probably do, I fear that they have a very
unrealistic grasp of the way in which politics works
in Washington and elsewhere. I am amazed and
pleased at how far the Bush Administration have
moved from where they were in their disastrous ﬁrst
few years on theKorean issue and probably on other
issues. The North Koreans may think that they can
get a better deal or get things faster than through this
process. Yet again, the years tick by. Last time, they
were waiting for Kerry and they did not get him.
Now they are probably waiting for—I should not
name a name—a new Democrat US President.
Again, I think that they probably delude themselves.
Unless Chris Hill, who is very clever, can come up
with some way of getting the Syria issue and the
enriched uranium issue oV balance sheet, as you
might say, or shove them away into a separate track
of talks, the Bush Administration will run out of
time. Again, an interesting parallel is with those in
Japan who have tried to push the abduction issue to
where it will not get in the way of everything else, but
not because they do not care about that issue. If the
Bush Administration run out of time, I fear that the
views of those like John Bolton, the former US
representative to the UN, who argue that the North
Koreans were never going to make a deal and that
Kim Jong Il will never give up nuclear weapons and
is just stringing us along, will become more
persuasive.
Professor Smith:May I add to that? One of the issues
is that the structure within the North Korean state is
not a monolithic entity, contrary to outside
conventional knowledge. There are real divisions—
I would not say between hard-liners and soft-
liners—but there are diVerent interests at stake. The
Committee will have met people from the Foreign
Ministry and the Ministry for Foreign Trade who
travel abroad, and they are fully aware that they
need to do some sort of deal with the international
community, howsoever that is organised. That could
be done through the United States, the Six-Party
Talks, the European Union—through the
negotiations that they have with the IMF and the
World Bank—or through any of the other people to
whom they talk, oYcially and unoYcially. Those
people are sophisticated, and some of them—not all
of them—go to a number of meetings, and I have
mentioned inmy evidence that there is track 2 as well
as track 1. In North Korea, the structure is such that
everything that goes in—UK Government
negotiations with the North Korean Foreign
Ministry, for example—must then go through
another layer, which is the security or the military
apparatus. Those people are not in direct touch with
foreigners and they still beneﬁt from the way in
which the systemused towork. They beneﬁt not only
because of their position in the apparatus, but also
because of the economic opportunities that come up
from below through the new processes of
marketisation. In other words, they have good
contacts, although no access to foreigners they have
access to hard currency, and that gives them another
way to beneﬁt from the system. That powerful layer
in the North Korean political structure is capable of
keeping a block on, or at least entering into
negotiations that have the eVect of paralysing
progress. In any negotiations that North Korea
undertakes with the rest of the world, it gives the
impression of one step forward, two steps back. It is
not the only reason for paralysis, but it is a major
one. North Korean bureaucracy does not work very
well and there is not much communication between
diVerentMinistries and organisations. That is partly
because there is no bureaucratic system in the
modern sense of the word—ﬁling systems and
regular systems of procedure—but it is also because,
for historic reasons, they do not trust one another.
There are all sorts of blocks on internal, institutional
change taking place. Lots of learning takes place at
the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Trade,
even at the top, and that can be eVective when the
very big issues are at stake. If, for example, the whole
state has to mobilise itself to respond to the United
States on the nuclear test issue, it is able to do so.
Anything less than that, requiring some sort of
eVective bureaucratic functioning, leads to all sorts
of problems.
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Q23 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Reading the history of
the nuclear negotiations seems drearily familiar.
Where authoritarian Governments are concerned,
there are endless retreats, advances, trade-oVs,
linkages, disappointments, disclosures, cheating,
disclosures of the cheating and then more cheating.
Does North Korea have a nuclear programme
simply as a bargaining chip, or does it have genuine
security concerns? Surely, North Korea’s
neighbours dread a collapse there—a demilitarised
NorthKoreawould be left alone, orwould be helped
in some way. Who would invade North Korea? Is its
concern real, authentic and valid, or is the whole
thing about bargaining?
Mr. Foster-Carter: I think that it is a bit of both. This
is a state that was ﬂattened by the US air force, with
a bit of help from ourselves, half a century ago. It
was not out of a clear blue sky—they had invaded
South Korea—but it is a very powerful memory. It
also reminds me—and here I show my age—of
Konfrontasi in Indonesia under Sukarno.
Throughout its history, the North Korean regime
has consistently traded on those genuine fears and,
for older North Koreans, on memories of attack
from the outside, to create a permanent impression
of a country at war on the verge of being attacked. I
have no doubt—Hazel will know better than I do, as
she has spent more time there recently—that many
North Koreans genuinely fear that, as they have
read and heard nothing else from their Government
all their lives. At the same time, it is also a bargaining
tool. My rather pessimistic fear is this. I take
seriously the Songun policy, the “military ﬁrst”
policy that has been an avowed doctrine since Kim
Jong Il came to power, although not under his
father . The military is put ﬁrst, and I have described
North Korea before, as others have, as a sort of
Sparta of the East. I fear that, in the rather ghastly
jargon of today, this is now hard-wired into North
Korea. I cannot imagine a North Korea that is not
trying to arm itself with everything under the sun,
partly for bargaining, but mainly because it cannot
conceive of security in any other way, such as
collective security. I very much hope to be wrong
about that. In my view, one must continue to try to
engage, but that is my fear. That is the kind of state
it is.
Professor Smith: I think that it is about deterrence.
It is quite a classical use of the nuclear possession as
a negotiating card. It is a fairly normal, whatever
normal is, use of nuclear deterrence. Do the North
Koreans think that they would be attacked? I think
that they thought that there might be a surgical
strike on their nuclear facilities, and my view is that
thatwas a realistic possibility at some points over the
past 10 or 15 years in terms of the relationship
between the United States and the DPRK.
Certainly, it was in 1994. They were very, very near
war—two days away from war—before President
Carter went to visit Pyongyang and negotiated a
deal withKim Il Sung, whowas then alive.However,
two issues to do with nuclear deterrence and the
military capability of the DPRK are diVerent from
the ﬁrst nuclear crisis, which took place in 1993-94,
so although of course there is this endless repetition,
as you rightly mention, two broad parameters are
diVerent. One is external; one is internal. Externally,
the international relations of north-east Asia are
very diVerent now from what they were in 1993-94.
China is a valued partner of both South Korea and
Japan, to a certain extent, because of the economic
relationships that now bind them together. In my
view, the nuclear test was the red line for China in
terms of negotiations with North Korea. A number
of other things took place that China was very
unhappy about over the past several years—
unilateral decisions that North Korea took that
would have had an eVect on China and that China
stamped down on. One of them was the declaration
of a free trade zone alongChina’s borderwhen it had
been trying to stamp out corruption in the Liaoning
area, which is north-west of North Korea. The
North Koreans unilaterally declared a free trade
zone with hardly any regulations and the Chinese
stopped it, but I think that the nuclear test was a red
line for China. China is a major supporter of North
Korea in terms of keeping the economy, such as it is,
going with coal, fuel and food. The overall position
of China, which is economically much more
important now than it was in 1993-94—the time of
the ﬁrst nuclear crisis—and also the economic
relations, the economic position of China in north-
east Asia and even in relation to the United States,
is diVerent now, so that North Korea is much more
isolated. This is a contributory factor, I would argue,
in the relative success recently of the Six-Party Talks.
It is not just about the approach of Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and President Bush, who have
argued since 2006, “We think we can get to an
agreement on this, diVerent from before.” The
external relations are diVerent in North-east Asia.
Also internally, there is, in my view, a crisis of
legitimacy inside the DPRK. If you were a child
born in North Korea in 1989 or 1990 and have now
reached adulthood, you have been brought up in
extreme poverty and have also seen inequality
growing quite rapidly. There is a nouveau riche class
that has made some money out of the market
opportunities that are available, but there is a vast
swathe of poverty. Social services at least used to be
provided, more or less nationwide, in the DPRK. I
am talking about health and education. You did not
have to buy medicines; they were more or less
available. In terms of schooling, there was a literate,
numerate population; there still is, although that will
be disappearing now because the resources have
gone. People do not believe that this is a socialist
paradise. Everywhere, people are trying to make
money from the market. The state is no longer able
to engage in the socialisation processes that it was
able to do until 15 or 20 years ago, especially outside
the capital, so the “military ﬁrst” policy, which we
have heard about in relation to North Korea, is, in
my view, partly an insurance policy to keep the
regime in place in the capital, in the DPRK. The
pursuit of being a nuclear power is partly to promote
a sense of national pride, as if to say, “We are doing
it, and only big powers likeAmerica can do it.” Also,
it helps the North Korean Government, because it
makes them seem more powerful than they are. In
my view, the Government in DPRK is very fragile.
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Q24 Sir John Stanley:As you both know, one of the
key factors that produced the quite surprising
progress on an agreement on nuclear weapons and
declarations via the DPRK was the successful
operation carried out by the US Treasury and other
agencies to block the foreign exchange outlet of Kim
Jong Il and his regime throughMacao.Do you think
that that key pressure point has become not so
eVective and usable? If so, can you identify any other
signiﬁcant sources of pressure that might persuade
the Kim Jong Il regime that it has more to gain than
to lose by complying with its enriched uranium
declaration requirements and by making progress
under the present agreement?
Mr. Foster-Carter: Gosh. On the former, theMacao
business was actually rather odd. I am not quite
certain, as you implied, that is has been established
that that pressure brought North Korea to the
conference table. Even if it did, things then turned
very peculiar, because, as I understand it, once the
Bush Administration decided that they wanted a
nuclear deal above all else, the Macao business
suddenly vanished from sight, with some
embarrassment within diVerent arms of the US
Government. The North Koreans, as ever seizing
any opportunity for further delay, saw the
wonderful spectacle of the US having to return all
the money, whether it was dirty or not. I do not want
to spend toomuch time on the detail, but some quite
interesting independent journalistic accounts have
cast some doubt on whether the matter was quite as
we had thought. I confess that I have become old and
cynical over the years, and I have tended to assume
that the North Koreans are probably guilty until
proven innocent, which is not our system in this
country. However, there are some holes in the
evidence; the US Treasury Department never
published its evidence, for example. The second part
of your question was themore forward-looking, and
I should like to pick up on something that my
colleague said. China is key now. I am sure that she
is right that it was a fateful day when the North
Koreans exploded their little bomb. I think that it
really annoyed the Chinese, not yet to the point that
they would decide that they did not want the regime
in place anymore, but at least to the point of
endorsing the famous lines of Arthur Hugh Clough:
“Thou shalt not kill; but needst not strive OYciously
to keep alive”. Chinese grain aid to North Korea is
down, as I understand it. The Chinese do not want
unrest on their borders or the regime to collapse;
but, to be brief, China is already applying more
pressure than it used to, and it is in a position to
apply more. Kim Jong Il may yet rue that day.
Professor Smith: This is not a direct answer to your
question—which is not always very popular. I am
not sure that now is the time for extra pressure. At
the moment, the negotiations between the United
States and the DPRK are more in the persuasive
mould; at least, they seem to be, relatively, but we
never know what will happen. We know what can
happen with the North Koreans—you could say
that they could snatch defeat from the jaws of
victory. However, at the moment, the transactions
that have been agreed via the Six-Party Talks
agreement would work for both sides. North Korea
needs the energy aid from the agreements, and the
agreements on shutting down the nuclear reactors,
which is well under way, have been successful—there
have been major advances in the past 18 months.
That is the signiﬁcance of the past 18months and the
Six-Party Talks. For once in the past 15 years, we are
seeing fairly successful negotiations and things
changing on the ground. Given that it is working,
why change it? Why ﬁx it if it is working? There may
come a stage in negotiations where, for all sorts of
reasons, the idea of more pressure, as opposed to
more engagement, is brought back to the fore.What
sort of things put pressure on the North Korean
Government? Certainly, you are right that they were
very upset about the freezing of Macao bank
accounts. Not a lot of money was involved—a
maximum of $50 million, I believe—but, as well as
the licit freezing of transactions, transactions may
have been frozen illicitly. That was one of the
problems for the US Treasury. We still do not quite
know, because we never saw the evidence, but we do
know that the personal bank accounts of senior
people in the North Korean regime were frozen, and
that caused a lot of upset. It caused the North
Korean Government to want to do something.
Clearly, whether it was strictly legal or illegal under
international law, it was something that exercised
the North Koreans. However, several things can be
done in respect of the trade that takes place between
North Korea and its neighbours that are not illegal.
For example, there are the various shipping
networks. We already have port controls in almost
every port to which North Korea sends its shipping,
and North Korean ships are inspected. Those are
perfectly legal ways of, for instance, checking the
cargoes that go between various countries. If the
international community wishes to reassure itself
that there are no contraband cargoes, that would be
a perfectly admissible way of ensuring that there are
not. Of course, at the same time, the economic
situation in North Korea is so bad that even though
a few people are making some money, most are not.
A lot of the trade that goes into North Korea
involves basic grains and things that actually help
the population—food. It is hard to see a situation in
which one would want to expand the sort of
sanctions that would make things worse for the
majority of the population, when they already suVer
major food shortages. Given the low level of the
economy—this is always the problemwith economic
sanctions, if that is what we are talking about—there
are not really many opportunities to make the
economy squeak, if that is the question. It is already
squeaking a great deal, and it does not show many
signs of being reinvigorated in the short, medium or
long-term future without a deal with the United
States that would enable World Bank and Japanese
funding to go into the country.
Q25 Chairman: Is there a particular role for the
UK?We are not part of the Six-Party Talks. Is there
any role that the UK Government speciﬁcally can
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play in these issues, or are we just there as a kind of
supporting cast for the people who are doing the
work?
Professor Smith: My view is that there is a role that
the UK Government could play, but it would
require funding. Also, it may not be a realistic
objective to have the UK play such a role, because,
after all, Korea has not been and, as far as I know,
is not of major national interest to the UK directly.
Of course, as an ally of the United States and as a
partner in the European Union, the UK has
supported denuclearisation and humanitarian
issues, but, in essence, it has taken a supportive role
in respect of what has come out of the United States
and the European Union, rather than a proactive
role. As I said inmy evidence,my view is that theUK
is at the stage, given its privileged relationship with
the United States and given the fact that it has
diplomatic relations with the DPRK, which has an
embassy in London and has had high-level
ambassadors here since the opening of those
diplomatic relationships, where it could play amajor
role in conﬁdence-building between the two major
protagonists, the United States and the DPRK. I
have said inmy evidence—I admit to having a bias—
that I think the Foreign OYce was wrong to cut the
money for CSCAP, the Council for Security Co-
operation in the Asia Paciﬁc, in which the United
States, North Korea and South Korea, operate, as
well as the countries in theAssociation of South East
Asian Nations. It has provided a forum in which
Asia-Paciﬁc security can be discussed. The
European Union and China are also part of it.
Irrespective of that, there is a focus, for instance, for
track 2-type forums to be made available, where
NorthKoreans andUnited States policymakers and
academics who are involved in the process can get
together. This happens in the United States; it does
not happen in Japan, but it does happen in China
and parts of South-east Asia, and that has provided
a forum for oYcials who are involved in the
negotiating process to get together. The UK is
certainly in a very privileged position, in terms of its
relationships with the key players, to provide forums
for that sort of trust-building exercise. North
Koreans and United States policy makers are used
to this sort of operation; they are used to taking part
in track 2 activities. The North Koreans, of course,
are a bit more unsteady in them, but they have been
toWilton Park in the past for these sorts of activities.
There is a big role for the UK, if it wants to play it,
but of course, it would cost money. It would cost
money to set these things up; it would cost money to
bring people in; and it would take time away from
Foreign OYce oYcials, who may see their primary
role as being vis-a`-vis Japan or China, because of the
economic relationships there. In the end, however,
that could provide an important stage for UK
diplomacy because, as I said, international relations
in east Asia—relations between China, Japan and
SouthKorea—are changing a lot. The United States
had found its position being sidelined and its status
and authority being undermined, because of its
previous inability to play a major part in the Six-
Party Talks—another reason for it to come back are
alliance relationships—and there is a place for the
UK, if it wants, to become a little more important in
playing a facilitating role in the region.
Q26 Chairman: Do you want to add anything?
Mr. Foster-Carter: Brieﬂy, and in parallel to that.
Again, this may be unrealistic, but I would hope that
we would try—subject to priorities and resource
constraints—to get as many North Koreans over
here as possible. They may not always be the top
people—I take Hazel’s point that we have had very
senior DPRK ambassadors here—but the coming
people, the students and so forth. There often is not
funding, and of course, after the second nuclear
crisis exploded a little over ﬁve years ago, a lot of
these initiatives were nipped in the bud because you
have to try to punish the state somehow. However,
the more younger North Koreans we can get out
here and expose to the West, the better. But you
know better than I what the constraints are.
Q27 Mr. Moss: May I turn to something that you
have referred to already, if somewhat obliquely?
How stable do you think the North Korean regime
is?
Mr. Foster-Carter: I am glad that you asked that,
because we ﬁxate so often on the nuclear issue, and
quite rightly, because it is important, but North
Korea is a package or a—the UN has a
terminology—complex emergency. There are so
many issues, and the internal stability issues are
coming to the fore. I speak tentatively here, because
I was foolish enough 17 years ago to go into print
saying North Korea was about to collapse and
would deﬁnitely go when Kim Il Sung died, so
nowadays one is circumspect. However, at the very
least, the tensions are growing. The pressures on the
regime and its long-suVering people are acute, and
they grow worse. The fact that the regime has been
able to keep things under control so far does not
mean that it can do it for ever. Brieﬂy, there are three
issues. One is economic reform, and as I understand
it, a toe has been put in the water since 2002, but that
has not been radical enough to be eVective—the
economy has certainly not taken oV in any sense.
You now have a very odd mixed system where, as
Hazel implied, the state no longer gives you a
living—you have to really scrabble for it as best you
can. Then, there is the whole question of succession.
Kim Jong Il is now 66.When his father was that age,
his dauphinhood, if there is such aword, was already
being arranged. It is complicated for Kim Jong Il,
whose marital history we will not go into, but he is
damned if he does and damned if he doesn’t. By
rumour, he has banned even private discussion of
the issue. There is certainly none in public. We all
just speculate. If he were to have the heart attack
tomorrow—we think he had heart surgery last
year—I would say that all bets for North Korea are
oV. I do not know what system they have, although
it is a very tight one—perhaps the military would
take over in a smooth manner. There are real
questions, particularly linking the two issues—going
back to the failure of economic reform.
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With people’s hardship and a growing knowledge of
the outside world—still not much, but a partial
breakdown of the information quarantine—one is
beginning to hear reports of people going to
Government oYces and protesting, and not
immediately being carted away and so forth. There
are huge tensions, and it is far from clear how the
regime plans to manage them.
Mr. Moss: I think you said that there were three
issues. I took down two: economic reform and
succession.
Mr. Foster-Carter: They interlink, so forgive me for
being unclear. Number one is the debates at the elite
level: whether to reform or not and, although not
quite the same thing, whether to give up the nuclear
weapons or not. One imagines people who are on
one side on that issue or the other. Secondly, there is
the grass roots and the risk of unrest from below, the
risk that the people will eventually become
unmanageable—that is obviously linked to the ﬁrst.
Thirdly, there is the question of succession. I am
sorry for my ambiguity.
Professor Smith: There are a number of diVerent
levels to that question. The ﬁrst question, I think,
was whether there was instability such that the
Government could be overturned, in basic terms.
One of the key variables is still the fact that there are
major food shortages. Those food shortages aVect
the middle classes in particular, in the urban areas,
because they do not have access to growing their
own food, or they may not have relatives in the
countryside. Let us look historically. I am a political
scientist, and political science does not have a good
record in prediction, but one of the things it ﬁnds is
that revolutions are not really made by hungry
people. Revolutions are made by people who have a
little bit of a stake in the system andwho do not have
to worry about literally getting enough food to feed
themselves and their families at the end of the week.
Now, in North Korea, with a population of about
23 million people, probably about half the country
is still worried enough about food, particularly when
the harvest has run out, in terms of its distribution.
The urban areas do not have access to their own
stores, so this is the top priority. Those people,
including the people that might in another system be
thinking about political change, such as white collar
workers, teachers, doctors and local government
oYcers working throughout the country, are
spending their time thinking about food and
survival—literally, survival. There is a modern
infrastructure in the sense of universities, schools
and technical and literate classes, but they are living
in a primitive way because of lack of access to food.
While there are continuing food shortages, there is a
lack of legitimacy for the Government, but there are
also bigger priorities than overturning the
Government—that is, making sure people are alive.
That is, literally, alive—it is not an exaggeration—
throughout the period. That also applies to the
army, the famous 1 million-strong military.
Although at the top of the tree people are of course
privileged, most of the foot soldiers at the bottom
are given basic rations, but they do not have enough
food for their families. A million in the army and an
average family of four people, that is 5 million
people. So they are worrying about their families as
well. The food issue, again, is so major that it does
not lend itself to a position where there is room for
political organisation and the ability to take over
the state.
Q28 Mr. Moss: Would it be possible for North
Korea under a diVerent political regime, and
another agrarian set-up, to producemost of the food
it needs? Or is that quite impossible, given the
geography of the state?
Professor Smith: It is not an agrarian country.
Something like 20%of the land is arable, but most of
it is mountainous and forested. Under Japanese
colonialism, in the ﬁrst 50 years of the 20th century,
it was developed by the Japanese as an industrial
area. In fact, the north-eastern strip was mainly
chemical factories and steel factories, providing
fertilisers. All those people are now unemployed,
because there have been no resources since the fall of
the Soviet Union to pump into those major
industrial plants. So it is not a natural—whatever
natural is—agricultural country, and when it was
able to produce enough food for its people it relied
heavily on agro-industrial inputs: electricity for
irrigation; fertiliser, chemicals and pesticides. Those
things are not available. Even the North Korean
Government plans, and all the UN plans, are based
upon: “If North Korea wants to feed its people, it
needs to do something about developing and
manufacturing export capacity so that it can buy
food.” I do not think that that situation is likely to
change.
Q29 Mr. Moss: Has there been any improvement
in the humanitarian or human rights situation in the
past few years?
Professor Smith: Those are two diVerent issues, the
humanitarian and human rights situations. On the
humanitarian situation vis-a`-vis food and
malnutrition, the three major nutrition surveys of
1998, 2002 and 2004 showed that the nutrition
statistics had improved for children under seven.
Those statistics are probably reasonably reliable.
The malnutrition statistics for North Korea are now
pretty much the same as those for south-east Asian
nations. In fact, the statistics are better than those
for India and Indonesia, for instance. Nevertheless
compared with North-east Asia—Japan and
China—the statistics are pretty poor, and the people
are still living under threat of dying because they do
not have medicines, and if they have enough basic
food they do not have minerals and vitamins, or
variety in their diet. There is such severe
malnutrition that people die of hunger. All that still
exists in theDPRK. So the humanitarian situation is
kept aﬂoat by aid from SouthKorea and China; that
is why it is not worse than it is. On the human rights
situation, you can break it down into various
aspects. Regarding the penal system, we still have no
knowledge of what goes on in that system because
there is no independent assessment.Wemust assume
the worst case scenario, as we have information only
from defectors. On the rule of law and electoral
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systems, we still have the same systems as before,
where the party is not independent from the
judiciary. In my view, there is room for manoeuvre
in splitting out human rights issues, and discussing
withNorthKorea diVerent aspects of those, in terms
of technical assistance on some of them. Overall,
people havemuchmore access to individual decision
making—they are making their own decisions about
their day-to-day economic transactions because the
state does not provide them—and there is more
ability to move around in the country, if you can
walk that is, because youwill not usually have access
to petrol or cars. However, in terms of political
freedoms, human rights are still non-existent.
Mr. Foster-Carter: May I add a couple of things on
the human rights side? I do not knowwhat counts as
independent evidence. I know what Hazel means,
but if anybody here is an enthusiast for Google
Earth you can now look at the North Korean prison
camps, just as you can look at Kim Jong Il’s palaces
and many other things. That adds an interesting
dimension. To link to what we have been saying
about how the power of the state has to some extent
weakened, when I read accounts of people who go
back and forth between North Korea and China—
because of the level of bribery that is possible—I do
not sense a trend, but there seems to be a growing
arbitrariness. People go back and forth between
North Korea and China to earn money. If they get
treated badly when they get caught, they might turn
against the regime and do the very long journey—
usually via another country in South-east Asia—and
eventually ﬁnd sanctuary in Seoul. People are
moving around in spite of the regime.When they are
caught, the degree of punishment can vary greatly,
as far as I can see. I think that the capacity of the
state to brutalise all its people is decreasing, and we
may be thankful for that. Perhaps its will to do so is
as well, but I am not so sure about that.
Q30 Mr. Moss: A ﬁnal question, if I may? What is
your take on the recent overtures fromPyongyang to
western musicians? What is the point of that? Did it
come as a surprise?
Professor Smith: No. The North Koreans have had,
at least since the ’80s, an active cultural—academic
even—diplomacy of some sort. They held a big
student festival where they brought in people from
around the world to show what they considered to
be the artistic and cultural side of Pyongyang. They
have sent sporting groups to the Olympics and
various festivals in South Korea, and they are very
proud of their circus people who have won medals
throughout the world, including Switzerland and
various places in the west. So, they have engaged in
large amounts of cultural diplomacy. What is
interesting is that it is with the United States as
opposed to with Europe, with which they are more
familiar. All talking is good, but the North Koreans
are pretty hard-headed about the signiﬁcance of
cultural diplomacy and on what are core issues to
them. Yes, the world is shown a cultivated side to
North Korea, but at the same time that does not
infringe too much on what they see as their interests
in the six-part talks, for instance.
Mr. Foster-Carter: Brieﬂy, I am particularly
interested in what might be called the replay, of
which we are the beneﬁciaries. I believe this is an
entirely independent matter, but a British
businessman, David Heather, is negotiating to bring
the leading North Korean symphony orchestra to
these very shores later this year. That cannot be bad.
Although I suspect it will not solve the nuclear issue
overnight, surely it is to be welcomed.
Chairman: May we switch focus and ask some
questions about South Korea?
Q31 Sir John Stanley: I would like to ask about
DPRK and the South.May I ask you both what you
consider should be the top British foreign policy
priorities towards the DPRK?
Mr. Foster-Carter: Gosh. In spite of what I said
earlier, I think it is right to push on the nuclear issue.
I would have hoped that if we have a voice, we could
try to work someway—although I do not know how
it would be done—towards a package approach, and
that the North Korean issue could be seen as how to
make what I sometimes call a rather ﬁerce little
dinosaur become amore peaceablemammal and live
at peace with its neighbours. We need to ensure that
we do not lose that focus. However, perhaps I have
not been speciﬁc enough. On speciﬁcs, if I can return
to what I said before about trying to encourage them
to send people over here. Maybe that is entirely
unrealistic. In a way, I would almost want to delink
that from the behaviour of the regime because one
wants to get at the hearts and minds of the younger
North Koreans. You may tell me that is unrealistic,
but that is the way that I think we and other
European countries could make a big diVerence, if
the resources permitted it.
Professor Smith: The question is about the role of
the UK and—
Sir John Stanley: Foreign policy priorities.
Professor Smith: It is not realistic to think that the
UK will take a major and leading role in the
relationship with the DPRK. It could make more of
three of its alliance structures: the ﬁrst is with the
United States, the second is with the European
Union, and the third is with South Korea itself. To
reiterate what I said earlier, in relations with the
United States the UK could provide a number of
forums where conﬁdence building could take place
around the issues identiﬁed for further discussion in
terms of the working groups that are coming out of
the Six-Party Talks, one of which is economic
development. That is something with which the UK
could play a role. Although there would have to be
some money spent—not a lot of money, but some.
Secondly, in terms of its alliance structure in the
European Union, the European Union has a
presence in North Korea and is likely to continue to
have a presence. It has not spent massive amounts of
money, but it has been very active, and has not only
spent money on humanitarian and development aid,
but has engaged in some form of political
negotiations where it can—for example, with
matters such as human rights. There is room for the
UK to play more of a leadership role within the
European Union in its relationships with North
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Korea.At themoment, the leadership rolewithin the
European Commission and the European Union is
played by Commission oYcials, who in my view are
very good. Nevertheless, there is room for a political
leadership role to be played, and the UK has a
comparative advantage because of its relationship to
the United States and to the DPRK. That political
role could be played in the European Union and
could help to lead the resources that are already
there in terms of providing some overall support for
the Six-Party Talks. Thirdly, on its relationship with
South Korea, there is of course a new President in
South Korea, who it seems will continue to promote
the engagement policy, but will probably put more
emphasis on what he has called eYciency and a
development type approach, as opposed to a
humanitarian approach. The UK could develop
partnerships through the various UK-Korea
parliamentary groups, and could seek ways to give
support, although not subservient support. We
could have an engaged dialogue with South Korea
about the UK’s views on what could and should be
done, and we could work with the South Koreans to
promote engagement with North Korea. Perhaps
the UK could makemore use of its alliances with the
US, the EuropeanUnion and South Korea. I should
like to talk about students coming here. Again, I
declare an interest, as I work at the University of
Warwick. In the early 1990s, when I worked at the
University of Kent, I was the director of a British
Council-funded project that brought Chinese
students here. It was just after the Tiananmen square
incident, so it was quite controversial. They came to
the University of Kent and other universities in the
country for periods of six months or more, and then
they went back. It was not a cheap project, but it
provided a fantastic foundation not only for my
project, but for others that were going on at the same
time and for future development. Canada was also
involved. The project meant that Chinese oYcials,
policy makers and people who were to work in
business were very well grounded in the various
norms and standard operating procedures relating
not only to my subject, international relations, but
to the economy, insurance and banking. There is a
role to be played by the UK, at this moment, in
funding North Korean students to come here. Last
year, the University of Warwick had two North
Korean students who hadworked atUniversityKim
Il Sung and who wanted to come here to do masters
degrees in English language education. They were
qualiﬁed, they took the English language test, and a
charity had agreed to fund them. The English
language testing and interviews were done by the
British embassy in Pyongyang, and the students
went through the whole process that any of our
overseas students would go through, but then the
funder pulled the plug at the last minute. It is not
cheap to bring students over: you have to pay
overseas students fees, which cost £10,000 a year,
and maintenance, so it costs about £20,000 a year
per person, plus a bit of travel but my view is that
such a project would pay substantial dividends in the
short, medium and long-term in terms of North
Korea’s integration into the international
community, as happened with all the experiences we
had with China. This is the right moment for such a
project because it is also North Korea’s top policy
priority to get its people out and educated in degree
courses, not just short-term courses, outside the
country. The North Koreans know that that is
expensive, but it is their top priority, and it should be
a political and educational priority for anyone who
can facilitate it. That runs counter to the myth that
the North Koreans will never let anyone out. They
will now, if we can ﬁnd the funding to do it, so Imake
a plea: if anyone who is listening to or reading this
wants to provide some funding for North Korean
students to come here, let’s go ahead and do it.
Q32 Sir John Stanley: Thank you. I shall now use
the same words to ask you both a very diVerent
question. What do you consider should be the top
British Government foreign policy priorities
towards the Republic of Korea?
Mr. Foster-Carter: Sure. I have a particular view on
that, although it takes us into entirely diVerent
territory, perhaps outside the remit of this inquiry.
Sir John Stanley: It is absolutely within the remit of
this inquiry.
Mr. Foster-Carter: Okay. In my view it is not
central—not a security issue. I hope that we will
continue to do something that we were doing under
the previous RohMooHyunAdministration, which
is to encourage the South Korean Government to
open their service sectors. I shall not go on at great
length about why I think that is important. To give
credit to RohMoo Hyun, which is not always done,
I think that he grasped that. Quite apart from any
general views that one has on free trade and so on,
South Koreans, right here and right now, are less
well served than they could be in the spheres of
education, health and legal services, which I know
this country has taken a lead on, as well as in other
areas. Curiously, although we are told that the new
President has a business background, is business-
friendly and so on, the business to which it is clearest
he is friendly is Korean business, and large Korean
business at that—the chaebol. He makes noises
about free trade agreements, but I have not heard
the sort of speech that we got from Roh Moo
Hyun—they were widely ignored—about why
opening the service sector, just as manufacturing is
open and the ﬁnancial end of the service sector is
largely open, would be a good thing. I am afraid that
it is straight-down-the-line national interest. I am
sure that there are British universities and others
that, if they were allowed to, would set up camp. It
is bizarre that in what is nominally still communist
China, Nottingham can go and set up a campus, but
one cannot yet do that—well, not
straightforwardly—in South Korea. That sort of
thing could only beneﬁt. South Korea has a huge
national debate and hang-up about its education;
again, I will not get into that. It has highly educated
people, but everybody is dissatisﬁed, for many
reasons, and it is not a lot of fun being a student
there. It is great fun being a university student—it is
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a doss—but the four years before that are absolute
hell on earth. One hardly sleeps in order to get in.
That sort of issue is what I hope we would do.
Professor Smith: I cannot really speak to the
domestic issues, because it is not my direct area of
research, but on security issues, I think that South
Korea will continue its policy of engagement, both
bilaterally and in the context of the Six-Party Talks.
My view is that it is nothing really new, actually. I
think that the UK can continue to provide what it
has from 1990 onwards, when Kim Dae-jung met
Kim Jong Il and the South Korean Government
asked for support from the UK in their engagement
policy, which was then called the sunshine policy. I
think that it is still a policy that has borne more fruit
than other policies, even if it is problematic. It is
something that the UK Government should still see
as the centre of their priorities in the security realm
in their relations with South Korea, supporting it,
though not blindly, in its attempts to deal with its
diYcult partner North Korea.
Q33 Sandra Osborne: What do you think has been
achieved by South Korea’s engagement with North
Korea and its economic support?
Mr. Foster-Carter: As it happens, I read this very
day that a plane load of 159 small and medium
entrepreneurs from South Korea have ﬂown to
Pyongyang. It is the ﬁrst such occurrence—I
presume that it was arranged under the previous
Government, but such continuities happen. Apart
from anything else, South Korea has celebrated 20
years of democracy and had 10 years of the sunshine
policy. One aspect of that, over and above what the
Government may or may not do, is that the South
Korean Government do not control what their own
people do. South Koreans can go to North Korea
now, and I am not sure that they even have to report
back. The normal exercise of democracy, which
doubtless we applaud, includes letting business
people do that if they want to, subject, of course, to
UN sanctions. That is all going to go on anyway, I
think, if—it is a very big “if”—South Korean
business thinks that there is any money to be made
there. A fact that is not often commented on is that
the famous South Korean chaebol—the big
businesses, some of them global household names
such as Samsung, Hyundai and so on—have not,
except for Hyundai, gone into North Korea. The
position is very diVerent from that of Taiwanese
ﬁrms, most of which nowmake their living in China,
whatever the political risk. That is because, quite
apart from security issues, North Korea has been a
pretty dire place to do business. Again, there is no
time for the detail, but Hyundai has arguably been
ﬂeeced quite a lot. The former Hyundai is now at
least three separate entities, as youmight know. One
lot has put up with all of that, but it has put oV the
others. However, if there is business to be done, they
will probably go in anyway. I shall add one thing on
the Government level. Again, while we are focusing
on the nuclear issue, sanctions, where to apply
pressure and so on, we should not forget the sheer
geopolitics of this. If North Korea is—I feel a bad
metaphor coming on—a rather rotten plum that will
at some point fall into somebody’s lap, there is a
question of whose. We can talk about
multilateralism and try to mean it as best we can,
but, at the bottom,China and SouthKorea are rivals
for inﬂuence in Pyongyang. They might co-operate
in many ways, but there is great concern in South
Korea, for instance, including in the conservative
circles that are now in power, that the Chinese have
been buying up all the minerals in North Korea,
which is rather well endowed with a wide range of
minerals, as Hazel mentioned earlier. Those were
developed during the Japanese colonial period,
which is one reason why most of the factories then
were in the north. Much of that has been sold to the
Chinese, so the South Koreans are worried that they
are losing out. On the other hand, there is the cynical
view of, “Let the Chinese have the diYcult ﬁrst stage
of turning North Korea into a more normal
country”—that is terrible talk that implicitly denies
the sovereignty of the North Korean Government.
However, even as the new South Korean leader, Lee
Myung Bak, says—and he means it, I am sure—that
he will try to move closer to the US and link his
dealings with North Korea to the nuclear issue, I
believe that there is powerful geopolitical and
geoeconomic pressure to get in there and stop the
Chinese, regardless of the nuclear issue. That will be
a real dilemma for his Government, I believe.
Professor Smith: It is a very interesting question and
I was just writing down what has been achieved in
this period. Let us consider the big picture and
compare the situation pre-2000, when there was
hardly any contact betweenNorth and SouthKorea,
with the situation today, when there are massive
numbers of North and South Koreans talking to
each other. That is something—they are opening up.
To be evenmore speciﬁc, from the humanitarian and
food perspective, there is absolutely no doubt that
many more North Koreans would be dead if it was
not for South Korean assistance. It has been the
main supplier of food and fertilizer to help North
Koreans grow food over the past six or seven years.
Certainly, it has kept people alive, which is
something. As we saw from the famine in the mid-
1990s, at the beginning of which there was no
external assistance to help keep people alive, such
assistance could not be taken for granted. China was
not on such good terms with North Korea.
Although China also supplies food, SouthKorean is
the major supporter in terms of bilateral food aid.
Also on the humanitarian side, we cannot dismiss—
although they get forgotten about these days—the
family reunions. Of course the war divided Korea in
1953 and those divided, with relations on both sides,
are all elderly and dying now. Divided families have
managed to see each other owing to South Korea’s
engagement policy, not because of anything else,
including the multilateral talks. That could not have
been expected, but it has not been good enough. My
view is that, for instance, the video family reunions
are nothing short of torture. Nowadays, some of the
family reunions have been replaced by video
contacts between relatives in North and South
Korea. I do not know why South Korea agreed to
that. Thatmust be as disturbing as not seeing people,
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perhaps. However, where people can get together, it
is a huge achievement on a very personal and
individual level. Of course, those opportunities get
lost as people get old and die oV. Little economic
development assistance has gone to North Korea
from South Korea. Most of it has gone into
humanitarian assistance. The small and medium
enterprises working in Kaesong in the south and in
the Kumgang tourist zone, when there is a
comparison with South Korea’s real wealth, have
not invested massive amounts. Owing to
proﬁtability concerns, it does not look like there will
be massive amounts of investment from the business
sector in South Korea, unless the political situation
improves. On the political side, I think that it is
certainly beneﬁcial to be talking, rather than being in
a cold war confrontation. There has been progress in
some areas. The militaries have talked to each other
on somematters. A road has been built through part
of the demilitarised zone. There has been increased
understanding at some levels, even if it has not
permeated through in every aspect of the societies.
However, under the cold war situation, you could
have counted the number of North and South
Koreans meeting in their dozens, but since 2000 that
number has been in its thousands. Obviously, they
are all speaking the same language, so that is
important. Finally, on the security side, the fact that
the North and South Koreans are talking on every
level, and that they have done throughout every
single nuclear and missile crisis when everybody else
has been very fraught—even in the nuclear test
times, North and South Korea have kept on talking
at diVerent levels—leads to security predictability,
or at least more predictability than there was when
people did not talk. An element of predictability
improves security relationships overall. The
situation is not perfect, but it is better than when
there was no talking. There have always been back
channels between North and South Korea, even in
the worst times, but the amount of back and front
channels between the countries now means that the
complete unpredictability of North Korea is long
gone. On the humanitarian and security levels, there
have been major paybacks from the talks but, of
course, not as much as the South Korean public
would like. There have not been enough paybacks
on a political level, and economic investment has
mainly been for support in political, security and
humanitarian matters than economic development
per se. I do not think that much on the economic
level will happen until a big deal is done to make
people more secure about their investment.
Chairman: I am conscious of the time, so I shall take
one more question from Sir John Stanley.
Q34 Sir John Stanley: Do you think that Kaesong
has the potential to expand signiﬁcantly and to
become a major source of thaw between North and
South? Speciﬁcally, have you any information on
whether the now joined-up rail system through the
DMZ, which I believe takes goods only as far a
Kaesong, will be used to its full potential to create a
freight link right through the DPRK? Is there any
prospect whatever of the rail link becoming a
passenger as well as a freight link?
Mr. Foster-Carter: It will eventually but, of course,
the key question is when. One passenger journey has
already been agreed. It is purely symbolic but, under
the old South regime, the two Koreas agreed to send
a joint cheering squad to the BeijingOlympics—they
will start from Seoul and go all the way to Beijing by
train. That is set to happen later this year. I do not
think the arrangement will change, but we shall see.
Progress has been terribly slow. The South Koreans
paid $500 million all told for relinking two
railways—I believe that the one on the eastern side,
which is of less economic importance, is not fully
done. So far, the North Koreans have been so
reluctant that, for a couple of years, reputedly, the
Northern military would not allow it to be used at
all. The roads, however, were open. What is it in the
North Korean military mindset that ﬁnds trains a
problem? As of very recently, you can drive on the
roads into North Korea. In the Kumgang zone on
the other side of the peninsula, you can drive your
car in. I believe that even foreigners can do that.
Perhaps you could ﬁnd out when you are next there.
The train situation is worse: it does not go even as far
as the Kaesong zone; it goes to the border station.
The South Korean ﬁrms are numerous and the
numbers are growing. It is for real—it might be too
late, but it might be a mini Shenzhen in the making.
The ﬁrms truck stuV because it is not economical to
use the railway. On the broader infrastructure, there
is a big question about the spate of agreements that
were reached in the last days of the Roh Moo Hyun
regime after his summit, many of which seemed to
me to be broadly practical. The agreements include
joint work on both the road up to Pyongyang and
the railway all the way to Sinuiju on the Chinese
border. All sorts of working groups were created,
but the process has slowed down as the North waits
to see what it thinks of Lee Myung Bak. North
Koreans cannot decide what to make of South
Korea’s new President, and I do not think that he
can quite decide what he is going to do with the
North Koreans. All those things will happen one
day, hopefully in our lifetimes.
Professor Smith: Clearly, the South Koreans have
the technical capacity to expand the railroad
through China and Russia, but the North Koreans,
for security reasons, are not keen to pursue the
project fast. When the security environment
becomes open, I do not believe that there will be any
technical problems with expanding the railway. On
the Kaesong development area—I know that we are
about to ﬁnish and I do not want to end on a
negative note, but I think I must—the way in which
the operation takes place in terms of labour
employment is essentially that South Korean
businesses working there pay the wages to the
Government, who pay a proportion of those wages
to the workers, presumably through currency
transactions that are favourable to the Government.
That means that, in many ways, the Kaesong
enterprise can reinstitute the old social and political
controls that were prevalent in North Korea
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throughout the country. Those controls are not
prevalent in many parts of the country because the
state does not have the resources to pay workers.
That was precisely why there was marketisation
throughout the country, and why there was an
increase in economic freedoms for people. In
Kaesong, the paradox is that with South Korean
investment, which is properly and eYciently
organised, the old systems can be reinstituted. South
Korea is in a bind about that because, at the same
time, SouthKoreans come in, talk toNorthKoreans
and show them new economic practices as well as
just engaging in normal conversation, so that is part
of the overall aspect of political diplomacy, but not
the economic side. Politically, I think that it is a good
thing that all this engagement takes place, but
economically it acts as a subsidy for some very old-
fashioned ways of operating in North Korea. I do
not think that it is possible to square that circle at the
moment. If I were asked, I would say, on balance,
that the South Koreans, whether by default or by
judgment, have come to a pretty good outcome in
squaring that circle, because investment goes on, but
there is not very much of it considering their
potential to invest in North Korea.
Mr. Foster-Carter: May I add something?
Chairman: Brieﬂy.
Mr. Foster-Carter: It will be very interesting if, as I
expect, South Korean investment outside the
Kaesong zone grows. In that case, we may get South
Korean ﬁrms striking local deals, and some of the
diYculties, which I agree are a problem, may be
mitigated.
Q35 Chairman: May I conclude with a comment?
When I went to Korea in 2006, I was told that the
South Korean managers did not actually engage
directly with the workers. They had to give
instructions through the party commissar, in eVect,
in order to tell the workers what to do. Is that the
case?
Mr. Foster-Carter: I think that it hasmoved on from
that. I have not been toKaesong—Iwas supposed to
go last year and did not manage it—but that is my
understanding from accounts that I have read. That
gets unwieldy; you can see the Party in the North
wanting it, but my understanding is that it is now
more straightforward. Fraternisation is not allowed,
but it being Korea, all the managers are southern
chaps and all the work force are northern females,
and there has been at least one rumour of romance.
That would be the best way to unify Korea, but no
one is having that yet.
Chairman: We could continue this discussion for
several hours. Thank you, Professor Smith and Mr.
Foster-Carter, for coming along. No doubt over the
next fewmonths, and when the Committee visits, we
will have a lot more questions, but this has been
extremely valuable and we are grateful.
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Q36 Chairman: Good afternoon. Before we begin,
members of the public please switch oV your mobile
phones so that we avoid interruptions. Thank you
for being with us today, Ms Muico. I apologise for
the slightly late start. We had some business to
resolve, principally about our travel arrangements
for when we go to the region. As you know, we have
just begun an inquiry relating to global security,
Japan and Korea. We are pleased that you are able
to be with us. Could you ﬁrst say a few words about
yourself and what you do? We will then begin the
questions.
Ms Muico: Sure. I worked on North Korea at a
previous NGO for about three and a half years and
produced two reports, one on traYcking of North
Koreanwomen intoChina and one on forced labour
in North Korean prison camps. I am currently the
researcher for Amnesty International. My remit
includes Japan, South Korea, North Korea and
Mongolia, and last week I returned from a four-
week mission, visiting Japan, South Korea and
Mongolia—obviously we have no access to North
Korea. I have spoken to various people there
regarding the human rights issues and concerns that
we have in Amnesty. It is exciting, because we are
looking at new projects on economic, social and
cultural rights.
Q37 Chairman: Thank you very much. Can I ask
you about the human rights situation in North
Korea? Howmuch information do we have and how
reliable is it? You are from Amnesty—how do you
get real information about the situation in North
Korea?
Ms Muico: There are various ways. Of course you
always have to vet them, to make sure that they are
reliable, but there are certainly ways to do that. One
way to ﬁnd out information is through interviews
withNorthKorean settlers, either in SouthKorea or
in third countries such as Thailand. Other NGOs
have access to China so they can interview North
Korean settlers—undocumented North Koreans—
there. From my experience, having done both, the
information in the border areas is newer and
therefore more reliable. The problem with North
Korean settlers in Seoul is that they have already
been exposed to life in China for several years,
sometimes even six to 10 years. They have been
exposed to speaking to the media, know what
questionswill be asked andwhatwouldmake amore
pleasant answer, so you have to ask them diVerent
questions without an agenda and try to re-ask the
question and get conﬁrmation elsewhere through
research-based non-governmental organisations,
both in South Korea and internationally. Other
organisations and Government agencies have vast
amounts of information as well.
Chairman:Thank you.We will now ask a number of
speciﬁc questions about the situation in North
Korea. We will begin with Fabian.
Q38 Mr. Hamilton: We know that captured North
Korean emigrants and would-be emigrants,
especially those in China, face particularly harsh
treatment when returned, sometimes including
torture and execution. According to Human Rights
Watch, in 2004 North Korea toughened its
treatment of its citizens found trying to leave for
China or return from there to a prison sentence of up
to ﬁve years. What is your assessment of the
situation for NorthKorean emigrants and would-be
emigrants, particularly women, in China and in
detention in North Korea?
Ms Muico: I think that the treatment of border-
crossers is getting harsher, because the numbers are
growing and it is a huge embarrassment for the
North Korean Government. Having said that, my
research and interviews with border-crossers in
January 2000 suggest that a lot of those who were
forcibly repatriated and faced beatings, torture and
other inhuman and cruel treatment tended to receive
sentences that were less than what they would have
been in previous years, and that could be for various
reasons. Also, there seems to be a better
understanding of why North Koreans emigrate or
ﬂee to China. An example would be why women
marry North Korean farmers mainly and how they
see it as a survival, and they are not persecuted as
much as they used to be. For example, I did not come
across any cases of forced abortion or infanticide,
and most of my interviewees were with women who
had all been forcibly repatriated and detained in the
various prison camps.
Q39 Mr. Hamilton: Can I just move on to the
Kaesong industrial complex, which I believe was
established in 2004 under South Korea’s policy of
engagement with the North? Given the way that
workers are paid and how the companies involved
transfer the funds to the NorthKoreanGovernment
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so that the relevant share can then be paid to the
workers, do you think that the Kaesong project is
actually of net beneﬁt for North Korean workers or
are they are exploited as they might be elsewhere in
North Korea?
Ms Muico: In order to get a job at the Kaesong
industrial complex you have to be fairly lucky.Many
North Koreans would like to work at Kaesong, as
the work conditions in the complex are, relatively
speaking, fairly good and the amount of money that
they get is quite favourable, even after tax and
despite the fact that the currency exchange is not in
their favour. Having said that, I think that we
cannot be complacent on this issue. There is a
window of opportunity for South Korean
companies and the SouthKoreanGovernment to do
more in terms of freedom of association, collective
bargaining and best practices using the labour
standards of the International LabourOrganisation,
of which South Korea is a member. Therefore, I
think that we can say at this point that the net gain
may be in the favour of the North Korean workers,
but a lot more needs to be done in Kaesong to make
the labour situation better for them.
Q40 Mr. Hamilton: Can you just clarify one thing?
You mentioned that they perhaps do not get the
same rights that the ILO would accord to them, but
what about the exploitation of children and child
labour? Does that go on at the Kaesong industrial
complex, and does sex discrimination and sexual
harassment still occur?
Ms Muico: There is not much data on that, because
we are not allowed to go toKaesong.However, from
the people I spoke to who work on the issue at a
peripheral level, based in Seoul, it seems that there
are no cases of child labour. There may be some
cases of sexual harassment, but, again, we have to
bear in mind that the majority of workers in
Kaesong are women, and they1 did not seem to think
that it was a big issue.
Q41 Sir John Stanley: On the previous question,
raised by Mr. Hamilton, could you tell us whether
Amnesty gives credence to the reports that have
appeared in the press and emanated from defectors,
that the North Korean regime has used political
detainees as live human guinea pigs on whom to test
chemicals for use in chemical weapons?
Ms Muico: I do not know how to put it delicately—
Sir John Stanley: Please put it as frankly and as
indelicately as you wish, madam.
Ms Muico: No, we give no credence to that. Many
NGOs working on human rights for North Koreans
would say that it is not true and that it comes from
a very unreliable source. They knowwho that source
is and he has been very unreliable in the past.
Q42 Sir Menzies Campbell: On the same point. We
know that there are South Koreanmanagers, but we
have also been told that quite a few of them have
1 Note by witness: The NGOs
been expelled. Are those South Korean managers
suitable sources of information about conditions in
Kaesong?
Ms Muico: Having not been to or worked in
Kaesong, I cannot comment on it that much.
However, from what has been said to me by various
South Korean oYcials, there seems to be a slight
separation between the North Korean workers and
the South Korean company people, although I am
not sure about the oYcials. They work in the same
area, but they do not interact frequently.
Q43 Ms Stuart: May I take this a bit further? It
relates to abductees. As I understand it, as recently
as 27 March 2008, the BBC reported that North
Korea expelled South Korean managers. There was
a kind of movement of labour.
Back in 2002, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il
admitted that they had abducted 13 Japanese
citizens. I wonder whether you can shed some light,
from your experience, on how the abduction of
foreign nationals and the enforced disappearance of
North Koreans relates—what picture would you
paint? The Japanese claim that actually more people
were abducted than the North Koreans are
admitting to. What is your assessment?
Ms Muico: The enforced disappearances carried out
by the North Korean Government are the subject of
Amnesty’s next report, which will be launched in
June. We have documented the enforced
disappearances of various nationals, mainly South
Koreans, but including Japanese, as you said, and
North Koreans, some of whom are now South
Korean citizens. There are also other nationals, but
those are the main nationalities.
In the case of the Japanese nationals, the Japanese
Government have been quite tough on North
Korea. The North Korean Government have
responded limitedly—but at least, in some ways,
positively—by returning some people and the
remains that were, of course, in dispute. However,
theNorthKoreanGovernment have said that, as for
the South Korean ﬁshermen—who make up the
majority of those whom the North Korean
Government have admitted to—they and the others
have chosen to stay in North Korea. There is no
conﬁrmation of that whatsoever.
It is quite worrying for us that about 80,000 non-
combatant South Korean nationals were abducted
by North Korea during the North Korean war from
1950 to 1953, yet the North Korean Government
refuse to acknowledge that they had those people.
The South Korean Government are also unwilling
to help in this matter. So, various people have been
abducted for diVerent reasons and, apart from the
Japanese citizens, the North Korean Government
are not willing to do much for them.
Q44 Ms Stuart: The Japanese have been very tough
and seem to have got some results. The South
Koreans are understood to give the matter higher
priority. Do you think that they should be tougher
to get results? Is that your read?
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Ms Muico: Absolutely.
Q45 Chairman: Let me be clear; when did the
abductions stop? Are we talking about people who
are now 50 or 60 years old or even older? Or are there
some people who have been taken more recently?
Ms Muico: People were taken during the Korean
war between 1950 and 1953. We are talking about
policemen, judges, lawyers and teachers. We do not
know why they were taken. We think that they were
taken because they served a useful purpose in
rebuilding North Korea.
During the cold war, ﬁshermen and other people
were taken from South Korea. We think that the
ﬁshermen were taken because they were out at sea
and, therefore, the North Korean spies would not
have to enter SouthKorea. The Japanese were taken
during that time. The North Koreans—some of
them South Korean citizens2—were mainly taken in
the border areas of China.3 Some were
undocumented at that time and were trying to help
other North Koreans in the border areas.
Q46 Mr. Illsley: In the past two years, there was a
very high proﬁle case in which a woman was
returned to Japan. Apparently, she had been
abducted from a beach in Japan about 20 or 30 years
ago. Is that serious? [Interruption.] The Japanese
lady was returned to Japan from South Korea. She
had been abducted as a young woman from a
Japanese beach.
Ms Muico: There were two diVerent stories.
Mr. Illsley: The story received a huge amount of
publicity at the time.
Ms Muico: I think that there are two diVerent
stories.
Mr. Illsley: I will check on it.
Chairman:Perhaps you can communicate in writing.
Mr. Illsley: It was on a news programme on TV.
Ms Muico: Megumi Yokota was the most famous
case. She was taken as she was returning home. The
North Korean Government admitted to taking
Megumi and returned her remains, but then the
DNA showed that they were not her remains. In fact
there was multiple DNA.
Chairman: Thank you. May we now move on? John
Horam wanted to ask about food aid.
Q47 Mr. Horam: Yes, may we turn to the food
situation and food aid? We seem to be getting
slightly conﬂicting stories. Some press reports
suggest that this year is going to be very diYcult, but
some South Korean NGOs say that because private
barter and markets are better, we will never see mass
starvation again. What is your view?
Ms Muico: I think that from what people have told
us in various sectors, the food situation is getting
worse.
2 Note by witness: Others undocumented North Korean
migrants.
3 Note by witness: Orwhen theywere forcibly repatriated back
to North Korea or family members in north Korea of those
who have settled in the South.
Mr. Horam: Worse?
Ms Muico: Yes, it is worse than last year. Some tend
to exaggerate and say that it could be as bad as the
Arduous March in the early 1990s when there was a
famine. Most NGOs will say that it is not as bad as
the famine years, but that they have used up all of
their available stock. What is worrying is that the
North Korean Government have not asked for
fertiliser from the South Korean Government this
year. The planting season is almost over now and the
worry is that they will not have much of a yield this
year. The North Koreans have recently said that
they will not ask for aid from South Korea, which is
quite unrealistic. We do not know how bad the
situation will be, but indications are that it will be
quite bad.
Q48 Mr. Horam: Is it possible to use international
food aid as some sort of leverage, or are they just not
asking for it because they do not want the lever?
Ms Muico: That is the best case scenario. Of course,
working with the North Korean Government is
diYcult at the best of times. What would normally
work as leverage in most countries cannot be
guaranteed to work with the North Koreans. What
the South Korean Government should always do as
a policy is to give food aid through the World Food
Programme, so that it can improve its monitoring.
TheWFP’smonitoring is better than SouthKorea’s,
far better. It is not perfect, but that is a point of
departure. You can ask for more monitoring, more
access to a wider area, and in previous years the
South Korean Government have not been doing
that. It is diYcult to have that leverage if South
Koreans prefer a bilateral agreement with North
Korea.
Q49 Mr. Horam: So do we not know necessarily
what is happening to the food?
Ms Muico: No.
Q50 Mr. Horam: It is not being used as leverage to
improve human rights?
Ms Muico: Not with the past Governments, in terms
of the food aid given by South Korean
Governments. The WFP has been increasing its
monitoring process and the access that it has. That
is a work in progress, but because SouthKorea gives
the most aid it would be in all our interests if it gave
that aid through the WFP.
Chairman:Wewill move on to some other questions.
Q51 Mr. Horam: Is it sensible for the UN to
continue pursuing the human rights resolutions
when—as you say—the North Koreans continue to
ignore them?
Ms Muico: Yes, because it is still our best hope, and
we need a mandate like Professor Vitit
Muntarbhorn’s to monitor the human rights abuses
and report back to the Human Rights Council. His
position is important and eVective, although
obviously not as eVective as we would like, because
he does not have access toNorthKorea. But a better
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way of looking at that is to ﬁnd parallel ways to
improve human rights in North Korea, along with
Professor Vitit’s special rapporteur role.
Q52 Mr. Horam: Do you think that there will be
any serious movement until there can be resolution
of the nuclear and other issues with the US?
Ms Muico: Yes. The human rights issue is not
necessarily connected with the nuclear issue. They
are two separate issues. Certainly the North
Koreans would be more apt to talk about nuclear
issues than human rights issues.
Q53 Mr. Horam: So they are separate,
distinguishable?
Ms Muico: Absolutely.
Q54 Chairman: The UN human rights system has
changed from theHumanRights Commission to the
Human Rights Council. Has that improved the
scrutiny and the pressure on North Korea or has
there been no diVerence? Given that the UN
representative was not able to visit North Korea in
producing his report, is there practically nothing
that has any impact?
Ms Muico: It is too early to say what the
eVectiveness of the HumanRights Council is. This is
the ﬁrst year that the Human Rights Council is
reviewing countries under the universal periodic
review, and it is far too early to say anything about
North Korea because it does not get reviewed until
2009. All the countries backing Vitit Muntarbhorn’s
position as special rapporteur and the passing of the
resolution in March is a good sign, and this time
South Korea did not abstain from the vote, it voted
in favour of Vitit’s position. There is a window of
opportunity there, via South Korea. I think that it
will be far more robust in its position.
Q55 Chairman: Was that before or after the change
of President?
Ms Muico: It was after.
Q56 Chairman: So does that have more to do with
internal South Korean politics?
Ms Muico: Yes.
Q57 Sir John Stanley: What do you think is the
most eVective way in which the British Government,
particularly through our embassy in Pyongyang, can
further human rights in the DPRK?
Ms Muico: I have worked with the British
Government on this matter for almost four years
and it has been a very productive relationship. They
have passed on a lot of the things that I have relayed
to them. But continuing their role as the
Government that is not the United States works in
their favour. Also, they have maintained a good
relationship but they have also pressed on human
rights issues.
It is very diYcult to work on human rights in North
Korea. For us it is quite frustrating at times because
progress is so slow. But as a Government—and they
are a Government not a human rights NGO—they
can open up the country by continuing with their
educational programmes, their exchanges and
anything that will open the society and the country
to other ways of thinking and to engagement with
other countries. It does not matter if they bring over
Government oYcials in the exchanges. That is even
better. Whatever exchanges you can have with the
country, the UK Government should continue that
and continue their tradition of dialoguing with
North Korea. They should never close the door
because they can provide a venue for us to speak.
They can speak on our behalf and they have done so
in the past.
Q58 Sir John Stanley: Do you expect President Lee
in the South to adopt any major changes of policy in
pursuing human rights in the North, now that he is
in the Blue House?
Ms Muico: If he stays true to what he has said about
acting in a more principled manner and pressing for
progress to be made on the nuclear issue as well as
on human rights, then I hope he does that. I worry
that he will become so caught up in issues that he will
not allow himself to be a bit more ﬂexible. Yes, as a
human rights organisation, we would want
President Lee Myung-bak to go forth and to do
more on human rights, but he must also be aware
that if the North Korean Government go back on
their word andmake it diYcult for the SouthKorean
Government, and that that in turn gets a negative
reaction from the South KoreanGovernment, it can
have a negative impact on theNorthKorean people.
Those are the people we are trying to help. Even
from a principled stance, he has to be ﬂexible.
Q59 Sir John Stanley: The DPRK regime initially
seemed to have taken a rather hostile stance to
President Lee. What do you think has precipitated
that?
Ms Muico: A series of events. It started from Lee
Myung-bak’s comments about a more principled
approach on the nuclear issue and on human rights. 4
Then there was the UN resolution on the special
rapporteur’s position,5 which South Korea voted in
favour of. That sparked the expulsion of the 11
Government oYcials from Kaesong. North Korea
feels that the SouthKoreanGovernmentwill end the
sunshine policy and be more strict about what aid
they give to North Korea. Lee Myung-bak has
already said that any humanitarian aid given to
North Korea will be based on progress made on the
nuclear talks, as well as their human rights record.
Chairman:Wenowhave somemore questions about
South Korea.
Q60 Mr. Illsley: The ﬁrst question is in relation to
the death penalty in South Korea, which I
understand has not been used for a decade. That
leads Amnesty to conclude that South Korea is an
abolitionist state. There is a piece of legislation that
is due to abolish the death penalty but it has to be
4 Note by witness: Then South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of StaV in
his conﬁrmation hearing responded that he would hit
North’s nuclear sites if North Korea showed signs of
attacking the South.
5 Note by witness: The mandate was passed.
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implemented by May of this year. Given that there
are forthcoming elections, it does not appear as
though therewill be time for that to take place.What
is your view on that that?
Ms Muico: It will expire in May in all likelihood, as
it has done under the previous Governments. So this
is not new. It is a trend. It is the second time that this
has happened. They seem to be quite willing to
introduce a Bill, but it just stays in the Legislation
and Judiciary Committee and does not get passed or
voted on.
Another worrying aspect is that LeeMyung-bak has
publicly stated that he is for the death penalty. We
have already expressed our concerns in an open
letter to the President in March, stating that South
Korea is an abolitionist country in practice, and that
this time it should be not only introduced in the
national assembly but passed, as the procedure for a
moratorium on the death penalty has already been
stated. It could also have a positive knock-on eVect.
I have spoken to people in Japan andMongolia, who
look to South Korea to abolish the death penalty so
that it may be seen as a role model for other
countries in the region.
Q61 Mr. Illsley: Although they have not used it for
10 years, if a suYciently serious case occurred now,
would South Korea hesitate to carry out the death
penalty? Are they serious about abolition, in that
they have not used the penalty for 10 years, or are
they simply paying lip service to it?
Ms Muico: The past two Governments were
deﬁnitely very serious. The previous President was a
human rights lawyer, and the one before that was a
dissident. However, even Lee Myung-bak would
hesitate to break that 10-year good performance.
The judicial system is certainly being tested, as there
have been several cases of heinous crimes, following
which there has been a lot of discussion in the media
on the death penalty.
Q62 Mr. Illsley:The ForeignOYce has said that the
only human rights problem in South Korea is the
death penalty. I would imagine that Amnesty would
take issue with that, because you have highlighted
other areas with which there are problems, such as
migrant workers, conscientious objectors, security
law, and refugees and asylum seekers. Would you
therefore take issue with our Foreign OYce on its
assessment of human rights issues in South Korea?
Ms Muico: Yes. We have very good working
relations with the FCO, but, right now, the migrant
workers’ rights issue is a big concern. The situation
is particularly worrying because there have been
targeted crackdowns on migrant workers’ union
leaders, some of whom have just been deported.
Theywere arrested at the end ofNovember 2007 and
then summarily deported in December without the
right to appeal. The authorities have been doing
various things. For example, immigration oYcers
have been issuing warrants for the arrest and
detention of the union leaders. That is something
that only a judge can do in South Korea, but they
have been bypassing that law.
There are countless cases of intimidation, arrests
and beatings, and of paid thugs being used to round
up migrant workers’ union leaders in vans, in which
they are handcuVed and which do not go to a
detention centre until the van is ﬁlled up. Many
union members have been surrounding the
detention centres, but the South Korean
immigration bureau will deport the leaders using a
back entrance and vans that are not clearly marked
as oYcial. A bread van was used in the detention in
December when they expelled three union leaders.
Little tactics such as that have created quite a stir
and union leaders feel quite vulnerable. When I was
speaking to the Migrants Trade Union in March, it
said that its current leaders were told not to leave the
building; and that when they do, they are
surrounded by other people, especially South
Korean nationals, so that they cannot be targeted in
future raids.
Q63 Mr. Illsley:You have mentioned that you have
a good relationship with the Foreign OYce in
relation to these issues. Is it taking any notice? Is our
Government doing anything to raise the issues with
South Korea?
Ms Muico: Yes. I think that my predecessor relayed
that in the past, when he did a report on migrant
workers in South Korea in 2006. I will continue to
work on the issue, as it will bemy next project. I have
already spoken to the British embassy in Seoul on
this matter, and it has even suggested that it would
be more eVective for a Government to give certain
recommendations on those areas and that it would
be best to go through them. I think that that sort of
co-operation is exactly what is eVective.
Chairman: Thank you. We have some questions
about Japan.
Q64 Mr. Hamilton: You made a submission from
Amnesty to the United Nations Universal Periodic
Review working group in January raising concerns
about shortcomings in human rights legislation in
Japan, including the death penalty and the failure to
protect the rights of refugees. You also expressed
concerns about the daiyo kangoku—the pre-trial
detention system—and the survival of Japan’s
military sexual slavery system. What is your
assessment of the current human rights situation in
Japan?
Ms Muico: I think that the human rights situation in
Japan is unique and very diYcult. Lawyers, NGOs
and community groups to which I have spoken all
consider themselves to be in the dark ages. It is very
diYcult to get the Government to engage with that
issue and to get the local media, rather than the
international media, to cover stories that are not
popular with the right-wing Government. In that
environment, it is, of course, very diYcult to work
on the problem. For example, the issue of comfort
women received lots of press coverage
internationally but had very little domestic press
coverage, and people who worked in the museum
that dealt with the comfort women issue were
harassed in February. These are the types of
diYculties that have to be worked on.
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I think that a lot more work needs to be done with
regard to the death penalty. I believe that the one
thing that works in Japan’s favour is that it is going
to the lay system—the jury system—so it will be
possible to raise the issue of the death penalty, the
transparency problems with the daiyo kangoku
system, Japan’s obsession with trying to coerce
confession out of prisoners and the number of days
that they can be detained. I believe that the death
penalty issue and the substitute prison system are
interconnected with the problem of the lack of
transparency in the judiciary and the criminal
justice system.
Q65 Mr. Hamilton:Do you think that there is likely
to be any imminent change in this situation—this
dark age of human rights that Japan is in?
Ms Muico: It is diYcult to say. The UN Committee
on torture, the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child and other committees, when reviewing Japan’s
status and the progress that it has made, have
observed that the Japanese Government have not
done much on previous observations and
recommendations. There is a lack of respect for the
UN system, which is quite worrying, considering
that Japan has ambitions to be a permanent member
of the UN Security Council. When you make a trip
to Japan and speak to the EU oYce there, you ﬁnd
that the Japanese do not tend to listen to the EU or
countries within the EU very much, and that is
another worry. They seem to take their cue from the
United States. One member of an NGO has joked
that Japan is the 51st state of the United States. In
that environment, it is very diYcult.When we had so
much success in various Parliaments around the
world on the comfort women resolution and also on
the moratorium on the death penalty, a Diet
member said, “Well, that’s the EU. We are not the
EU”. So, there is this deﬁance that there is a cultural
diVerence in Japan that other countries cannot
understand. Of course, that is an excuse. Human
rights violations go beyond cultural diVerences.
Q66 Ms Stuart: May I probe you on the death
penalty? Some people would say that some human
rights are universal. The United States still has the
death penalty. Did you say that Japan is quite closed
to outside pressure on these issues? Only the US
could have any kind of inﬂuence, but as it has the
death penalty too, pressure is unlikely to come from
that source.
Ms Muico: There are challenges, but a more
concerted eVort will certainly bear fruit. There has
been a lot of media attention outside Japan. It is a
matter of getting the domestic media interested and
letting people know about it, because the Japanese
public are not aware of what is happening in their
own country. Executions in Japan are secretive—
quite deliberately. Executions often take place when
the Diet—the Parliament—is in recess or on
national holidays. The person who is supposed to be
executed is told hours before, and the families are
told afterwards, not even before. There is no
transparency. Even Government oYcials—Diet
Members—cannot go to the execution chambers
and visit the prisoners. Only direct family members
and the person’s lawyer can.
Q67 Ms Stuart: Am I right that many people have
been on death row for decades?
Ms Muico: Absolutely. One such case was recently
in the news. Iwao Hakamada was convicted in 1968
and at ﬁrst confessed to the crime of killing a family
of four. Immediately afterwards he recanted, and
during the trial he said, “I was forced to confess, the
police coerced a confession out of me. They beat me,
they threatened me until I would confess.” There
were also irregularities with the evidence that was
provided, but despite all that, he was convicted.
Forty years later, one of the three judges broke four
decades of silence and said, “I thought he was
innocent. I really felt that his testimony—his
confession—was coerced.” They took all the new
evidence and asked the Supreme Court for a retrial,
and that was turned down last week.
Q68 Ms Stuart: Given that any pressures are likely
to come from inside only, what sources are there for
that greater open and public debate, which might
just lead to a moratorium in the ﬁrst stage and then
potential abolition, or is the support so
overwhelming that that is far oV?
Ms Muico: Support can be overwhelming, because
the general public do not know what the issues are:
there is no transparency within the investigation
process and there is a dire necessity to get a
confession. The 99.9% conviction rate is based on
confession. There is a good window of opportunity
because of the jury system debate. Lots of people are
rightfully worried that a jury can decide on death
penalty cases, and they are using that to say that we
should have amoratorium on the death penalty. The
human rights lawyers are quite active. They have the
support of the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations, but it is divided on the issue. Some
want to be a bit more realistic—even those who are
against the death penalty, by all accounts. They
believe that there should not be any substitute
system for the death penalty and that it should be
abolished, but, having said that, they would like to
introduce life imprisonment without parole, just so
that the issue could get in there and the death penalty
could eventually be removed over time. Other
people think that we cannot go there because we
have to abolish the death penalty on principle.
Q69 Sir Menzies Campbell: May I explore the
apparent contradiction between an aspiration to be
at the highest level of the United Nations—the
Security Council—and an unwillingness to accept
much of what the UN stands for? If the British
Government were to make plain that their support
for Japan’s membership of the Security Council
depended upon amore sympathetic attitude towards
the UN, would that have any eVect, or is
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theobduracy so engrained that it would pass over the
heads of the people making the decision?
Ms Muico: No, I think that that would be useful.
Certainly this delegation going to Japan will raise
interests, and there will be concern about what you
would have to say after your visits. I think that, in
some ways, they are banking on hiding behind the
fact that one of the permanent members on the
Security Council has the death penalty. However, it
is an exaggeration to say that they do not listen to the
EU. NGOs in Japan are frustrated, but they will
listen, especially if there is a lot of international
attention on this matter. For some strange reason,
Prime Minister Abe apologised as an individual to
President Bush6 because there was a lot of attention7
on the issue of ‘comfort women’. He felt compelled
to make a statement because there was so much
media and press.8 The Japanese are not immune to
government pressure; this is about what they do
about it, and trying to ensure that they do the right
thing and monitoring that.
Q70 Mr. Illsley: Is there any pressure from within
the Japanese Parliament? You said that some
executions are done secretly or when Parliament is
not sitting. In a similar situation in this country,
there would be pressure groups and parliamentary
groups of MPs campaigning on the issue. Is there
anymovement within the Japanese Parliament to try
and end this system of executions, particularly
secret ones?
Ms Muico: There is a parliamentary group within
the Diet that supports a moratorium on the death
penalty and works closely with the NGOs. There is
a network of NGOs that want to abolish the death
penalty. It is imaginative and active, but the problem
is that the general public seem not to care as much.
In South Korea, anything will get a reaction out of
the people. They will not put up with things—even if
something is quite detrimental in terms of a strategic
point of view, you will get a reaction from the
general public, and it is quite buoyant. You do not
have the same society in Japan. They are willing to
sacriﬁce a bit more for the good of the country and
the society.
Q71 Chairman: May I ask you about the issue of
reparations for people who were put into sexual
slavery in the second world war? What is the
progress on that?
Ms Muico: We had something passed in the
Parliament in the Philippines in March and we are
trying to build up momentum because it had slowed
down. We would like the matter to be raised when
you are in Japan, because a resolution was passed in
the European Parliament and also in the Dutch
Parliament. We feel that there is NGO fatigue
perhaps, so if the message could be relayed by a
6 Note by witness: Not to the victims of sexual slavery.
7 Note by witness: In the US
8 Note by witness: Regarding the resolution in the US
Congress calling for Japan to make an unambiguous
apology for the suVering of the ‘comfort women’.
Government, rather than by Amnesty continuing to
hound the Japanese Government, it might have
more eVect on reparations. However, so far, the
Japanese Government have not engaged with us on
this issue.
Q72 Mr. Illsley: What evidence is there that the
daiyo kangoku system of detention involves serious
human rights abuses? Is there any prospect of
reforming this procedure?
Ms Muico: Yes, I think that in some ways there
might be a better chance, because it aVects a larger
number of citizens than the death penalty. Suspects
can be detained for 23 days without charge, and
police use this period to interrogate and to coerce a
confession. There has been some progress in this
area, although it is still in the talking stage. Themost
worrying thing is that lawyers cannot be present
during the interrogation. With support and raising
awareness on this issue, there can be some changes,
at least in this stage with lawyers allowed to be
present during interrogation as part of basic rights.
Another thing that I would ﬂag up is that there is no
digital recording of police interrogation. That is
quite important, because if you get a digital
recording, the coercive nature would be reduced
because there would be proof that the confession
was not given voluntarily.
Q73 Mr. Illsley: Well, any recording, whether
digital or analogue. It still seems inconceivable that
a country such as Japan could have a system such as
that, where people can be detained for 23 days and
be abused—
Ms Muico: They can be interrogated for 16 hours
continuously at night time.
Q74 Mr. Illsley: To be interrogated like that in a
country that we regard as quite civilised beggars
belief.
Ms Muico: That is the most diYcult part of our
work. Most people in the world think that Japan is
a very wealthy country that has been a democracy
for a long time and that it would not have human
rights abuses on such a large and dramatic scale.
Yet, it is going on. It is not only Japanese citizens
who are aVected, but foreign nationals. Quite
recently a Swedish journalist went through this
horrible system.
Q75 Mr. Illsley: I just ﬁnd that incredible. I
remember visiting Japan in 1990 and being told by
our embassy there that this is a crime-free area where
you can leave your car open and you do not have to
worry about theft and this, that and the other. From
that point of view, we looked upon it as a modern,
civilised society, with very little crime. To learn that
they have a system of organised brutal interrogation
such as this seems crazy, particularly as we have had
a couple of high-proﬁle murder cases in Japan
involving British women. It just seem crazy that this
is still going on.
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Ms Muico: It is the criminal justice system. The
general public do not want to be associated with
crime and with anything that may make them look
dirty or bad. You have to understand that when
someone is given the death penalty, it is not just the
family of the person who has been accused and
convicted that is shunned from society. The family
members of the victim are also shunned from
society, because they are in some way implicated in
a terrible heinous crime.
Q76 Mr. Illsley: That is an aspect of a lot of Middle
Eastern societies.
Ms Muico: But a lot of societies impose so much
pressure that people feel compelled to leave the
neighbourhood, change their names, and never tell
their children.
Mr. Illsley: We look upon Japan as a country equal
to ourselves in status in terms of civil and human
rights. To trade with it and so on and to accept it as
an equal when it is carrying out things that we did
away with in the stone age in terms of interrogation
seems incredible.
Chairman: We can pursue those matters in other
ways, and the Japanese Government will no doubt
wish to send a submission on that to us.
Ms Stuart: I caution us about being quite so
condemnatory about a highly civilised 21st-century
country and comparing it with the stone age.
Mr. Illsley: Sorry.
Q77 Ms Stuart: Do you have any statistics about
how many people are held for 23 days without any
lawyers or any support present compared with the
percentage of how many people go through the
court system?
Ms Muico: They may be available. The Japanese
Federation of Bar Associations will have statistics
on that. On lawyers not being present, that is never
allowed, so that would apply to anyone who goes
through the system.
Q78 Ms Stuart: Is that something that you can put
in context? It is not all that long since we introduced
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and
other safeguards, so it would be helpful if you could
put the matter in context.
Ms Muico: I don’t have the statistics right now.9
Q79 Sir Menzies Campbell: My question is rather
general. I cannot help thinking of the post-war
reconstruction of Japan, which was carried out
largely under the direction of the United States, in
particular under General MacArthur. How far do
these practices and the length of the law—the
process that you have described—go back? Are they
are century or half a century old, or are they more
recent?
9 Ev 103
Ms Muico: The daiyo kangoku system was
established in the early 1900s—I believe it was 1908.
It was just the way in which things were done. In
2006 the system was put into a new legislation, so
they allowed that type of system to continue.
Q80 Sir Menzies Campbell: It was custom, but then
it became the subject of statutory enactment?
Ms Muico: Yes.10
Q81 Chairman: A ﬁnal question. You touched on
this in some of the earlier answers: is the new UN
human rights council—the new UN system—likely
to lead to improvements in human rights in Japan or
in either of the Koreas, or is it too early to say?
Ms Muico: It was designed to be revised, so that
countries had to be more answerable, so I hope the
answer is yes. We all have our eyes on Geneva at the
moment, because it is starting its ﬁrst review
sessions. At this point, I cannot comment. The
system is much better laid out, so it should work
more eVectively. All countries are reviewed under
the universal periodic review.
Q82 Chairman: In a diVerent context, people said
that that factor will not lead to much change in
practice, because countries operate as political blocs
to protect their own. In the wider sense, leaving aside
speciﬁc countries, some countries operate to put
certain countries in the dock and keep other
countries out of it.
Ms Muico: That cannot be done so easily now.
Every country is reviewed every four years. It is not
the case that, for example, if a country has signed a
treaty body it could delay submitting a report. It is
not the case that, for example, if a country has signed
a treaty, it could delay submitting a report. You
cannot review a country unless it has submitted a
report, and Japan is quite late with its report-
writing, as are a lot of other countries, but in this way
they are reviewed no matter what every four years.
That is one aspect to our advantage. The other is
that the three countries who get to review the
countries form a troika, and those three countries
are selected randomly. It could be a friendly country,
if you are lucky, and it could be a neutral country.
Any country can be lobbied to do their job, because
then they will get reviewed as well, so it is harder to
go round that.
Chairman: Thank you very much for your time and
for coming to speak to us today.We shall now break
for about two minutes so that we can change our
witnesses over and for any members of the public
who wish to leave, this would be an appropriate
moment.
10 Note by witness: Under the old Prison Law of 1908 the daiyo
kangoku system was meant to only hold arrestees
temporarily until they were brought before judges, that is
used as substitute prisons temporarily (due to overcrowding
at the time). But the new Prison Law of 2006 retains the use
of the system and gives them the legal status as an institution
for detaining arrestees, thus, no longer merely a
provisional option.
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Witnesses: Sir Stephen Gomersall KCMG, Chief Executive for Europe, Hitachi, 2004-present; HM
Ambassador to Tokyo 1999-2004, and Dr. Jim Hoare, freelance consultant on East Asia; formerly with the
FCO as a research analyst and in Seoul, Beijing and Pyongyang, gave evidence.
Q83 Chairman: Gentleman, we are running slightly
late because we started slightly late. I have to warn
you that there will be a vote at 4 o’clock, which will
interrupt the proceedings, hopefully for only 15
minutes, but that is one of the perils of having
Committee meetings that run at the same time as the
House. We can never be sure what the business will
be on a particular day, but I think there will be at
least one vote at 4 o’clock. I would be grateful if you
each introduce yourself for the record.
Sir Stephen Gomersall: It is an honour to be invited
to give testimony to the Committee and a great
pleasure to see some old acquaintances again. As
you know, I left the Foreign OYce in 2004 and have
been working since for a Japanese engineering
company called Hitachi, orchestrating its businesses
in Europe. I would like to clarify that for today’s
purposes, I am talking in a personal capacity and
largely on the basis of my diplomatic experience.
Dr. Hoare: I am Jim Hoare. I, too, was a member of
the diplomatic service, a member of the research
cadre, and I retired in 2003. In my time in the
Foreign OYce, I worked on East Asia almost
entirely. Since I retired, when I thought I was going
to work on East Asia, I have worked almost entirely
on North Korea, but I follow both Koreas and to a
certain extent China, and to a lesser extent Japan.
Q84 Chairman: May I begin with some questions
about Japan? How do you assess the current
Japanese economic position? Given the diYcult
decade or more experienced by Japan, how
vulnerable is it today to the repercussions of the
international problems emanating from the United
States and the possible global downturn?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: The perception that Japan
went into recession during the whole of the 1990s is
slightly mistaken because, in fact, it sustained about
a 1% growth rate. Indeed, some important structural
changes in the economy took place. Broadly, the
exporting part of the economy that trades
internationally restructured itself and became
internationally competitive; it made a lot of changes,
invested overseas and so forth. That is basically why
the Japanese economy today is still driven, as far as
growth is concerned, by the export sector. By
comparison, the domestic part of the economy—
retail, construction, insurance, ﬁnancial services and
so forth—remains rather stagnant. The overhang of
debt on the economy, coupled with policies by the
Government, which mistakenly tried to reinﬂate the
economy by excessive public expenditure, led to the
polarisation of the economy between an eYcient
export sector and a less eYcient domestic sector.
Since the Koizumi period, Japanese growth rates
have been higher. They have been comparable to
those of the EuropeanUnion on thewhole, in the 2%
to 2.5% range. However, if you diVerentiate between
what is happening in the short term and in the longer
term, you would have to say that the Japanese
economy is underperforming in comparison to its
potential. There is no doubt about that.
In the short term, most people assess that Japanese
exposure to the sub-prime crisis is less than that in
other countries. However, the combination of
dependence on export markets, increase in import
prices, the potential rise in the value of the yen, the
expected decrease in corporate earnings, and
generally low consumer sentiment inside Japan,
means that in the course of this year wewill probably
see a reduction of growth to around the 1% to 1.5%
level. That does not mean a collapse, but it is less
than is desirable, obviously.
In the longer term, although Mr. Koizumi achieved
quite a lot in being a catalyst for reforms, there are
still some major structural issues in the economy
that politics is ﬁnding it diYcult to sort out. One of
those is obviously the ageing population. The
essential problem is the diYculty of dealing with
such deep-seated issues and bringing about further
reforms in a situation where there is conﬂict between
the two houses of the Diet at the moment, and both
the major political parties lack a clear strategic
vision of how to take the economy out of its current
situation.
Dr. Hoare: I am not competent to comment on
current Japanese economic development. The only
point that I would make is that, despite the
perception that Japan’s performance in the 1990s
was and continues to be poor, people in the region
still think of Japan as very much amajor component
in the region’s economic development. In South
Korea, people still look to Japan and think of it as
more wealthy than SouthKorea. It is a country to be
emulated still. Of course, Japanese components and
technology go into much of the development in
South Korea and China, too.
Q85 Mr. Horam:Given what you said, Sir Stephen,
that the current economic situation in Japan is
rather fragile, how much scope is there to increase
British exports there?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: I started to give an economic
analysis, but Jim’s point is valid. With 10% of the
world’s economy, Japan is still an enormousmarket.
Even when, in relative terms, the economy is in the
doldrums, particularly domestically, Japan is still
putting out a lot of new technology and still
accumulating a large current account surplus, which
indirectly helps to sustain American debt. It is still
making an enormous contribution to international
aid, so even at this relatively low level, it is making a
sizeable contribution to the global economy.
British exports are, relatively, a great success story.
Japan is still the third largestmarket after theUnited
States and the European Union, so something must
be right. If you would like me to address trade
barriers and so on, I would be happy to do so, but
the bottom line is that after 20 years’ eVort, most of
the barriers that have impeded foreign exports,
particularly western exports to Japan in the past,
have been taken away one by one, thanks to a
combination of EU action and bilateral actions. The
market is open, but challenging, and our advice to
British exporters is that they must do a lot of
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research before going into the market. They must
have the right product, and the three critical factors
are presence in the market, quality and delivery of
the product, and relationships and trust with those
with whom they are doing business.
Having said all that, while I was there, we had some
major successes on the export side, including the sale
of Westland helicopters to the Maritime Self-
Defence Force, whichwas worth about £400million,
and the sale ofRolls-Royce aero-engines andmarine
engines to All NipponAirways and the Self-Defence
Forces. British telecommunications companies had
big investments, which have since been unwound,
but at that time, they were major British stakes in
the ground.
Our exports cover a broad range of commodities.
Some 70% of them are industrial, so they have not
beneﬁted so much from the imports to Japan that
have been strongest, paradoxically, during this
period of recession—luxury goods from the
European Union. Companies producing fashion,
high-quality jewellery, liquor and automobiles have
had high levels of growth during the past 15 years.
Q86 Mr. Horam: What is the best way in which the
FCO and other Departments can help British
companies?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: We—I am sorry, I am
slipping back. A lot has been done over a
considerable period, beginning as far back as Mr.
Heath’s Government. Mechanisms were set up in
the then Department of Trade for directly helping
and subsidising exports to Japan. That helped us to
get an early foothold in the market.
In terms of oYcial assistance, partly because of the
priority given now to new markets, the volume of
subsidy has been reduced, probably rightly, for
Japan, and some of the mechanisms for promotion
and hand-holding for British exporters have been
unwound, but there is still a lot of expertise in the
market, in the embassy and in the British Chamber
of Commerce in Japan.
Q87 Mr. Horam: By direct subsidy, do you mean
export credit guarantees?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: No. I was thinking more of
small subsidies for trade missions, market surveys
and so on, aimed at the smaller end of the market.
There is a very powerful trade and investment
section in the embassy, which is still a large part of
the embassy’s eVort in looking after trade missions,
and you will no doubt hear a lot more about that
when you are there. At the front end, I would say
that it is still the most important part of the
embassy’s mission, along with inward investment.
Q88 Mr. Horam: Looking at the UK and Japan the
other way round, do you think that Japanese
investment in the UK is likely to be sustained?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: The major investments that
we have here in the automotive industry and in the
manufacture of machine tools and construction
machinery is almost certainly likely to continue for
the foreseeable future. I think that what has
happened in the market is that it has become more
cost driven, and the sort of investments that we got
in the ‘70s and ‘80s, which came in support for the
automotive industry and other electronics
businesses that dealt with components and that sort
of thing, will now go to eastern Europe—it has done
for the past ﬁve or six years.
The second trend is that, among European
countries, there is now amore level playing ﬁeld.We
got a lot of investment from Japan in the initial
phases because we put out the welcome mat: Mrs.
Thatcher said that, if they came and had 60% local
content, she would stand up for them in Brussels as
though they were British companies, and that made
a big impact. Of course, 20 years ago, companies
took their decisions sometimes on a personal basis,
because of the predilections of the chairman or the
president of the company, but I think that, today,
companies analyse the cost-eVectiveness of diVerent
locations very carefully when deciding where to go.
The UK is still very competitive, as we have an open
market and a relatively benign labour climate. Of
course, we are vulnerable on the cost of living side,
but with the English language and our general
infrastructure, the UK is still very attractive.
Q89 Mr.Horam:Does it matter that we do not have
the euro?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: I think that that has become
a non-issue, because people understand that a
decision to enter the euro is probably a long way oV.
Whereas ﬁve or six years ago, they were very
exercised about it, other factors have now
supervened and, as I have said, the low-cost
investment in any case would probably not come to
the western end of Europe. What people are looking
for in the UK is probably much more high tech and
science and technology-related. They are looking for
research tie-ups with British universities or want to
set up their own research or design facilities in the
UK, where they can beneﬁt from being at the
crossroads of ﬁnance and commerce and where the
number of employees is going to be smaller. They
need a good supply of international graduates and
well-qualiﬁed people, not only British, but
Europeans predominantly. They need scientists, so a
lot of collaborations have grown up between
Japanese companies and universities. My own
company has a laboratory at Cambridge University
that has been going very productively for 15 years.
A lot more companies have come in since then to do
the same sort of thing, and I think that the role of
development organisations in the UK is often to put
potential investors in touch with British centres of
excellence in universities in a competitive manner.
Dr. Hoare: The only point that I will make—it is a
bit tangential and I have made it before—is that, in
Japan and other East Asian countries, the
perception of interest in Britain has been damaged
by the closure of certain academic departments and
the withdrawal of such studies at Durham, Stirling
and other places. Those things add up: they may not
be in themselves themost important, but they add up
to a perception of a lack of British interest.
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Chairman: When we produced our report on East
Asia two years ago, we commented on that. No
doubt it is an issue that we can revisit in this inquiry.
I am conscious that the bell is just about to ring, but
we will start the next question.
Mr. Hamilton: Following on from the question of
my colleague, Mr. Horam, about investment, is
Japan the largest—[Interruption.]
Chairman: We will hopefully be back in 15 minutes.
Thank you.
Sitting suspended for Divisions in the House.
On resuming—
Q90 Chairman:Wewere in the middle of a question
from Fabian Hamilton, but I will pick up that
question and carry on. We should get through as
quickly as we can. I am sure that there will not be
another vote until 7 o’clock, so we have that
advantage. Fabian was beginning to ask a question
that followed on the remarks about scientiﬁc and
technology co-operation. The Government have
told us that there are huge beneﬁts to be obtained
from deepening co-operation between the UK and
Japan with regard to research and development.
First, do you agree with that? I think from your
earlier remarks, Sir Stephen, that you do. How can
that best be achieved, especially given the global
competition from not only South Korea and China,
but the United States?
Sir Stephen Gomersall:The ﬁrst thing that is obvious
is that Japan is very much a superpower when it
comes to research and development, with 3% of
GNP going on research and development, most of
which is from the private sector. There is a lot of
innovation coming out of Japan on to the world’s
markets. Quite a lot of that innovation will be
developed partly in Japan but also partly overseas.
Therefore Japanese companies are certainly looking
for research partners around the world to help
develop and implement innovation. Japan’s science
base is very complementary with our own. There is
an enormous emphasis on energy technology,
sustainability of society on low-carbon technologies,
intelligent transport systems, nanotechnology,
aerospace and areas like that, which coincides with
our own agenda.
The UK began a formal framework for partnership
with Japan in this area in the 1990s, but it came to
life more after 2002 and 2003 as a result of an
increase in eVort by the OYce of Science and
Technology, which sent a lot of missions and
research council missions to Japan at that time. As a
result of that, relationships have built up—for
example, the relationship between the Met OYce
Hadley centre and the Japanese climate-modelling
supercomputer in Yokohama—which have direct
and tangible beneﬁts for UK science. Relationships
are always important, and so the Government’s
eVort and the embassy’s eVort in organising and
helping to orchestrate visits of researchers in both
directions, particularly from the UK to Japan to see
what is going on in Japan, is vital from the point of
view of stimulating the ﬁrst stages of collaboration.
The second area is obviously continuing to try to
attract Japanese investment, and particularly
science-related investment, to the UK. By and large,
the UK is probably ahead of most other European
countries in that. Therewas a perception, even inside
Japan, in the early 2000s that Japan spent a lot of
money but did not get good value for what it spent
on R and D, because it did not have the right
techniques or the right organisation. A lot of
exchanges took place to discover how the UK got
value for money out of science and research,
particularly in the Government sector. This has
helped, together with the reform of the universities
in Japan, which can now form partnerships not only
with Japanese private companies but with overseas
private companies to do research and development.
The doors have been opened in a big way, and the
UK has a very good reputation in innovation—and
research particularly—that we can trade on.
Dr. Hoare: The UK also has a historical link with
Japan. I would not want to make too much of the
history, but the Japanese have a long tradition of co-
operating with Britain over such things as the
Japanese railway system, which began with British
assistance, shipbuilding, and so on. Those things
matter. They do not matter on their own, but in
conjunction with the sorts of things that Stephen has
described, we have there a bit of historical support
for turning to Britain rather than to the United
States. In South Korea, for example, the inclination
is much more to turn automatically to the United
States. I suppose that the only competitor in Europe
might be Germany, in terms of that sort of legacy.
Q91 Chairman:Can I now switch to some questions
about South Korea? Does the recent election of
President Lee—he has been in oYce for less than two
months, I think—mean that there will be more
protectionist policy in South Korea?
Dr. Hoare: He has said the opposite. He has made
lots of noises about opening up to the outside world.
He has talked about everybody having to be taught
in English in schools and universities. I suspect that
the reality is that at this stage nobody really knows
whatMr. Lee’s policies will be. As you say, he is only
a couple of months into oYce. He comes from a
particular background—the chaebol, which is a big
business background—but I think that he realises
that there are problems within the South Korean
economy, and that one way to get round those will
be more international links and trade. His
programme is very long on rhetoric at the moment,
and rather vague on details, and I suspect that it will
be some time before it really settles down. He knows
that he has problems, but I am not sure that you can
yet say that he knows how to deal with them.
Q92 Sir John Stanley:Do you think that the British
Government should be supporting the EU-Republic
of Korea free trade agreement? Are there any
particular bottom lines that you think the British
Government should insist on in that negotiation?
Dr. Hoare: That particular agreement is popular in
South Korea—at least it was under the previous
President. It was expected to have an easier ride than
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the US-ROK free trade agreement. I think that it is a
good development and that the South Koreans have
decided that free trade agreements are positive. They
have just been celebrating the one they have hadwith
Chile for some years. I am not sure how much trade
they do with Chile, but nevertheless that is a positive
attitude towards such agreements. It is essential that
an eye is always kept on the free trade agreement
with the United States and what is in that, because
South Koreans’ normal instinct is, I think, to take
account of US interests ﬁrst and not necessarily
think through other people’s.
There is going to be the question over European
attitudes towards the Kaesong industrial zone,
which is situated just across the demilitarised zone in
North Korea. It is ﬁnanced and managed by South
Koreanmanagers, withNorth Korean workers. The
United States has had problems with that, because it
has various measures in place eVectively forbidding
trade with North Korea—Europe does not have
quite the same restrictions. There will be much
pressure from the South Korean authorities for
Europe to accept that products from the Kaesong
zone are Korean products rather than North
Korean products. I suspect that the United States
might—at least as long as the present
Administration are in place—try and put pressure
on Europe over that particular issue, although I do
not know what form that pressure might take. Such
free trade agreements bind the South Koreans into
more open trading practices and are therefore a
good thing.
Chairman: May we move to some questions on
climate change? Eric.
Q93 Mr. Illsley: It has been suggested that in the
past, the Japanese have allied themselves to the
United States on climate change. Although South
Korea does not come within the Kyoto protocol, it
is a high per capita producer of emissions. Bearing
that in mind, what are your views on the eVorts of
both countries to comply with international action
on climate change?
Dr. Hoare: I really would not know much about the
current Japanese attitude. South Korea often pays
lip service to such things, but the pressure there is
still for economic development and growth, and that
tends to override other considerations. There is a lot
of talk about the beautiful hills and streams of
Korea, but in reality a lot of those streams are
polluted by industrial development, or have been in
the past. The new President has put forward an
ambitious programme of economic development to
raise South Korea’s position in the OECD league
from its current 11th to seventh position, to raise
salaries to $40,000 per year and to raise annual
growth to 7%. That is all put forward as the 747
policy.
It is unlikely that any of that will be reached—
unless the dollar falls and falls and its value is
reduced—but none of it seems to take much account
of the climatic consequences of such a push for
growth. Some of youwill know thatMrLee’s biggest
proposal so far is to construct a canal from Pusan in
the south to Seoul in the north of the country—
about 450 km—through mountains and over plains.
It will go through areas that need economic
reconstruction—former coal-mining areas and so
on—but the environmental consequences of
building a canal capable of carrying seagoing ships
are horrendous, if you think about the construction
traYc and so on. That seems to indicate a not very
strong commitment to taking account of
environmental factors. The rhetoric will be there,
because the Koreans know the rhetoric, but the
reality is slightly diVerent. That said, they have
cleaned up the Han river. When I lived in Seoul, it
was a dead river; now it is used for recreational
purposes and has ﬁsh again. There have been other
eVorts to improve particular environmental black
spots, but there is no more widespread commitment.
Sir Stephen Gomersall: Japan is an absolutely
pivotal country in the debate on climate change and
for various technological solutions to deal with the
eVects of that. It is a founder signatory of the Kyoto
protocol, and it is a large emitter with the potential
to make very large reductions in its emissions. It has
tried, in recent years, to ﬁnd ways of bringing theUS
into the process and keeping the door open for that.
I have mentioned the technology that it is prepared
to share with other countries. Japan is struggling to
meet its original Kyoto targets because they were set
at a time when Japan was probably more advanced
in its control of pollutants than the EU. Japanese
industry up to now has been rather negative on
mandatory reductions in carbon emissions,
particularly in circumstances where its competitors
across the water in China are not subject to that kind
of regime. There is a lively debate going on about
that at the moment.11
As you are doubtless aware, when he was at the
Davos meeting, Prime Minister Fukuda came out
with quite a signiﬁcant statement, saying that he
would have it as his objective at the G8 to try to get
agreement on a post-Kyoto framework that would
bring in all the major emitting countries and that he
would try to set a global target of 30% for an increase
in energy eYciency by 2020. He announced a
multilateral fund, in conjunction with the UK and
the US, of $10 billion for aid to developing
countries. He said that he wanted Japan to play a
leading role in transforming the globe into a low-
carbon planet, and by that he included sharing
Japanese technology with other countries.
On the mechanics of carbon reduction, it is quite
signiﬁcant that the Japanese Government set up two
panels, one in the Cabinet OYce and one in the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, to study
the beneﬁts of cap and trade policies, which implies
a step which will be taken later. The EU has been
urging Japan assiduously—I know that the British
embassy has been involved in this—to shift its
position by the time of the G8 so that we can get the
sort of agreement that Mr. Fukuda was talking
about. Given that the position of the American
candidates in the American election is positive
towards cap and trade, Japan in any case will see the
need to make a shift in its position. Most people are
expecting Japan to move.
11 Note by witness: In the Federation of Japanese Business
Organisations
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The private sector, while being bound by an industry
consensus to not yet accept these mechanisms,
nonetheless sees climate change and carbon
reduction as both a duty and a business opportunity.
Companies such as mine are developing
technologies in carbon capture, hybrid vehicles and
things like that, which hopefully will come to the
world market in a reasonably short period of time.
On the whole, Japanese industry is trying to get
ahead of the curve, so that it will be in a position to
make a contribution to the solution of the problem,
when there is a global agreement.
Q94 Mr. Illsley: So, the country is committed to
reducing climate change in terms of themechanics of
how we achieve it, or how they achieve it?
Sir Stephen Gomersall:There is not yet consensus on
accepting a mandatory regime, although the Prime
Minister said that he was prepared to accept a
national target.
Chairman: We now move to some questions about
cultural education.
Q95 Ms Stuart: I noticed that Dr. Hoare, in one of
the observations, made some reference to the impact
that we had when we stopped the Japanese teaching
relief in universities. What I want to explore a little
more is, over the years in which you have had
involvement, either in Korea—north or south—or
Japan, what changes have you observed in the way
the UK is perceived?
Dr. Hoare: This is always a very diYcult question to
answer. My own experience over the last 30-odd
years—Stephen’s will be very diVerent, being an
ambassador in Japan—is that there is a lot of respect
for Britain, often for quite the wrong reasons.
Britain is still seen, despite all the changes and
developments, as the country of gentlemen—no
doubt of ladies as well, but of gentlemen in
particular. It is regarded as a place that is rather
polite and a good model for courtesy and how to
behave. However, often, particularly in Korea, it is
seen not to be as dynamic as some of our European
partners. It is often hard to pin down why that is
the case.
When I was in South Korea, we had trade
campaigns. They were not as intensive as those in
Japan, as we never had quite the same number of
staV, although that has now changed. The number of
staV at the embassy is greater than it used to be, as
is the concentration on trade. However, when we are
dealing with Korea in particular and Japan to a
lesser extent, the dominance of the United States as
the favoured world power is very strong.
We were the major power until the 1930s in Japan,
then the United States began to take over, and after
the second world war there was no contest, until
recently perhaps. We never had a very strong
presence in Korea; it was always the United States
there, through American missionaries and
educators. Two, at least, of the major Korean
universities and the biggest international hospital
are American missionary foundations. There were a
few cottage hospitals run by the Anglican Church,
but they never came to anything much.
Similarly in South Korea, educational models have
been very much based on those from the United
States rather than Britain. If it was not the United
States, they tended to look to Germany as an
international model. Germany and France have
often made a bigger cultural impact in South Korea
than Britain. The British Council has tended
recently to concentrate on English language
training, and some of the other things that go into
the pot marked culture have been rather neglected.
So, the impression of Britain there also is that we are
not quite the leaders.
To a certain extent I have found that impression in
Japan as well, in the past. It is the old whisky and
Burberry syndrome. Those were the sort of things
that Britain sold. In fact, we contributed to Japanese
shipbuilding, and South Korean shipbuilding
eVectively beganwith Britishmoney and know-how.
The Korean car industry began with British money
and to a certain extent British know-how, although
there was a lot of Japanese input as well. However,
the initial impetus was not kept up and the memory
of Britain tended to fade somewhat. This is one
person’s perception. Even though I have been
working within a British Government context in the
embassy, others will have a diVerent perception I am
sure, including Stephen. However, that is what I
have found about Britain in East Asia, and also in
China, incidentally.
Q96 Ms Stuart: So, Stephen, would you like to add
whether UK-Japan 2004 has made any diVerence, in
your assessment?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: I would like to say a number
of things. On the question of universities and Japan
studies, there was indeed quite an outcry four or ﬁve
years ago when Stirling University closed its
Japanese Studies programme, and Durham
threatened to do the same. Many people became
very active on the matter and the Japanese embassy
became involved.
As a result of representations from, among others,
Peter Mandelson and the 21st-century group, the
Department for Education and Skills took a look at
thematter, and the result was a streamof funding for
which universities were entitled to bid. As a result,
the White Rose Universities of York, SheYeld and,
I think, Leeds were given funds for something called
the White Rose East Asia Centre, which is now in
operation. That funding is time-limited, but I think
that it has eased the problem for quite a while and as
a result it has brought in other groups like the Great
Britain Sasakawa Foundation and the Daiwa
Foundation to fund teaching posts either at those
universities or at secondary schools that will feed
them. There is more demand for places, particularly
graduate positions, in those universities than ﬁve
years ago. It is a very healthy sign.
I agree with what I think is the premise of your
question, which is that cultural diplomacy is an
important part of projection and ultimately our
eVort to win friends and trade, and that it should be
part of a joined-up co-operative enterprise between
the British Government agencies involved. In my
time in Japan the embassy and the British Council
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worked very closely together. I have a lot of
admiration for the British Council because, together
with the embassy, it worked very intensively and
successfully on changing the perceptions of Britain
as a country of castles, Beatrix Potter and that sort
of thing. It introduced contemporary arts and
fashion and showed Britain as a diverse,
multicultural society, and brought together a lot of
artists andNGOs in the process. That work is rather
tenuously funded and depends on funds from local
sponsors for these kinds of activities, even more so
today because of cuts in British Council funding.
Nevertheless, that is an important part of the work
in Japan. It was pretty successfully executed.
There were, as you mentioned, a number of speciﬁc
promotions. There was the big one in 1998, another
in 2003, and another related to scientiﬁc innovation
in 2004. There is UK Japan in 2008, which you will
hear about. That is all very important. Again, it is
run on a shoestring and developing the concept and
implementing it is very much down to the people at
the front end, but it seems to work. The eVort is
ﬁrstly to project modern Britain and secondly to
bring in grass-roots schools, including primary and
secondary schools, to make an acquaintance with
the UK. A lot has been done through online means,
both in advertising British educational services and
putting schools in Japan in touch with schools in the
UK so that they have some joint classes at particular
times of the day and so forth. That is very good.
On top of that, the British Council’s other big
responsibility is to try to compete in the education
market. Japan is an enormous market for British
educational services, both for language teaching
inside Japan and also for students coming to British
institutes of learning. There are about 8,500 students
in the UK on full-time studies and about 80,000 per
year coming for short-term language courses. That
is a very competitive business, and the British
Council is trying to position itself so that if andwhen
the Japanese Government decide to make English
language learning compulsory in Japanese primary
schools, the British Council is seen as a provider of
those services. In themeantime it helps to administer
British standard English language tests for business
men and students, competing all the time obviously
with the Americans and the Australians and
Canadians.
A ﬁnal element which is very valuable for us, as well
as the other countries involved, is the JET
programme. I am sure that you know all about it. It
was invented by a British man, called Nicolas
Maclean, in the 1980s. It involves British graduate
students going for two years or so to teach as
assistant language teachers in schools throughout
Japan. It is a wonderful resource. We used to have
about 1,200, but about 700 students now go out each
year. They are literally dotted around the country in
Japan, sometimes in very oVbeat places. As a result,
they acquire a very deep knowledge of how Japan
works, and in many cases good Japanese language.
A lot of the students from the programmes then
come back and take up jobs related to work and
business with Japan. It creates a virtuous circle. The
British Council has about 90 staV to deal with
everything. It has about 37 language teachers. It
does a very good job on relatively thin resources.
Q97 Ms Stuart: It seems that both of you are saying
that we are making a good job of the fact that
English is a preferred language and that we have an
advantage. To what extent do you think that we are
held back in our business relationships by what
could be described as a degree of ignorance of East
Asia as a business area on theUK side?Do you think
that that is a problem in the development of
business? Are we held back in terms of building on
our strength? Is business in the UK not as well
informed about East Asian aVairs as it should be?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: That is the thinking behind
the re-expansion of Japanese studies that we were
discussing a moment ago. If we do not have such
skills, that is a disadvantage. Businesses in the
ﬁnancial sector, for example, operate in English. It is
no great disadvantage to go with only English. In
any case, many young people going there pick up the
language to a suYcient degree quite quickly.
Q98 Ms Stuart: Even in Japan?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: Even in Japan—up to a
certain point. Japanese is a very diYcult language to
read and write, but it is not impossible to speak.
Dr. Hoare: Something Sir Stephen said at the
beginning is very important not only in Japan but in
the whole of East Asia. I am sure that Sir John
Stanley will back it up. It is very important to
become known, to have a presence, to go regularly
and to show a commitment. To have the language is
an important element to show that you are
committed to the area and the people with whom
you are dealing. As Sir Stephen said, it is true that
there has been an attempt to undo the damage
caused by closing a whole series of university
departments.
Unfortunately, there is a pattern. It comes partly
from our short-term funding approach. There is a
burst of enthusiasm and an establishment of
university departments not only in Japanese but in
Korean. The Government funding then falls away.
The universities are not committed for one reason or
another, such as a change of vice-chancellor,
diVerent priorities or the university senior
management not seeing the importance of East Asia
because it does not have anything to do with it. The
university then refuses to take on the funding, and
there is a crisis.
So what do we get? Another input of Government
money that funds things for ﬁve years or whatever.
That is ﬁne. Perhaps the universities keep it on for
another two or three years, but then the same thing
happens. That has happened over and over again. It
creates the opposite impression from the
commitment that Sir Stephen said was important in
business. It creates an impression of, “We don’t
really care, although if money is available, we will
take it.” That was particularly true of Korean
studies. When the Korean Government were
handing out money, the universities, including
Durham, were very keen to have it. When that
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stopped, they said, “Well, hard luck.” In the case of
Durham, they refused to give back money that they
had received, even though they were proposing to
stop the programmes that they had received it for.
That creates the wrong sort of impression.
I am notmuch of a linguist—I have always been very
conscious of that—but I think that while you can do
business in most of these countries without the
language, the language indicates a depth of
commitment and helps you to a depth of
understanding which is very important. Even if you
can manage in English, the fact is that you will then
often be dependent—in the case where English is not
in use—on the other side to interpret your position.
That is not necessarily a very strong position to be in.
These things all tie together, both our domestic
interest in East Asian studies—let us not pin it down
to one country or another—and the bigger
commitment globally.
Chairman: Thank you. We have just a few minutes
more and want to move on to some security
questions.
Q99 Mr. Illsley: I think that my question follows
on. I was going to ask in relation to our Foreign
OYce whether there is suYcient commitment to
Japan and the Korean peninsula by our
Government. Are we as involved as we should be in
that region? I was interested in what you were saying
about business—sometimes it does not show enough
commitment. Do our own Government show
enough commitment?
Dr. Hoare: You have here someone who indicates
the commitment. Stephen was a language student—
that is when I ﬁrst met him. That language student
qualiﬁed and then went back to Japan several times,
ending up as ambassador. I think that that has an
eVect on the Japanese. They see that as a
commitment. We have just had our ﬁrst ever
Korean-speaking ambassador, just retired—
Warwick Morris—and succeeded by another
Korean-speaking ambassador. That matters too.
Throughout East Asia we have a long-established
tradition of believing that the people on the ground
doing the job for Government did need to have the
local languages. There is a long-established school in
Kamakura that teaches people Japanese. We have
been less successful in having the same sort of
structure for Chinese and Korean, but we make an
eVort to train people in these languages. That is
important, and also a sign of the more general
Foreign OYce acceptance that, to understand these
places, you should have people who have lived there,
know the language and understand the people.
Sir Stephen Gomersall: That is absolutely right. I am
glad to say that the British embassy has the
reputation of being certainly the best in the EU, by
a long chalk, for that. The Chinese, Russians and
Koreans are also very strong in that area.
I think your question is a bit wider than language
skills. On the issue of whether British diplomacy is
giving enough weight to East Asia and Japan, I
would say that the FCO does a lot with the relatively
thin resources that it has in this area. The question is
broader than just the FCO. It is a question of how
much expertise there is in all the other Departments
that deal with Japan. On the whole, the number of
Japan experts within the British Government is
relatively limited, although departments like the
Bank of England and the Financial Services
Authority and so forth, for obvious reasons, have
quite a lot of skill in that area.
At the time that I was ambassador, certainly, the
preoccupation in the FCO was with, ﬁrst, the
transatlantic relationship, secondly the European
Union, and thirdly all the other big global security
issues. There was very little quality time for dealing
with East Asian issues. That was not entirely bad
news, because it meant that the front line, in a sense,
had the initiative. The embassy in Japan has two
particular strengths. One is that its staV includes a
lot of people on secondment from other
Government Departments. There are regularly
secondees from the Bank, from BERR, the OYce of
Science and Technology, the Treasury and so forth
in the mission, which means that it has direct access
to those Departments, and that can help, therefore,
to get decisions when they are needed. The second
strength is that there is a high percentage of staVwith
previous Japan experience, and therefore the
expertise is on the spot. So the absence of that in-
depth knowledge in the Foreign OYce or elsewhere
does notmatter toomuch. Butwe are skating on thin
ice when we consider that the trend in the global
economy and politics is that East Asia will have a
greater share ofwealth and inﬂuence than up to now,
and that there are important unresolved security
issues there. We have big investments in East Asia.
We need to be careful not to neglect that.
It is very diYcult to say toMinisters that they should
spend more time on Japan when there are not a lot
of major problems on the agenda, and business can
be done eVectively at oYcial level most of the time.
But the symbolism, the body language, matters a
great deal and—if it is not the wrong thing to say—
I think that Mr. Blair was superb in communicating
to his opposite numbers and to Japanese visitors
who came through No. 10 that Japan mattered to
the United Kingdom. Those little gestures, for
exampleMinisters getting on the phone from time to
time to their counterparts, even if just for 10
minutes, make a lot of diVerence when it comes to
following up on the substance of issues. I would
argue not for an excessive re-calibration, but
certainly for not forgetting the need to invest a bit
more in expertise in oYcial Government structures
in these regions.
Q100 Mr. Illsley: Would you agree that delegating
our inﬂuence in that part of the world through the
European Union would probably be a mistake?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: Absolutely. The European
Union is a very important player with Japan. It took
Japan probably 20 years to understand and come to
terms with the fact that the European Union—the
Commission—has competence in certain deﬁned
areas. In those areas and on some bigger global
issues that are not formally European competence
issues—Middle East policy, climate change and
things like that—the EU voice is very important, but
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in many cases the Japanese would not have moved
on trade issues if member states had not been there
as well, backing up the formal representations of the
EU. Of course, there are many instances where
member states—particularly the UK, France and
Germany—have interests in issues that are way
outside the formal EU agenda, and we need to be
there to represent our interests directly on those.
My view is very clear, and that is that there is a great
beneﬁcial complementarity between the EU and the
member states in Japan. The EUdelegation in Japan
has a fairly long experience there, and there are some
very good people, including the ambassador. The
relationship between the EU in Japan and the
member state delegations is extremely close, and
tactical and other information is shared pretty
closely.
Chairman: We have a couple more areas to address.
Sandra Osborne will speak and then John Stanley.
Q101 Sandra Osborne: In 2006, the Committee, in
its East Asia report, noted a lack of institutionalised
regional security architecture in East Asia. The
Government’s response was that they were
encouraging that through the EU and its
involvement in the ASEAN Regional Forum. What
is the state of play with regard to the development of
such arrangements, and does there remain a useful
role for the UK in encouraging that?
Dr. Hoare: I think that it would be fair to say that
the reality has not changed a great deal since 2006.
The one new development is the high-proﬁle and, to
a modest extent, successful Six-Party Talks on the
Korean nuclear issue, but even that is perhaps in
diYculties. There are a number of problems with
trying to impose a European or western-style
security apparatus on East Asia. There is the
diYculty that there are two leading East Asian
nations: China and Japan. There are diYculties
because of the historical legacy of the second world
war, which aVects attitudes towards Japan, and
because East and South-East Asia are not coherent
political and cultural region in the way that Europe
is. There are very great diVerences between China
and Malaysia, for example, or any combination of
countries that you care to take.
There is also the historical fact that until very
recently the major outside power interested in East
Asia—the United States—was not really very
interested in any sort of regional security system. It
preferred what was called the hub-and-spoke
system, whereby the United States was the hub and
had bilateral treaties with countries such as the
Philippines, Japan and South Korea. Therefore, one
of the problems is that you lack one of the basic
building blocks to create the sort of regional security
structure that we have in Europe.
There is an attempt to change that through the
various oV-spins from the Association of South East
Asian Nations: ASEAN!3, which includes China,
Japan and Korea at the meetings, and the ASEAN
Regional Forum,which ismuchwider.However, for
a number of reasons, which are partly cultural, these
are not very powerful or dynamic bodies. When I
worked in the Foreign OYce on the ASEAN
Regional Forum, a phrase that was used often was,
“ASEAN will not be comfortable with that,” but
ASEAN was not comfortable with a lot of things,
and anything that might provoke confrontation was
to be avoided. That said, the emergence of some
issues, particularly the North Korean nuclear issue
and how to cope with it, have made countries in the
region look much more at the idea of some form of
overarching security apparatus, but the problems
still remain and I do not see them being solved in the
short term.
Sir Stephen Gomersall: I think that Jim is basically
right. My personal belief is that Japan has slightly
missed out by not being more proactive in trying to
promote some structures based loosely on ideas of
free trade and respect for certain political norms in
the area, which would have put relationships among
Japan, China,Korea and the ASEANcountries on a
more stable and constructive kind of framework and
taken some volatility out of the situation. When I
was there, I made several public suggestions that
there might be things to be learned from EU
experience, and I certainly believe that that is the
case in areas of military transparency. For example,
people are really quite worried about Chinese
deployments and deployments in North and South
Korea. The Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe evolved lots of mechanisms in
the 1970s and 1980s that could be transported to that
part of theworld, but the bottom line is that there are
virtually no takers for those kinds of ideas in Japan.
Japan has pursued its own diplomacy through aid,
the negotiation of free trade arrangements with
individualASEANcountries and, as Jimmentioned,
through the ASEAN!3 format, which is new, but
not yet very operational. The stock answer to all
these ideas is that Asia and Europe are
fundamentally diVerent in geography, culture,
stages of development and relative wealth, and
therefore the European experience cannot be
transported there.
Q102 Sir John Stanley: As Sir Stephen and Dr.
Hoare know, this Committee is overwhelmingly and
primarily concerned with the scrutiny of British
foreign policy. I would like to ask you, Sir Stephen,
what you consider today should be the top British
foreign policy priorities towards and with Japan,
given our involvement with it as an associate
member of NATO, for example, in Iraq previously,
and continuing in Afghanistan.
Sir Stephen Gomersall: The two that stand out are
climate change, which is a security issue, and
international security, in the sense of Japan’s
growing involvement in, and support for,
international peacekeeping and peace support
eVorts. As you know, since the ﬁrst Gulf war, Japan
has gradually moved to become more involved, and
it has been so in peacekeeping and peace support
operations in the Gulf, Cambodia, East Timor and
places such as that.
The National Defence Guidelines that were
published at the end of 2007 state that international
peace and security support is now a primary mission
of the Self-Defence Forces. As you know, Japan
Processed: 20-11-2008 19:24:03 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 395647 Unit: PAG3
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 37
2 April 2008 Sir Stephen Gomersall KCMG and Dr Jim Hoare
deployed in the wake of 9/11 both to the Indian
ocean and to Iraq, with much support from the
British armed forces. It is tentative at this stage, but
mechanisms are being put in place within the Self-
Defence Forces to create a readiness brigade, for
example, which would be deployable more quickly
in the event of a big natural disaster or international
crisis, certainly in the East Asia area.
There is still a great allergy among the public to
involvement in anything that would require the Self-
Defence Forces to shoot in anger, and there is a
tendency to look for operations where Japan can
fulﬁl more of a support role than a front-line one. I
think that that will evolve with time, but UK
experience is highly regarded by Japan in that area.
We have given it a lot of advice on, for example,
forming joint operations and on the theory and
practice of peacekeeping. It is very useful for us to
keep alongside Japan, which does not like to be
dominated all the time by the United States in that
kind of area.
Q103 Sir John Stanley: Do you feel wholly
conﬁdent that Japan will remain a non-nuclear
power?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: I remain pretty conﬁdent,
yes.
Sir John Stanley: Only pretty?
Sir Stephen Gomersall: Very conﬁdent. It is
remarkable that 50 years after the end of the
American occupation, Japan is still ﬁrmly allied to
the United States. It is a very stable country.
Although is has big armed forces, it has a very
limited deployable oVensive force. There is still a
strong consensus around that position. It is
recognised that Japan, with its ambitions to be more
of a global player, including in the United Nations,
needs to be visible in international peacekeeping
operations. We have seen a lot of evidence of that.
Only in the event of a major cataclysm on the
Korean peninsula, or if the Americans were totally
unexpectedly to turn tail and withdraw from the
Paciﬁc, could there be a scenario in which Japan
would arm in the nuclear sense. That is my view, but
that does not mean that there is not more open talk
and discussion in the bars. You will ﬁnd Japanese
parliamentarians who say that Japan ought to
protect itself against North Korea by rearming.
However, although Japanmight have the capacity to
do that, I do not see any serious political movement
in that direction.
Q104 Sir John Stanley: Dr. Hoare, you were
charged with reopening our embassy in Pyongyang
and blazed a trail there. Can you tell us the answer
to the same question in relation to theDPRK?What
should the British Government’s top foreign policy
priorities be towards the DPRK?
Dr. Hoare: The problem is that we are not a leading
country onmatters relating to theKorean peninsula,
so our role will always be somewhat limited. Over
the years, we have tended to defer to the United
States on Korean issues, providing support to the
UnitedNations at themilitary armistice commission
when it used to meet—the British defence attache´
was a member of that. Indeed, we used to keep a
token number of British troops in South Korea until
the last 20 years or so.
In 2000, Ministers made a decision to establish
diplomatic relations with North Korea—that was
one of the clearest examples of aministerial initiative
rather than Ministers taking up something that
oYcials had proposed. Within the Foreign OYce, a
small number of people had been saying for years
that it was a sensible policy, but it had not been
accepted. In 2000, it was accepted.
We had very few illusions that the demilitarised zone
was going to disappear because Britain had
established diplomatic relations with North Korea.
According to our arguments at the time, we did it to
help the South Korean Government in their
relations with North Korea, and that has remained
part of our policy ever since. As it developed in
2002—something about which there is considerable
debate—the North Korean nuclear issue has
overshadowed that initial initiative, and that has led
us away from a position of developing our
engagement with North Korea.
The lady from Amnesty who spoke just before us
argued for continued British engagement with
North Korea as a means of dealing with human
rights issues. I would also argue for that. Even if
there is going to be a modiﬁcation in the South
Korean Government’s policy—again, it is a little
early to see exactly what the new President is going
to do: the rhetoric is strong, but the reality may be
diVerent—there is no signwhatsoever that the South
Korean Government want those countries that have
already engaged with North Korea to back away
from that engagement. Even when the US
Administration were at their most vociferous about
North Korea, there was no sign that they thought
that we should back away from the engagement
marked by diplomatic relations with North Korea.
Nobody opposes that policy.
By dealing directlywith theNorthKoreans, we learn
more than we would if we were not there. By
showing them, in however small a way, that the
outside world has lessons for them to learn, by
exposing their oYcials and students to that outside
world and by giving an alternative to the closed
society in which they live, we are helping to modify
NorthKorean behaviour and policies. It is not going
to be an easy or quick process, but it is underway.
The changes that have taken place in North Korea
have many causes, including the hunger of the 1990s
that forced it to seek international aid, and the
consequences of the South Korean engagement
policy, which has led it to be able to establish
relations with more countries. All those things are
modifying North Korea’s attitude to the outside
world and, to a certain extent, its behaviour. If we
stop, we will not improve the situation; if we
continue, we might.
There is one big area where we have no inﬂuence—
where nobody has much inﬂuence that I know of.
That is the North Korean military. When I was
there, we made some attempt to reach out to the
North Korean military, without much success. The
United States, believe it or not, did have some link
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into theNorthKoreanmilitary that was quite unlike
that of any other country that is known—the
American missing in action programme that ran in
North Korea for 10 years. It is a great pity that that
was stopped by the then Defence Secretary a couple
of years back. That was a small military conﬁdence-
building measure that I think was helping the
situation. However, we have nothing like that.
We should, I think, continue to engage with North
Korea. We should encourage other countries to do
so as well. We may not make great advances, but we
will certainly not help if we back away.
Q105 Sir John Stanley: You spent many years of
service in the Republic of Korea embassy. You
know it extraordinary well. What would you say, in
the totally diVerent situation in respect of South
Korea, should be the British Government’s top
foreign policy priorities for the Republic of Korea?
Dr. Hoare: We have a lot of interests with South
Korea. We have trade interests, and cultural and
educational interests, some of which are growing.
We can play a positive role. South Korea may have
an idealised picture ofwhatwe are like, but it regards
Britain with a certain degree of respect because of
our historical role in East Asia, as well as with a
certain amount of gratitude because we were one of
those countries that came to its aid during the
Koreanwar. It also regards us as a leading European
power that is worth cultivating.
The new President is something of an unknown
quantity to all of us. He was a very good mayor of
Seoul—it used to be said of Neville Chamberlain
that he was a very good mayor of Birmingham in a
quiet year—but Mr. Lee has not played on the
international stage before, so we have to take
account of that. We have to learn his methods and
his approach.
We have formed a good basis over the years for
continuing engagement with South Korea—for
encouraging it to be more open—but we have to be
realistic. We are not going to break its long-standing
links with the United States, but in the past 10 years,
we have proved helpful in South Korea’s main
security consideration—relations with the North.
Even if the President changes the policy, we will still
gain credit for having played that role.
I think that we should continue to act very much as
we have done over the past 20 years, by providing an
alternative voice to the United States on certain
issues and providing an extra entre´e into Europe.
Like many Japanese, many South Koreans have
English as their ﬁrst language and, instinctively, if
they are thinking of coming to Europe, they think of
coming to Britain rather than other parts of Europe.
Economic considerations may push them towards
Poland or Romania these days, but the place where
they want to live and to educate their children is
probably London.
Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much for
your time and for staying longer than we originally
said—unfortunately, we had the two votes. We have
covered a lot of territory and we are very grateful to
you. If either of you has any thoughts that you wish
to convey to us, we should be happy to receive them
in writing.
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Q106 Chairman: Minister, thank you for coming.
We are pleased to see you again. It was only a few
weeks ago that you were talking about human
rights; now we are dealing with a regional issue. We
also welcome Mr Lillie—I do not think that you
have previously been before the Committee. May I
begin by asking a brief question about UK relations
with South Korea? How would you assess them at
the moment?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Very good. You have chosen
a diYcult area, because in the case of both South
Korea and Japan, my brieﬁngs are always loaded
with terms like “never been better”, and I think that
that makes it hard for you to ﬁnd issues.
Chairman: We shall try.
Lord Malloch-Brown: Obviously, the one thing that
I would say about South Korea at the moment is
that we are following the current political crisis with
close interest. As I am sure that you are all aware, the
row that has ﬂared up over the resumption of US
beef imports is having an astonishing eVect on the
new President’s popularity. It is one of those
honeymoons that has ended very abruptly—
something that we know nothing about, of course—
and the row has driven his approval ratings below
20%, leaving perhaps the prospect of a Cabinet
reshuZe when the Assembly resumes in September.
With the one caveat that we are not quite sure how
dynamic foreign policy can be in the comingmonths,
I think that things are very good.
Chairman: We shall come on to some South Korea-
related questions later on, but we are going to begin
with a focus on North Korea.
Q107 Sir John Stanley: Minister, when we were in
Seoul inMay, we picked up a degree of anxiety that,
with the Bush Administration coming to its end, the
American President might be looking around to
achieve a foreign policy “success”—in inverted
commas. Since then, the Bush Administration have
announced that they are planning, possibly within
45 days, to remove the status of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea as a state sponsor of
terrorism and to begin the process of lifting
sanctions. Do the British Government believe that
that is a timely move by the American Government,
or do you think that it is premature?
Lord Malloch-Brown: However much President
Bush wants a success—I am sure that he does—I
think that the Six-Party Talks process has been very
well grounded. None of the steps that are being
taken avoid the necessary time for veriﬁcation. For
example, the core issue at the moment is the
disablement of the reactor at Yongbyon, which is
going slower than had been hoped. That is partly
due to deliberate stalling by theDPRK, but there are
also some health and safety issues. The next stage is
for Pyongyang to agree to actual dismantlement.We
saw rather dramatic photographs and TV coverage
of the cooling tower coming down in front of the
international press. That was the ﬁrst step, but it is
not the whole thing. While it is right that last week
the US took steps to remove the DPRK from both
the Trading with the Enemy Act and the list of state
sponsors of terrorism, the latter will take some 45
days, which allows time for the declaration that
Pyongyang has made to be veriﬁed. The US is
proceeding, but it has a very hawkish lobby
domestically that is cautious about any kind of
diplomatic agreement with the DPRK because of
doubts about the honesty of its declarations.
Combined with that is the Bush Administration’s
own history. Initially, they were against this kind of
approach and they have come round to it somewhat
reluctantly. All that means that President Bush will
not do anything imprudent. He will move cautiously
on this matter right until the end.
Q108 Sir John Stanley: When we were in Japan and
Seoul, we were told that only a few days previously
the Americans had sent a lorry through the 38th
parallel to Pyongyang to collect the DPRK’s
evidence of veriﬁcation. The lorryload of boxes was
then brought back to South Korea and they have no
doubt been shared among the members of the Six-
Party Talks. I appreciate that the British
Government are not a member of the Six-Party
Talks, but can you tell us whether they have had
access to the veriﬁcation material supplied by the
DPRK? Are the Government satisﬁed that the
DPRKhas complied with its veriﬁcation obligations
under the agreement of October last year?
Lord Malloch-Brown: We do not have access to that
material and we would not seek it. We do not see
ourselves as a front-line player in this matter.
Neither we nor the EU are members of the Six-Party
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Talks. There are countries with an extreme
interest—greater even than that of the US—in
ensuring that what is in those boxes stacks up.
Obviously, South Korea has a particular interest, as
does Japan. Those documents will be examined by
people with a deep inherent scepticism. As I said, the
US has given itself 45 days for the initial veriﬁcation
period. The documents will have to pass the truth
test with a lot of very cautious people. While we are
not part of that process, we are conﬁdent that it will
be rigorous.
Q109 Sir John Stanley: It has been reported that the
Bush Administration are still to be satisﬁed on
whether the veriﬁcation obligations have been
complied with in relation to the documentation
supplied so far. If that is the case, are the British
Government satisﬁed that the US Administration
will not lift sanctions or end the designation of the
DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism until they are
absolutely satisﬁed on the veriﬁcation point?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Yes, we are satisﬁed that the
US will be very cautious about this matter. It
deliberately made the declaration last week while
giving itself time to be satisﬁed. As far as I know, you
are correct that it is not yet satisﬁed.
Q110Chairman:Thank you verymuch.Will you say
a little more about the inﬂuence and the pressure
that the international community apart from the US
might have?
Lord Malloch-Brown: On?
Chairman: On North Korea.
Lord Malloch-Brown: First, one has to say that the
members of the Six-Party Talks include the circle of
countries with the most direct and important
inﬂuence. The rest of us are in the second row of this.
For a long while, the EU has tried to play a
constructive role—we have been generous providers
of food aid, but we have also sought in our
diplomacy to be something of a bridge between the
DPRK and the outside world. Often that has been
limited to small cultural and other programmes to
try and open the eyes of that very closed regime to
the outside world. However, I do not think that we
should overestimate our own direct inﬂuence.
Supporting the Six-Party Talks is the most
important thing that we can do.
Q111 Mr Purchase: The axis of evil idea caught the
imagination for a time. I am pleased to hear you say
that Britain does not feel that it has a front-line role
in that. Fromwhat I could understand and gather on
the trip that we made, it seems that the North
Korean regime is in deep decay—it is literally
unsustainable for very much longer in its present
form. Does the Foreign OYce have a view about
whether the North Koreans would have any
capability worth talking about of doing anything at
all with their nuclear technology—in terms of being
aggressive?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Certainly, the tests have
shown so far that what weapons the DPRK has—its
rockets—are not particularly accurate, and certainly
do not have much of a range. I do not think that
Europe, for example, is at any risk at this stage from
the DPRK. However, that little part of East Asia is
a pretty tight neighbourhood, and you can hit Japan
or South Korea with a quite primitive weapon,
because they are close.
Q112 Mr Purchase: But that is not really what I am
asking you—I understand that. Do you believe—or
does anyone outside certain propagandists—that
North Korea, even if it had the intention, has any
serious capability to launch even to Japan?
Lord Malloch-Brown: It could not sustain any kind
of nuclear military eVort against Japan beyond a
ﬁrst strike, but we have to remain wary of, or alert
to, the possibility of a once-oV nuclear weapon or
ﬂight of nuclear weapons—or the launch of a very
small number with the character of a dirty bomb—
that could nevertheless do signiﬁcant civilian harm.
The DPRKwould have no follow-up capability, but
it has and still retains a very large land army, which
continues to pose a threat to South Korea. The fact
is that any rational calculus of military options by a
regime engaged with the world and weighing their
options sensibly would lead it to conclude that, in
any major confrontation with the region, it would
come out the worst very quickly. I completely accept
that point. The issue is the irrationality of the
leadership that is equipped with such damaging if
not accurate weapons, and feeling that it is forced
into a corner, where it takes some kind of last-stand
political-military strategy.
Q113 Mr Hamilton: Minister, it is almost exactly 10
years since the missile test of the Taepodong 2 on 4
July 1998, which alerted the world to what North
Korea was trying to do with its missile arsenal and
to its proliferation of missiles.My question concerns
how the international community has tried to stop
that proliferation, althoughwe know that the regime
has deliberately been selling thosemissiles to all sorts
of undesirable countries throughout the world to
gain foreign exchange. How eVective has the
international community been in trying to stop that
proliferation?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I might well ask Stephen to
come in and supplement this. As always with such
things, the ﬁrst thing is the issue of good intelligence:
really knowing exactly what has happened.
Secondly—it is one of the secondary drivers for the
whole Six-Party agreement—is the idea that one
does not want to leave a rogue regime like that
outside the framework of international agreements
where it can export such technology. We have all
seen the photos of the Syrian site and its alleged
similarity to sites in North Korea. Perhaps I should
know better. Stephen, perhaps you could say what
we know, veriﬁably, of DPRK exports of those
technologies.
Stephen Lillie: I think that North Korea’s
proliferation activities are one of the key concerns in
terms of UK policy towards North Korea—it is not
just its indigenous programme, but its proliferation
and, of course, its human rights record. Much of the
UK’s counter-proliferation activity has been
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directed against North Korea, but the very fact that
it appears to have provided technology to Syria is in
itself an indication of the continuing threat that it
poses. That is why, in seeking a declaration from
NorthKorea in the Six-Party Talks, theUS has been
anxious to obtain some kind of accounting byNorth
Korea of its proliferation activities. Our
understanding is that the declaration itself probably
does not include that commitment, but there have
been other discussions with the US to address it. I
would also say that the two Security Council
resolutions from 2006, following the missile test and
the nuclear test, are very much directed at the
proliferation threat. It is important to keep in mind
that whatever is happening in the Six-Party Talks
and between the US and North Korea bilaterally,
those two Security Council resolutions remain in
force.
Q114 Mr Hamilton: Minister, you and Mr Lillie
referred to the human rights record. While we were
in Korea, we had the privilege of meeting Mr Kang,
the author of the book “The Aquariums of
Pyongyang”, which is recommended reading as an
account of human rights violations. Is there any
evidence that the UK and the international
community are having any eVect on such dreadful
violations? We heard, for example, that it was a
criminal oVence to open the back of a radio set and
de-tune it from the Government channel. Being
discovered to have broken the rules has the most
appalling consequences. What eVect are we having?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I think limited. With our EU
partners and Japan, we sponsored a resolution at the
March session of the Human Rights Council
extending the special rapporteur’s mandate, but, as
I understand it, he cannot get into the country.
Although we are pressing Pyongyang through our
embassy there for access, the fact is that it is a
country that continues to abuse human rights on a
massive, systematic scale. We use every opportunity
that we can to raise the issue bilaterally, as well as
pressing for aUNpresence. Again, that is the cost of
a country that has essentially opted out of the
international system. Our ability to inﬂuence things
there is very limited.
Q115 Mr Pope: On human rights, there is the issue
of the Japanese abductees. When we were in Japan,
Mr Illsley and I met with the families of Japanese
citizens who have been abducted. That was
obviously a distressing meeting. It is a big issue in
Japan. Is it an issue that the BritishGovernment will
raise bilaterally with DPRK?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Yes. We have been trying to
support the Japanese eVorts on this in everyway that
we can. There have been some quite positive
bilateral talks—hosted by the Chinese, but between
Japan and DPRK—in which the DPRK authorities
agreed to reopen the investigations. As you will have
gathered from your brieﬁng in Tokyo, the numbers
are quite small. There are only 19 oYcially
recognised abductees. However, you will also know
from your visit to Tokyo that it is a dramatic issue in
Japan, over which Governments fall and Prime
Ministers get chosen. It has a huge emotional
attachment. So, yes, we do support the Japanese.
The good news is that, because it is such a priority
for the Japanese, theDPRK understands and within
the general coat tails of the Six-Party Talks’
progress, the Japanese are getting some traction on
this now.
MrPope:That is welcome. It is easy to lose this issue
in the bigger picture of nuclear weapons and so on.
I am very reassured that the BritishGovernment will
raise it.
Q116 Mr Moss: Do the Government hold out any
hope that under the current regime there is any
prospect of economic reform or any improvements
in human rights in the country?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Yes, in that obviously the
fundamental purpose of the Six-Party Talks is to
secure an end to the nuclear programme. Its broader
purpose is to normalise relations and to begin to
open up the country to both the ﬂow of ideas and
people, and to get them a bit more engaged in the
international community. Through the bilateral
eVorts of the EUand countries such as ourselves, but
also through international organisations, there is an
eVort to get a few more North Koreans engaged in
economic training. That is sometimes only in China,
but that is now not a bad place to learn aboutmarket
capitalism. At the margins there are educational
initiatives, technical assistance and even work that
the British Council is doing to get people a bit more
engaged. The hope is that the Government
themselves might become slightly more reformist. If
you were to stage it, it demonstrates some of the
communist reform initiatives of Castro at a certain
point, allowing a small enclave for overseas
industrial investment and a little bit of liberalisation
of prices in some areas. However, the fundamental
state system is still in place. One has to assume that
before there is the necessary root and branch reform,
it is likely that there would be a change of
Government. Stephen, do you want to add to that?
Stephen Lillie:What theNorthKoreans have clearly
not done is made the Chinese calculation that
embracing economic reform will ensure the
sustainability of their own system. They have taken
rather the opposite view and fear very much that
moving down a real process of economic reform
would be the beginning of the end and, similarly,
with any kind of relaxation on human rights. There
are a number of things that happen around the
edges. They are willing to look at very limited areas
that would open themselves up to trade, for
example. Even on human rights, we have seen some
reports from non-governmental organisations
suggesting that when there is international pressure
and international attention, there are limited
changes. For example, there are reports that suggest
that the North Koreans have stopped the practice of
forced abortions on returnees from China, but the
big picture—the overall trend—is still rather
pessimistic.
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Chairman: I apologise for the break. If there is more
than one vote we may have a problem. Assuming
that there is only one vote, we will be back in 15
minutes. If there are more votes it will be 30minutes,
but hopefully there will be only one.
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
On resuming—
Chairman: The meeting now has a quorum and shall
begin. I do not know when the next vote is, but it is
not immediately, so we will do as much as possible
before the next disruption to our proceedings.
Q117 Mr Moss: Since the election of the current
President, there has been a move away from the
sunshine policy of his predecessors to such an extent
that we have been told of a signiﬁcant deterioration
in North-South relations. Are the Government
concerned about that and about the implication of
any lasting breakdown inNorth-SouthGovernment
relations?
Lord Malloch-Brown: No. In a sense, it increases the
need to hold theNorth to an even higher standard of
veriﬁcation of its actions. Some held the view that
the last President had perhaps become too much of
a hostage to getting progress under the sunshine
policy. We view the basic policy as remaining
unchanged, but with a good dose of scepticism
added. I do not think that people in South Korea
want their Government to close down progress with
North Korea, but it must meet an even higher
standard of veracity. For now, basic policy is intact
and the impact of the new President, if anything, will
be to make things move more slowly and cautiously.
Q118 Ms Stuart: Minister, I want to probe a little
further about Britain’s approach. We say that the
UK has a policy of carefully targeted engagement
with the North Koreans. One the suggestions for
what we could do to inﬂuence that was to have more
student exchanges. Can you tell us what your
priorities are in that respect and where you think
that we are going?
Lord Malloch-Brown: At the moment, in that area,
we are limited to three British Council English
teachers. They are not teaching English directly to
students, but they are teachers of teachers. There is
the prospect of a fourth one, I think.
Stephen Lillie: There are two there at the moment.
Lord Malloch-Brown: There are two teachers there
and a third is going. I am not sure what the situation
is regarding scholarships.
Stephen Lillie: We are trying to get the North
Koreans to identify two candidates for a Chevening
scholarship as part of our ﬂagship programme. The
diYculty so far has been for the North Korean side
to identify the right sort of personwith the right level
of English. We have indicated that we would show
some ﬂexibility on the English language requirement
if they could come up with somebody suitable.
Q119 Ms Stuart: And how would you deﬁne
suitability? We met some young North Koreans
whose English was absolutely excellent, but we were
told that North Korea should be looked at as four
diVerent economies and four diVerent circles of
society. Will you look at whether such people come
from only the political elite? How will you decide
whether they are suitable, other than just by the
English? Is that the only criterion?
Stephen Lillie: It is very diYcult to decide because,
clearly, whoever they put forward will have come
through some kind of pre-selection process and
therefore might not be the person who would come
through an open procedure that we would conduct.
Having said that, we nevertheless see value in people
coming here and being exposed to the way in which
we do business and howwe organise ourselves in this
country. There would have to be some compromise.
Q120Ms Stuart:But there are no attempts to link up
universities to have students coming over. You are
just talking about two Chevening scholars?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I do not think that there is the
political will on their side for that kind of opening
up.
Stephen Lillie: The focus so far has been on the
English language programmes. Two teachers were
there to teach the Koreans to teach English.
Q121 Mr Purchase: May I ask you about our
priorities with regard to North Korea? When
replying, will you refer to its labour relations and
workers’ rights? We visited the Kaesong industrial
complex and I was appalled—as I think were my
colleagues—to learn that wages were not paid to the
workers. They were given to the Government and
they sliced them oV, for their purposes or the
purposes of their family, before giving anything to
the workers. That seemed to be against everything
that we know about in International Labour
Organisation work. Such practice was outlawed in
most advanced capitalist western countries in the
early part of the last century. Given our adherence to
ILO organisations, what are Britain’s top priorities?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I shall respond ﬁrst to that
point. The DPRK is not a member of the ILO, so
while the working conditions for North Korean
workers, as you will have seen at Kaesong, are better
than those for workers in the rest of the country, it
is a bit of a Faustian pact. Theywork there under the
conditions that you describe. They are not really
getting the full amount of their already rather
modest wage. The hope was that it would start
opening things up. Therewill be issues. For example,
South Korea is pushing for goods that are produced
at Kaesong to be covered by the EU-Korea free
trade agreement, which is currently under
negotiation. Well, if that were to happen, I imagine
that we would want human rights issues to be
incorporated into the agreement. More broadly, the
absence of workers’ rights is part of our whole eVort
to advance the broader human rights agenda—
again, getting the UN special rapporteur involved
and pressing on our ownbilateral contacts to expand
rights. That is the key. Kaesong is what it is. It is
better than the averageƒ1 a month that workers get
elsewhere, but it is a classic situation of people
Processed: 20-11-2008 19:25:29 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 395647 Unit: PAG4
Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 43
2 July 2008 Rt hon. Lord Malloch-Brown KCMG and Stephen Lillie
operating in conditions where they have no rights
and are not getting their full salary. It is
unacceptable, even if a little better than the rest.
Q122 Mr Purchase: So what can we do? Are there
opportunities to get more younger Koreans here to
study and to start to understand diVerent ways? The
absence of a free trade union in any country is one
to be deplored, especially in circumstances such as
those in North Korea. You are right. The
technology is that of the 1950s. It is pretty well
behind the times. The use of cheap labour—not
quite slave, but very cheap—to make the thing go is
an absolute aVront to any decent human being. Can
we do something? Is there scope for North Koreans
to study in the UK? Are any systems or schemes
set up?
Lord Malloch-Brown: No. As we said earlier, before
you came back, not really. That is not through a lack
of willingness on our part, but because of a paranoid
regime that really does not want people to go
abroad. We are trying to identify two Chevening
scholars to come here from North Korea, but that is
the tiniest of toes in the door. I know from when I
was head of the United Nations Development
Programme, and we had a much larger programme
whereby we were trying to bring people out to train
them in economic planning, that ultimately the only
country the regime would let us take them to was
China. It would not let us bring anybody to theWest
for fear that in addition to getting economic
training, some political free thinking would rub oV
on them, too. We are in the situation of demandeur.
We have very little direct inﬂuence. It is a closed
regime, which does not thank us for the generous
food aid we provide and does not allow us to use it
as a lever because of its lack of humanity towards its
own people.
Q123MrPurchase: Sowhat would be the British top
priority for North Korea?
Lord Malloch-Brown: It is to bring North Korea
more fully into the global community through things
such as the Six-Party Talks so that the range of more
normal pressures starts to have eVect and the regime
engages, gets a little richer, gets a glimpse of a better
future for itself and its people in the world, and
becomes amenable to pressure and dialogue as it
engages.
Q124 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: When we were in
Korea, we were told that manyNorthKoreans cross
into China and that several hundred a week are
forcibly sent back to North Korea, where they have
committed a criminal oVence in trying to leave. They
are then punished, or worse. China is a signatory to
the UN refugee convention and its 1967 protocol,
which requires it to look into the refugee status of
each of those escapees, instead of which it treats
them all as a group, as illegal immigrants or
economic migrants. Do you believe that China is in
breach of its international human rights obligations?
Lord Malloch-Brown: You are right: China is a
signatory to the UN refugee conventions. It insists,
however, that those defectors are economicmigrants
and, as you say, on those grounds returns them to
the DPRK. We have raised that both in the most
recent UK-China human rights dialogue and as part
of the EU-China human rights dialogue, and the
Foreign Secretary covered that point in a letter to
your Committee following his appearance here. We
have sought to raise the issue in every way we can.
Whether China is in breach or not is something for
the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees to have a view on, rather than us, and I am
not sure that it does, does it?
Stephen Lillie: I am not aware that it has expressed
that view, but it has expressed concerns about how
it works with the Chinese.
Q125 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I do not think that is
good enough. North Korea may be a slave state that
has opted out of the world system, but China is a
member of the Security Council. It is therefore part
of that international network of obligations and law.
It is hosting the Olympics. I know the issue has been
raised with China, but why do we not get the United
Nations Human Rights Council to investigate? This
is not a handful of abductees we are talking about; it
is hundreds of people every week, on a routine and
continuing basis, trying to leave one country and go
to another. They are leaving a country where they
are persecuted and if they get sent back, they are
punished. It is no good raising the issue with China;
we want a row with China. This is a request fromme
and, I hope, this Committee: can you formally raise
it with the United Nations so that it starts to do
something about a convention that China has
voluntarily signed up to and which it pretends to
abide by?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I am happy to go back and
look at this again. I would just say that in every
country, including this one, clear diVerences are
made between economic migrants and refugees, and
we get criticised, too, for whom we put in the
economic migrant category. Just the fact that you
are punished for illegally leaving your own country
is not in itself grounds for being able to claim refugee
status. In other words, when we return economic
migrants to countries, they may well be subject to
legal procedures, so it really is a matter for the
United NationsHigh Commissioner for Refugees to
determine whether this case load can lay suYcient
claim to refugee status to enable it to try to persuade
and force China, through its obligations to the
convention, to put in place procedures to test the
claims of individuals. We will take a look at it, but I
do not think it is quite as straightforward as it seems.
As I say, we do raise it. We have been very clear in
two diVerent sessions with the Chinese this year that
we do not accept their position that all the people
concerned are economic migrants.
Q126Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I know these things are
never completely straightforward, but the evidence
we have is that there is a breach of the convention
going on here, on a systematic basis, and people who
are sent back are not just punished, they sometimes
face torture. I do not know whether that is true, but
I think someone ought to ﬁnd out. If that is not a
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breach I do not knowwhat is. Would you undertake
to look into this again and engage with the United
Nations about this—about its own convention?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I certainly undertake to look
into it, and we will ﬁnd out where the UNHCR is on
this—yes.
Chairman: Perhaps we can have a note.1 Minister, as
you are aware, the Korean war never ended. There
is an armistice, but not an end to the war, and there
is still a United Nations command.We would like to
ask some questions about that.
Q127 Ms Stuart: The two areas on which I want to
probe a little further are what the UK security
commitment is and how we see the situation post-
2012. Let me begin by asking howwe see the security
commitment and, more importantly, raising the
question of the Military Armistice Commission and
Britain’s current role in it, and how we see the future
of Britain’s participation in that.
Lord Malloch-Brown: On the latter point, our
participation in the Armistice Commission has
evolved a little recently: we have involved military
staV—the defence attache´, who is the senior
Commonwealth member of the United Nations
Command Military Armistice Commission and a
brigadier in Seoul—and a liaison oYcer, who is an
oYcial and our political counsellor, so that we have
both military and political representation, if you
like, on UNCMAC and its issues. As to the issue
going forward, we obviously, through the military
committee, have participated in this at the staV
oYcer level since the war. There is the prospect now,
in 2012, of the transfer of the wartime command
from the US to the Republic of Korea, but that
function does not get in the way of the UNC, as it is
called, which will retain responsibility for
maintaining the armistice. That will remain under
US control. We think that that is vital because it
allows the transit of reinforcements and equipment
through Japan if they are needed. There is a question
going forward—if a peace agreement replaces the
armistice—of whether there would be a UK role in
that. Again, primary responsibility devolves on to
the membership of the Six-Party Talks—the DPRK
itself, the Republic of Korea, the USA, China and
obviously Japan. Whether we become formally
involved or not, we will continue to take a close
interest because, obviously, the economic and
political stability of north-east Asia remains crucial
to us.
Q128 Ms Stuart: May I probe you a little further on
the UK’s representation? The naval attache´ was
withdrawn, and we have some rather short-term
postings of junior oYcers in Tokyo. There is a hint
that the UK is even considering withdrawing its
rather minimal commitment. Can we have an
assurance that we will not give up our seat at the
table, however minimal that seat may be?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I will leave the assurance to
Mr Lillie—oYcials are around a lot longer than
Ministers, so it is worth more. As I understand it,
1 Ev 106, Ev 108
however, we do not accept the proposition that it is
a downgrading. The naval attache´ has been replaced
by the political counsellor, and by having both the
defence attache´ and the political counsellor, we have
a broader array of talents on the committee, because
we have both the military and the political foreign
policy side. We remain committed, but I am not
quite sure what longer-term plans there are.
Stephen Lillie: I do not feel empowered to give a
long-term commitment.
Lord Malloch-Brown: I am not asking you to give a
commitment. I am thinking in terms of our
planning.
Stephen Lillie: There are no papers being prepared
for the Minister at the moment to suggest that we
should in any way change our representation. The
switch from the naval attache´ to the political
counsellor reﬂected changes to the whole defence
attache´ network worldwide. The provision of junior
oYcers has happened before, but that is very much
an additional supporting role to help the Japanese
self-defence forces in the rear command and the
South Korean forces in South Korea. But no
consideration is being given—in the Foreign OYce
at least—to changing that basic headline
representation by the defence attache´ and the
political counsellor.
Q129 Ms Stuart: We may return to that subject in
the recommendations in our report. May I now take
you to 2012, when we will essentially see the
withdrawal of the US, and things will be completely
under South Korean control? There is a clear
mismatch in terms of who will have responsibility
and who will have control. Are the Government
satisﬁed that the arrangements are working?
Stephen Lillie: On the handing-over of wartime
command in 2012, we need to keep it inmind that the
basis for the security of South Korea is not the UN
command, but the US-ROK mutual defence treaty.
It has always been our assumption and
understanding that in the case of a war, it would be
the US and ROK combined forces that would be
activated, at least in the ﬁrst instance. Although
command will be handed over to the ROK in 2012,
the US is still part of the combined forces there, and
we would accept the judgment of the United States
forces that that is an acceptable arrangement, which
fully meets their security requirements.
Q130 Ms Stuart: In 2007, General Bell said that this
would create a “military authority-to-responsibility
mismatch for the United Nations Command”, so I
am not even sure whether the Americans are terribly
satisﬁed that this works, but you may want to write
to us. In that context—this is a speciﬁc question of
UN command—do you think that they will be able
to provide an international oYcer back in the
headquarters in Japan by the end of the year? Again,
we got the impression that that was rather
important, but I accept that these are rather speciﬁc
and detailed questions, so I am happy for you to
write to us.2
2 Ev 106
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Chairman: Thank you. May we move on to
questions about Japan?
Q131 Mr Illsley: First, may I go back to my
colleague’s comment regarding the handful of
abductees? It is worth stressing again that that is a
really important issue in Japan; indeed, I was
surprised just how important it was, until I met the
families. However, my question to you, Lord
Malloch-Brown, relates to Japan’s chairmanship of
the G8.What is our assessment of how eVective that
chairmanship has been? Have any issues been
identiﬁed or highlighted on which we and the
Japanese do not see eye to eye? My impression from
our visit was that there are few, if any, issues on
which we have a problem in our relationships with
the Japanese.
Lord Malloch-Brown: Again, as I said about South
Korea, although it is even truer of Japan, our
relationship is so good that I sometimes detect
frustration among diplomats on both sides that
there is not enough to work on, because we agree on
things. They were therefore quite pleased to have a
summit. To be honest, there was some despair on
our side earlier in the year because Japan has deep
domestic diYculties and a Prime Minister who has
faced a lot of problems. There was a worry in terms
of the Japanese leadership of the G8 that the
ambitions would fall short because people were
distracted. In fact, as we get close to the G8, the
agenda has shaped up as pretty good. The Japanese
have surprised people by their leadership on climate
change. They were in the slow lane on climate
change for a long time, but under Prime Minister
Fukuda, they have really stepped up andmade some
pretty bold initiatives in terms of their own domestic
target of a 60 to 80% cut by 2050 and their
commitment to funding a low-carbon revolution.
They have also become partners with us in
contributing to the new World Bank climate
investment funds. So, on that issue, we have seen
signiﬁcant progress. The Japanese have also done
pretty well on development. They had the Tokyo
international conference on African aid, which
discussed Japan-Africa development. It was quite a
success, and that has given new momentum to
development issues as we come into the G8 meeting.
They have also been quite receptive to incorporating
food and oil into the conference at a very late stage.
We just had the G8 Foreign Ministers meeting last
week, and we were pretty pleased because there were
statements on issues such as Zimbabwe and Burma.
You can never take it for granted that such things
will be in a Japanese-hosted meeting, because of
Japan’s general reticence about taking politically
provocative positions. They will also have an Africa
session and a major non-G8 powers session at the
G8 next week, and they will bring in some of the
major Asian regionals at one point. So it will be a
fairly imaginativeG8 session, andwe can all feel that
it looks promising.
Q132MrHeathcoat-Amory:Youmentioned climate
change, and the Japanese have moved on that, but
we detected a reluctance to go for a binding national
emissions reduction target. They are keen on
research and technology transfer, which you
mentioned, but do you think that Japan will bind its
future industrial capacity in the way that a binding
target implies?
Lord Malloch-Brown:Fukuda gave a very important
speech on 9 June. You were there earlier, right? In
that speech, he set the domestic long-term target of
a 60 to 80% reduction in emissions by 2050 and,
critically, said that a trial emissions trading scheme
would be initiated later this year. All the signals are
that the Japanese are preparing to enter into an
international scheme. It is right that there is some
continuing reticence. I suspect that they are
probably under quite a lot of pressure from the Bush
Administration not to commit to an international
scheme yet, but I would expect, with the change in
the US Administration and both candidates
committed to a global emissions system, that Japan
will not hold out against it.
Q133 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Are the British
Government alert to the danger of the world
dividing into developed countries with targets that
may be diYcult to meet—that is certainly what is
happening here with the Climate Change Bill—and
other industrial countries, which may beneﬁt if
businesses shift to them to avoid the targets?
Although I am sure that Japan will do a lot to
develop technology to counter climate change, do
you think that it will ﬁnally wriggle out of the sort
of target that we will be obliged to pursue? It is not
impressed by whatever leadership or pioneer role we
are taking. The moral lead does not impress the far
east terribly, in my experience. How concerned are
the British Government about that?
Lord Malloch-Brown:Wehave got tomake sure that
the process that began in Bali and will conclude in
Copenhagen is a global one. There are all sorts of
groups of countries that could be free riders:
industrialised countries that do not buy into the
scheme or large developing countries that declare
that they do not want to join the scheme until they
have climbed the industrialisation ladder as well.
There are all sorts of anomalies. We have stopped
talking at this point about South Korea, but it has
one of the bigger emissions footprints around, yet it
counts as a developing country, so it fell outside
Kyoto. We have got to solve the free-rider problem
and create a global scheme that is seen as fair in how
responsibilities are diVerentiated, to use the word of
the negotiators, and that everybody is in.
Q134 Mr Illsley: Just to follow on from what David
said, in one of our meetings—I think that it was with
Mr Tsuruoka—he said that Japan had led on the
issue of climate change. He made an interesting
comment. He said, “I don’t think we’ve achieved
very much by taking that leadership role. It hasn’t
brought the developing countries into taking the
action that we want.” Is there any sign that Japan
may be moving away from a leadership role on
climate change?
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Lord Malloch-Brown:Theymay think that theywere
leaders, but for a long time they were not. For a long
time, they said the right things but were real back
markers, along with the US. It is really only since
Prime Minister Fukuda took oYce a year ago that
we have seen it. The prospect of chairing the G8
came together with that to move Japan very
dramatically on that. I actually think that it is a huge
commercial opportunity for the Japanese, because
Japan is exactly the kind of country likely to beneﬁt
from opening up a technological lead in terms of
low-carbon energy technologies. If the whole world
chooses to retool itself with low-carbon energy, I bet
that a lot of the technology that we use will have a
“Made in Japan” label. I think that they have great
opportunities.
Q135 Ms Stuart: Japan seems to have discovered
Africa as well, not just climate change. It seems
incredibly proud of its international development
commitment. What is your assessment of that? Is it
something that could, in the long term, create a new
dynamic as to who the donors are for somewhere
such as Africa, or is it just part of a kind of
awakening on Japan’s side to the fact that if it wants
UN reform, space at the top table and to be an
international player, with that comes certain
obligations, and giving aid to Africa is just one of
them?
Lord Malloch-Brown: In fairness to the Japanese,
they have not just discovered Africa. The TICAD IV
conference—Tokyo international conference on
African Development—at the end ofMay was, as its
name implies, the fourth, and they take place at three
or four-year intervals, so the Japanese have been
pushing the issue for a dozen years or so. I was the
co-chair of TICAD III with the Japanese and they
have done a lot. I think they are, to be honest, quite
aggravated. I would apply the last question to this
issue. This is somewhere where they feel they have
done a lot and it has not been recognised. There are
some competitive juices ﬂowing now at the way
China has swooped in and very quickly created,
frankly, a larger programme and a lot more African
buzz and attention around it. What the Japanese
have promised to do now is double their oYcial
development assistance to Africa, excluding debt
relief, by 2012. That means they will have a target of
$1.4 billion by 2012, but one should observe that,
important and generous though that is, it will be less
than the UK is giving to Africa at that time, despite
the fact that Japan is a considerably larger economy.
It will also come from re-allocating aid from other
regions to Africa, because unlike the UK, Japan is
not on track to reach 0.7 per cent. of its gross
domestic product being given asODAby 2012. They
will do some important things and it might be worth
pulling out several, because some are being done
verymuch in partnershipwith theUK.The Japanese
have a long history of being very good on food issues
in Africa, and not just food aid, whereby they are
giving $100 million at the moment, which is mainly
targeted at Africa. They have been incredibly
important in improving African rice production by
the development of the so-called Nerica—new rice
for Africa—crop, which is an African-Asian hybrid
that does well in African drought conditions but has
the productivity of an Asian rice. It has dramatically
transformed west African rice production. Over the
next ﬁve years, the Japanese will train 100,000 health
workers in Africa. They also made a signiﬁcant
contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria. Very much encouraged
by us, they are trying to do a lot on education in
Africa. They have committed to construction of
1,000 primary schools, the training of 100,000
teachers in maths and science and so on. Those are
important initiatives, but they are still within a
ﬁnancing framework that is signiﬁcantly less than
what, for example, we are doing.
Q136 Sir Menzies Campbell: Minister, in a minute I
shall ask you to make an assessment of Japan’s
current international role, and your last answer and
the answer before are both quite important factors
in making such an assessment. However, there is
another component that you are probably uniquely
qualiﬁed to help us with, which is the issue of
Japanese permanent membership of the Security
Council. Could you brieﬂy cast your mind back to
your days on the East River? Just how important do
you think Japan regards the possibility of permanent
membership of the Security Council, and to what
extent are the objections of China, for example,
capable of being overtaken?
Lord Malloch-Brown: On that last point, an
extraordinarily high priority for Japan’s foreign
policy is to achieve membership of the Security
Council. Some of the setbacks that it has suVered
over the past few years—it seemed to be enticingly
close, and has now receded—have been a deep blow
to Japanese self-esteem in the foreign policy area.
We are very clear that we strongly support its
membership of the council. Because it is the second
largest economy in the world, it is the second largest
contributor to peacekeeping operations. On the
simple Boston tea party principle of no taxation
without representation, it seems inherently unfair
that Japan is being asked to pay ever larger portions
of a growing global peacekeeping bill but has no
direct say over it. It has made Japan rather
recalcitrant on the expansion of peacekeeping, and
grumpy about it. It has turned Japan into budget
cutters and all the rest of it. We are losing its support
in the sameway thatwe are, on a smaller scale, losing
Germany’s, and that has a real cost, because I think
that we all assume that the multilateral portion of
global peacekeeping is likely to increase. I hope that
we will come back. Part of the Prime Minister’s
initiative of international institution reform is to get
the Security Council issue resolved. Just yesterday at
the African Union summit, I was pressing a number
of AfricanGovernments to get their act together and
decide what form they want African representation
to take, so that we can resume an eVort to resolve it.
More broadly, Japan sees itself as a little bit taken
for granted in its foreign policy everywhere. It is still,
as I said, the second largest economy in the world,
yet one would never know it, as western Ministers
and leaders all beat their way to the doors of Beijing
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or Delhi, but less frequently to Tokyo. The Japanese
are publicly gracious about that, but I think that
they scratch their heads a bit about how they have
been so eclipsed, given how important they remain.
It is very much in our interest to stay extremely close
with the Japanese, ﬁnd them a forum as a permanent
member of the Security Council and encourage
them, within the limitations of article 9 of their post-
war constitution, to become active in peacekeeping
missions such as Afghanistan and now, with staV
oYcers, even in Sudan. We do not want Japan to
skulk back into itself, disappointed by its lack of a
global role or recognition of that global role, or to
be thrown oV balance by its increasingly competitive
relationship with China.
Q137 Sir Menzies Campbell: You have managed
very comprehensively to answer the question I had
not yet asked, but no matter. On the issue of
willingness to spend money but not capital on
military contribution, is there anything that the
British Government can do to persuade the debate
internally in Japan? As we all know, it is locked into
the history and the events of the 1930s and 1940s. I
am not talking about sticks or carrots, but is there
anything that we can do to foster an understanding
that a military contribution of the kind that they
could well make, both in peacekeeping and in the
more civilian aspects of military activity, would
enhance their claim for membership of the Security
Council as well as being a good thing in itself?
Lord Malloch-Brown: In a way, you answered the
question with that last observation. The way to do it
is through as multilateralised a direction as possible.
Even Afghanistan was diYcult for Japanese public
opinion, because the military side of Afghanistan is
not a fully ﬂedged UN operation. Afghanistan and
Iraq are diYcult places for Japanese public opinion
to see Japan immersing itself in. It is much easier for
Japan, as it is for Germany, to accept that
within internationally endorsed UN-mandated
peacekeeping activities. I see a kind of convergence
between these objectives of trying to get Japan
permanently on to the Security Council and getting
Japanese public opinion to accept that with
membership of the Security Council come broader
multilateral obligations and responsibilities. I think
we need to drive those two things together.
Q138 Sir Menzies Campbell: We are at one on that.
I have one last question. I deduce fromwhat you said
about the Prime Minister’s commitment, and from
your own eloquence, if I may say so, in support of
the topic, that the Government place a high priority
on this, and will take every opportunity to push a
solution that we, I think, agree would be ideal.
Lord Malloch-Brown: Absolutely, yes.
Chairman: Thank you. Can we move on to some
questions about the economy?
Q139Mr Hamilton:Minister, you mentioned earlier
the revolution in green energy, the move away from
fossil fuels, and how Japan would likely beneﬁt and
produce many of those new technologies. However,
I wondered whether you could give us your
assessment of Japan’s current economic position.
We all know, and we have stressed this afternoon,
that it is the second largest economy in the world,
still; and while people beat their way towards the
doors of the Foreign Ministry in Beijing they seem
reluctant to go to Tokyo, yet Tokyo has
considerably more economic muscle. What do you
think is Japan’s vulnerability, given its recent history
in terms of banking and credit, to the current credit
squeeze worldwide? Is it going to suVer more or less
than other developed economies, in your opinion?
Lord Malloch-Brown: This is one of those cases
where the failure of Japan fully to liberalise its
international ﬁnancial system and to allow as large
a foothold in its banking sector for multinational
banks as others have done is perversely rewarded at
this point by the markets; in a sense the most
liberalised international ﬁnancial model—the
allegedly Anglo-Saxon model of fully liberalised
ﬁnancial markets—has taken a bit of a knock from
them recently. Japan is protected against that. It has
a low level of foreign investment in its economy
compared with other economies of a similar
situation, and not only does it have relatively low
exposure of its own banking sector to overseas banks
but equally Japan itself has not got a high degree of
exposure to sub-prime in the US or housing bubbles
elsewhere. Its own housing bubble was a long while
ago and while housing prices have come back in
Tokyo they are nothing like the problem we have.
Japan is actually growing again; part of the business
of everybody overlooking the fact that it is still the
world’s second largest economy is that along with
that goes a ﬁve-year-old view of what is happening
to the Japanese economy. It is growing again quite
nicely thank you. They have brought down, I think,
their estimate from 2.1% to 1.5%, but that still is
pretty respectable compared with where the other
G8 economies for the most part are. I think it is
looking ﬁne, and we also need to acknowledge the
relationship between the health of the Japanese
economy and our own, because while I have said
that foreign direct investment in Japan is only 2.5%
of its GDP, which is very low by global standards,
nevertheless within that group are some very
prominent UK investors—GKN, Astra Zeneca,
GlaxoSmithKline, Unilever, Virgin, British
Airways, HSBC, Standard Chartered and Dyson.
Also, in areas such as legal services we now have a
lot of British law ﬁrms there. Correspondingly we,
who are much more open to FDI in our economy,
have 1,450 Japanese companies that have FDI here
and which employ more than 100,000 people, and
that process continues. Just in the past year, Sony
and Fujitsu have set up European headquarters
here. Over the past 20 years, Nissan, Toyota and
Honda have transformed the automotive supply
chain with their investments in the UK; indeed, they
account for more than half the cars made in the UK.
All three, by the way, have made substantial new
investments in the sector over the past year. So we
have strong two-way economic links, and the health
of Japan’s economy matters a lot to us.
Q140 Mr Illsley: How much scope is there for
increasing British exports to Japan, bearing in mind
that there is a relatively low level of FDI into Japan?
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As recently as 2006, those on the lord mayor’s visit
to Japan commented on the diYculties involved in
getting exports into Japan. Recently, it has been
noted that Japan is perhaps looking to be a little
more protectionist, particularly after looking at this
side of the world and at the credit crunch. Is there
any prospect of increasing our exports to Japan?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I think there is. In January,
Stephen Lillie and I were both at remarkable events
in Japan to celebrate 150 years of diplomatic
relations between our two countries, and they were
used to show oV a little of our commercial ankle—
and even a little leg, I might add. A lot of British
design ﬁrms and service sector ﬁrms used that as an
opportunity to remind the Japanese of the sectors
where we believe we still have a lot to oVer. Brave,
British-based ﬁrms are still trying to take on the
Japanese ﬁnancial services sector and to expand
their investment in it. You are right that they have
run into some problems, which although couched in
legal terms, smack of a little protectionism, and that
needs to be taken on. Yes, I hope the British business
sector continues to see the huge opportunity in
Japan. While everybody else is racing oV to Beijing,
they might even get a bit of a competitive break in
Japan.
Q141Mr Illsley:Are you happy with the advice that
companies that are willing to make that move are
getting not only from the Foreign OYce, but from
across the Government?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Yes. This is a high priority for
our colleagues in the Department for Business,
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, ourselves and
others. So, yes, everybody is pushing hard to try to
make the most of the opportunity.
Q142 Mr Purchase: We have adopted the Anglo-
Saxon model of ﬁnancial markets and capitalism
more generally, but the Japanese and the Germans
have adopted a diVerent version, which has been
very successful. You use the word “perverse”, but
they are not being perverse at all; indeed, the
Japanese have managed their model very well over
a long period. Even though they have had negative
interest rates because of over-production and all the
usual problems, they have been able to weather that
storm. However, there is also a high level of
Japanese investment in Britain, and we see cultural
changes in many of the companies involved. What
makes Britain attractive to Japanese investors, who
know that they will be coming into a dog-eat-dog
world that Macmillan once described as being run
by “banksters”? What makes it attractive to them?
Lord Malloch-Brown: It is its openness. It is the fact
that they feel that they can come here and open
factories and that they will be welcomed and
encouraged. That is the plus of the British model.
Compared with our European competitors, we are
an extremely open economy, which welcomes
overseas investment, whether from the Japanese or
elsewhere. We have seen waves of this. At the time
when the US was getting suspicious of the Japanese
because they had bought the Rockefeller centre and
Pebble Beach golf course, the UK remained
extremely open. Let us take as an example the
sovereign wealth funds not of Japan but of the Gulf
countries, China or Singapore. In Europe or the US,
you see a certain antipathy growing towards those
funds, but the UK remains open. The reward for
that is that we attract more than our fair share of
that capital. The diYculty sometimes is that it does
not look like a particularly ﬂat playing ﬁeld, because
we have a much more liberal set of rules for here
versus those available to us there. It is swings and
roundabouts; you win some and you lose some in
such a situation.
Q143 Mr Purchase: Japan is, for all that, in the top
three or four of the countries with which we enjoy
major trade relations, but is there anything we could
or should do—is there anything we could do to
attract more Japanese investment? I will leave the
“should” because that has a bit of a value-laden
connotation.
Lord Malloch-Brown: Japan was the fourth-largest
investor in the UK last year after the US, Canada
and France. Similarly, our exports to Japan are
worth £8 billion a year, breaking down 50:50
between goods and services. Both sides of that
equation are growing strongly. Whenever we see
anything that might slow down Japanese inward
investment into Britain, we jump on it like a tiger.
Earlier in the year, there was some fear that the new
points-based system for visas might discriminate
against Japanese middle managers coming to work
in sectors such as auto parts when they had not had
big international exposure elsewhere in their careers
and so were not ﬂuent English speakers. We work
very closely with our colleagues in the Home OYce
and I personally spend an awful lot of time lobbying
the Home OYce, working with the Japanese
ambassador here and combining our eVorts, because
this is a very important economic relationship,
which we want to make sure is not disrupted
unintentionally by other policy objectives of the
Government.3
Chairman: I congratulate you on that. If only the
Home OYce listened all the time to all
representations made to it, but that is another
question, which I will raise in a diVerent context.
Q144 Mr Illsley: On research and development,
some members of the Committee made a very
interesting visit to an outﬁt called Advanced
Telecommunications Research Institute
International in Kyoto, where my Barnsley accent
managed to defeat its wonderful device that is
entitled themultilingual speech translation system—
a wonderful machine that delivers simultaneous
translation from Japanese into English. It simply
could not cope with a Barnsley accent. I felt very
sorry for the poor English designer of the machine,
who had spent 15 years developing it with 500
diVerent regional accents from the UK. In two
minutes, we destroyed his career, but there you are.
The Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
memorandum talks about the huge beneﬁts from R
3 Ev 107
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and D and deeper relationships and co-operation
between the UK and Japan. How can we ensure that
we maximise those beneﬁts? You referred to
competition from China, the US and South Korea.
How can we best ﬁght oV that competition and
maintain that research and development co-
operation?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Japan is, as I am sure the
memorandum said, the UK’s second-largest
research partner. We set out in the two Prime
Ministers’ joint statement of January 2007 aligned
priorities on climate change, sustainable energy,
health care and innovation. I have to admit we are
slightly riding on the coat tails of the Japanese,
because they aim to spend 1% of GDP on science
and technology during the current ﬁve-year period
between 2006 and 2011. The annual budget for the
current period is £15.5 billion a year. It is singularly,
and in a Japanese way, focused on Japan’s priorities.
For example, under its new cool earth initiative for
low-carbon technologies, which is $30 billion, it is
strategically funding in that area.We recently signed
a memorandum of understanding between our two
countries’ twomain funding agencies on R andD. It
sets out a framework in which we can develop
speciﬁc collaborative programmes. Later this year,
Japan is due to host the UK-Japan joint committee
on science and technology, which meets every two
years to discuss priorities. It is led on our side by our
Government chief scientiﬁc adviser, John
Beddington. A huge amount goes on at the
Government and private sector levels to work with
the Japanese Government. As Mr Purchase said
earlier, it has more of a model of Government-led
investment in things such as R and D. We are trying
to go with that and work with that, and to partner
Japan as much as we possibly can.
Q145 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: I want to raise the
question of the death penalty in Japan. I am against
it, but I am slightly puzzled why we apparently take
up the issue regularly with the Japanese
Government. Your Department tells us that the
UK, “through the EU, regularly takes this up with
the Japanese Government, although there is still
overwhelming support for capital punishment in
Japan.” Is there not a slight contradiction in that
sentence? If Japan is a democracy, is self-governing
and has a judicial system that by and large we
respect, why do we waste an awful lot of time
lecturing Japan about this issue when there are
appalling human rights abuses elsewhere in the far
east? Is this really a good use of diplomatic eVort?
Lord Malloch-Brown: It has been a long-standing
priority of British foreign policy to lecture
everybody on the death penalty. Japan is in no way
singled out. Even the Americans get their ears bent
by us on that one. For countries where it is much
more horrendous, such as China, the death penalty
is always part of our dialogue, along with all the
other issues. I think that the feeling is that in Japan,
precisely because it is a democracy, we are pushing
on more of an open door, and it is worth keeping
going. We feel that there are UN resolutions to back
us, but it is also an underlying value of British
engagement in the world generally that we want, if
possible, to persuade other people of it. If your
worry is that lobbying Japan on that issue happens
at the expense of the quality of the bilateral
relationship, or that by lobbying Japan we lobby
China less, I would not worry. I do not think that it
is a trade-oV on either. We make a nuisance of
ourselves on the point, but not to the point of
damaging our other objectives.
Q146 Mr Illsley: To expand on that, there are
aspects of the Japanese death penalty that are quite
horrendous.A person can be imprisoned for decades
and simply be told with a few hours’ notice that they
are about to be executed. Their family is not told,
and it is done quietly and in secret. Aspects of
Japan’s treatment of prisoners are questionable,
including the daiyo kangoku, or substitute prison
system, whichwe looked at while wewere over there.
How susceptible are the Japanese to pressure to
change that system? Unlike the death penalty, I do
not think that how the system operates has
overwhelming public support. I am pretty sure inmy
own mind that a lot of Japanese do not realise just
how the system works. We were given the example
of a British national who was detained in Japan
during the World cup. He was told that until he
confessed his misdemeanours or crimes, he would
simply remain in prison. The Japanese rely simply
on the fact that a lengthy period of imprisonment
will produce a confession. About 98 per cent. of
crimes in Japan are solved as a result of a confession,
with the person being incarcerated until they sign a
confession. Is there any sign that they are likely to
change that and move to a jury trial system?
Lord Malloch-Brown: You have pretty accurately
described the daiyo kangoku system, which literally
means substitute prison. You are right that there is
a possibility of repeated detentions. They are
approved at several stages—after 72 hours and after
a further 10 days—but prosecutors generally get
extensions, if they seek them, up to 23 days. In that
period, they can secure confessions, in circumstances
where the full legal rights that would be available in
the formal prison system are not available. That
gives us signiﬁcant disquiet. What can we do about
that? Bilaterally, there have been a number of notes
verbales on this and we have even sent letters on
general prison issues to speciﬁc prisons where we
have had concerns. However, the main point is to
pursue the issue in the multilateral, international
legal system.Wehave been urging Japan to ratify the
optional protocol to the convention against torture
as soon as it can. We also recently raised our
concerns about the treatment of detainees as part of
the new Human Rights Council’s ﬁrst universal
periodic review of Japan. When the report on Japan
was adopted, it insisted that the country remain
committed to human rights, to its participation in
the process and to its claim that all people were equal
and no form of discrimination was possible under its
constitution. We have noticed some changes. There
was a 2006 prison law, which was deﬁnitely an
improvement on the condition before, but we still
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have worries and we will go on raising them
multilaterally and in bilateral de´marches of
diVerent kinds.
Mr Illsley: It is worth placing on record that the
Japan Federation of Bar Associations campaigned
strongly on this issue, and we had a successful
meeting with it.
Q147 Mr Purchase: This sitting is part of our global
security inquiry, as you know, so my next point
might not seem desperately relevant, but may I
remind you that the discussion in Britain about
detention has revolved around global security and
the ﬁght against religious fanaticism? People here
will say, “You introduce these measures at your own
peril. They actually encourage religious fanaticism.”
Although this has little to do with us in Britain, is
there any evidence in Japan that such measures,
which Japan has used for a long time, encourage,
discourage and or have any eVect whatever on the
behaviour of people who would kill others for
reasons of fanaticism or fundamentalism?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Japan is a homogenous
society and does not have the same problems of
domestic security or fundamentalism as we do. As a
young UN refugee oYcial, I served in Asia, and I
remembermy outrage that Japan would not allow in
more immigrants. Frankly, it has always been highly
restrictive in that regard, although less so in recent
years. Again, however, I would argue that there have
been somewhat perverse consequences.
Q148 Mr Purchase: You would not see any
connection between what Britain and the Americans
are doing in this area of so-called global security and
what is happening in Japan?
Lord Malloch-Brown: No. I think they are
disconnected. Having said that, it is worth pointing
out that our own proposals for detention without
trial were also brought up in the universal periodic
review of the UK in the HumanRights Council, and
very properly so. This issue of peer review, in which
everybody has blemishes and is willing to point a
gentle ﬁnger at each other, is a very important one.
We have no monopoly of virtue in this area.
Chairman: We have a few minutes left. I am
conscious that we have kept you a long time, but we
have a few more areas to cover.
Q149MrMoss:May I turn theMinister to Japanese
whaling activities? Although there has been some
success this year in disrupting the Japanese whaling
eVort in the southern oceans—particularly by
organisations such as the Sea Shepherd
Conservation Society and Greenpeace—it is
unlikely that this direct action is sustainable in the
medium to long-term. What leverage, if any, does
the UK Government have in persuading Japan to
discontinue its whaling activities?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Despite our close friendship
with Japan, we choose to diVer with it very ﬁercely
on that issue. We have just had the annual
International Whaling Commission meeting; it was
held at the end of June in Santiago, Chile. The
formidable and redoubtable warrior, Lord Rooker,
was ﬁghting the British corner. I get a large mailbag
on the issue the whole time. The BritishGovernment
is very clear with its close allies—Japan and
Norway—about our abhorrence of this activity and
we go on ﬁghting. At the moment, we are up, but
there are always new issues with which to deal, such
as the restructuring and reform of the IWC. We are
intent on ensuring that that is not a cover for
emasculating its anti-whaling position. We have to
go on ﬁghting on this issue.
Chairman: I want to touch on some regional
issues.We produced a report in 2006 on East Asia in
which we suggested that the NATO model or
regional security model for Europe could proﬁtably
be considered with regard to security in East Asia.
The Japanese PrimeMinister recentlymade a speech
in which he talked about the potential development
of the Association of South East Asian Nations and
where it might go. Is there anything that we can do to
encourage greater regional institutional framework
security in a very volatile part of the world?
Lord Malloch-Brown: It will become more and more
of an issue. Anyone involved in the business of
strategic forecasting of where the most dangerous
part of the world will be in 10 or 20 years would have
to choose the Asian region. You have all the
conditions necessary for a rise in the likelihood of
conﬂict with surging Asian economic powers, sharp
population growth and increases in consumption of
energy and resources. Everything is there for some of
the economic and political competition turning
violent. Such violence characterised Europe in the
19th and 20th centuries. Anything that we can do to
put in place frameworks for managing that
competition through mutual security arrangements
is important. I commendBill Emmott’s new book on
China, India and Japan to anyone who has not seen
it. He speculates how long the competition will
remain friendly and economic in character and not
assume a military dimension. The fact is that the
current regional security arrangements are pretty
insipid and have not been intended so far to provide
a NATO-like arrangement, or anything akin to it.
As people who are not members of the region but
have strong historical connections with it, we can
press them constantly to improve things. I cite,
although it is a little bit out of regional context, our
eVorts to get ASEAN to take a lead role on Burma.
It is all about trying to encourage regional
institutions tomove beyond passive secretariats with
very mild ambitions to be something more. The
region is generally light on regional institutional
arrangements, let alone security arrangements.
Q150 Ms Stuart: My question follows on from what
you said about the regional realignments. There are
two issues on which I want to have your view. One
concerns the development of trading groupings
within that part of Asia. Is the UK fairly relaxed
about that, as you were last time the Foreign OYce
responded about it? The second concerns the UK
Government’s view on goods produced in Kaesong
in terms of the EU free trade agreement. Are we
happy, or are we pushing for those goods to be
classiﬁed as South Korean in origin?
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Lord Malloch-Brown: On the latter, the position has
not yet ﬁrmed up, either in Europe or in theUK. The
dilemma, as we discussed earlier, is that against the
ƒ1 a month salaries that industrial workers earn
elsewhere in DPRK, it is attractive. The South
Koreans have asked that it be included in the
agreement, but we have to take a good hard look at
the human rights and other issues and not give them
a free ride. If they are to be included, there must be
human rights requirements and, included in that, I
suspect, labour requirements. Is it correct, Stephen,
that policy on the issue is under development and
not formed at this point?
Stephen Lillie: The negotiation has not yet moved to
a stage where we have had to take a ﬁnal view on
that.
Lord Malloch-Brown: We welcome guidance from
this Committee
Q151 Ms Stuart: One problem that we usually have
involves discussions. We ask speciﬁc questions and
Ministers tell us, “Well, we’re thinking about it,” but
give no indication which way they are thinking until
the decision is dished up. I would like to put it on
record that there are just 50,000 workers there. It is
planned to have 250,000 there within the next 18
months. Whatever the decision is, it will have
considerable long-term consequences.
Lord Malloch-Brown: You can be absolutely
conﬁdent and safe that it is not going to be allowed
in without a set of conditions to govern it. Although
it is an important toehold, in some ways, on the
liberalisation of North Korea, it is a very limited
one, as we said earlier. I mentioned Cuba, and
Stephen made the point that it is, in a way, like pre-
1978 China. It is an eVort to create some kind of
enclave that brings in foreign currency, but it is not
indicative of a willingness to open up the economy
as a whole. It is an opportunity of limited value. It is
not the doorway to political and economic change in
NorthKorea. Althoughwe think that it is useful and
helpful that the workers there get a bit more than the
rest of them, it is not something that we are wedded
to for the liberalisation policy. The downside—a
ﬂood of cheap goods into our markets for which
there are no workers’ or human rights protections—
is very evident. I can conﬁdently tell you that we
would press for conditions. We are not clear exactly
what they would be. As I said, I really do urge you.
This is an issue where timely advice from this
Committee would be very inﬂuential in us forming a
view. On the ﬁrst point, trade more generally, we
remain of the view that a global successful
conclusion of the Doha trade round to prevent the
need for all these regional agreements is the way to
go, but we are not inherently against regional
agreements as long as their general impact is to
increase international trade.4
Q152 Sir Menzies Campbell: Can we take that last
sentence as an endorsement of Commissioner
Mandelson?
4 Ev 107
Lord Malloch-Brown: Commissioner Mandelson
needs an endorsement today, so he deﬁnitely gets it
from me, poor fellow.
Q153 Chairman: As a Committee, we are going to
Paris in two weeks’ time, so we will no doubt have
opportunities to discuss it with oYcials in the French
Government. May I ask you about cultural issues?
Do you think that more work is needed on the image
of theUK in Japan and SouthKorea?Has the public
diplomacy work of UK-Japan 2008 made a big
diVerence? Has it been successful so far? Is there
more to do?
Lord Malloch-Brown: It is a huge undertaking, with
hundreds of events, if I remembermy numbers right,
and all of them intended to show cool Britain at its
coolest. As far as I can tell, the only thing missing
from the show is Tony Blair.
Ms Stuart: And he is free.
Lord Malloch-Brown: There is an awful lot going on
that is intended to showcase British design and
British innovation in the services sector, the arts
sector, culture—you name it; it is all there.While the
eVort has not got a particular focus this year in
Korea, there is a heavy public diplomacy eVort. As
far as I can tell, Britain is extremely well regarded in
both countries and has a good little niche going for
it made up of history, our reputation for openness
today and our diVerent cultural exports. We are well
recognised in both countries.
Q154 Chairman: What about the English language?
When I was in Japan a year ago, there was clearly a
big American-inﬂuenced English language system.
Are we well positioned to take advantage of the
great desire among young people in Japan and South
Korea to learn English?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Reasonably so. The British
Council in both markets is largely self-ﬁnancing in
its activities—completely, I think. In both cases,
there is huge commercial provision of English
language beyond anything we can provide. The
great glory of English becoming the global language
is, in a sense, that it has outgrown the ability of our
own institutions to service and meet that need. The
demand is huge and the British Council is part of the
way of meeting it.
Q155 Chairman: There was discussion earlier about
trade issues, inward investment and our investment
in the region. Is there not a problem of lack of
knowledge in the UK, in terms both of the
universities having a very limited footprint on these
areas and of our business community being able to
get into the Korean and Japanese markets?
Lord Malloch-Brown: The ﬁrst point is deﬁnitely
true. Interestingly, regional studies in the UK have
not run down anything like as badly as in theUS, but
I generally think that all western countries made a
terriblemistake 10 or 20 years ago when they let a lot
of real regional institutional capabilities in our
university system go.We can all regret that. It means
that fewer people have the language skills and the
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university-level knowledge of these countries than
ideally we would want. British businesses make up
for that even if it is a case of knowledge gained on
the ground. You do not get to sell £8 billion-worth
of goods to Japan without having learnt your way
around the commercial sector there, so I think they
are doing okay. My suspicion is that in many cases
their Japanese does not gomuch further than how to
order a beer, but that has not stopped them; they are
selling a lot of stuV.
Chairman: Lord Malloch-Brown and Mr Lillie,
thank you very much for coming. This has been a
very useful and wide-ranging session and we are
grateful.
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Written evidence
Submission from the Council of the British Association for Korean Studies
Introductory Comments
In 2006, the British Association for Korean Studies was asked to comment on the emergence of China
(“The Emergence of the People’sRepublic of China as aRegional Power and Its Impact on the International
System”, statement prepared 20 April, 2006).
Much of what we said then is relevant to your query regarding Korea and Japan.
Although the past is not a certain guide to the future, it is the only guide we have. In order to understand
the “global security” of Korea and Japan in contemporary times, we must clarify the nature of the historic
cultural and political system of East Asia and look there to see what patterns there are. An examination of
the East Asian past reveals the following general patterns:
(1) East Asia (comprising China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Tibet, andMongolia) is a coherent cultural
and political sphere which has the area of “China” as its cultural, political, and economic centre.
(2) When “China” is strong and stable, the region as a whole is stable.
(3) When “China” is weak and internally divided, the region as a whole is embroiled in war.
(4) Contiguous areas to this core region such as Vietnam andKorea have long been self-aware of their
socio-political context, and traditionally have developed schemes to accommodate Chinese power,
while at the same time maintaining independence and sovereignty.
(5) Japan has historically been in and out of the Sinitic (Chinese) sphere. That is, its history has not
been patterned along the lines of a centralised state, because it has the advantage of being an island
and therefore it did not need to create andmaintain a Sinitic-style bureaucracy tomobilise defences
against land-based military threats. Korea has had this necessity and that is why it did not descend
into feudalism as did Japan.
The Cultural and Historical Background—China
Chinese culture is the oldest continuous culture on Earth, having a literary and canonical tradition
(largely based upon Confucian thought) stretching back to the ﬁfth century BC. Even today, the literary
works which constitute this canonical tradition can be read easily. Such accessibility to classical thought and
ideas has produced an extraordinary continuity in literature and historical writing in the region so that
ancient aesthetic, philosophical, social, and historical views have been created and re-created overmillennia.
General social, economic, and political views, as well as views and observations about neighbouring peoples,
became ﬁrmly established by the second or third century AD and have accompanied, if not motivated, the
successive drives to unify politically the mainland under bureaucratic autocracies.
Confucianism, the predominant philosophical mode of East Asia, deﬁned individuals as social entities,
elaborated an extensivemoral systemwhich limited governmental power, and presented an economic system
focused on concepts of national co-operative activity to ensure general popular subsistence. As a
consequence of Confucian ideology, politics have been dominated by political responsibility being vested in
a regularised, bureaucratic institution recruitment into which has been determined by objective
examinations, which in turn led to the creation of a non-feudal e´lite class (the so-called literati bureaucrats).
Attempts to establish feudalistic aristocratic dominance over the “Chinese” state have been quashed,
dynastic rulers preferring intellectual attainment over birth, deﬁning status almost solely in terms of
performance in the civil service examinations. We may style this system of governance as a “meritocratic”
system.
Over the past two millennia, the key economic zones of the world have always included China. For most
of the past two millennia, the Chinese economy was the most advanced in the world, triggering the onset of
globalisation through the “Silver-for-Silk Trade”. The scale of the Chinese economy has usually dwarfed
all others, containing within its domestic sphere nearly every known agriculturally productive ecological
niche, often possessing the world’s most advanced technology, and using transport systems rivalled
elsewhere only in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Although the standard of living in theYangtzeRiver valley seems to have been on a par with northwestern
Europe until about 1800, from the mid- to late 19th century, Western views of China have been blinded by
a European obsession with its own growth, and from the actual decline and collapse of one of the world’s
greatest political and economic powers, the Qing dynasty (1616–1911) of China. From the mid-19th century
to the mid-20th century, China passed through another period of “dynastic change”. However, by the end
of the 20th century, it had again embarked on a stable growth path which will probably take it throughmost
of this century and beyond.
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The Cultural and Historical Background—Korea and Japan
Naturally, the brilliance of “Chinese” civilisation has had a profound impact on neighbouring nations,
especially “Korea” and “Japan” which—not appearing as viable, coherent political entities until the ﬁfth
(“Korea”) and the seventh (“Japan”) centuries, beneﬁted from nearly a millennia of advanced “Chinese”
civilization. The diVerences in socio-political organisation among these three countries can be placed on a
spectrum from “meritocratic” (China) to “mixed meritocratic/aristocratic” (Korea) to “aristocratic”
(Japan). These diVerences deeply aVected traditional politics and helped create centralised, bureaucratic
states in China and Korea and feudal anarchy in Japan. Only from the late 19th century has Japan moved
towards a more meritocratic recruitment model.
Although their heritages diVered, the three countries are now in the midst of a historical convergence and
can be expected to share and expand their mutual understanding of bureaucratic/technocratic management.
This convergence along pragmatic lines also means that full-scale military conﬂict between them is unlikely.
If they are now internally stable and prosperous, how might they be expected to interact?
East Asian Interactive Dynamics
Each of the nations of East Asia perceived that they had a particular place within the commonEast Asian
cultural sphere, and were perceived in turn by the Chinese to have a certain place within it. Partly, this has
been the result of geographic propinquity. Koreans have long shared a land border with China and have
accommodated themselves over the centuries to this fact. Japan is an island, and thus could join the Chinese
socio-political ambit when it suited their purposes. This does not mean that the Japanese have not adapted
Chinese civilization, quite the reverse. But it does mean that Chinese culture has been made to ﬁt Japanese
circumstances much more than has been the case of Korea.
The Emperor of China was considered to be the Son of Heaven and the symbolic centre of the East Asian
socio-political system, which was composed of a series of hierarchical relationships amongst the nations
based upon a model of ideal family relations. This idea of a “family” of nations derives from Confucian
philosophy. The emperor’s mandate to rule his nation (“China”) was dependent on his ability to keep the
peace and to satisfy the subsistence needs of his subjects—an idea deriving from the thought of the classical
Confucian philosopher Mencius (372–289 BC).
The rulers of Korea in “traditional times”, however, never presumed to refer to themselves as “emperor”,
but only as “king”. This usage reﬂects the fact that although the Korean e´lite thought of themselves as
“equal” participants in East Asian civilisation, their socio-political position in the family hierarchy was
perceived to be that of a younger brother to an elder brother. To do otherwise, would have implied that they
were making a political claim that would have invited unnecessary Chinese interest and subsequent
interference.
In terms of pure power, the Koreans have presented the Chinese over the centuries with both a loyal ally
and a determined resistor to political assimilation. Korean policy towards China has always been a
negotiated activity, either on the battleﬁeld as is the case with the ancient kingdoms of Koguryoˇ (4c AD)
and Silla (7c AD), or by political accommodation suYcient to keep the Chinese out of Korean aVairs as was
the case with the kingdoms of Koryoˇ (918–1392) and Chosoˇn (1392–1910). From the late seventh century
to the present, the Chinese have rarely sought to control Korean territory, because the Koreans always
presented themwith a very eVective resistance. By the same token, theChinese have viewedKorea as a buVer
state. Massive Chinese assistance was provided in the 1590s to beat back a Japanese invasion of Korea, and
again in the 1950s to drive back the forces of the United States and the United Nations.
When they have been able to do so, the Chinese have committed massive resources to defend Korea—in
alliance with a Korean state—to drive military power away from their Korean frontier. Again, when it has
had the resources, China has never allowed a hostile or potentially hostile power to dominate Korea.
However, China has almost never sought to dominate Korea itself, being content that the peninsula is
neutral or has a positive attitude towards Chinese interests.
The Koreans have long appreciated these circumstances and have proﬁted from Chinese protection.
When China has been strong and stable as in the early Song (960–1126), Ming (1368–1662), and Qing
(1616–1911) periods, Korea has been at peace and has prospered as in the early Koryˇ and the Chosˇn periods.
When China was strong (as in the Ming dynasty) and the Japanese mobilised to attack (as in the invasion
of 1592), the Chinese-Korean alliance repelled them.When China was weak and divided as it was in the late
nineteenth century, the Japanese sought to take advantage of the situation, seized Korea, and then attacked
China. Traditionally, the aggressive state in Northeast Asia has been Japan, not China, never Korea, and
the Koreans have always been allied with the Chinese. We should not expect that this pattern will change.
Although the Americans have provided stability in the region since the end of the Second World War in
1945, they can now retreat, because the Chinese and the Koreans are strong enough to check the Japanese.
This old equilibrium is re-emerging and not to be feared, unless we fail to understand the history and cultures
of the East Asian cultural sphere and end up by being excluded from it because of our ignorance.
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In short, when China is stable, Korea is stable. When Japan is also stable, then the region is completely
at peace. These are the current circumstances, but they could change. The greatest current threats to regional
stability arise from a North Korea that might descend into civil war, or an outside power—such as the
United States or Russia— that might engage in a military adventure.
Implications for British Policy
The greatest problem for British policy in the East Asian region is the high level of ignorance about East
Asia which pervades contemporary British society. Unlike the United States, Britain lacks a signiﬁcant and
successful East Asian minority that can provide cultural background knowledge at all levels. Consequently,
it is imperative that we develop such high-level expertise in our institutions of higher education. However,
the current record provides a dismal picture. Major higher education institutions, such as the Universities
of Durham and Sterling, have eliminated almost entirely their oVerings on East Asia, destroying long-held
(Durham) or nascent (Sterling) expertise. Even a ﬂagship institution such as the School of Oriental and
African Studies in London recently threatened to destroy its research infrastructure by eliminating specialist
librarians.
The problem is that the Government and our higher education institutions have been driven by
“managerialist” views which consider long-term investment in strategic “knowledge industries”
(universities) to be foolish, for fear that the current year’s budget might show a deﬁcit. To try and develop
long-term expertise onEast Asiawith aworkforce that can be sacked this year and re-hired the next is to play
a fool’s game bred from the twin delusions that any need for information can be provided by out-sourced
consultants, and the belief that the important diplomatic and commercial people speak English anyway.
In his 1986 report “Speaking for the Future: A Review of the Requirements of Diplomacy and Commerce
for Asian and African Languages and Area Studies”, Sir Peter Parker stressed the need to have a well
developed cadre of people in this nation who had a good knowledge of Asian and African languages and
cultures. It would appear that, more than 20 years on, his lesson has still not been learned. Not to have a
signiﬁcant ﬁnancial investment in the creation of a cadre of British citizens with a competent knowledge of
East Asia contradicts the commonsense approach usually taken towards developing scientiﬁc expertise. If
in science, why not in diplomacy and business?
Because of our ignorance about the importance of building up long-term expertise, we may say that in
world historical terms, East Asians are colonising us. How better to control a people than to learn their
language (English) and their culture and hope that they remain ignorant of yours? One might think that the
recent “China craze” inBritainwould have beeen good forChinese Studies in general andEastAsian Studies
in particular. However, not only are the actual resources that are currently being committed to the
development of the subject area still risible, but the focus of spending is almost entirely on the Chinese
mainland. This latter issue ignores the key principle of understanding the context of any situation. One fears
that the hype surrounding the “China craze” may be as transient and vacuous as the wind.
Decisionmakers seem to be lost in a dreamof a billion-plusChinese consumers all buying a Britishwidget.
This is fantasy. The challenge is not to make a widget that all Chinese want to buy; it is the Chinese who
are making the widgets that we are buying by the shipload. The challenge for us is to keep the East Asian
nations—who now trade among themselves more than they do with the rest of the world—away from
systems of autarky and closed trading spheres. This means that the United Kingdom must move upstream
and develop expertise on East Asia so that the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese will look to Britons for
sympathetic understanding, partnership, and the trust that is bestowed on honest brokers.
This goal can be fostered by:
(1) the guaranteed and continued Government support for all branches of East Asian Studies in the
nation’s universities;
(2) Government encouraging businesses and other commercial bodies to provide bursaries for
students studying East Asian subjects, and by making it ﬁnancially attractive for them to do so;
and
(3) encouraging businesses and other commercial bodies to provide in-course or immediate post-
course internships for studentswho have studied a branch of East Asian Studies. It should bemade
ﬁnancially attractive for businesses and commercial groups to provide these opportunities as this
training is in the nation’s long-term interest.
(4) More speciﬁcally, in the cases of Korea and Japan, we want to call attention to the following:
(a) The nearly complete lack of undergraduate and graduate bursaries⁄It is a sad truth that few
undergraduate Britons choose to study East Asia, and is a dangerous trend that the best
graduate students do not come to this country, because we have no money to support them.
Universities in the US, Canada, and Australia catch and keep the best and brightest.
(b) The nearly complete lack of post-doctoral research appointments that would snare the best
young scholars.
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We propose that:
For Korean Studies alone, the Government should capitalise a set of 12 full undergraduate and
post-graduate bursaries for use at the four institutions which teach Korean subjects in the UK
(SOAS, SheYeld, Oxford, and Cambridge).
The government should capitalise a set of six post-doctoral research fellowships for the same
institutions.
The BAKSCouncil could administer these bursaries and fellowships, because it represents all four
institutions, and for several years has administered bursaries and internships for undergraduate
students to spend part of their course-time in Korea, and to experience the business world of
Korea.
Any successful short-term policy prescriptions on East Asia will be dependent on the pursuit of a
long-term policy for the development of expertise on the region, as Sir Peter Parker made quite
plain over 20 years ago.Without the commitment to a long-termpolicy of development, this nation
will not only be ﬂying blind, but we will have nothing to oVer East Asians in the coming decades,
who will increasingly become the world’s dominant force politically as well as commercially.
The Council of the British Association for Korean Studies:
President: Professor James H Grayson
Immediate Past President: Dr James Hoare
Secretary: Professor Keith Pratt
Treasurer: Dr John Swenson-Wright
Members of Council: Dr Kirsteen Kim, Dr Grace Koh, Ms Fumiko Kobayashi, Dr James B Lewis,
Ms Jane Portal, Dr David Prendergast
March 2008
Submission from the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
I. Introduction
1. We welcome this inquiry. North East Asia is of vital importance, both politically and economically,
to the UK and EU and key strategic priorities are at stake in the region. Some of the largest and fastest
growing economies are here. It is a major source of trade and investment for the UK and wider EU, as well
as being important for climate security, counter-proliferation, regional and international security. Within
the region, Japan and South Korea are major “like-minded” partners for the UK: free-market economies
and democracies, with shared values and a number of common objectives in international issues. We have
shared interests in combating key global challenges, including in the areas of international security, counter-
proliferation, climate change and poverty reduction.
2. Japan and South Korea will play a crucial role in ensuring stability in East Asia, which is vital to the
security and prosperity of theUKandEU. Their success in achieving this will depend on their close relations
with the US and involvement in the Six Party Talks on North Korean denuclearisation, and through
bilateral relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Key to this too will be Japan’s
improving relationship with China. A conﬁdent, outward looking Japan which enjoys good relations with
China is essential for regional security and beneﬁcial to both the UK and the EU. The EU’s economic and
security interests in the region are set out clearly in the Council’s East Asia Policy Guidelines, published at
the end of 2007. These recognise the region as being one of especially dynamic change in which the EU has
substantial interests.
3. The DPRK nuclear and missile issues, and the fragility of its economic and political systems are a
major threat to international peace and security in the region. We already work closely with South Korea
and Japan and will support them where possible to ensure a peaceful and sustainable resolution to the
DPRK question. We also continue to have a role in upholding peace and security on the Korean peninsula
as a member of the UN Military Armistice Commission.
4. Trade and investment is the dominant side of our relationship with both countries with the Japanese
and South Korean economies being respectively the second and eleventh largest in the world. Japan is the
UK’s largest trading partner outside the US and the EU with £4 billion each in goods and services. Japan
is also the leading source of FDI into the UK after the US and the largest in Europe with about 20% of the
total. There are huge beneﬁts to be gained for the UK in deepening UK-Japan co-operation in R&D. South
Korea is a similarly signiﬁcant trade partner being the UK’s eighth largest export market. Major Korean
companies are also choosing the UK as the base for their European operations.
5. Internationally both countries are committed members of the UN being in the top 15 largest
contributors to the UN Regular budget, though with Japan paying signiﬁcantly more as the second largest
contributor after theUS.Onpeacekeeping, Japan’s actions are limited by its constitution. In contrast, South
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Korea has been able to contribute troops to Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon and is keen to do more. Japan
took over the Presidency of the G8 in 2008. The UK is working hard with Japan for ambitious outcomes
on climate change and Africa and development, which are Japanese priorities.
6. Our relationships with Japan and South Korea are well established, though in some ways receive less
public attention than the emerging relationship with China. In order to ensure that our relationships with
both countries can achieve their full potential the FCO has formulated cross-Whitehall strategies to guide
our engagement. These identify our key priorities for both countries: top priorities for the Japan relationship
were also embodied in the joint statement issued by then Prime Ministers Blair and Abe when they met in
London in January 2007. At the same time, there are senior level advisory bodies feeding into the work of
Government. The UK/Korea Forum for the Future headed by LordKerr of Kinlochard and the UK/Japan
21st Century Group headed by the Rt Hon Lord Cunningham of Felling meet regularly in both countries
to discuss the state of the relationships.
7. During former-President Roh’s 2004 State Visit to the UK it was agreed that both countries would
hold campaigns celebrating our bilateral relationship and raising awareness of each other’s strengths. The
South Koreans held their campaign in 2006, while the UK campaign took place in 2007, partly to mark the
50th anniversary of our raising a diplomatic presence in South Korea. In January 2008, the British Embassy
in Tokyo launched amajor public diplomacy campaign tomark 150 years ofUK/Japan diplomatic relations
entitled UK-Japan 2008. The programme focuses on highlighting UK/Japan achievements in the creative
industries, science and innovation and the arts, all of which are areas for strong potential for future UK and




8. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has ruled Japan for almost all of its post-war
history. In power continuously from 1955–93, they were toppled by a loose opposition coalition in 1993.
But they returned to power in 1994 as part of a coalition and all governments since then have been led by
the LDP. The current coalition was formed in April 2000 between the LDP andNewKomeito, a small party
with close ties to the lay Buddhist organisation, Soka Gakkai. The main Opposition party is the nominally
“centrist” Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)—in reality an amalgam of former members of the Socialist
Party, LDP rebels and others.
9. After a succession of short-lived leaders in the late 1990s, Junichiro Koizumi became Prime Minister
in April 2001. His fresh approach was popular with the public allowing him to pursue diYcult structural
reforms and tackle vested interests within the party. Koizumi was succeeded as Prime Minister by Shinzo
Abe on 26 September 2006. Abe was Japan’s youngest Prime Minister since WWII and the ﬁrst to be born
after it. He pledged to continue Koizumi’s domestic reforms and to break with the post-war foreign policy
consensus by amending the Constitution and promoting a proactive foreign policy. But his position was
weakened when the LDP and New Komeito lost their Upper House majority in the election in July 2007
following a major pensions scandal. In theory, this allows the Opposition to block or delay most legislation.
Abe resigned due to ill health on 12 September 2007 after just one year as Prime Minister.
10. Yasuo Fukuda succeeded Abe as PrimeMinister on 25 September 2007. He is 71 and is respected for
his experience, especially as Chief Cabinet Secretary under Prime Ministers Mori and Koizumi. Known for
hismoderate, consensual approach, Fukuda has sought to cooperatewith theOppositionwhere possible but
has shown himself willing to force legislation through theDiet using the government’s two thirdsmajority in
the Lower House. A general election is not due until September 2009, but Fukuda might be forced to go to
the country before then to break the political impasse. His current poll ratings are not healthy and he has
said that he would prefer to wait until at least after the G8 Summit in July.
International security and peacekeeping
11. Japan has become an increasingly co-operative partner on a wide range of issues including Iraq, Iran,
Indonesia/East Timor, the Middle East Peace Process, Afghanistan, and in counter-proliferation and the
ﬁght against terrorism. Since 9/11 Japan has provided welcome political, economic and logistical support
to the international coalition against terrorism and has extended strong civil and military support to
reconstruction eVorts in Iraq.
12. Japan’s security policy has been constrained by its American-authored post-war constitution, in
particular byArticle 9 which renounced war, disallowed the possession of armed forces, and denied the right
of belligerence. Although Japan has interpreted the constitution in a way that allows for the right to
maintain self-defence forces (SDF), the current cabinet interpretation of Article 9 judges that Japan should
not exercise its inherent right of collective self-defence. This has implications for Japan’s participation both
in Ballistic Missile Defence with the US and in UN peacekeeping operations. In practice, it also inhibits
military co-operation or combined exercises with countries other than the US. Under Prime Minister Abe
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there was a drive to revise Article 9 tomake it easier for Japan to contribute toUNpeacekeeping operations.
However, Fukuda has had to concentrate—at least initially—on domestic issues, and appears less inclined
to take this issue forward.
13. In January 2004, Koizumi overcame strong domestic opposition and secured authorisation for the
deployment of of approximately 550 Ground SDF personnel to southern Iraq. The forces were withdrawn
at the mission’s end in the summer of 2006. Japan maintains an intra-theatre airlift mission in Iraq, which
has recently been extended until July 2009.
14. Since 2001, the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF) have provided fuel to coalition
vessels conducting maritime interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean in support of Afghanistan
OperationEnduringFreedom. Therewas a short break betweenNovember 2007 and January this yearwhen
the DPJ used its Upper House majority to block renewal of the enabling legislation. This led to the
temporary withdrawal of the MSDF from the Indian Ocean. The Government, using their two thirds
majority in the Lower House, eventually forced through new legislation on 11 January and theMSDF have
now returned to the Indian Ocean. The UK has welcomed the resumption of the mission, not least as an
important symbol of Tokyo’s commitment to a wider international security role.
15. On international peacekeeping, Japan has incrementally increased its global contributions
(particularly in Asia), recently dispatching a small observation team to theUNmission in Nepal and a small
policing team to East Timor. The UK Government would like to see Japan doing more despite the
constitutional constraints and has lobbied for a greater contribution in Afghanistan and Africa among
other places.
UK/Japan Defence Relations
16. In the wake of close co-operation on the ground in Iraq, the bilateral defence relationship is stronger
than it has ever been. The Japanese have made clear their wish to continue regular dialogue with the UK
across a wide range of defence matters, with a particular focus on, joint operational planning, defence
procurement reform, the higher level management of defence, and the UK’s “comprehensive approach” to
Peace Support Operations (PSO). The Japanese place great emphasis on the close relationship between our
two Navies⁄co-operation which dates back to the end of the 19th Century. There is scope to deepen our
relationship still further with the two other Services.
17. The UK’s primary security co-operation objective is to help build Japan’s capacity for joint
operations, particularly in the area of peace support activities combining civil andmilitary eVects. The desire
is for Japan to become an eVective contributor to global PSO in the medium-term. The UK also seeks to
maintain Japan’s commitment to its remaining mission in Iraq (airlift). Defence sales remain an important
aspect of the bilateral relationship, with Japan seen as a possible market for the Typhoon.
18. Japan and the UK hold regular Defence StaV Talks, and single Service StaV Talks. In June 2007,
Political-Military Talks were held for the ﬁrst time in Tokyo jointly with the MOD, FCO,and the Japanese
MOD and MOFA. Japan regularly takes up places in the UK’s Royal College of Defence Studies and
Advanced Command and StaVCourse, with a Japanese RCDS graduate seconding to theMOD in alternate
years for eight weeks (next in 2009).
US/Japan relations
19. The US remains Japan’s principal partner in foreign and defence policy as well as trade. The US has
guaranteed Japan’s security since 1960 under the terms of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Like the UK, the
US would like to see Japan play a more active role in international security and supports Japan’s bid for
permanent membership of the Security Council. Fukuda reaYrmed the importance of the alliance by
making his ﬁrst overseas visit as Prime Minister to the US in November 2007. The Japan and US share
similar views on most security issues, including on DPRK (but see below). They also agree on a policy of
engagement towards China. Prime Minister Fukuda took this approach further at the East Asian Summit
in November last year stating that the alliance should be used to leverage an enhanced Japanese role in Asia
to boost relations with China and the Republic of Korea. The Japan and US have begun co-operation on
a ballistic missile defence programme in response to the DPRK and terrorist threats. The base realignment
agreement in May 2006, which should be implemented by 2013, should lead to a substantially more
integrated and regionally focused US defence posture. However, there remain diYculties with local
communities in the areas surrounding the bases.
20. DPRK featured prominently in Fukuda’s visit to the US on 17 November 2007. He emphasised that
Japan was concerned by DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes, as well as the Japanese abductees issue
(see below), and feared that DPRK would not keep its promises on denuclearisation. President Bush
reassured Fukuda that the US would not jeopardise the US-Japan relationship as it sought to normalise
relations with the DPRK, and that the Japanese abductees would not be forgotten.
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EU/Japan relations
21. Japan’s bilateral relationship with the EU is anchored in two documents: the Joint Declaration of
1991 and the Action Plan for EU-Japan Co-operation of 2001. The Joint Declaration established common
principles and shared objectives in the political, economic, co-operation and cultural areas and established
a consultation framework for annual meetings between Japan and the EU. The Action Plan has four basic
objectives: promoting peace and security; strengthening the economic and trade partnership; coping with
global and societal challenges; and bringing people and cultures together. An EU-Japan summit takes place
annually at the level of the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission
and the Japanese Prime Minister. The next Summit is due to take place in Tokyo in April.
22. At the last EU-Japan Summit in June in Berlin in June 2007, it was agreed to deepen Science and
Technology co-operation as part of the shared drive to a knowledge-based society and the promotion of
innovation. This drive was also reﬂected in the adoption of an IPR Protection and Enforcement plan to
further encourage co-operation in this area. A new high level dialogue on trade issues was launched last year,
as well as the Industrial Co-operation Dialogue. There was also an initialling of an Agreement on Customs
Co-operation and Mutual assistance.
23. The EU has recently started to realise its interests in the preservation of peace and security in East
Asia and the need for eVective and consistent EU diplomacy in the region to aVect this. Furthermore,
regional countries havemade clear their desire for the EU to play a greater, more strategic role in the region.
The endorsement of the East Asia PolicyGuidelines in Council and subsequent publication on 20December
2007 are a step forward in our eVorts to achieve a coherent and strategic EU approach to East Asia. The
guidelines are based on the assessment that East Asia is a region of especially dynamic change in which the
EU has substantial interests and set the parameters for pursuing the EU’s broad foreign and security
objectives in the region (Attached at Annex 1).
Japan regional relations
China
24. Japan normalised relations with China in 1972 and the two countries have strong, and growing,
economic links. But there are underlying tensions in the relationship. Japan is concerned about the
implications of China’s rapid economic growth for regional security and is particularly concerned about the
growth in, and lack of transparency of, China’s defence spending. In China, there are still bitter memories
of Japanese actions in the 1930s and 1940s, which the Chinese Government has occasionally fanned for its
own domestic reasons.
25. Prime Minister Fukuda’s premiership holds out the prospect that Japan’s relations with China will
continue to improve. Fukuda sent out a strong signal to Beijing by ruling out making visits to the Yasukuni
Shrine immediately after he became prime minister. Fukuda’s relations with Prime Minister Wen are
markedly more relaxed than those of his predecessors. His lunch with Wen at the East Asian Summit was
the ﬁrst time a Japanese prime minister had had lunch with his Chinese counterpart in a third country; and
a recent phone call was reportedly the ﬁrst ever between Japanese and Chinese leaders. This was followed
by a successful visit by Fukuda to China in December 2007.
26. A key objective in bilateral relations is to increase China’s eVorts in reducing GHG emissions and
other pollutants. During Fukuda’s visit to China the two sides committed to pilot projects in emissions
reduction, to strengthen intellectual property in the area of energy eYcient technologies, and to co-operate
on clean production in heavy industry. They also agreed to step up joint research and training programmes
on environmental issues, with a target of 10,000 participants over three years. China is Japan’s top priority
for strengthening international collaboration (with South Korea a close second) and in many areas of
science and technology appears to have overtaken individual EU countries in terms of numbers of scientiﬁc
exchanges and research projects (the US remains top partner). Leading Japanese Universities and research
agencies have opened oYces in Beijing.
27. On the East China Sea dispute (over territorial limits relating to exploration rights for gas reserves),
it was agreed that the negotiation teams would be upgraded to Vice-Ministerial level. However, territorial
delineation eVorts remain deadlocked and China continues its development of some gas ﬁelds near the
disputed boundary. The next target for progress is Hu Jintao’s visit to Japan scheduled for spring 2008.
South Korea
28. Although the history of the colonial period remains a sensitive issue, links between Japan and South
Korea have been expanding in the economic and cultural areas. Relations with the South were normalised
under the Basic Treaty in 1965 and had shown signs of warming after President Kim Dae-jung, during his
visit to Japan in September 1998, stated publicly that the relationship should look forwards, not back.
President RohMoo-hyun visited Japan for a regular summit meeting in June 2003 but, after he clashed with
PrimeMinister Koizumi over a variety of what he saw as “inappropriate” Japanese actions (including visits
to Yasukuni), these Summits were suspended. Relations improved after Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Seoul
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in October 2006. South Korea’s new President, Lee Myung Bak, has said that he is keen to strengthen the
relationship further, moving on from the past, and there are signs that this is receiving a warm response
in Tokyo.
North Korea
29. Japan’s relations with DPRK been overshadowed by the latter’s nuclear and missile programmes.
They have been further complicated by the DPRK’s unwillingness to give a full account of its abduction of
an unknown number of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s,Koizumi’s bold decision to visit Pyongyang
and meet Kim Jong II in September 2002 was supposed to pave the way for normalisation of relations. But
Kim’s conﬁrmation that the DPRK had abducted Japanese citizens provoked a backlash in Japan. The
Japanese Government responded by cutting oV the humanitarian aid that it had been providing to the
DPRK. This temporarily resumed in May 2004 when Prime Minister Koizumi made his second visit to
Pyongyang and secured the release of the immediate families of those abductees who had been allowed to
return to Japan. The UK has repeatedly expressed its support for Japan’s eVorts to resolve the abductees
issue.
30. Japan is a participant in the Six Party Talks, which address the DPRK nuclear issue. It has adopted
a sceptical position on the prospects of DPRK giving up its nuclear weapons and has consistently insisted
on a resolution of the abductees issue. Japan does not contribute to the 1 million tonnes of heavy fuel oil
(or equivalent) energy aid that the DPRK is entitled to receive under the Six Party Talks’s 13 February
Agreement if it fulﬁlls its side of the bargain. A Six Party Talks working group established to work towards
the normalisation of Japan-DPRK relations has failed to make substantive progress.
Wider political relations with Asia
31. Japan is by far the largest investor and bilateral aid donor in the ASEAN region. Prime Minister
Fukuda used his ﬁrst East Asian Summit to develop his greater focus on Asia. He held a series of meetings
with regional leaders at which he discussed bilateral and regional topics. These included Premier Wen of
China, President RohMoo-Hyun of the Republic of Korea and PrimeMinister Manmohan Singh of India,
and others. He alsomet the Burmese PrimeMinister and called on him to re-double his eVorts to bring about
democratisation and to open negotiations with Aung San Suu Kyi. Japan has been negotiating a series of
Free Trade Agreements and Economic Partnership Agreements with its ASEAN partners.
Relations with international organisations
32. Japan is a reliable member of the international system and contributes 19.5% of the UN regular
budget. Japan is supportive of UN administrative reform. Securing permanent membership of the Security
Council is a long-standing aim for Japan. The UK supports wider representation, including a permanent
seat for Japan. It joined the International Criminal Court in 2007. As President of the G8 and an active
player in the IFIs, Japan takes seriously the need for eVective international institutions and shares a number
of our objectives on institutional reform, eg on the UN and the IFIs.
UK/Japan relationship
33. Japan is one of the UK’s most important global partners. It is a strong ally on nuclear non-
proliferation, the third largest aid donor in theworld and shareswith theWest similar values and approaches
to major foreign policy issues. Engagement with Japan is crucial on these issues and on climate change,
conﬂict prevention and reform of international institutions. This does not prevent the UK Government
making it clear where it diVers from Japan on such issues as whaling and the death penalty.
34. In order to make more of the close working relationship with Japan, the FCO, with other Whitehall
departments, formulated a UK/Japan strategy in September 2006 with the aim of deriving beneﬁt for both
countries’ international priorities.
35. In January 2007, former Prime Minister Abe visited the UK and signed an agreement with former
PrimeMinister Blair on promoting bilateral relations. The agreement endorsed joint objectives in four areas:
international security, climate change, international development and science, technology and innovation
and has formed the basis for developing relations in 2007. (The agreement is attached at Annex 2).
36. In January 2008, the HMG took stock of developments over the past 18 months recognising that the
political climate in Japan since the strategy was written had changed signiﬁcantly. Japan’s key role in
counter-proliferation and conﬂict prevention, its importance to the UK for trade and investment and its
central role in discussions on development and climate change was underlined. We are now looking at ways
to develop the EU/Japan relationship and improve further the UK image as a place for future direct
investment.
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37. In 2008, the British Embassy launched UK-Japan 2008 to mark 150 years of UK/Japan diplomatic
relations. UK-Japan 2008 is a major public diplomacy campaign running throughout the year, organised
jointly by the British Embassy and British Council. It focuses speciﬁcally on highlighting UK/Japan
achievements which are contemporary, creative and collaborative in the creative industries, science and
innovation and the arts—all areas with strong potential for future UK and Japanese economic growth.
There will be well over 100 events in total as part of UK-Japan 2008, ranging from major public events,
performances and exhibitions through to science and business workshops. (A list of highlight events is
attached at Annex 3).
Trade relations
38. Japan is the UK’s largest trading partner outside the US and EU. It oVers export and technology
opportunities in key business sectors such as aerospace, automotive, IT, health care, nanotech,
pharmaceuticals and ﬁnancial services. Japanese companies are generally open to buying products, services
and technology from theUK, but competition is getting tougher. Japan is amajor trading and foreign direct
investor in the Asia/Paciﬁc region. There are strong prospects for UK companies to establish closer business
links with Japanese partners ie joint ventures, investing in Japan to target the region as well as the large
Japanese domestic market. The market can be confusing, expensive and time-consuming: large and small
UK companies value UKTI help with introductions, market research, events and PR.
39. Japan is the leading source of FDI into the UK after the US. Some 1445 Japanese-owned companies
have invested in the UK, which is host to over a quarter of all Japanese investment in Europe. Japanese-
owned companies employ over 100,000 in the UK, far more than in any other European country. Of the
Japanese companies operating in the UK, over 230 own manufacturing facilities and over 150 have their
own R&D operations. In 2004–05, UKTI recorded 57 investment projects from Japan, creating over 3,000
new jobs. The number of projects for 2005–06 totalled 84. In 2005, Japan invested more through acquisition
in the UK than in any other market, and more than at any time since 1988. Many of these are strategic
investments for the global market, expected to beneﬁt the UK operations acquired as well as the acquiring
companies. There are strong prospects for investment from Japan in the pharmaceutical and life science
sectors and in ICT (services and software as well as equipment), with opportunities in sectors as diverse as
environmental technology, aerospace and medical equipment. Japanese-owned car plants account for over
50% of UK car production, three quarters of it exported. Over 70 Japanese companies manufacture
automotive components in the UK. Automotive R&D, not least Environmentally Friendly Vehicle
technology, is a major target, both for collaborative R&D and for independent facilities.
Science and Technology Relations
40. Japan is the UK’s second biggest partner for research collaboration. Our priorities are aligned,
focusing on climate change, sustainable energy, healthcare and innovation, as set out in the PMs’ joint
statement in January 2007. The Japanese government aims to invest 1% of GDP in science and technology
over the ﬁve year period (2006–11), with an annual budget in FY 2008–09 of 15.5 billion pounds. There is
increasing focus on investment in strategic priorities. Under the Cool Earth initiative for example Japan
aims to invest approximatelyUSD30 billion in developing innovative low carbon technologies over the next
ﬁve years. It is in our interest to ensure that this investment is eVectively aligned with our own investment
in energy R&D, both to support development of UK needs and capabilities and to ensure eVective
international co-operation in this arena—as recommended in the Stern Review.
41. Overall, Japan accounts for about 20% of the world’s R&D, 80% of which is conducted by the private
sector. The top 10 Japanese companies invest more in R&D than the UK public and private sectors
combined. Access to Japanese R&D strengthens the UK science base, supports technology development by
UK business and helps build a common agenda around the key challenges facing the UK and Japan—
security, climate change, energy supply, an ageing population and infectious disease. It has an important
role to play in delivery of a low carbon, high growth economy.
42. UK scientists stand to gain from access to Japanese funding and support for collaborative research,
particularly in those areas perceived to be less strong. The International Strategy recently published by the
Research Councils sets out more clearly the importance of international collaboration in maintaining UK
scientiﬁc capabilities. Informally, the Research Councils estimate that around 220 million pounds of
research funding supports projects with some form of Japanese involvement (second to the US). There is
strong evidence to suggest that internationally co-authored research papers have a higher impact than those
resulting from non-collaborative research. The relationship is of mutual beneﬁt, with Japan particularly
interested in developing links to UK expertise in the life sciences (the most striking example being a GBP 8
million grant to Imperial College to establish a joint programme on structural biology) and the UK focused
on developing links in advanced materials, physics and ICT.
43. Access to Japanese research facilities and data is also important tomaintaining the strength of theUK
science base, particularly as Japan has invested heavily in advanced research facilities and is a participant in
major international projects (such as ITER—the experimental nuclear fusion reactor). Access to the Earth
Simulator supercomputer in Yokohama helped secure continued UK leadership in the ﬁeld of climate
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modelling, with UK researchers estimating that this put their research one to two years ahead of where it
would otherwise have been. Output from the collaboration contributed to the fourth IPCC report and the
skills can be transferred to the UK’s own supercomputer (HECToR) through continued partnership with
the Japanese. The Japanese contribute around GBP 4 million to run a muon research facility at the
Rutherford Appleton Laboratory in Oxford and have just agreed to extend that facility by another ﬁve
years. An MOU between next generation synchrotrons in the UK and Japan (Diamond and SPring8
respectively) ensures that both countries remain at the forefront of global research and maximises scientiﬁc
output. Other beneﬁts include the opportunity to work with Japan in complex data heavy areas, such as
systems biology and structural biology (eg access to large amounts of structural biology data).
Development Relations
44. The UK has good relations with Japan on development: development was one of four priority areas
for the bilateral relationship going forward in the statement signed by PMs Abe and Blair in January 2007.
During 2007, the Department For International Development has made substantial investments its
relationship with Japanese counterparts, particularly through visits to Japan and contribution toG8 papers,
as part of wider eVorts to increase engagement with major donor countries.
45. Current signs indicate that the investment is paying oV. The Japanese have conﬁrmed that together
with Climate Change, Development and Africa will be one of the key themes of their G8 Presidency.
Japanese priorities on development ﬁt well with UK government priorities for the G8 Summit: the primacy
of the MDGs; the importance of making progress on health systems and education; economic growth; and
the fundamental connections between climate change and development.
46. Bilateral cooperation in country is also increasing. Discussions are underway in Ethiopia, Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda to identify areas where the UK and Japan can collaborate more. The UK
and Japan have diVerent complementary strengths: Japanese strengths of particular interest are growth,
infrastructure and investment and bringing lessons from Asia to Africa. These discussions are important in
view of current Japanese ODA reform process—fromOctober 2008 DFID and the Japan International Co-
operation Agency (JICA) will be two of the largest bilateral aid organisations in the world.
47. The UK is working closely with Japan on development both within the G8 Presidency and in
preparations for the fourth Tokyo International Conference on Africa (TICAD IV) which is being held in
May 2008. The results of this will feed into the G8 Summit.
48. Overall despite the fact that the Japanese ODA budget is falling due to its tight ﬁscal situation and
low public support for development, Japan is an important and complementary partner to the UK on
development with whom the UK’s relationship is closer than ever before.
Environment relations
Climate Change
49. Prime Minister Fukuda has conﬁrmed that climate change will be the priority theme for the G8
summit, and has pledged to continue “Cool Earth 50”, former PMAbe’s personal climate change initiative.
Although otherMinistries favour a more ambitious approach, the Japanese approach to climate change has
been strongly inﬂuenced by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) which favours a stance
based on voluntary agreements and a sectoral approach. They co-ordinated their position very closely with
theUS throughout COP 13 in Bali in December 2007, and were consistently among the backmarkers (along
with the US, Canada and Australia) in resisting further mention of short-term emissions reduction targets
for developed countries.
50. Prime Minister Fukuda moved Japanese policy forward when he launched Japan’s G8 agenda at the
World Economic Forum at Davos on 26 January 2008. In his speech, Prime Minister Fukuda proposed:
— Japan would agree, together with other major emitters, to set a post-Kyoto “quantiﬁed national
target”. This “could be” based on a bottom-up sectoral methodology.
— The 1990 base year and other issues “must” be reviewed to ensure fairness.
— A global target of 30% improvement in energy eYciency by 2020.
— Japan’s “Cool Earth Partnership” would oVer $10 billion to work with developing countries in
tackling climate change.
— Japanwould aim to createwith theUS andUKanewmultilateral fund, and called on other donors
to participate.
— Japan would invest US $30 billion in energy R&D over the next ﬁve years and set up an
“international framework” in order to work closely with international organisations like the IEA.
51. A further agreement along the lines of Kyoto is opposed by the Keidanren, and especially by a group
of energy intensive industries (steel, electric power, cement). Their view is that the Kyoto Protocol, with its
1990 baseline and “6, 7, 8” (Japan 6%, USA 7%, EU 8%) target setting was deeply unfair to Japan, which
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had considerably better energy eYciency in 1990 than its competitors. This group is resisting any further
mandatory target setting, and has instead set itself tough voluntary targets, promising to buy CDM credits
if it fails to meet them.
52. The British Government has been active on this issue with Japan. As well as discussions with the
government, we have been in contact with business, the media and civil society. With business we have been
arguing that the global move to low carbon presents a business opportunity for Japan, with its world class,
energy eYcient companies. Among our public facing events, we held a joint symposium with the Keidanren
in May at which former Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett spoke; and arranged public presentations by
BERR Secretary of State John Hutton MP, the former Chief Scientiﬁc Adviser Sir David King and the
former Head of the Government Economic Service, Lord Stern.
Whaling
53. Whaling remains a point of contention. This will continue to be the case so long as Japan insists on
its right under the Convention for theRegulation ofWhaling, to carry out “scientiﬁc”whaling. Japan carries
out large-scale lethal scientiﬁc whaling programmes in the Antarctic and North Paciﬁc. Under JARPA II,
(in the Antarctic) Japan announced its intention to take 935 minke whales, 50 Fin whales and 50 humpback
whales annually (though the humpback programme was later suspended). The UK is strongly opposed to
all lethal whaling, except for some limited subsistence whaling, andworkswith allies within the International
Whaling Commission (IWC) to maintain a majority of the current membership in favour of the
international moratorium on commercial whaling. The UK and its allies regained the simple majority at the
IWCAnnualMeeting in 2007, but continued Japanese recruitment of developing countries puts this at risk.
Death penalty
54. Japan continues to apply the death penalty. There was a de facto moratorium in place during most
of 2006, but Japan did not hold de facto abolitionist status. Execution is by hanging and is carried out in
secret, with little notiﬁcation to prisoners and none to their families. Recently however Justice Minister
Kunio Hatoyama decided to announce the names of three prisoners executed on 7 December 2007, the ﬁrst
time such details have been disclosed. The UK usually lobbies on the death penalty as part of the EU. The
EU raises the death penalty during Human Rights Troika meetings and through de´marches.
55. There is an active “Parliamentary League against the death penalty”. The league is planning to submit
an abolition bill to the forthcoming ordinary session of the Diet, one of the main points of which will be
that life sentences should be introduced as an alternative to the death penalty. The Japanese government
justiﬁes its position in favour of the death penalty by reference to strong public support and a rise in violent
crimes, although the standard of public safety in Japan is higher and reported crime rates are far lower than
in most industrialised countries.
III. Republic of Korea (South Korea)
Political Situation
56. The end of the SecondWorldWar freedKorea from 35 years of Japanese rule but the country divided
intoUS and Soviet occupation zones along the 38th Parallel. This then acquired semi-permanent status with
the onset of the Cold War. The Republic of Korea was founded in the south on 15 August 1948 and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north on 9 September the same year. On 25 June
1950 the DPRK invaded the South Korea and overran most of the country. A UN Command (UNC) led
by theUSAwas established to defend the South. The war devastated the peninsula. An armistice was signed
between the DPRK/China and UNC on 27 July 1953. South Korea’s early Presidents established
authoritarian dictatorships but waves of civil unrest eventually led to the ﬁrst truly democratic elections
in 1987.
57. Lee Myung-bak from the centre-right Grand National Party decisively won the December 2007
Presidential election and succeeded Roh Moo-hyun on 25 February, ending 10 years of progressive
government. Lee Myung-bak nominated former Finance and Foreign Minister Han Seung-soo (who has
close links to the UK) as his Prime Minister.
58. After the last National Assembly elections in April 2004, the progressive Uri Party was the largest
party with 152 seats, followed by the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) with 121 seats. In the run
up to the latest presidential election the competition between potential candidates led to a major
restructuring of progressive political groups with the United New Democratic Party (UNDP) replacing the
Uri Party at the centre. Despite the party’s eVorts, the UNDP’s candidate was beaten by the GNP’s in the
election. Further regrouping of political parties can be expected before the National Assembly elections
scheduled for April with the UNDP nowmerged with the Democratic Party to form the United Democratic
Party (UDP).
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International security and peacekeeping
59. The 1953MutualDefence Treaty between SouthKorea and theUS forms the basis of its alliance with
theUSA, which ensures security on theKorean Peninsula. TheUS is re-conﬁguring its presence to a smaller,
but more potent force of 25,000 stationed within South Korea. South Korea’s largely conscript army
supports this with over 600,000 troops, the sixth largest in the world. The US has other forces in the region
onwhich it could call if necessary. SouthKoreawill assume operational wartime control of its forces in 2012.
60. With a per capita defence expenditure exceeding that of the UK, together with modern and capable
defence forces, South Korea has considerable potential as a substantial contributor to international peace
keeping operations. Its desire to play a greater role on the international stage and to maintain its alliance
with the US has led to South Korean soldiers being sent overseas to play a valuable and important role in
the last six years, albeit rarely on the front line. The transition team for the new Administration recently
recommended the creation of a 1,000 strong standing force available for Peace Support Operation (PSO)
with the UN by the end of 2008, increasing to a 2,000 strong force by the end of 2012. Currently, under the
South Korean Constitution, all deployments of soldiers overseas require the annual approval of the
National Assembly. However, it is also likely that new legislation will be proposed during the next twelve
or so months that will allow Korea to deploy forces on UN mandated operations without the speciﬁc
approval of the National Assembly. The success of this legislative change, which will facilitate rapid
deployment of Korean forces on UN PSO and which has been attempted three times previously, will very
much depend on the size of the government majority after the National Assembly elections in April.
61. Despite its a modern well-equipped military, the potential PSO contribution by South Korea can be
over-estimated primarily because her regional security responsibilities take precedence. In addition, South
Korea’s forces are largely conscripted and, as a result, are much more closely linked to the civilian
population than volunteer professional forces such as exist in the UK. Not only does this result in a higher
level of public, and therefore political interest in any potential deployment of the armed forces, but also
results in a reduced ability to accept casualties.
Afghanistan
62. In December 2007 all bar one of the last South Korean troops serving in Afghanistan returned home,
ending their six-year mission during which they had suVered one fatality. About 50 South Korean army
medics and 150 engineers had been stationed in Afghanistan since 2002 to help with reconstruction and
rehabilitation eVorts, including paving the runway at Bagram airport, expandingmajor roads and providing
medical services to about 259,000 people. The mandate of the deployment had been extended several times.
It was due to end at the end of 2008. However, the kidnapping of 23 Korean missionaries/“aid” workers in
July and subsequent murder of two of the group by Afghan militants who demanded the withdrawal of the
deployment was followed by a South Korean decision to end the deployment early.
63. South Korea remains involved, however, in a small Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)in
Afghanistan. A group of 20–30 government oYcials, civilian medical staV and vocational training experts
were sent to Bagram airbase in January 2008. The PRT also includes a group of ﬁve soldiers formed of two
doctors, one chemist, one administrator and one “manager” (a Lieutenant Colonel who will act as the Vice
Chief of the PRT). The PRT will provide medical services and vocational training.
Iraq
64. By late 2004 South Korea’s 3,000 troops in the Zaytun Unit made it the third largest contributor of
troops to theMultinational Force (MNF) behind the US and theUK.Numbers have steadily dropped since
then, with annual cuts the price for gaining three rounds of National Assembly approval for this somewhat
unpopular and controversial deployment. In December 2007, the National Assembly agreed to extend the
deployment of the Zaytun Unit to Iraq until the end of 2008, cutting the number of troops from 1,008 to
approximately 650.
Lebanon/Middle East
65. 358 South Korean troops have been serving as UN peacekeepers in Lebanon since July 2007. The
deployment consists of a formed unit of infantry combat troops with some support elements. The
deployment is relatively uncontroversial.
Elsewhere
66. There is a possibility that the South Korean Navy may contribute to Combined Task Force (CTF)
150 operations in Indian Ocean. CTF 150, currently commanded by the UK, is a combined naval force
employed in counter piracy and anti-terrorist operations in the Middle East. In addition, the Transition
Team working for the new administration recently recommended the deployment of Korean forces to assist
in the UN mission in Darfur “within the early part of this year”. The expected creation of a 1,000 strong
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force for UN operations by the end of 2008 (increasing further to 2,000 by the end of 2012) and attendant
changes to the legislative procedures necessary to allow these forces to deploy rapidly, will greatly enhance
Korea’s ability to contribute to global PSO.
UK/South Korea Defence relations
67. Defence relations between South Korea and the UK are good but our inﬂuence is limited, as South
Korea’s security remains dependent on the US military presence and security umbrella. The UK retains a
role through its membership of the UNMilitary Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), thereby contributing
directly to peace and stability within the region. The UK provides the senior Commonwealth oYcer to
UNCMAC (a Brigadier) and a National Liaison OYcer (a diplomat)
68. The UK’s primary defence relations objective is to persuade South Korea to contribute more to
global PSO and at least to a level commensurate with her world economic ranking. The UK and South
Korea hold biennial Defence StaV Talks and share similar views on many security issues, such as counter-
proliferation, counter-terrorism, and regional/global security. There is a growing relationship between the
Navies, cultivated through high-level contact, Naval StaV Talks, and regular ship visits. South Korea sends
students to the UK’s Royal College of Defence Studies and Advanced Command and StaV Course, and
there is a developing relationship between our respective defence and security academic institutions. TheUK
and South Korea have established an ongoing Air Force Cadet exchange programme and a midshipman’s
exchange programme is under development.
69. Defence sales remain a signiﬁcant area of UK interest. The South Korean armed forces—the 6th
largest in the world—are in the process of modernising and are likely to oVer an increasingly competitive,
and potentially lucrative, defence market for UK industry. Speciﬁcally, the UK hopes to encourage greater
transparency within South Korean defence procurement procedures. Areas of potential for British defence
business include maritime surface and sub-surface sub-systems and integration expertise; helicopters and
rotary wing sub-systems; aircraft sub-systems, unmanned aerial vehicles; as well as force protection
technology for all environments.
70. South Korea has an energetic high-tech defence industry that is keen to grow to become a net
exporter. Particular strengths include shipbuilding and armoured vehicle production. It is keen to have its
own ﬁfth generation ﬁghter, as well as blue-water submarine and aircraft carrier capabilities, aiming to
develop a domestic capability for these by 2020. A key factor in all defence-related contracts is the ability
to transfer IPR and ensure domestic Korean production capacity. South Korea is a possible future partner
in the TYPHOON project (although EADS and Spain rather than the UK have the responsibility for
pursuing this).
US/South Korea relations
71. President Roh came to power vowing to loosen the historic ties between the US and South Korea.
Nevertheless, at the end of his presidency, the US still maintains nearly 30,000 troops in South Korea and
South Korea’s ground forces have a very strong relationship with the US Army. President Lee, however,
recognises the importance of the US-South Korea special relationship and has pledged to take steps to
strengthen it, although a desire for independence from the US will still remain in some quarters.
72. In April 2007, US and South Korean trade negotiators in Seoul concluded a bilateral free trade
agreement (FTA). The trade deal was Washington’s largest since NAFTA, agreed over 10 years ago, and
South Korea’s largest ever. The FTA is expected to boost two-way trade, currently over $70 billion a year,
by up to 20%. The deal is predicted to add up to 1.99% to Korean GDP and up to 0.2% to US GDP. It has
yet to be ratiﬁed in either capital.
EU/South Korea relations
73. In 2006, the EU became South Korea’s second largest trade partner (with the UK its largest recipient
of Korean investment for three out of the last four years) and its largest foreign investor. The EU, therefore,
has major direct economic interest at stake in South Korea and is currently negotiating a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) and considering whether to negotiate an updated Framework Agreement, which would
demonstrate how its relationship has grown with South Korea. Of particular interest to the UK is the
liberalisation of theKorean ﬁnancial and legal services markets, the lifting of indirect ownership restrictions
on telecomms companies and the elimination of whisky tariVs. The issue of whether to include a clause
covering Kaesong Industrial Complex (see below) as part of the overall EU/South Korea FTA is under
discussion.
74. President Lee is expected to seek to improve and expand relations with the EU, focussing on:
maximising economic cooperation (through the conclusion of EU-Korea FTA); improving Korea’s
investment environment for the EU (as part of a global policy designed to attract more foreign investors);
strengthening cooperation with the EU on key 21st century challenges (energy, environment, ﬁght against
terrorism); expanding cultural and education exchanges and cooperating with the EU for a post-nuclear
North Korea.
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South Korea regional relations
China
75. South Korea’s relations with China are driven by trade worth over $120 billion a year. The political
relationship after 15 years of diplomatic relations, however, is becoming more mature and President Lee
intends to develop that relationship further. Soon after his election in January, he sent a number of special
envoys to key countries, including China.
DPRK
76. Hostilities between the DPRK and the UN ended under the 1953 Armistice, but there is no Peace
Treaty. A heavily guarded De-Militarised Zone (DMZ), supervised by the UN Command Military
Armistice Commission under the Armistice Agreement, still separates the DPRK and South Korea. A war
between the twoKoreas, while unlikely, would have disastrous consequences for theKorean peninsula. This
scenario is perhaps made less likely as both sides have committed to work for the reuniﬁcation of Korea.
President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy from 1998 to 2003 led to the ﬁrst ever Inter-Korean Summit in
2000. It aimed to reduce tension on the peninsula and encourage inter-Korean co-operation. President Roh
pursued a similar approach, with great emphasis on economic and tourism co-operation.
77. Over the past 10 years, South Korea has invested more than US $1 bn into infrastructure projects
and provided other humanitarian assistance to the North. South Korea hopes that by exposing the DPRK
to outside inﬂuences, and improving basic infrastructure, the regime will see the beneﬁts of engagement and
becoming a responsible member of the global community.
78. President Lee has pledged to take a more cautious but pragmatic stance concerning inter-Korean
relations. The key political diVerence will be Lee’s determination to coordinate his DPRK policy more
closely with that of theUnited States. Consequently, the new government will attempt to link any expansion
of existing inter-Korean projects with progress at the Six Party Talks and agreements reached at the 2–4
October 2007 inter-Korean summit will be “re-examined in regard to feasibility, ﬁscal burdens and public
opinion in the south”. Inter-Korean related issues have been categorised by the new South Korean
administration into three “baskets”: projects that should be implemented as planned; those dependent on
the progress of the denuclearisation process in North Korea (likely to constitute the majority); and ﬁnally
plans thatwill bemomentarily suspended. Projects with substantial beneﬁt to SouthKoreawill be continued
(such as Kaesong Industrial Complex and the tourist resort at Mt. Kumgang). As yet, Lee has shown no
particular rush towards the negotiation of a Peace Treaty with his northern counterpart and other
interested parties.
79. Lee also proposed, as part of a wider package of government restructuring, that the Ministry of
Uniﬁcation (MOU) be merged with the Ministry of Foreign AVairs and Trade, ending its 40 year history.
Lee’s proposals need to be approved by theNational Assembly, but he has found resistance from theUnited
Democratic Party, which opposes the abolition.
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)
80. Most assistance from the South has gone into the development of initiatives such as the Kaesong
Industrial Complex or the Mt Kumgang Special tourism zone. Many more initiatives—both economic and
tourist—were agreed at the Second Inter-Korean Summit 2-4 October 2007, which was followed by
numerous oYcial level meetings and several high level visits by Prime Ministers and intelligence chiefs.
81. KIC is located 12km north of the DMZ in the DPRK. It was opened in 2004 under the management
of the SouthKorean companyHyundai Asan to allow SouthKorean (and other) businesses tomanufacture
goods using North Korean cheap labour. Currently 22 companies are operating in the complex employing
11,803 North Koreans and 709 South Koreans. By 2020, the plans are to have 2,000 companies employing
350,000 North Korean workers and turning over 20bn USD. There are plans too to include a tourism
complex and a zone for biotech and hi tech enterprises eg semi conductors.
82. Working conditions at the KIC have been the subject of much debate from a human rights
perspective. Although conditions are much better than those elsewhere in the DPRK, concerns have been
raised by a number of human rights organisations about the absence of basic worker’s rights. These include
the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining, the right to strike, the prohibition on sex
discrimination and sexual harassment, and restrictions on child labour. The DPRK is not a signatory to the
International Labour Organisation (ILO). The nominal salary for DPRK workers in Kaesong is US$68 a
month—considerably more than they would normally be paid. The problem is that only a part of this gets
to the workers with the DPRK government siphoning oV the rest. Kaesong is a source of foreign currency
income for theDPRK regime and although this may not contraveneUNSCR 1718, the lack of transparency
is problematic.
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DPRK Human Rights
83. To date, South Korea has been hesitant to openly criticise the human rights situation in the DPRK,
and has abstained from all UN DPRK human rights resolutions, with the exception of the 2006 related
UNGA resolution. Our Embassy in Seoul is working hard to raise the proﬁle of DPRK human rights issues
and is sponsoring a South Korean NGO working on North Korean human rights to produce a report on
children’s rights in the DPRK, based on refugee testimony. Some 10,000 refugees have settled in South
Korea, as South Korea is committed by its constitution to accepting all refugees from the DPRK. These
numbers are growing at a rate of around 2000 a year.
Relations with International Organisations
United Nations
84. The appointment of former SouthKorean ForeignMinister, BanKiMoon, asUNSecretaryGeneral
was viewed by many as heralding South Korea’s arrival on the world stage. South Korea is fully committed
to the UN reform agenda, and the need to shape a more eYcient, eVective and responsive UN, headed by
a Secretary-General empowered to run it. South Korea was admitted to the Geneva Group (15 largest
contributors to theUNRegular Budget) in 2006 in recognition of its ﬁnancial contribution (2.2%,UK6.6%)
and its reform credentials.
UK/South Korea relationship
85. The UK’s bilateral relationship with South Korea goes back over a century and 2008 is the 125th
Anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the UK and
Korea. The UK recognised the Republic of Korea when it was founded in 1948 and was quick to support
UN actions on the peninsula during the Korean War. The UK also played a full part in South Korea’s
reconstruction and British know-how helped in the development of the shipbuilding and automotive
industries. HM The Queen made a State Visit to South Korea in April 1999 and President Roh paid a State
Visit to the UK in December 2004.
86. Cultural and education links with theUKare also thriving. The number of Korean students currently
studying in the UK is approximately 20,000. The British Council has been in Seoul since 1973, and now
receives over 700 visitors a day, with unprecedented interest in its services. Its English language teaching
programme is one of the largest in the world and is set to expand, as the new South Korean government
places greater emphasis on English skills.
Trade
87. South Korea is a signiﬁcant trade and investment partner and is one of 16 countries in UKTI’s High
Growth Markets Programme. But it is not an easy place to do business and there is a degree of anti-foreign
business sentiment in the country. UKTI’s services are therefore highly valued by the British business
community and the team in Seoul is one of UKTI’s top performers world wide.
88. In 2006 (the latest full year for which statistics are available) theUKwasKorea’s eighth largest export
market and Korea was the UK’s twentyﬁfth. UK exports to Korea were valued at US$2.976 billion and
Korean exports to the UKUS$5.635 billion. Major UK exports in 2006 included whisky at US$222 million
(by far the most important—in value terms—export from the UK to Korea since 2003 and in the top three
for the past 15 years) and medicinal products (US$162 million). In the other direction, mobile phones
(US$1.2 billion); ships (ferries, cruise ships and tankers) (US$688 million); and motor vehicles (US$609
million) were the most signiﬁcant contributor to Korea’s favourable balance of trade with the UK.
Year UK Exports of UK Exports of UK Imports of UK Imports of
Services to Korea Goods to Korea Services from Korea Goods from Korea
(£ million) (£ million) (£ million) (£ million)
2006 784 1,702 265 3,116
2005 712 1,640 254 3,084
2004 903 1,451 248 3,128
2003 462 1,462 186 2,616
2002 495 1,464 185 2,869
Source: DTI Statistics.
[Note: In 2005 the UK accounted for about 1.2% of Korea’s import market. Biggest exporters to Korea
were: Japan (16.5%); China (15.7%) and the USA (10.9%). Korea’s biggest export markets were: China
(21%); USA (13.3%); and Japan (8.2%).]
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89. UK companies are present in a range of sectors inKorea.We are particularly strong in bankingwhere
Standard Chartered (the largest single foreign direct investor in Korea) and HSBC (currently attempting to
get a majority share in the Korea Exchange Bank valued at around US$6.3 billion), are particularly high
proﬁle. Prudential and Barclays are others in the ﬁnancial services sector with a strong presence. In retail,
Tesco in its collaborationwith Samsung is the nation’s second largest supermarket chain and derives around
40% of its overseas proﬁts from its Korean operation. Other notables include Diageo (Korea is the fourth
largest market for ScotchWhisky by value), Burberry, Unilever, BAT, AMEC, Rolls Royce, Astra Zeneca,
GSK, Shell and BP.
90. In 2006 there were a number of high level oYcial trade-related visitors to Korea from the UK
including the LordMayor of the City of London, JohnHutton (SoSBERR) and SusanHaird (DeputyChief
Executive of UKTI). Korea also receives a large number of senior business ﬁgures with Sir David Wright,
Sir Thomas Harris, Stephen Green and Sir John Rose all regular visitors.
91. On the investment side, manyKorean companies are choosing theUK as the base for their high value
European operations. Samsung and LG have long been major investors in the UK and during 2006, LG
Electronics relocated their European Headquarters from Amsterdam to Slough. The UK is also the centre
for Samsung Electronics’ European operations as well as headquarters and a large R&D facility. In
addition, Samsung has a product design centre in Clerkenwell, London. At the end of 2006, Doosan Heavy
Industries made a very large investment in the UK (acquiring Mitsui Babcock for US$160m and renaming
it Doosan Babcock) and has over 1000 employees across Britain and is Doosan’s technology centre for
boiler design and engineering.
Science and Innovation
92. Research links have become an important part of the bilateral relationship and are becoming more
so. Korea’s rise from one of the poorer countries in the world to 11th or 12th largest economy in just a few
decades has been brought about, in a large part, by the growth and development of a number of technology
based industries—semiconductors, steel, shipbuilding, automotive, construction, electronics, nuclear
energy. Korea regards further technological developments and innovation as key to future prosperity and
both the government and industry invest heavily in R&D.
93. The UK stands to beneﬁt from Korean funding for collaborative research, access to Korea state-of-
the-art facilities andworkingwith the bestKorean scientists. TheUKoVers in-depth strengths inmost areas
of science and a willingness to collaborate on a mutually beneﬁcial basis. The bilateral S&I relationship is
based on a UK-Korea Science & Technology Agreement dating from 1985 and a Science & Technology
Joint Commission held every two years led by Ministers. The broader umbrella of the UK-Korea Science,
Technology and Innovation Partnership (ﬁrst agreed in 2004) brings industry into the mix and attracts
support funding from the trade Ministry (the Ministry of the Knowledge Economy).
94. Korea signed a Science & Technology Agreement with the EU in 2007 and is looking to increase its
participation inEUprogrammes. The relationshipwith theUS is strong andmany leadingKorean scientists
have spent timeUS, either for their studies or subsequent research. Korea is keen to play a role on the global
stage and has joined international projects such as ITER.
95. Korean strengths include nuclear physics, electronics, telecommunications, manufacturing processes
and nanotechnology. Biotechnology is a growth area with government and industry treating it as a priority.
Korea has an indigenous Space programme and is due to complete its own launch facilities this year and
launch vehicle in 2009–10.
Climate Change
96. South Korea is the world’s 11th largest economy and is ranked as one of the OECD’s highest per
capita emitters. It is the world’s 10th largest energy consumer—4th largest importer of oil and 2nd largest
importer of LNG, and has a key role in the global debate on climate change.
97. It is in the anomalous position of being anOECDmember that is non-Annex 1 to theKyoto Protocol.
Thus, if it shows more ambition there is a potential role to play in bridging the gap between developed and
developing countries. Whilst not a developing country in the traditional sense of the phrase, it is widely seen
amongst the !5 countries as setting a benchmark for development and has a per capita GDP rate
comparable to some EU member states. Some South Korean oYcials have expressed strong interest in
carbon pricing and trading as a mechanism to reduce emissions levels globally, although widespread
scepticism remains. The South Korean government and business are increasingly preparing for a potential
domestic trading scheme as well as the possibility of taking on board a commitment post 2012—although
concerns over negative impacts on competitiveness pose a considerable obstacle. They are strong
proponents of the Clean Development Mechanism and are becoming more vocal in the formal UNFCCC
processes.
98. In December 2007, South Korea unveiled a plan to increase the use of new and renewable energy to
9%of the nation’s total energy supply by 2030 (from the current level of 2%). The SouthKorean government
also announced a plan to drastically increase its renewable energy budget in 2006 as part of an eVort to adapt
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to high oil prices and to encourage the use of environmentally friendly energy sources. Discussions are
underway with South Korea on an MoU with the UK on benchmarking climate technologies and carbon
pricing and mechanisms.
99. The new President has not yet set a speciﬁc agenda for environment and climate change issues, but
both areas have been identiﬁed as a goal of the new government’s foreign policy. But the Prime Minister,
Mr. Han Seung-soo, as special envoy of UN Secretary General on climate change, has voiced criticism of
South Korea for failing to take eYcient measures against its CO2 emissions. There are also indications that
the new government may react to growing international pressure with a more constructive approach on
climate change policy—although economic growth will remain the highest priority. Plans for the
construction of a trans-Korea canal will also be presented as a contribution to the reduction of air pollution
but it will have an enormous environmental impact and there is strong opposition in South Korea—also on
grounds of cost.
Development Relations
100. South Korea is a key emerging donor with a great deal of promise.Multilaterally, Korea is stepping
up engagement in all fora. Most recently, in January 2008, South Korea was granted observer status with
the Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). Although an OECD
member, South Korea is not yet a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
101. In preparation for joining DAC (planned for 2010), South Korea is substantially increasing its aid
volumes and aid eVectiveness. Korea’s ODA/GNI ratio is set to grow from 0.09% to 0.15% by 2010 and
0.25% by 2015, bringing volumes of $3-3.5 billion. This would easily put Korea in the top 10 DAC donors
in volume terms based on present forecasts. President Lee has pledged to increase South Korea’s ODA,
particularly to Africa (although as yet he has not announced any ﬁgures).
102. South Korea looks to the UK as a role model for ODA work and has established a close working
relationship with the Department for International Development (DFID). Korea is particularly interested
in exchanges on evaluation and eVectiveness and a policy dialogue is held annually between DFID and the
Ministry of Foreign AVairs and Trade (MOFAT). This is a key partnership for the UK in terms of
increasing aid volumes, eVectiveness and co-operation. Korea has the potential to have considerable impact
on the world stage.
Human Rights
103. The death penalty is a divisive and controversial issue in South Korea. As of October 2007, there
were 64 people on death row, but an execution has not been carried out since 31 December 1997. South
Korea, therefore, gained “an abolitionist in practice” status from Amnesty International on 31 December
2007. A special bill to abolish the death penalty has been introduced three times into the National Assembly
(NA), but it has yet to be debated in the National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee. If the
National Assembly doesn’t vote for this bill by May 2008, the bill will expire. President Lee, however, is a
retentionist, which perhaps reduces the chances of the bill going through the National Assembly by the
required deadline. Nevertheless, the UK will continue to take every opportunity to encourage the South
Korean government to abolish the death penalty.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718
104. Following the DPRK’s nuclear test on 9 October 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously
adopted UNSCR 1718. The resulting sanctions included a ban on the export and import to/fromDPRK of
goods and technologies that could be used in aWMDprogramme. It also provided for the freezing of assets
of individuals and entities supporting DPRK’s WMD programmes and a travel ban on those individuals.
The UK, along with EU partners, has implemented 1718, and encourages others to do the same.
DPRK’s nuclear programmes and international eVorts to end it
105. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programmes are the most immediate threat to
security in the region. Besides the potential threat to the DPRK’s neighbours (in particular Japan) and the
wider risk from onward proliferation, an unchecked DPRK nuclear programme would undermine global
non-proliferation norms weakening our ability to counter proliferation elsewhere.
106. The DPRK acceded to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, but in January 2003 it stated
its intention to withdraw. The UK does not consider the DPRK to have met the withdrawal provisions of
the NPT when announcing its departure, though we accept that others recognise that the DPRK has
withdrawn. Following that announcement, we halted any bilateral activity, which might be seen to directly
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support the DPRK regime, eg economic/technical assistance and trade promotion. We have made it clear
to the DPRK that relaxation of these restrictions will not be considered without progress on the nuclear
issue and also on human rights concerns.
107. On 10 February 2005, the DPRK publicly claimed to have manufactured nuclear weapons. In
February 2007 it acknowledged having extracted plutonium from spent fuel rods (almost certainly removed
from the DPRK’s 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon). We believe that the DPRK has also tried to develop
a uranium enrichment programme for weapons purposes.
108. In addition, the DPRK is also believed to have chemical and biological weapons capabilities. It is
not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), but has ratiﬁed the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC). It possesses and has tested missiles, which we believe are capable of
delivering payloads to all of Japan and beyond. It has also demonstrated expertise in technologies that
could, if developed successfully, give its missiles the capability to reach the UK.
109. Since 2003, the DPRK has engaged in the Six Party Talks process with South Korea, US, Russia,
China and Japan. In September 2005 the parties agreed a Joint Statement in which the DPRK undertook
to abandon its nuclear weapons and programmes and return at an early date to the NPT.
110. Two further agreements followed. The ﬁrst was on 13 February 2007 and laid out the First Phase
Initial Actions for the Implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement. The DPRK met its obligations under
this Agreement, albeit after a delay while a mechanism was found to release its funds from the Banco Delta
Asia in Macau, which had previously been subject to ﬁnancial measures imposed by the US. The Second
Phase Actions were agreed on 3 October 2007. Under this, the DPRK had to disable all its existing nuclear
facilities. It also undertook by the end of 2007 to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear
programmes (the US has made clear that this must include any hitherto clandestine programme to produce
highly-enriched uranium). In return, it will get further substantial energy assistance and the prospect of
further progress on normalisation of relations with the US and Japan.
111. At the time of writing, the DPRK had still not made its nuclear declaration. The sticking points
appear to be references to its uranium enrichment programme and the size of its plutonium stockpile and
past proliferation activities. Resolution of these sensitive matters will delay release of the declaration. Also,
the DPRK claims that it has not received all the oil and other compensation agreed under the Six Party
Talks, and that theUS needs to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and to cease application
of the Trading with the EnemyAct to theDPRKbefore it delivers its declaration (theUS ﬁrmly rejects this).
Most of the disablement at Yongbyon has been completed, but the DPRK has slowed the unloading of the
nearly 8,000 fuel rods there in response to what it claims is the slowness of other Six Party Talks partners
to meet their obligations.
112. The 3OctoberAgreement leaves for the next (third) stage the big issue of dismantlingNorthKorea’s
existing nuclear devices and stockpile of plutonium.Until these are given up theDRPKwill remain a nuclear
and proliferation threat.
113. Whilst not a participant in the Six Party Talks, theUKand the EU strongly support the process, and
both we and the EU havemade clear our readiness to assist. The UK and EU also take every opportunity to
press the DPRK to honour NPT obligations and to negotiate constructively and in good faith in the Six
Party Talks. We will continue to work with the EU and the international community to try to reduce the
threat of DPRK WMD proliferation.
EU/DPRK Relations
114. As already mentioned, the DPRK’s nuclear programme and the attendant risks of proliferation is
a major threat facing the region. A stable region is vital to protect the EU’s economic interests in countries
such as South Korea. Thus, the EU is keen to see successful progress at the Six Party Talks, leading to the
denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.
115. Following the DPRK government’s call for an end to humanitarian aid in 2005, the EU has been
winding down interim arrangements put in place to cover existing projects. The main focus of EU funding
is now food security, primarily to tackle chronic malnutrition. The World Food Programme (WFP) is
continuing its eVorts on a reduced scale, but monitoring food distribution is diYcult and concerns remain
that not enough food is reaching intended targets, including vulnerable groups such as small children and
the elderly.
116. In the absence of any progress following a widely supported condemnatory resolution at the 2003
UN Commission on Human Rights, the EU tabled a second resolution in April 2004. This called for the
establishment of a UN Special Rapporteur on DPRK Human Rights. Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn was
appointed to this position in July 2004. TheDPRKgovernment refused to acknowledge either the resolution
or the appointment. The EU tabled a further resolution at the UN CHR in April 2005, which was again
adopted by a signiﬁcant majority. In addition, an EU-sponsored resolution was adopted by UNGA in
December 2005 during the UK’s Presidency of the EU, and again in 2006 and 2007.
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Relations with International Organisations
UN—Human Rights
117. TheDPRK is party to four keyUNhuman rights treaties: the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Reports are however regularly submitted late. The UK
continues to urge the DPRK government to fulﬁl its obligations under the human rights instruments to
which it is party and to allowUN special representatives to visit the country, including Special Rapporteur,
Vitit Muntarbhorn. The UK strongly opposed any move to drop the DPRK Rapporteur’s mandate at the
Human Rights Council in June 2007, and worked closely with partners to ensure it was not weakened or
abolished.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
118. UNDP suspended its operations in the DPRK in 2007 following suspicions that in 2006 funds in the
DPRK were misspent and used to purchase “dual use” items (GIS equipment, computers and a
spectrometer). These questions are still being investigated.
UK/DPRK relationship
119. Despite our strong condemnation of DPRK’s poor human rights record, we have maintained an
Embassy in Pyongyang since 2001. Despite the diYcult circumstances in which our staV operate, they have
regularly and frankly imparted our concerns about nuclear proliferation and human rights to senior
DPRK oYcials.
120. TheUKhas a policy of carefully targeted engagement with theNorthKoreans. It sets out to support
the Six Party Talks in order to ensure early denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, as well as considering
ways to counter the wider threat that the DPRK poses to regional stability in North-East Asia. It also
outlines our eVorts to challenge human rights abuses in theDPRK and explores ways to improve the overall
ﬂow of information into and out of the DPRK on human rights issues. Our aim is to work for a positive
change in the DPRK by exposing the country to external thinking and alternative models of economic and
social organisation.
English Language Training
121. The FCO has funded a British Council-run programme to provide English language training to
North Korean trainee teachers and students at three Pyongyang universities since 2003. This programme
is welcomed by the DPRK government. Each year some trainee teachers are given the opportunity to visit
the UK as part of their course, which provides an excellent opportunity for them to experience British
culture at ﬁrst hand.
122. Through the British Council, we have also arranged English Language Training courses in the UK
for mid-ranking oYcials from various DPRK Ministries. Again, this has enabled us to expose those who
may hold inﬂuential positions in the future to external thinking.
Trade
123. We have considered the possibility of expanding UK trade links with the DPRK, for example, by
notifying UK business of Trade Fairs held in Pyongyang twice a year. However, UKTI ministers on advice
from the FCO decided in 2002 that all trade promotion activity by HMG should be suspended until the
DPRK nuclear issue was resolved. Some EU partners, on the other hand, argue that trade relations are an
important part of bringing theDPRKout of its isolation.While theDPRKhas certainlymade some positive
moves in relation to the nuclear issue, it is a long way from being resolved. We therefore continue to feel
that for now we should uphold the existing trade policy, but bring this under review if there is signiﬁcant
progress on the nuclear issue.
Human rights
124. The DPRK is widely considered to have one of the worst human rights records in the world. Much
of the evidence for this record comes from North Korean defectors, who are also referred to as refugees,
escapees or border crossers, who provide shocking reports of serious and widespread violations of basic
human rights in theDPRK. The alleged abuses include: abductions and disappearances; arbitrary detention
and imprisonment for up to three generations of the same family; regular use of the death penalty (including
political and extra-judicial and public executions); routine use of torture and inhumane treatment; forced
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abortions; political prison camps and labour rehabilitation camps; extreme religious persecution; and
chemical experimentation. Foreign observers in Pyongyang have been able to conﬁrm directly harsh
restraints on freedom of information.
125. The DPRK has repeatedly invoked sovereignty, non-interference and cultural diVerences to avoid
its human rights responsibilities. Humanitarian aid workers and diplomats in Pyongyang are subject to
severe internal travel restrictions and some 20% of the counties in the DPRK remain inaccessible “for
reasons of national security”. The government denies foreign diplomats access to judicial institutions,
saying that it amounts to interference in the country’s internal aVairs. These restrictions, coupled with the
government’s self-imposed isolation and unwillingness to co-operate with the international community on
human rights, make it diYcult to compile evidence regarding human rights abuses.
126. We have made it clear to the DPRK government that we cannot extend the beneﬁts of a full and
normal bilateral relationship until we have evidence that it is addressing our concerns on issues such as
human rights. We will continue to raise human rights issues directly with the government and voice our
concern in international fora. Until the DPRK responds to international concerns, the UK will work with
EU partners and others to maintain and increase pressure in the appropriate international bodies.
Broadcasting
127. Anecdotal evidence from refugees suggests that increased numbers of illegal radio sets are being
smuggled in to the DPRK from China, and that more people are listening to foreign radio broadcasts.
Refugees have often said that this has been a factor encouraging them to leave the DPRK.
128. The UK has explored the possibility of the BBC World Service broadcasting Korean language
programmes into the DPRK, based on the assumption that such a broadcast would not be jammed. The
BBC produces no Korean service at present. The World Service has concluded that it would be diYcult to
make a robust business case for this service in the current ﬁnancial climate and given the diYculty in
measuring impact. US radio services VOA and RFA already have Korean language broadcasts and do not
operate under the same restrictions as the BBC in having to justify audience numbers. It is likely, therefore,
that the US will continue to lead the way forward in this area.
March 2008
Submission from the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
Japan’s Contribution to International Security and Peacekeeping
I. Summary of ﬁndings
1. The primary mission of the Japanese Ministry of Defence is still the defence of the Japanese home
islands.
2. Changes in Japan’s security environment since the 1990’s have caused major shifts in traditional
Japanese security policies, though these shifts remain at odds with conservative elements of the Japanese
population who continue to resist changes to the paciﬁst constitution.
3. Policy-makers now seek to normalise Japan’s military status in two diVerent ways: as a reliable partner
with its main ally the US, and as a responsible member of international society through active participation
in the United Nations.
4. International Peace Cooperation Activities have become the primary mission abroad for Japanese
forces.
5. Japanese peacekeeping forces are still hobbled by Diet-imposed rules related to interpretations of the
paciﬁst constitution.
6. In addition to peacekeeping, Japanese forces are deployed in support of the USGlobal War on Terror
(GWOT).
7. Elements of the Japanese government and LDP are trying to draft a General Law to replace the ad
hoc laws on supporting missions for the GWOT.
8. Japan is playing a large role inAfghanistan, both as a provider of oYcial development aid to theKarzai
government but also as an active development partner.
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9. Japan is seeking closer ties with NATO and is carrying out more joint activities with NATO.
10. Japan is developing an interest in the theory and practice of the comprehensive approach and has sent
a number of observers, academics, and oYcials to the West to learn more about civil-military co-operation
(CIMIC) activities.
11. Japan is at a crossroads. It has been shifted by events, by its main ally, and by its leaders, from its
Cold War position of strong economic policies combined with passive security and foreign policies.
12. Although policy-makers display a desire to be involved in world aVairs like a “normal” country, there
remain signiﬁcant sections of Japanese society uncomfortable with the implications of the changes.
II. Findings in more detail
1. The primary mission of Japan’s defence forces remains the defence of the home islands of Japan.
According to the 2007 Defense of Japan White Paper, Japan is making eVorts to develop its defence
capabilities in line with the present Constitution, while abstaining from any action that causes military
unease in the region. Japan will continue to follow the three main strands of military policy, including
civilian control of the military, observation of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles,1 as well as maintaining
the current Japan-US Security arrangements.
2. Changes in Japan’s security environment since the 1990’s have caused major shifts in traditional
Japanese security policies. The Yoshida Doctrine, named after the post-war primeminister who formulated
it, was gradually overturned by several events. This policy of focusing Japan’s foreign policy eVorts into the
economic sphere, while relying on a US defence and nuclear posture was eroded by a sequence of events:
(a) US and international pressure on Japan after the ﬁrst Gulf War in which Japan was severely
criticized for “cheque-book diplomacy”, rather than risking its own troops in combat or
peacekeeping missions.
(b) The revelation in 1994 in a Japanese newspaper that an undetermined number of Japanese
nationals had been abducted from the Japanese mainland by special teams of North Korean
agents. These citizens were to be used to train North Korean spies in Japanese language and
customs so that they might pass as Japanese abroad.
(c) The ﬁrst phase of the North Korean nuclear crisis 1992–95.
(d) China’smissile-ﬁring exercises, naval and air force live-ﬁre drills and integrated ground, naval, and
air force exercises oV the strait of Formosa, indicating Chinese resolve toward the Taiwan issue.
(e) The launch by North Korea of missiles over and beyond Japanese airspace in 1998.
(f) The discovery of at least two submarine craft from North Korea in South Korean coastal waters
in 1998.
(g) The discovery in 1999 of a spy vessel oV the Japanese Noto Peninsula.
(h) The discovery of submerged Chinese submarines nearOkinawa in 2006 (theKitty Hawk incident).
(i) China’s successful Anti-Satellite Test in January 2007.
3. Policy-makers now seek to normalise Japan’s military status in two diVerent ways: as a reliable partner
with its main ally the US, and as a responsible member of the United Nations. In 2004, Japan formulated
the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG 2004), which set two objectives for Japan’s security: to
prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan, and to improve the international security environment.
This was to be realized by the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for ﬁscal 2005 to ﬁscal 2009. This has
been themechanism enabling Japan to build up its defence capability. As of 2007, Japanese defence doctrine
has also emphasized responding to new threats and diverse contingencies, including responding to terrorist/
insurgent attacks, as well as enhancing counter-missile abilities through intelligence-gathering, warning, and
surveillance.
4. Peacekeeping has become the primary mission abroad for Japanese forces, although Japanese
peacekeeping forces are still hobbled by Diet-imposed rules related to interpretations of the paciﬁst
constitution. Following Japan’s ﬁrst deployment of election monitors in 1992 to Angola, Japan has
deployed an increasing number of peacekeeping operations (PKO), election monitoring operations (EMO)
as well as disaster relief operations (DRO). The two laws passed that made these missions possible are the
International Peace Cooperation Law and the Law Concerning Dispatch of International Disaster Relief
Teams which both came into force in 1992.
1 Japan shall neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese territory.
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5. Japanese peacekeeping forces are still hobbled by Diet-imposed rules, related to interpretations of the
paciﬁst constitution. According to a Japanese government oYcial, restrictions placed on Japanese PKO
missions make them frustrating partners for other countries. When the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
tried to push a PKO law through the Japanese Diet in 1990, it was blocked by opposition parties;2 the
resulting 1991 law was the result of political compromises with other coalition partners,3 which
necessitated the watering down of the law. In addition, there is a conservative anti-militarist culture in the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau, which checks all draft legislation to ensure it is constitutional before it is
submitted to the Diet. The International Peace Cooperation Law contains “the Five Principles”, which
specify the conditions under which Japanese forces may be deployed in PKO missions:
(i) A cease-ﬁre accord must have already been reached.
(ii) Japan’s participation must have the consent of all parities to the conﬂict.
(iii) The UN mission must be carried out with complete impartiality.
(iv) Japanese personnel must withdraw if the above three conditions are not met.
(v) Japanese personnel can only use ﬁrearms to defend themselves or personnel under their protection.
6. In addition to peacekeeping, Japanese forces are deployed in support of the USGlobalWar on Terror
(GWOT). These missions have been legalised in two important ad hoc laws called the Anti-Terrorism
Special Measures Law and the Law Concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq. The
“Anti-terrorism Law” was passed in November 2001 in response to the events of September 11. This law
provides for the deployment of Self Defense Forces (SDF) to cooperation and support activities, search and
rescue activities, and disaster relief for aVected people. According to the law, the SDF can operate in Japan,
on the high seas, in space, and in countries which allow Japan’s involvement. The international community,
led by the US, implemented Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)- Maritime Interdiction Operation in the
Indian Ocean to block terrorists from escaping using marine routes, and to prevent the proliferation of
weapons, ammunition, and narcotics. Japanese supply vessels and Aegis destroyers have been involved in
the delivery of water and fuel to allied vessels, the conducting of search and rescue activities, and ﬁnally, the
delivery of supplies for refugees when requested by the UNHCR. In January 2008, Prime Minister Yasuo
Fukuda was able to force through an extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law despite the
opposition of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which had threatened to block the law with its hold on
the Upper House. In order to do this, Fukuda employed a rarely-used overriding power to push the law
through, expending a lot of time, energy, and political capital in the process. Although Fukuda is a pan-
Asianist in his foreign policy outlook, he hasmade a point of simultaneously strengthening ties with theUS.
The Iraq Reconstruction Law was passed in July 2003 in response to the adoption of UN Security Council
Resolution 1483 in May of that same year. The ﬁrst contingent of GSDF was deployed in Samawah, Iraq
in January 2004 to carry out reconstruction and medical relief, while MSDF and ASDF units carried out
logistical missions, bring supplies from Japan to Kuwait, and serving as in-theatre airlift component for
coalition forces.
2 The Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) have been instrumental in tranforming an anti-military culture
into a political ideology.
3 One of the LDP’s coalition partners is the Komeito party, which has as its support base the Buddhist religious organization
(Souka Gakkai), which has strong paciﬁst leanings.
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7. Elements of the Japanese government and LDP are trying to draft a new “General Law” to replace
the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law for supporting missions for the GWOT. In January 2008, two
task forces were established to draft a new General Law which will replace the current arrangements. One
is within the LDP, while the other is within Government, chaired by the Cabinet OYce, containing
representatives from the JapaneseMinistry of Defense, the Peacekeeping Operations Bureau (an adjunct to
the Cabinet OYce), and the Ministry of Foreign AVairs. Since the current law is due to expire by January
2009, Fukuda must try to pass this new “General Law” before then.4
8. Japan is playing a large role in Afghanistan, both as a provider of economic assistance to the Karzai
government, but also as a development partner. Japan’s initial role in dealing with Afghanistan was
coordinating the economic sphere so that the new Karzai government would not be starved of funds. In
January 2002, Japan held the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in
Tokyo. Since then, Japanese oYcial development aid (ODA) has totaled US$1.2 billion.5 In addition,
Japan held two more fund-raising style conferences, the First and Second Tokyo Conference on the
Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan in 2003 and 2006. The costs of Japan’s assistance can be broken
down in the following ways:
Peace Process - Support for Good Governance (approximately US$165 million)
Administrative Cost Assistance
2001 The Afghan Interim Administration Fund (US$1 million)
2002 Assistance to Emergency Loya Jirga (approximately US$2.7 million)
2002 The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (approximately US$5 million)
2002 Supply of OYce Equipment for Transitional Administration (approximately US$500,000)
2002 Grant Aid to Support Improvement of Economic Structure (approximately US$49 million)
2003 Assistance to the constitutional process (approximately US$750,000)
2005 Grant Aid to Support Improvement of Economic Structure (US$10 million)
2006 Sector Project grand aid (US$24 million)
2007 Sector Project grand aid (US$13 million)
Media Assistance
2002 Improvement of TV broadcast equipment in Kabul (approximately US$19 million)
2003 Information Communication in Vulnerable Communities (US$370,000)
2002 Improvement of TV broadcast facilities in Kabul (approximately US$6.5 million)
Election Assistance
2004 Afghanistan Voter Registration Project (approximately US$8.2 million)
2004 Assistance to the Presidential Election (approximately US$8.8 million)
2005 Assistance for the Lower House and Provincial Council Elections (approximately US$13
million)
Improvement of Security (approximately US$ 209 million)
DDR and DIAG
2003 Partnership for Peace (approximately US$34 million)
2004 Assistance for Afghanistan’s New Beginning’s Programme (approximately US$ 25 million)
2005 Assistance for Afghanistan’s New Beginning’s Programme (approximately US$ 26 million)
2006 Assistance to National Solidarity Programme (approximately US$ 5 million)
2006 Programme for Support of the Integrated Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups Initiative
(approximately US$ 29 million)
Mine Countermeasures
2002 Procurement of demining equipment (approximately US$15 million)
2002 Procurement of artiﬁcial legs provision and educational activities on land mines for land
mine victims (approximately US$1 million)
2002 Necessary expense for demining activities (approximately US$2.8 million)
2003 Research Project for developing mechanical machines (approximately US$590,000)
2003 Research Project for developing mechanical machines (approximately US$5.2 million)
4 Exchange with unnamed Japanese government oYcial.
5 Japan’s Contribution toAfghanistan—Working on the Frontline in theWar onTerrorism,Ministry of ForeignAVairs, 2007.
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Counter-narcotics
2002 Support for implementation of the project to reinforce drug control (US$500,000)
2004 Capacity-building for narcotic demand reduction (approximately US$1 million)
2006 Counter-narcotics Trust Fund (US$5 million)
Support for Police
2003 Improvement for Police equipment (approximately US$2.3 million)
2004 Improvement for Kandahar Police equipment (approximately US$900,000)
2005 Improvement of the equipment for Mazar-e-Sharif Police (approximately US$1 million)
Reconstruction Assistance (approximately US$ 668 million)
Infrastructure Development
2002 Primary road rehabilitation from Kabul to Kandahar (approximately US$6.3 million)
2002 Road rehabilitation from Kandahar to Spin Boldak (approximately US$15 million)
2003 Rehabilitation of the public transportation system in Kabul city (approximately US$18
million)
2003 Construction of trunk road in northern Afghanistan (from Mazar-e-Sharif to Khulm) and
international road bound for the border of Uzbekistan (from Naibabad to Hayratun)
(approximately US$20 million)
2003 Improvement of equipment for Kabul International Airport (approximately US$2.7 million)
2004 Improvement of trunk road in northern Afghanistan from Kandahar to Heart
(approximately US$89 million)
2005 Improvement and construction of roads in Kandahar (approximately US$14 million)
2005 Construction of the terminal at Kabul International Airport (approximately US$26 million)
2006 Rehabilitation of Bamiyan-Yakawlang road (approximately US$20 million)
2007 Improvement of Kabul Road Engineering Center (approximately US$7.2 million)
Public health/medical assistance
2002 Medical Equipment and medicine (US$15 million)
2002 Infectious diseases prevention for children (approximately US$9.8 million)
2006 Integrated Child Survival Project (approximately US$3.8 million)
Support for Education
2002 Back-to-school campaign (US$5 million)
2004–05 Construction of basic education facilities (approximately US$22 million)
Assistance for Afghan Refugees and Displaced Persons
2002–04 Ogata Initiative (approximately US$86 million)
Agricultural/Rural Development
2004 Project for Balkh river basin integrated water resources management (US$ 10 million)
2004–05 National Solidarity Programme (NSP) (US$21 million)
2005 Regional development for sustainable peace (US$17 million)
Other Assistances
FY Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human Security Projects (approximately US$49 million)
2002–06
2002–06 JICA’s technical assistance, training (approximately US$100 million)
2003–05 Preservation Project for Bamiyan ruins (approximately US$3 million)
2005 Improvements of the exhibition equipment of Kabul National Museum(approximately
US$360,000)
2005 Support to Afghanistan National Development Strategies (approximately US$140,000)
9. Japan is seeking closer ties with NATO and is carrying out more joint activities with NATO. The
growth of working relationships betweenNATO, SouthKorea, Australia, and Japan has led some Japanese
policy-makers to wonder if NATO membership will be extended to Paciﬁc states. As a small part of the
larger debate onNATO’s remit andmission statement, enlargement is likely to be discussed at the Bucharest
Summit6 in April. According to a Joint Press Statement made by Prime Minister Fukuda and Secretary
General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop ScheVer in Tokyo on December 13, NATO and Japan have a mutual
sense of responsibility towards global security challenges. They also “share common values”. Both countries
recognised the vital role that each was playing in the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan, and
that in working together in-theatre, the long-standing relations between the two powers have reached a new
6 April 2008. As this summit is meant to be inclusive, high level delegations from the above-mentioned Paciﬁc states are likely
to attend.
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phase. It has been argued that since the JMOD is not in Afghanistan, the Ministry of Foreign AVairs and
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) must work more closely with NATO. The Joint Press
Statement goes on to list a number of bilateral achievements between NATO and Japan including:
— Reinforced high-level policy dialogue, including Prime Minister Abe’s January 2007 visit to
Brussels, the 7th Japan-NATO High Level Consultations held in Tokyo in March, and this visit
by the Secretary General, the second in two years.
— The participation of Japanese government oYcials in variousNATO-hosted events, seminars, and
conferences.
— The establishment of a framework for humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan through Japanese
grant aid for grassroots projects in cooperation with NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs). 13 projects have been initiated under this framework.
— The appointment of a Japanese liaison oYcer at its Kabul Embassy, to deal with the OYce of the
NATO Senior Civilian Representation.
Further cooperative activities include the participation of Japanese Self-Defense Forces in courses at the
NATO Defence College in Rome.
10. Japan is developing an interest in the theory and practice of the comprehensive approach7 and has
sent a number of observers, academics, and oYcials to theWest to learnmore aboutCIMICactivities. RUSI
has hosted a number ofmeetings for Japanese government oYcials as well as academics with oYcial backing
from the JapaneseMinistry of Foreign AVairs andMinistry of Defense. In addition, the UK’s Stabilisation
Unit has hosted an equally large number of Japanese oYcials and academics for similar reasons8 and high-
ranking Japanese MOD oYcials have attended the Comprehensive Approach training course in Swindon
over two days in January 2008. These visits were not restricted to the UK alone, but have included other
countries in Europe that are practising various forms of CIMIC work or civil military aVairs, including
Sweden and Holland.
According to an unnamed Japanese Ministry of Defense oYcial, “CIMIC work has Japanese
characteristics, since it incorporates defence work with civilian planning and diplomacy.9 One does not
rely on military strength alone.” The Japanese MOD has not yet begun to work closely with the Japanese
development agency JICA, but a MOD report published in 2007 on lessons learnt in Iraq is bound to have
an impact. At the moment, JICA is not a ministry, but merely a part ofMOFA, which initiates the planning
with JICA carrying it out. However, according to an unnamed Japanese diplomat, there is a movement
towards JICA control. What level of control remains unclear; it could range from JICA becoming a
Ministry, to JICA merely getting more of a say in planning operations.
There are two training centers dedicated to developing PKO and CIMIC skills in Japan: the Lessons
Learned Unit and the Central Readiness Force.
III. Analysis of Findings
11. Japan is at a crossroads. It has been shifted by events, by its main ally the United States and by its
leaders from its Cold War position of strong economic policies combined with passive security and foreign
policies. The expression of this shift has been a dramatic growth in active peacekeeping missions with the
UN from the 1990s and participation in the US Global War on Terrorism since 2001. Japan’s development
agency JICA is also playing an extremely active development role inAfghanistan through the distribution of
ODAand support operations. TheMinistry of ForeignAVairs probably has themost consistent and highest
proﬁle on human security, going back to 1997–98 when Prime Minister made a speech on it. The Japan
Ministry of Defence has a host of diVerent reasons for supporting the expansion of Japanese CIMIC and
peacekeeping. Part of this support from within the JMOD comes from old-style nationalism, some of it
comes from defence nerds, who think that if the job is to be done correctly, it should be done by the JMOD,
some want value for money, the Japanese taxpayer pays for the SDF (“let them earn their pay”), and some
of it is based on the Japanese desire for international recognition, the desire to do the right thing, and a
Permanent UN Security Council seat.
12. Although Japanese policy-makers display a desire to be involved in world aVairs like a “normal”
country, there remain signiﬁcant sections of Japanese society uncomfortable with the implications of the
changes. Critics of these changes say that the fall of the Abe administration is proof of this electoral
disapproval, though there is a strong case that Abe fell because a large number of scandals involving his
cabinet and for putting foreign policy concerns ahead of domestic ones, rather than for the content of his
foreign policy. The relationship with the US remains a strong, but complicated factor in Japanese politics.
As always, the alliance has its domestic critics, but the alliance experiences waves of strong electoral support
(particularly after regional crises concerning China10 or North Korea).11 Although support for UN-
backed missions is higher than support for US-backed missions, there is a lack of widespread knowledge or
7 This is taken to mean combined planning of diplomacy, development, and defence in hot stabilisation regions like
Afghanistan.
8 Source: unnamed UK oYcial.
9 Paraphrased.
10 Anti-Japanese riots in 2005 took place in several major Chinese cities when Japan announced it had joined a group on UN
Reform of the Security Coucil membership.
11 North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and missile technology have often been implicitly or explicitly aimed at Japan.
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concern with UN activities in Japan. Japanese political elites, LDP think tanks, and government oYcials
support Japanmaintaining a strong relationship with theUnited States, while opening Japan up to activities
andmembership withinmultilateral organisations. Japan has moved closer to NATO recently for a number
of reasons which reveal the political context in which Japan moves. The ﬁrst reason is to counterbalance
the military rise of China, which Japan views with real consternation. China’s growing naval strength
concerns Japan as it is heavily dependent on open sea routes for trade and natural resources.12 The second
reason is that a more formal relationship with NATOwould change the nature of Japan’s relationship with
the United States to something more akin to what the United Kingdom has developed with the US: a
multilateral partner, rather than a bilateral partner. The third reason is that Japan wishes to gain prestige
for acting as a good global citizen, both as a security provider and as a security consumer. Despite the tone
of this report, real change in Japanese security thinking is likely to be gradual compared toWestern political
standards, and if these changes are to be carried out successfully, they will need to be more closely linked
to public sentiment in Japan. Policy-makers in Japan who try to move too quickly before gaining the
support of the electorate are bound to provoke a backlash.
March 2008
Submission from Dr J E Hoare
I am J E Hoare. I received my PhD in Japanese history at the School of Oriental and African Studies in
1971. By then, I was a member of what is nowResearch Analysts of the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce,
which I joined in 1969. For most of the following 33 years in the Diplomatic Service, I worked on matters
relating to East Asia, apart from a spell between 1977–81, when I worked on South and South East Asia. I
served as HM Consul and Head of Chancery in Seoul, Republic of Korea 1981–85, and did a short spell
there as Head of the Political Section in 1997, HM Consul-General and Head of Chancery in Beijing,
People’s Republic of China 1988–91, and I was Charge´ d’AVaires and HM Consul-General in Pyongyang,
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2001–02. I spent a year at the International Institute for Strategic
Studies 1992–93. Since I retired in January 2003, I have been engaged in occasional teaching, broadcasting
and writing about East Asia—mainly but not exclusively about the DPRK. I have authored or edited
numerous books on the area, including several with my wife, Susan Pares, who is also a former member of
the Research Analysts, and who served in the Beijing Embassy in 1975–76.We last visited the ROK in 2003,
and the DPRK and the PRC in 2004.
The Effectiveness of British Diplomacy in East Asia
So all my adult life I have worked on East Asia both professionally and as a hobby. My original work for
my PhD was on Japan in the nineteenth century. At that point and up until the mid-1930s, Britain was still
the main Western power in East Asia, with extensive economic and security interests in China and Japan,
although not in Korea, which had always been something of a backwater as far as Britain was concerned.
Even in the 1930s, however, Britain’s position as the leading Western country in East Asia was steadily
giving way to the US, while Japan, with Korea as a colony, was increasingly dominating the China. Post
WorldWar II, Britain’s inﬂuence waned. Japan and South Korea were ﬁrmly in the US orbit. Although the
absence of US diplomatic relations with China until the 1970s, and the British presence in Hong Kong,
appeared to make Britain important in East Asia, this was largely illusory. Britain never had more than a
subordinate role in Japan or Korea. Even in HongKong, British ﬁrms lost ground to their US counterparts
and agencies of the US government ignored British rules about not using Hong Kong as a base for
operations against China. Well-qualiﬁed diplomats and active British Council programmes could not
compensate for the lack of political or, relatively speaking, economic power. In Britain itself, East Asia
generally faded from view, except at times of crisis such as the Korean War and the Cultural Revolution in
China, and from the 1970s onwards, the issue of prisoners of war of the Japanese. Academic coverage was
limited. Reasonable onChina and Japan, especially after the Scarborough andHayter reports, it was limited
to one post on Korea at SOAS until the late 1980s.
In East Asia, Britain was seen as close to the US politically, not very successful as a trading nation and
not very interested in Asia—the closure of university departments of East Asian Studies and the decline of
resident journalists in recent years have tended to conﬁrm this lack of interest. There was—and often still
is—a sentimental picture of a country shrouded in Dickensian fog, populated by gentlemen (ladies rarely
featured) who maintained high standards of dress and were always courteous; North Korean school and
university students were still repeating such views four years ago.
EVorts are of course were and are made to counter these somewhat old-fashioned perspectives. British
culture in all its aspects is promoted by the FCO and the British Council, as well as by enterprising
entrepreneurs. Strenuous eVorts are made to promote Britain as a trading partner and as a source of
innovation and design.
12 This is despite strong trade links and growing ties.
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At the same time, “British imperialism”, rapidly forgotten at home, was still remembered in Asia. Hong
Kong was one reminder, and the Chinese had not forgotten howHong Kong was acquired—as late as 1990
a young Chinese oYcial in Beijing, on whom I had called seeking support for a British initiative on drugs,
responded to my presentation “Ah yes, Dr Hoare, the Chinese and the British have long had a special
relationship over drugs!”, at whichwe both grinned. In the 1960s, SouthKorea’s then president, ParkChung
Hee, made speeches in which he blamed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the British for Japan’s takeover
of Korea. That alliance was remembered with more aVection in Japan but even there, the manner of its
ending in the early 1920s was remembered with distaste. Yet in Britain I would be surprised if, outside of
specialist circles, any of these events are remembered at all.
EVorts are of course were and are made to counter these somewhat old-fashioned and mistaken
perspectives. British culture in all its aspects is promoted by the FCO and the British Council, as well as by
enterprising entrepreneurs. Strenuous eVorts are made to promote Britain as a trading partner and as a
source of innovation and design. World Service radio and television broadcasts are beamed to East Asia,
although the only vernacular broadcasts are in Chinese. I do not think that I met one person, outside the
expatriate community, in SouthKorea who admitted listening to the BBC, though thingsmay have changed
since the 1980s. The impactwas greater in China, probably because of the vernacular broadcasts; few seemed
to listen to the English-language broadcasts, although there may have been a small audience among those
who studied abroad. InNorthKorea, only those with a very strict need to know clearance could have oYcial
access to foreign broadcasts. Several of the oYcials that I dealt with in the Ministry of Foreign AVairs and
the Ministry of Foreign Trade clearly could listen, but few seemed to choose the BBC. As one MFA vice
minister put it—despite the hostility between North Korea and the US—“Voice of America has so much
more about Korea”. In North Korea, British newspapers and journals, especially technical papers, were
willingly taken.We gaveThe Times to the EuropeanDivision ofMFA, and TheGuardian to the Association
for Friendship with Foreign Countries. The MFA asked us to send the paper wrapped not because they
should not be receiving it but because if other oYcials saw it, they would take it for their own use. We even
gave the MFA Private Eye, but nobody ever commented on that. In both Koreas, British ﬁlms, videos and
DVDs could also be used to good eVect. In North Korea, of course, audiences were carefully chosen, but
the eVect was still there.
The most successful of all ways of combating old-fashioned views of Britain is scholarships and training
in the UK. Here one is always up against the greater ﬁnancial power of the US, and the fact that generally
US institutions are better known that British ones—Oxford andCambridge excepted. Therewas also in both
SouthKorea andChina a lingering negative eVect from the heavy increases in student fees in the early 1980s,
an eVect which persisted despite scholarship schemes and other forms of assistance. Nevertheless, schemes
like the Chevening scholarships have had a very strong impact.
Generally, Britain is now thought of as part of the European Union. Some realise that in certain areas,
EUmembers act independently but others are confused by this. I think, for example, that theNorthKoreans
have been confused by the strange mix of unity and diversity that has marked policy towards the DPRK.
Some countries, including Britain, established relations in 2000 and others soon after, but Ireland not until
2003, and France not yet—where is the Common Foreign and Security Policy? Both Koreas thought that
these diplomatic moves were the sign of a policy developing policy on Korea independently of that of the
US, and both had been disappointed that this has not proved the case as far as supporting the developing
rapport between the two on the Korean peninsula.
Japan and South Korea’s contribution to international security and peacekeeping
Japan’s constitution has been regarded as inhibiting any action that went beyond strict self-defence, and
this was used until very recently to justify not sending Japanese forces overseas to protect international
security and peacekeeping. While some politicians have wished to see changes, arguing that the 1947
Constitution which contains Article 9 limiting Japanese forces to self defence was imposed by the US and
is inappropriate in the contemporary world, there seems to be still a popular groundswell of support for
maintaining the constitution—in the words of one mother at a proposal to send SDF forces abroad in the
early 1990s, “My son did not join the Self-Defence Forces to get killed”. There is also considerable regional
objection to Japan becoming a “normal country”, with regular armed forces. However Japan has moved
towards involvement in peace keeping while trying to avoid combat involvement, resenting the assumption
that Japan would pay rather than ﬁght. This trend will continue.
SouthKorea has sent forces overseas on several occasions, including the VietnamWar—itwas a common,
if inaccurate, comment that both President Chun Doo Hwan (1980-88) and President Roh Tae Woo
(1988–1993) hadmademost of their foreign contacts down the barrels of guns inVietnam. Such involvement
has had less to do to a commitment to internationalism than a desire to keep in with US wishes and those
increase the US commitment to South Korea. Thus the immediate past president, Roh Moo Hyun, has
indicated that while he did not really want to send South Korean forces to Iraq, he felt that he should do
so because of theROK-US alliance. One argument against the overseas deployment of ROK forces has been
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that they are needed because of the immediate threat to posed by the DPRK.However, as relations between
North and South have improved, this argument in less and less prominent. That said, in South Korea there
remains among many people a sense of obligation towards the United Nations because of the role that the
United Nations played in saving the country from defeat during the Korean War. While the role of the US
has perhaps been blurred by the problems arising from the continued presence of US forces in South Korea
and the attendant problems, the broader UN role has not been forgotten, and South Koreans were pleased
when the country ﬁnally entered theUN in 1992. This sense of obligation towards theUNperhaps inﬂuences
South Koreans positively towards involvement in peacekeeping and related projects.
Relations between the two Koreas
I have already submitted a short paper that appears in the March 2008 issue of Asian AVairs, the journal
of the Royal Society of Asian AVairs, in which I argue that, despite the recent change of presidents in South
Korea, the engagement policy which is now some 10 years old will continue, although the rhetoric may
change. Despite the more strident claims of some South Korean and international media as well as some in
the academic world, the policy has been a success. It has of course been unequal in some ways; the South’s
economic contributions can be measured, but some of what has come back is inevitably intangible. Yet
South Korea has gained over family contacts—still limited but once non-existent; knows far more about the
North now than it ever did—books and other materials about North Korea, once locked away, are now
freely available—people visit the North, and so on. The North is viewed far more realistically now than it
was in the 1980s. By insisting on keeping open some channels to the North even after themissile and nuclear
tests of 2006, South Korea helped create a climate which allowed the Six Party Talks to resume. The wish
to engage theNorth is not a policy alien to SouthKorean conservatives; it can be traced back to Park Chung
Hee and the 1972 Joint Communique´. The new president and his team can build on this, and have already
given signs of doing so.
The North has obviously gained by the supply of food and other commodities, but the engagement policy
has created groups within North Korea who wish such beneﬁts to continue—ie there is now, I believe,
though I cannot prove it, a pro-South Korean constituency in the North, which will not willingly see the
beneﬁts it receives thrown away. There will be a period of watching and assessing the new South Korean
government—and also of course the US presidential election—but I expect that contacts will continue
somewhat below the parapet.
The North Korean nuclear programme
We are now reaping the harvest of wishful thinking and a dogmatic approach which destroyed the 1994
US-North Korea Agreed Framework and pushed North Korea into testing—probably not very
successfully—anuclear device in 2006.NorthKorea feels and is threatened by nuclearweapons, and believes
that the only way to counter that threat is to make it costly for any attacker. The 1994 Agreement was not
perfect—neither is any agreement—but it provided a process whereby bothUS andNorthKorean concerns
could be addressed as well as meeting North Korean needs for energy. The decision to abandon the
agreement awakened allNorthKorean fears about hostility and at the same time allowed them the breathing
space to work on the development of a nuclear device. Attempts to get back to where we were in 2002 before
the present crisis was created have been hampered by the wish to bring in other issues such as human rights,
conventional forces, the Japanese abductees and allegations of counterfeiting and money laundering; all
matter but they have distracted from what we are told is the main issue.
The decision by the US administration to engage in direct talks with North Korea got the process of
negotiations moving again in 2007. However, the wish for a speedy settlement and attempts to be as
comprehensive as possible have hampered the success of the negotiations. The unwillingness to settle for less
than total demands could well mean no settlement at all, especially as the North Koreans may not be able
to deliver what is demanded. If they do not have—or no longer have—a highly enriched uranium
programme, how can they prove that they do not? If the US administration is sure that no treaty
guaranteeing not to attack North Korea would get through Congress, what is the value of presidential
assurances that, as was shown in 2001, can be torn up as soon as the next president is in oYce?
Wemay therefore have to live with the fact that NorthKorea has some sort of nuclear device. This should
not lead to panic. Other countries have more sophisticated devices which do not seem to have caused the
same worry or the claims that such a development is bound to lead to others following their lead. Indeed,
the US treatment of India after it acquired a nuclear capability may have been a factor in the North Korean
decision. Whatever was tested in October 2006 was hardly a resounding success. The North Korean may
continue working on the project but they are clearly not as advanced as sometimes claimed. They also lack
the ability to deliver a nuclear weapon except in their immediate neighbourhood, where they already have
plenty of conventional military capability. The tests of a long range rocket carried out in 1998 and 2006
appear to show a regression rather than an advance.
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If we are to continue to press for an end to the North Korean nuclear programme, we must accept that
North Korea has genuine worries about the threat that it faces and about the wish by some to oust the
present regime. Imposing sanctions is unlikely to have much eVect on a country that does relatively little
international trade. The way to change North Korea is that followed by South Korea in recent years—
engage and continue to engage even when it there are diYculties.
7 March 2008
Submission from Professor Hazel Smith, University of Warwick
Hazel Smith is Professor of International Relations at the University of Warwick, UK and Director of
Graduate Studies in the Politics and International Studies department. She received her PhD from the
London School of Economics in International Relations in 1993 and was a Fulbright visiting scholar at
Stanford University in 1994-95. While on secondment from the University of Warwick, Dr Smith was a
visiting Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC (2001-
02) and between 2003 and 2004, worked at the UN University in Tokyo. Professor Smith has worked on
the DPRK for nearly two decades, where she has been a regular visitor since 1990. Dr Smith worked for
nearly two years in North Korea between 1998 and 2001, for the UN World Food Programme, UNICEF
and UNDP. She regularly briefs oYcials in the US Department of State on the DPRK (most recently in
February 2008) and has been called on to advise a number of governments, international organisations
NGOs, business and the international media on North Korea. Professor Smith was invited to provide
evidence to the UK House of Commons Select committee on East Asia in Spring 2006 on the subject of
Korean security. Professor Smith’s recent work includes the research and completion of a report on DPRK
shipping for the Japanese foreign ministry and a context analysis for development programming in the
DPRK for the Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency (SDC). Between 1999 and 2002 she directed a
FCO funded project that supported academic exchange between DPRK economists in the Ministry of
foreign Trade and the University of Warwick. Professor Smith has published extensively worldwide on
NorthKorea and other topics in international relations. Hermost recent books areEuropean Union Foreign
Policy: What it is and what it Does (London: Pluto, 2002); Hungry for Peace: International Security,
Humanitarian assistance and Social Change in North Korea (Washington DC: United States Institute of
Peace, 2005); Humanitarian Diplomacy edited with Larry Minear (Tokyo: United Nation University press,
2007); Diasporas in Conﬂict edited with Paul Stares (Tokyo: United Nation University press, 2007);
Reconstituting Korean Security (Tokyo: United Nation University press, 2007). Professor Smith has been
interviewed frequently by the international media, including the BBC, KBS, and, among others,CNN, CBS
60 Minutes, ABC’s Nightline, Fareed Zakaria’s PBS series Foreign Exchange, KBS, Japan Times, Straits
Times, South China Morning Post. Professor Smith is the owner of a North Korean driving license (after
taking her driving test in Pyongyang in 2001).
Evidence presented is drawn from Professor Smith’s publications which include:
— Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Social change, Washington
DC: United States Institute of Peace press, 2005.
— Reconstituting Korean Security (ed) (Tokyo: United Nations University press, 2007).
— Regional Dialogue and Institution-Building: The Necessary Foundation for Human Rights Reform
in the DPRK in Kie-Duck Park and Sang-Jin Han, (eds) Human Rights in North Korea: Toward a
Comprehensive Understanding (Sungnam: The Sejong Institute, 2007), pp 20.
— Nation-building as Peace-building in Korea, inDeok-HongYoon and Sang-JinHan (eds), The 2005
Global Forum on Civilization and Peace (Seoul: Academy of Korean Studies, 2007), pp 80–91.
— Reconstituting Korean Security dilemmas, in Hazel Smith (ed) Reconstituting Korean Security,
(Tokyo: United Nations press, 2007), pp 1–20.
— Food Security: the case for multisectoral and multilateral cooperation, in Hazel Smith (ed)
Reconstituting Korean Security, (Tokyo: United Nations press, 2007), pp 82–102.
— Korean Security: a policy primer, in Hazel Smith (ed) Reconstituting Korean Security, (Tokyo:
United Nations press, 2007), pp 253–268.
— Analysing change in the DPR Korea, Working paper, SDC Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation—East Asia Division, pp 53, November 2006.
— Caritas and the DPRK—Building on 10 years of experience, (Hong Kong and Rome: CARITAS-
Hong Kong, 2006), pp 72.
— UNIDIR, North East Asia’s regional Security Secrets: re-envisaging the Korean crisis, In
Disarmament Forum, No 2, (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
(UNIDIR). 2005), pp 45–54.
— Crime and economic instability: the real security threat from North Korea and what to do about it,
in International Relations of the Asia Paciﬁc, Vol 5 No 2 2005, pp 235–249.
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— How South Korean means support North Korean ends: Crossed purposes in Inter-Korean
cooperation, International Journal of Korean Uniﬁcation Studies, Vol 14 No 2, 2005, pp 21–51.
— The disintegration and reconstitution of the state in the DPRK in Simon Chesterman, Michael
IgnatieV and Ramesh Thakur (eds), Making States Work (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2005),
pp. 167–192.
— NorthKoreans in China:Deﬁning the problems and oVering some solutions in TsuneoAkaha and
Anna Vassilieva (eds), Crossing National Borders: Human migration Issues in Northeast Asia
(Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2005), pp 165–190.
1. Evidence from Professor Hazel Smith
1.1 Given my expertise is on the DPRK, North-South Korea relations and the international aspects of
East Asian security, I will focus my evidence on items 3-6 of the issues under investigation.
Summary of recommendations
1. I recommend that the UK government consider ways to play a supportive role in facilitating trust and
conﬁdence building between the major protagonists in the 6 party talks.
2. The UK government should fund DPRK students to attend degree courses in the UK.
3. The UK government should work with its European partners in the EU to establish a contingency
framework of support to regional partners in the event of a major public order and or humanitarian crisis
in the Korean peninsula.
4. Given the central security problem for north East Asia is instability in North Korea the UK
government should set out a comprehensive strategy to respond to this continuing security dilemma.
Developing such a strategy does not mean taking on a lead role in every area of concern but it would help
identify the comparative advantage of the UK government in the various networks of partnerships in which
it operates.
5. Funding should be increased toDFID, the British Council, BBCWorld Service and the FCO to enable
these agencies to play amore active and amore sustained part in helping to bring about stability in the region
and a more secure future for North Korea’s population.
2. North Korea’s nuclear programme and international efforts to bring it to an end
2.1 North Korea has two core domestic and foreign policy aims: the ﬁrst is regime maintenance and the
second is economic development. The government’s objectives in establishing a nuclear programme should
be considered in the context of core government aims. The nuclear programme has two parts: nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes and nuclear weapons development.
2.2 The nuclear energy programme is an eVort to develop alternative energy sources to the coal and hydro
power sources currently available. The country has no discovered oil reserves and is reliant on coal and oil
subsidies from China and elsewhere to maintain minimal economic functions (transport, electricity supply,
heating, pumped water supplies and sewage systems, etc). This is a regime maintenance issue for the
government in that there is continuing dissatisfaction (and distress) in the population as a whole because of
insuYcient and inadequate energy supplies, including in the capital city of Pyongyang, for now over a
decade.
2.3 The DPRK’s nuclear weapons development programme was designed to oVer a deterrent capacity
against the perceived threat of United States attack. The programme was given impetus in the early 1990s
when the Soviet Union, then Russia, made it clear to theDPRK leadership that there could be no automatic
military support for the DPRK in the event of hostilities breaking out on the Korean peninsula. The ﬁrst
nuclear crisis of 1993–94 reﬂected international concerns that the DPRKwas attempting to develop its own
nuclear weapons. The 1994 international agreement that established the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organisation (KEDO) putNorthKorean nuclear weapons development on a precarious hold
until 2002. In 2002, the North Koreans were charged by the US administration with engaging in clandestine
weapons development through a process involving “highly enriched uranium” (HEU). This was the start of
the so-called “second” nuclear crisis. The six party talks that began in 2003 and involved theUS, theDPRK,
SouthKorea, JapanRussia and China resulted in a stalemate up until 2005. It was not until after theDPRK
implemented a nuclear weapons test in October 2006 however that the talks received signiﬁcant new impetus
under the aegis of a revived United States diplomacy, sanctioned by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and
President George Bush and implemented by experienced US diplomat Assistant Secretary of State
Christopher Hill.
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2.4 According to the US State Department “On 13 February 2007, the parties reached an agreement on
‘Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement’ in which North Korea agreed to shut down
and seal its Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and to invite back IAEA personnel
to conduct all necessary monitoring and veriﬁcation of these actions as agreed between the IAEA and the
DPRK.” The Yongbyon facilities were to be dismantled by 31 December 2007.
2.5 By February 2008 the Yongbyon facilities were being dismantled under the terms of the agreement
but the outstanding issue for the United States was that the DPRK had not provided a “complete and
correct declaration of all its nuclear programs” as required. TheDPRK for its part complained that the parts
of the agreement that guaranteed shipments of fuel oil to the DPRK were not being implemented
expeditiously. The agreement also speciﬁed that by 31 December 2007 the United States and North Korea
would begin to negotiate a process of removal of North Korea from the terrorism list. The DPRK argues
there was little sign of the United States making progress towards fulﬁlling that commitment and therefore
it was being asked to declare all its nuclear facilities while the US did not comply with its side of the bargain.
2.6 Negotiations remain ongoing between the United States and the DPRK with the former consulting
with the remaining four parties but coninuing with a de facto leadership of the process.
The role of the UK government
2.7 The UK is not a member of the six party talks. It has thus far been content to play a backseat role,
oVering support to the general principles of nuclear disarmament on the Korean peninsula. The UK does
however have some comparative advantage in terms of being both close to the US as a valued ally and at
the same time having diplomatic relations with the DPRK. It has therefore some potential to play a part in
conﬁdence building between the two key protagonists, the US and the UK. For this to happen however the
UK would probably have to consider a strategic recalibration of its approach to the DPRK such that it
adopted a similar approach to the US in terms of the various diVerent issues in the negotiating agenda with
the DPRK. During the period of the 6 party talks (2003-ongoing) the United States has had a number of
priorities in its policies towards the DPRK; denuclearisation, human rights and humanitarian issues being
just three. It has however adopted a de facto policy of de-linkage however such that progress in any one issue
has not been made contingent on another. It has also made diYcult decisions to prioritise some issues for
negotiation over others with denuclearisation being given top priority since 2006.
2.7 The six party talks has set up ﬁve working groups to which middle level oYcials in the respective
governments are appointed and the UK could provide a useful neutral venue for some lateral thinking to
take place on the subjects covered by these working groups. These are;
(i) denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,
(ii) normalization of DPRK-US relations,
(iii) normalization of DPRK-Japan relations,
(iv) economic and energy cooperation, and
(v) a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism.
2.8 The UK government should encourage and promote the provision of track two type fora whereby
DPRK and US oYcials and “persons of inﬂuence” (also if useful from the other participants in the six party
talks) in policy making circles could be oVered a conﬁdential “space” to discuss relevant topics. These could
be hosted by the FCO or interested academic institutions (like the University of Warwick). There is some
room for the traditional “Wilton Park” conferences to be utilised for these purposes but these should be
complemented by more focused colloquia.
2.10 Up until a couple of years ago theUKgovernment paid an annual contribution to theConference on
Security and Cooperation in the Asia Paciﬁc (of which the US and the DPRK, among others, are members)
(CSCAP), of around £2,000. CSCAP provides a track two fora in which government oYcials, ex oYcials
and academics fromAsia, the Americas andAustralasia meet regularly in working groups to discussWMD,
transnational crime,maritime security in the region andAsia-Paciﬁc security. Because of the rather frequent
movement in Asia and in the Americas between government and academia policy discussions in these fora
have fairly straightforward feedback channels into government policy thinking in Asia and the US. As the
European co-Chair of CSCAP I am sorry to see that, although other European governments, such as the
French and German government, are able to take advantage of these channels, unfortunately the UK cut
the funding in 2007 so that the UK no longer has a voice in CSCAP and therefore has lost access to the most
established and most respected multilateral track two mechanism available in Asia-Paciﬁc security. Should
CSCAP funding be renewed, the UK could use this forum to provide frameworks for trust-building
discussion involving US and DPRK oYcials, along with any other participants as appropriate. Supporting
conﬁdence-building between the two major protagonists is in my view is the single most important thing
that the UK government could do in the short term to facilitate denuclearisation in the Korean peninsula.
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Recommendation one
1. I recommend that the UK government consider ways to play a supportive role in facilitating trust and
conﬁdence building between the major protagonists in the six party talks.
3. Relations between North and South Korea
3.1 North-South Korean relations are best understood in terms of the changing conﬁguration of East
Asian economic and political relations since the rise of China as an economic power over the last decade or
so. Both South Korea and Japan have become closer to China as their economies have received boosts from
China’s new spending power. All three states prioritise stability in the region as a fundamental part of their
plans for continuing economic growth and all three therefore have a common interest in ensuring an end to
the debilitating and long drawn out crises that have occurred in respect to North Korea’s nuclear,
humanitarian and human rights records since the early 1990s. South Korea has support from neighbouring
powers in its eVorts to engage with North Korea as China, Japan and Russia all consider South Korea’s
role as dialogue partner with North Korea preferable to that of non-communication and hostility that
characterised the highly militarised Cold war based North-South relations prior to 1999.
3.3 China is North Korea’s major ally in the region, but this does not mean that China has not been
uncritical of the DPRK. It did not veto the United Nations resolution of late 2006 that imposed sanctions
on theDPRK after its nuclear weapons test. It would not be an exaggeration to state that Communist China
and capitalist South Korea have probably more in common today than China and North Korea because of
their joint commitment to sustaining stability in the region to promote economic growth and their concern
that NorthKorean government is a major cause of instability in the region. In the early 2000s both countries
had chided the US for not taking a more pro-active diplomatic role in resolving the Korean security crises
but since the advent of Ambassador Chris Hill’s diplomatic eVorts to secure an agreement, both have tried
to facilitate US diplomatic overtures.
3.3 South Korea and China also share a more intangible but nevertheless important commonality in that
both countries harbour still important popular antagonism towards Japan for a perceived recalcitrant
attitude to the consequences of the colonial past.
3.4 New South Korean president Lee Myung-bak has therefore come to power in the context of a
generally supportive regional and international environment oriented towards continued dialogue with the
NorthKorea. Regional partners also share a perspective that can be understood as at best irritation at worst
and outright hostility to Pyongyang for its perceived failures to denuclearise and reform internally.
3.5 President Lee has pledged to carry on with North-South cooperation, albeit on diVerent terms than
the previous government. President Lee largely ran his campaign on the basis of his successful career in
business (working for Hyundai) and his achievements as Mayor of Seoul. He has promised to pursue more
“reciprocity” in relations with the DPRK and, as well, to promote economic development in the North.
3.6 In the few weeks of his new administration President Lee has made a start to his “eYciency” reforms
in foreign policy by abolishing the National Security Council and replacing it with a Cabinet-level Foreign
AVairs and Security Council led by the Foreign Minister. The Uniﬁcation Ministry has thus been deposed
as the lead ministry responsible for North-South relations—signalling the new president’s intention to treat
North Korean relations as international issues to be resolved in close collaboration with allies including the
United States.
3.7 The DPRK on the other hand will likely take its time in its response to the new South Korean
presidency. The DPRK government has been pragmatic in its relations with South Korea and will likely
continue to be so. Its priority will remain to improve or “normalise” relations with the United States and it
is not likely that it will change its attitude to give relations with the South a political priority over and above
relations with the US.
3.8 In the meantime the South’s policy of engagement with the North should be supported by the UK
government in practical ways. In 2002 the government stopped funding development projects to the DPRK
including support for universities (including the University ofWarwick) to engage in academic training and
exchange. The government should reconsider this policy as all concerned parties in the eVorts to encourage
North Korea to normalise its relations with the rest of the world have considered education and training to
be a fundamental prerequisite to equip the next generation of North Korean leaders with the foundation
for interaction with the rest of the world. The North Korean government has also agreed to permit students
to attend UK universities if funding can be found for them
Recommendation two
2. The UK government should fund DPRK students to attend degree courses in the UK.
3.9 The above account of North-South relations is based on an “all things being equal” scenario. There
are signs however of instability in North Korea whose outcomes are not at all clear. The majority of the
population continues to live in abject poverty. Chronic food shortages underlie continuing malnutrition in
all parts of the country. Unemployment and underemployment is prevalent. The economic and social
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infrastructure remains degradedwith basic services of runningwater, sewage systems, electricity and heating
availability unpredictable and inadequate even for those living in the capital city. There is little evidence that
the population has conﬁdence in the government’s ability to rescue them from the economic mess in which
the country has been enmired for nearly 20 years.
3.10 There has been some discussion in the United States and South Korea of contingency planning
should for instance public order collapse from any one of a number of potential triggers; perhaps a coup
from within the military; succession complications; sections of the army and the security forces refusing to
continue to serve.
Recommendation three
3. The UK government should work with its European partners in the EU to establish a contingency
framework of support to regional partners in the event of a major public order and or humanitarian crisis
in the Korean peninsula.
4. The Three Countries’ Relations with the EU and other International Organisations
(particularly in the Light of Japan’s Current Presidency of the G8)
4.1 Both the DPRK and the ROK have good relations with the EU. The Seoul based European
Commission representatives visit Pyongyang regularly and the Commission continues to provide a limited
amount of humanitarian and economic aid to the DPRK. British based NGO Save the Children works in
Pyongyang under the aegis of the European Commission under a deal worked out with the Pyongyang
authorities in which resident European NGOs were retitled as agents of the Commission.
4.2 If the working groups spawned by the six party talks become institutionalised as a means to help keep
the peace on theKorean peninsula it seems likely that the EUwill play some form of support role inwhatever
multilateral economic mechanisms emerge.
4.3 Other IOs with a potential interest in the Korean peninsula include the IMF and the World Bank.
Given the scale of development funding that will be necessary in a post conﬂict North Korea both
institutions, though not formally involved in any of the current talks, are maintaining a watching brief on
North Korea developments. The major UN humanitarian organisations of UN World Food Programme
and UNICEF maintain a presence in the DPRK as does the ICRC and the IFRC.
5. The Effectiveness of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s work in pursuing UK policy
priorities—such as action against climate change and the upholding of human rights—with these
countries, and in promoting diplomatic, economic and cultural links between these countries and
the UK (including through the work of UK Trade and Investment, the British Council and the
BBC World Service)
5.1 The central security problem in the region is to gain resolution to the continued Korean nuclear
cruises and to create a peace and security mechanism in the Korean peninsula. In terms of human security
a humanitarian crisis continues in the DPRK with most of the population at risk of malnutrition and
premature death from insuYcient and inadequate food, poor health andmedical provision, degradedwaters
supplies and the sheer diYculties of keepingwarm in extremewinter temperatureswithout adequate heating,
shelter and clothing. The government’s national security priorities and preoccupations are used as to
provide a rationale for curtailing freedoms and it seems unlikely that these polices will change quickly.
5.2 In this context there needs to be a clear strategy for engaging with the DPRK at diVerent levels and
in diVerent sectors. The UK government should continue to work in partnership with allies but it should
also use its diplomatic relations with the DPRK to pursue openings for dialogue at every level possible.
Budgets for work in theDPRK should be increased and clear goals set for what is hoped to be achieved over
a period of three to ﬁve years in the security; economic and humanitarian; human rights; and cultural and
education areas. The government should work with those in the UK that have experience of working over
the long terms with the DPRK and should set itself realistic targets.
5.3 It is unrealistic for instance to set a goal thatwould envisage either signiﬁcantUKdirect involvement
in the resolution of security dilemmas in Korea nor is it realistic to envisage signiﬁcant British investment
in the DPRK because of the lack of proﬁtable investment opportunities in a short or long term perspective.
Humanitarian programmes however could be enhanced and DFID could play a more substantial role in
supporting IOs andNGOs operating in theDPRKbut this would depend on increased funding for that role.
5.4 TheDPRKunderstands “Human rights” talk as a synonym for “regime change” talk and so a serious
eVort to support the North Korean population on human rights issues requires thinking about how to
engage the DPRK government in a human rights dialogue that is not conceived of by them as a way of
promoting regime change. The EU had some success in the past in engaging in human rights dialogues with
the DPRK government. The UK is again well placed because of its diplomatic relations with the DPRK to
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enter into human rights discussions with the DPRK government. Such discussion should be accompanied
by oVers of technical support to investigate how change could take place (eg on instituting the rule of law,
an independent judiciary, etc).
5.5 The UK government should also play a more enhanced role in conﬁdence building (see
recommendation one above) in the context of the continuing Korean security crises. In terms of playing a
part in long term building for stability the UK could also play a larger role in cultural diplomacy and
educational and training development. Both the BBC World Service and the British Council need to be
funded appropriately as a systematic programme of cooperation is not possible without the funding to carry
out such a programme.
Recommendation four
4. Given the central security problem for north East Asia is instability in North Korea the UK
government should set out a comprehensive strategy to respond to this continuing security dilemma.
Developing such a strategy does not mean taking on a lead role in every area of concern but it would help
identify the comparative advantage of the UK government in the various networks of partnerships in which
it operates.
Recommendation ﬁve
5. Funding should be increased toDFID, the British Council, BBCWorld Service and the FCO to enable
these agencies to play amore active and amore sustained part in helping to bring about stability in the region
and a more secure future for North Korea’s population
7 March 2008
Submission from the British Council
1. Summary
1.1 This evidence addresses the element of the inquiry’s terms of reference which refers to “the
eVectiveness of the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce’s work in pursuing UK policy priorities—such as
action against climate change and the upholding of human rights—with these countries, and in promoting
diplomatic, economic and cultural links between these countries and the UK (including through the work
of UK Trade and Investment, the British Council and the BBC World Service).”
1.2 This evidence sets out the key issues as seen by the British Council as we seek to develop mutually
beneﬁcial relationships between people in UK and Japan.
2. Strategic Context
2.1 Despite weak growth in recent years, Japan remains the second largest economy in the world, and
one of the UK’s most important trading partners. It is inevitably a major contributor to greenhouse gas
emissions given the size of its economy, but Japan is one of themost energy-eYcient of themajor economies,
mitigating this eVect to some extent. Given that the Kyoto protocol was originally agreed in Japan, and that
climate security is one of the focuses of the G8 meetings in Japan this year, Japan plays an additional
symbolic role in this particular debate.
2.2 The relationship between Japan and theUK is a healthy one, particularly at higher levels. For obvious
reasons, the Japanese imperial family prefers the UK’s monarchical model to the US republican one, while
the two countries’ mature democracies, operating with bicameral parliamentary systems, have resulted in
broadly similar policy priorities and a great deal of common ground. At grass-roots level, on the other hand,
the sheer physical distance between the two countries limits interaction, and perceptions of the UK tend to
be outdated.
2.3 Japanese education outcomes score well in standardised tests, but in recent years there have been
growing concerns that the education system fails to promote creativity and innovation, and that in higher
education in particular Japan is losing ground in a rapidly internationalising market.With the shift of much
of Japan’s manufacturing base to cheaper locations such as China, the need to move into higher valued-
added areas, and into high-value services such as the ﬁnancial business, is becoming ever more pressing, and
education has a crucial role to play here.
2.4 The English language is of growing importance as the economy internationalises and shifts towards
higher value-added services, but here divisions of opinion among policy-makers have been hampering
progress. One problem is the time-consuming nature of learning the Japanese language itself, and it is
understandable that Japanese policy-makers place a higher priority on this than on English. However
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despite this, English language education is likely to be made compulsory in primary schools in a few years’
time, and depending on the exact shape of policy, there is great potential for the UK to establish itself as
the leader in quality English language teaching and linked areas such as exams and teaching materials.
2.5 Another factor is that Japan’s strict immigration laws mean that the proportion of non-Japanese
living in the country is very low. As a result, the level of English, especially spoken English, is generally poor,
and this is particularly true outside Tokyo. Given that English is the language of international research as
well as of business this is a contributory factor to the poor performance of Japanese universities in
international rankings. Policy in this area has been inconsistent, with the government oVering subsidies to
language school students a few years ago, only to slash them later. As a result, the private sector English
teaching industry is in disarray, with student numbers falling by around 30% yoy in recent months,
widespread complaints about poor quality, and the bankruptcy of the largest company in the industry
(Nova) last autumn.
2.6 In the arts, and particularly in the visual arts, Japan is a world leader. Perhaps partly because the
Japanese language requires strong visual memory skills, the average standard of drawing is extremely high
among young Japanese children, and this translates into a world leading position in manga (comic books),
anime (animated ﬁlms) and computer games, as well as enormous strengths in design and architecture. The
size and wealth of Japan’s major cities (both Tokyo and Osaka are substantially larger urban
conglomerations than any city in Europe) supports an enormous variety of cultural activity, on a par with
other major international cities like London and New York.
2.7 In international relations, Japan focuses very heavily on the US. Japan was in eVect occupied by the
US after the Second World War, and the continued presence of US bases in the country has been another
factor leading to close high-level engagement. The rise of China in recent years is a major concern to Japan,
which likes to see itself as the natural leader in Asia. Japan would dearly like a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council, and is increasingly concerned about the perception that politically speaking, it punches
below its weight.
2.8 Despite weaknesses in its universities, Japan remains a world leader in technology. This is partly
because the best of its universities are still extremely good, and partly because of the enormous spending in
this area of its leading manufacturing companies. The extremely demanding nature of Japanese consumers,
as well as certain societal diVerences, lead tomany innovations being rolled out in Japan ﬁrst before reaching
other countries. Recently, for instance, this shows up in the use of mobile technology. Given limited space
in Japanese homes, and long commuting times, younger people are increasingly not bothering with
computers at homes, and mobile devices are increasingly the standard for e-mail and web browsing, with
enormous markets having developed speciﬁcally in this area.
3. The British Council in Japan
3.1 The British Council in Japan meets the aspirations of young Japanese by creating opportunities in
education, English language learning and cultural exchange. The British Council opened in Japan in 1953.
A Cultural Agreement between Japan and Britain was signed in 1960, designating the British Council as the
UK’s oYcial agency for cultural relations.
3.2 The British Council has oYces in Tokyo andOsaka, and currently employs 90 full-time staV in Japan,
including 37 English teachers. Total turnover for 2006–07 was £7.0 million, consisting of £2.8 million in
grant in aid from the FCO and £4.2 million in contract and customer income. Our teaching staV teach
English to over 10,000 learners a year, while we also administer exams for over 8,000 candidates a year. Our
websites in Japan attract 60,000 visitors a month, and overall, we reach nearly 2.5 million Japanese people
a year in some way or other.
3.3 We work with our partners, both Japanese and British, to showcase British excellence, innovation
and creativity. We are a major channel for the UK’s public diplomacy in Japan—putting Japanese people
in touch with people in the UK. We work for the beneﬁt of the individual and for the mutual beneﬁt of
Britain and Japan. The British Council also promotes UK creative endeavours and industries and
encourages links in the arts, science and technology between practitioners and wider publics in UK and
Japan.
3.4 TheBritishCouncil seeks to inﬂuence policy in education, and particularly English language learning,
and enhance the UK’s reputation as the leading source of good ideas and innovation in the sector.We work
to present the UK as a strong competitor in the international education market, both as a value-for-money
destination for those wishing to study abroad and as source of high quality education services.We have over
13,000 visitors amonth to our sites promotingUK education, and there are currently around 8,500 Japanese
Higher and Further Education students studying in the UK (as well as around 85,000 language students).
3.5 Given that English Language teaching is likely to bemade compulsory in Primary schools, the British
Council is working closely with Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japanese
Government (MEXT) to inﬂuence the agenda here, with the aim of inﬂuencing the syllabus and getting
involved in teacher training. We are also building links between UK and Japanese schools through which
they can work together on speciﬁc projects, learning about each others’ cultures in the process.
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3.6 In higher education, there is enormous scope for partnerships between Japanese and UK universities
as the former try to internationalise. Japanese universities are also increasingly building in an overseas
module to courses, which increases their attraction to potential students looking to gain language skills. We
have used funding from the second phase of the Prime Minister’s Initiative to internationalise higher
education (PMI2) to hold symposia on relevant issues, giving opportunities for university leaders in Japan
to forge links with their opposite numbers in the UK. In education, we have brought together over 100 UK
and Japanese universities each year. At a recent symposium we held, 31 of 33 universities participating said
they expected to forge new partnerships as a result. Given the importance of the English language, the UK
has clear opportunities here. Japanese universities also have growing interest in the direct English teaching
the British Council oVers on a full-cost recovery basis, and we are currently working on models for
“implant” centres in Japanese universities, oVering potential for high impact at low cost. Meanwhile our
school links programme created new links between 82 schools in Japan and the UK last year, as well as two
links at local Board of Education level, and of course supporting existing links.
3.7 The British Council is working actively to stimulate the debate on climate security in order to increase
pressure on policy-makers to act. In the climate change area, we recently ran a competition to identify 10
articulate schoolchildren from across Japan who are passionate about climate issues. In the short term, the
focus for these young people will be on the G8!5 Environment Ministers’ summit in Kobe, when they will
be working with their counterparts from across the world to raise awareness of the issues, and to add
pressure on theMinisters to work towards ameaningful agreement. But we aim to continue to support these
“International ClimateChampions” in awide range of networking andmedia opportunities over the coming
years, while the planned introduction of the regional Climate Cool project in Japan this year will further
add to the mobilisation of young people in support of action for measures to halt climate change.
3.8 In the arts, our main focus will be on the regional “Creative Cities” project, which focuses on the
importance of art and design in raising the quality of life in urban areas, and draws attention to the UK’s
leadership in this area. We will also be continuing to showcase the best of UK contemporary art in Japan,
helping to bring a more accurate and up-to-date view of the UK to Japanese audiences. In this area, the
British Council increasingly operates as a broker, bringing together artists, venues and funding sources, and
minimising direct use of our FCO grant.
3.9 There are several other areas where we are currently looking at projects to increase UK-Japan
engagement. One obvious contender is sport, given the approach of the 2012 London Olympics. The fact
that Tokyo is bidding for the 2016 Olympics means that there is huge interest in London’s experience, and
its use of the Olympics to revitalise an economically depressed part of London.
4. The British Council working in Partnership
4.1 Japan is a rich country, and oVers scope to work with partners who can help with project delivery
and/or funding, allowing us to achieve more impact for our money. We are now actively working to both
identify partners interested in funding our work and bring them into our planning cycle at an earlier stage
and ensure long-term engagement.
4.2 Similarly, in English teaching, we are developing partnership models to reduce our costs and increase
our leverage. We are actively looking at ways to share teaching facilities with, in particular, universities.
These represent an important target audience for our work, and their pressing need to internationalise oVers
opportunities for us to work with them in oVering high-quality language training, not just for students but
also for faculty members. On the cost side, there are clear potential savings from using the same classrooms
for university teaching during the day, and for British Council English teaching in the evenings and on
Saturdays.
4.3 We maintain close contacts with other UK stakeholders in Japan, including the British Chamber of
Commerce and Visit Britain, and the British Embassy. We are working particularly closely with the
Embassy this year on theUK-Japan 2008 programme to celebrate 150 years of diplomatic relations between
the two countries.We also believewe dovetail well with the Embassy in our climate changework. TheBritish
Council focusses onmobilising public opinion, while keeping an openmind about what sorts of government
action are appropriate.
The Republic of Korea
1. Brief introduction
1.1 This evidence addresses the element of the inquiry’s terms of reference which refers to “the
eVectiveness of the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce’s work in pursuing UK policy priorities—such as
action against climate change and the upholding of human rights—with these countries, and in promoting
diplomatic, economic and cultural links between these countries and the UK (including through the work
of UK Trade and Investment, the British Council and the BBC World Service)”.
1.2 This component of the evidence sets out the key issues, as seen by the British Council, as we seek to
develop mutually beneﬁcial relationships between people in UK and the Republic of Korea.
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2. Strategic analysis
2.1 The Republic of Korea (“South Korea”) is a major economic power in East Asia, with a growth rate
of about 5% per annum, and trade relations with the UK are important to FCO. As a major manufacturing
base, and with a growing transport sector, it is also a major and growing contributor to greenhouse gas
emissions and therefore a priority country for UK in terms of climate security.
2.2 Strong relations within the Korean peninsula, and with Japan and China, are crucial to Korea and
of considerable concern toHMG. SouthKorea is seen as largely a supportive partner in international aVairs
and there are very few problems in the bilateral relationship.
2.3 Despite its apparently robust economic performance, internally there is much dissatisfaction with the
economic situation; youth unemployment is a serious issue, and—of particular relevance to the British
Council—there is a wide perception that the public education system is failing to prepare young people
eVectively for employment.
2.4 Education is therefore a major political pre-occupation for the incoming government of President-
elect Lee Myung-bak, and particular attention is being paid to the role of English in improving South
Korea’s competitive position. Meanwhile, Koreans spend more per capita on private education, and send
proportionally more students abroad for study, than any other nation in OECD.
2.5 There is a lively arts scene in Seoul in particular, with the current Mayor seeking to re-deﬁne the city
as a centre of creativity. Seoul will be the International Capital of Design in 2010. Other urban centres see
the arts as an area of opportunity to promote themselves, with festivals and biennales being a regular feature
of urban life in Korea, together with competition to hold major international events and meetings. There is
a strong feeling that Korea is not well enough known in the international arena.
2.6 In international relations, and especially in education, South Korea looks largely to its interest in
relations with the EU, which is now Korea’s second largest trading partner after China. As an English
speaking country, the UK is seen as a potential gateway to Europe, and an alternative to the USA for
overseas education.
2.7 South Koreans are increasingly conscious of their relative inability to communicate eVectively in
English and enormous sums are spent on evening language tuition in a huge number of private institutes,
known as hagwon. In the run up to the inauguration of the new government Lee Myung-bak’s team has
made frequent reference to its plans to improve the public education system’s performance in English
language teaching, as a means to reduce the expenditure on private language tuition as well as to raise
English standards across the board. The incoming government has formulated an 8-point plan to build
English competence through investment in training and development in the public education system.
2.8 South Korea is a leading centre of technological innovation, with major electronic and IT companies
constantly pushing back the boundaries of technology in their sector. Use of IT is widespread and
broadband provision at a very high level by international standards. Mobile and wireless applications are
moving forward at high speed. The biotechnology sector is also advanced and active, with stem cell work
continuing at international standards despite the scandal in 2006 over faked cloning work by an
internationally reputed team under Hwang Woo-suk.
3. The British Council in the Republic of Korea
3.1 The British Council in the Republic of Korea was established in 1973. Our aim is to achieve
recognition of the UK as the source of the highest quality English language learning opportunities and the
latest techniques in language teaching, and to increase the market share of the UK as a study destination
for young Koreans.
3.2 The British Council has one oYce in Seoul and employs 29 country-appointed staV and three UK-
appointed staV. We employ 43 teachers, all of whom are on global contracts. We administer 50 Chevening
awards on behalf of the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce (FCO).
3.3 Total turnover for last year was £4,590,000. This was made up of £990,000 in grant in aid from the
FCO and £3,600,000 in contract and customer income and other UK funding.
3.4 In 2006–07:
— 583,137 people visited our website;
— 6,944 people studied at our teaching centre;
— 3,814 candidates took UK examinations with us;
— 51 visitors were sent from here to the UK through the British Council; and
— 4,500 students from Republic of Korea studied in the UK.
3.5 The British Council is also focusing on climate security as an area to promote. We work to promote
UK creative endeavours and industries and encourage links in the arts, science and technology between
practitioners and wider publics in UK and South Korea.
Processed: 20-11-2008 19:28:47 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 395647 Unit: PAG1
Ev 90 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence
4. Future work
4.1 There is a clear window of opportunity for British Council to establish ourselves as a principal source
of support and advice to the new South Korean government in the area of English education, and we intend
to invest signiﬁcant resources in demonstrating the UK’s leading position in this area.
4.2 The British Council has already begun to leverage the reputation of our own English teaching
operation for quality and eVectiveness and to build a range of networks of inﬂuence. We plan to step up the
pace of this activity signiﬁcantly in the coming year. This will give us opportunities further to develop
English teaching activities on a full cost recovery basis, not only in our existing Seoul teaching centre but
with new partners and models of delivery.
4.3 The British Council, in partnership with Seoul National University of Education, will shortly begin
teaching at a new centre in South Korea’s leading teacher training university. We are also working in
partnership with Woongjin Thinkbig, a local education consultancy, in provision of teacher training. We
have also brokered an agreement between Woongjin and Promethean, a UK manufacturer of interactive
white boards for teaching.
4.4 There is much concern about assessment of English language ability in South Korea, with a strong
reliance on US benchmark tests such as TOEFL (Teaching of English as a Foreign Language). We are
working with research institutes to develop local assessment tools as well as seeking to raise the proﬁle of
the UK’s IELTS (International English Language Testing System) as the most reliable, internationally
recognised, test of English language communication.
4.5 In education, we have engaged the interest of senior policy makers and inﬂuencers in through
Connecting Classrooms, a global British Council programme linking local schools with schools in the UK.
The result has been that Korean educators have a renewed awareness and understanding of the importance
of a strong international dimension to the curriculum.This has been reinforced byworkwith local education
authorities on the development of international links for Korean schools, and the Ministry of Education
has recently joined the DCSF/British Council global internet portal for international education, Global
Gateway.
4.6 South Korean Universities are increasingly concerned with establishing themselves as globally
competitive, and are realising the importance of international contacts in achieving this status. As part of
the second phase of the PrimeMinister’s Initiative to internationalise higher education (PMI2) we have been
working with UK and Korean institutions to develop closer and more productive links. An example of this
is a series of symposia on relevant issues which are giving opportunities to senior Korean educationists to
forge links with their opposite numbers in the UK. The British Council will continue to promote the value
of developing links with UK and build awareness of the strengths of UK education for overseas study and
trans-national education.
4.7 Building on the British Council initiatives in climate security we shall work with young Koreans and
those who inﬂuence them to raise awareness of the crucial importance of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Our objective is to establish networks of young people committed to acting and advocating action to limit
climate change.We shall work closely with the British Embassy in Seoul and withKorean partners to ensure
that the UK is seen as a world leader in our approach to the climate security.
4.8 No cultural relations strategy for South Korea would be complete without a strong focus on creative
endeavour in the arts and related areas. We shall participate actively “Creative Cities” a British Council’s
initiative that focuses on the contribution of creative industries, entrepreneurship, the arts and education to
improving urban life.
This will capitalise on Seoul and other cities’ interests in creative arts to develop sustainable links with
UK artists, designers, architects and urban planners.
5. The British Council working with partners
5.1 The very successful Seoul English teaching centre allows us to deploy a high level English language
professional expertise which we can use in work with local partners and to inﬂuence policy and practice in
Korea. There are constraints on how far we can re-deploy these people from their main duty of teaching.
5.2 We have engaged with private and public sector partners, particularly in English language work, to
extend the scope of our activity. An example is the English Adventure Bus project, which delivers direct
teaching and teacher training in schools around Korea, which is largely funded by PCA Life Korea. There
is scope for further partnership arrangements in this sector, and in education, and will seek to develop this
model of working.
5.3 In all our grant-funded activity, the British Council seeks opportunities to involve corporate partners
in support, thus delivering higher proﬁle for their interests as well as extended impact for the British Council.
In promoting UK education, we rely on the funding generated through the Education UK Partnership and
the large number of institutionswhich sign up for special additional support speciﬁcally inKorea. The Prime
Minister’s Initiative aVords some scope for developing further work with Korean and UK educational
institutions in partnership building.
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5.4 We also seek to ensure that our activity eVectively complements that of the British Embassy and other
UK interests in Korea. In Climate Security, for example, our regional project aims to secure the active
engagement of wider publics in combating climate change, while the Embassy is working on inﬂuencing
policy and engagement with marketable technologies. There is an eVective Public Diplomacy Committee
which brings together stakeholders from the British Embassy, British Chamber of Commerce, Visit Britain
and the British Council.
North Korea
1. Brief introduction
1.1 This component of the evidence sets out the key issues as seen by the British Council that we seek to
address to develop mutually beneﬁcial relationships between people in UK and North Korea (DPRK).
1.2 Despite themany issues, particularly around nuclear proliferation andDPRK’s human rights record,
the UK has a policy of carefully targeted engagement; particularly to improve the overall ﬂow of
information into and out of the DPRK—working for positive change by introducing the country to new
ideas and models of society.
2. The British Council in North Korea
2.1 The British Council supports UK engagement in DPRK from its Beijing oYce through its work in
English language teaching with the aim of building capacity in English to foster future international
engagement.
2.2 A successful example of this is the British Council/Foreign OYce jointly-funded teacher development
project which delivers programmes of teacher training and English in three of Pyongyang’s key universities.
This programme, welcomed by North Koreans, oVers the opportunity for trainee teachers to visit the UK
and experience the UK ﬁrst hand. This project has the opportunity to extend its reach beyond Pyongyang
and to also focus on curriculum development, assessment and forms of English for Speciﬁc Purposes.
2.3 The British Council arranges English language training in the UK for mid-ranking DPRK oYcials
from a number of ministries giving future leaders and inﬂuencers exposure to new ideas. The British Council
is overall project manager for both of these activities.
2.4 TheBritishCouncil alsomanages theChevening Scholarship Programmeon behalf of the FCOwhich
currently has one award in North Korea.
2.5 Currently the British Council’s work in the area of cultural exchange inNorthKorea has been limited
to providing advice on request. However over the last few months there has been a growing interest by the
DPRKwith proposals for tours of the UK by the DPRK symphony orchestra, and performances in DPRK
of British rock music.
12 March 2008
Submission from BBC Global News in Japan and Korea
Summary
— The media market in Japan and South Korea is highly developed—these countries have led the
way in TV and new media technology.
— Development of the media market in North Korea has been stiﬂed as radio and TV sets are pre-
tuned to the state-controlled broadcasters and listening to/watching foreign radio andTV is illegal.
— Television and new media platforms are the prime means for the BBC to reach audiences in Japan
and South Korea. Very few people listen to short wave radio in these countries.
— Japan: BBC World television is available in 2.1 million households and 70,000 hotel rooms. BBC
World Service in English is available on cable throughout Japan 24/7, and on FM in western
Japan.
— Additionally, 128 hours each week of BBC television news and documentaries are translated into
Japanese and are available in voiceover on BBC World television.
— South Korea: BBCWorld television is available in 3.6 million households and 13,000 hotel rooms.
BBC World Service in English is available on FM in Seoul and via mobile devices and digital TV
24/7 nationally.
— North Korea: There are currently no opportunities for BBC World or BBC World Service in this
country, and consequently no plans for BBC World Service to start up a Korean Service.
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— BBC World Service and BBC World report regularly from the region and produce a variety of
special programmes on Japan and Korea.
— North Korea is a high priority for BBC Monitoring who translate items from the state-controlled
radio and TV channels and produce some 4,000 reports on the country each year, with particular
focus on the ongoing nuclear issue, inter-Korean and foreign relations. Coverage of Japan and
South Korea focuses on foreign and defence policy, taken mainly from English-language news
agencies in the region.
Media Market Overview
Japan
Japan’s broadcasting scene is advanced and vibrant, with established public and commercial outlets
competing for audiences. There are ﬁve national terrestrial TV companies, including the public broadcaster
NHK which also runs national radio networks. Most of NHK’s funding comes from the licence fees paid
by viewers.
Japanese broadcasting is diversifying rapidly.Manymillions of viewers nowwatch satellite and cable pay-
TV services, including those provided by NHK.
The country has spearheaded high-deﬁnition TV (HDTV), and an NHK channel is dedicated to such
transmissions. Digital terrestrial TV broadcasting is being rolled out.
South Korea
Television is inﬂuential and the major terrestrial networks command the lion’s share of viewing and
advertising. Many South Koreans subscribe to digital cable and satellite TV services.
Since 2000, andKimDae-jung’s summit in North Korea, the media have adopted a warmer tone towards
the North. But there have been cases of South Korean journalists being intimidated for giving favourable
coverage to North Korea’s communist leadership.
South Korea is at the leading edge of the digital revolution. It is a trailblazer for high-speed and wireless
internet services and has pioneered the distribution of TV via mobile devices.
North Korea
Radio and TV sets in North Korea are pre-tuned to government stations that pump out a steady stream
of propaganda. The state has been dubbed the world’s worst violator of press freedom by the media rights
body Reporters Without Frontiers.
Ordinary North Koreans caught listening to foreign broadcasts risk harsh punishments, such as forced
labour.
Press outlets and broadcasters—all of them under direct state control—serve up a menu of ﬂattering
reports about Kim Jong-il and his daily agenda. North Korea’s economic hardships or famines are not
reported. However, after the historic Korean summit in 2000, media outlets toned down their ﬁerce
denunciations of the Seoul government.
North Korea has a minimal presence on the internet. The web pages of North Korea’s oYcial news
agency, KCNA, are hosted by the agency’s bureau in Japan.
BBC Output in Japan and Korea
BBC News has oYces in Tokyo and Seoul, with one correspondent based at each oYce—Chris Hogg in
Tokyo and John Sudworth in Seoul. The newsgathering operation for the region is co-ordinated by the Asia
Paciﬁc hub bureau in Beijing, a multimedia broadcast and newsgathering unit.
BBC output is available in English across a number of media platforms, television being the primary
method of reaching audiences in the region. BBCWorld television also oVers a Japanese translation service.
As described earlier, the broadcasting scene in Japan and South Korea is highly developed. Although its
short wave broadcasts cover the Far East, including Japan and Korea, the World Service’s short wave
audience in these countries is negligible. BBC World Service has responded to this by creating local
partnerships and making use of new technology opportunities—BBC World Service in English is delivered
via FM, cable, satellite, digital TV and mobile phones.
As part of the BBC’s Global News Division, BBC World, the BBC’s commercial international television
news channel, is able to complement the World Service’s oVer to Japan and South Korea with extensive
distribution of the TV channel via satellite and cable.
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Full details of BBC output are as follows:
— Japan:
BBC World Service—FM Cocolo, a multilingual FM radio station based in the World Trade
Center in Osaka, carries BBC World Service programmes The World Today, World Brieﬁng and
Top of the Pops. The station broadcasts to the Kansai area which includes Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo,
Nara, Shiga, and Wakayama prefectures. As part of the Megalopolis Radio Network, it covers
more than 65% of Japan’s population.
A national cable operator, Usen Corporation, in Tokyo relays BBC World Service in English 24/7. It is
the leading company in the Japanese domestic cable broadcastingmarket, boasting the largestmarket share.
BBC World Service has no measured audience in Japan.
Internet—TheBBCwebsite in English, www.bbc.com is available throughout Japan.Data fromFebruary
2008 reveals 183,074 unique users in Japan. BBCWorld Service radio is available online throughout Japan.
BBC World is available in 2.1 million households and 70,000 hotel rooms in Japan. Distribution is as
follows:
— 740,000 households via Sky PerfecTV (direct-to-home satellite);
— 1.1 million households via 120 cable platforms;
— 220,000 households via CS One-Ten Company (DTH Satellite);
— 12 million households on a part-time basis through an arrangement with Chiba TV; and
— 70,000 hotel rooms (265 hotels).
The BBC is keeping abreast of developments in newmodes of multi channel consumption such as mobile,
live streaming and IPTV (Internet Protocol Television) throughout Asia. In Japan BBC World isUstreamed
24/7 to the DoCoMo mobile network in Japan.
BBC World is also working closely with clients in Japan such as Nissan, Mitsubishi Motors, Honda,
Subaru, Sanyo and Toyota to develop online advertising campaign activities to meet the diversiﬁed needs
of the regional/global audiences.
Japanese—Live Japanese translation services (128 hours per week of the programming on the channel)
are provided in London and Tokyo, available in voiceover on BBC World television to over two million
households and 70,000 hotel rooms throughout Japan. Japan is the only market where BBC World is
dubbed into the local language.
BBC World Service radio broadcast in Japanese between 1943 and 1991. The service was closed down as
short wave audiences in Japan dwindled, and access to free and independent news and information was
readily available. BBC World television picked up where BBC World Service left oV, and has operated its
translation service in Japanese ever since.
South Korea
BBC World Service—Arirang FM in Seoul takes World Service news programmes and documentaries.
The station is Korea’s premier English-language radio station. Targeting both domestic and international
listeners, Arirang Radio provides useful information on life and culture, weather, traYc and travel, as well
as up-to-the minute domestic and international news.
TUMedia in Seoul relaysWS inEnglish 24/7 viamobile phones and other portable devices. The TuMedia
Corporation led the way in providing the world’s ﬁrst S-DMB (Satellite Digital Multimedia Broadcasting)
service in May 2005. TU Media provides its contents through cell phones, car televisions, PDA’s (Personal
Digital Assistants), and more recently, launched a car navigation service, which oVers both the latest traYc
information and TV broadcasts along with audio channels. Total subscribers to TU Media stood at over
1,130,000 throughout South Korea by the end of March 2007.
In September last year BBC WS in English secured another 24/7 relay with one of the world’s leading
digital pay-TV operators, Skylife, in Seoul. Skylife is the only digital satellite broadcasting company in
Korea. Its nationwide coverage includes the entire Korean peninsula (including North Korea) with more
than two millions subscribers. Subscribers can also access SkyLife channels through their mobile phones.
Skylife leads the way in media convergence with its interactive broadcasting services.
BBC World Service has no measured audience in South Korea.
Internet—The BBC website in English is available throughout South Korea. Data from February 2008
reveals 56,204 unique users in South Korea. BBC World Service radio is available online.
BBC World is available in 3.6 million households and 13,000 hotel rooms in South Korea. It is carried by
more than 40 Pay-TV operators across the country.
In February 2006, BBC World began broadcasting through Skylife (as described above) in Korea. KT
(Korea Telecom) are major owners (25.4%)Uof SkyLife and BBC World is also carried 24/7 on their 3G
Mobile service (KTF), which has 1.5 million subscribers.
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Skylife and BBC World have also established the BBC World English Scholarship which allows students
to come to the UK to study English for one month.
The BBC considers KBS (Korea Broadcasting System—the main public broadcaster in South Korea) a
ﬁrm friend in the news market place and has two long-term relationships on a news level with the
broadcaster. The ﬁrst is via BBC Worldwide (the commercial arm of the BBC) which sells domestic BBC
news bulletins (6 and 10 o’clock) to KBS. The second is a direct broadcaster-to-broadcaster relationship
with the KBS London bureau for sound material in BBC domestic network news programmes.
North Korea
BBCWorld Service is not available in North Korea as all radios and TVs are only able to receive the state
broadcaster, and it is illegal to listen to or watch any other channel.
For the same reason, there are currently no opportunities forBBCWorld in this country. Recent research
suggests there are 55 TV sets per 1,000 people, all of which are ﬁxed tuned to the state broadcaster.
According to N Korean refugees, the penalty for watching foreign TV or listening to foreign radio is
“very high”.
No data is available for use of the internet inNorthKorea. Internet usage is restricted to a limited number
of individuals who are judged to have strong ideological credentials and on a need to know basis.
Korean—The BBC does not, and never has, broadcast in Korean. The main reason for this is that the
options for reaching audiences through radio or TV are extremely limited. It is also very rare for journalists
to get visas for North Korea.
Although most households own a radio, this is not a straightforward business; a set must be registered
with the local police and the tuning is sealed and regularly checked. Rumours suggest that cheap
unregistered radios are smuggled in fromChina and used to receive foreign broadcasts, but this is extremely
risky and a serious “crime against the state”.
Mobile phones have also been banned in recent years—with reports of severe punishments for just owning
a mobile phone, although recent reports have suggested that the ban is to be lifted shortly.
BBC World Service and BBC World programming on Japan and Korea
BBCWorld Service and BBCWorld provide coverage of the region across their news programmes. Most
recently there has been extensive coverage of the SouthKorean elections, the ongoing nuclear issue inNorth
Korea, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to North Korea and the Japanese whaling issue.
BBC World Service’s main news and current aVairs programmes include Newshour, The World Today,
World Brieﬁng, Have Your Say and Global Business. BBC World’s news and information programmes
include: HARDtalk with Stephen Sackur, Asia Business Report, World Business Report, Have Your Say
(where listeners, viewers and internet users join up to share views on key international topics), Click
andUfast:track.
As well as coverage in these regular programmes, some examples of recent special packages and
programmes on the region include:
Japan
BBC World Service: In August Tokyo correspondent, Chris Hogg, investigated energy eYciency in
Japanese industries in Japan Environment. Japan has an impressive record in this area, and yet a recent
report said the country will struggle tomeet its obligations under theKyoto agreement to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. The report asked what kind of initiatives the Japanese were putting in place, and what the
rest of the world could learn from them.
In JapanEarthquakes, another package fromChrisHogg inOctober, he described how the Japanese have
introduced a warning system to help predict when or where an earthquake will strike—the ﬁrst time a whole
country has been protected in this way.
As part of theCulture Shock strand inNovember, VirtualWorlds&CollaborativeGaming reported from
Tokyowhere the latest collaborative game for the Playstationwas revealed. Sony claim that this is the future
of gaming. Players create the video game from scratch and then hook up with other players online to create
levels, characters and challenges together.
Coming up, a season entitled Made in Japan for the Culture Shock strand has been commissioned and
will be broadcast shortly on BBC World Service.
BBC World: The Real . . . travelogue series visited Tokyo as one of ﬁve keynote destinations: New York,
Tokyo, Paris, Sydney and London, where prominent locals took viewers to their haunts—and revealed the
secrets of each city behind the bright lights and tourism.
Around TheWorld In 80 Treasures also visited Japan. It featured the sword of the Samurai warriors and
a Japanese temple and meditation garden.
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Korea
BBC World Service: In an Assignment programme in January entitled South Korea Computer Addiction,
Julian Pettifer investigated the extent of this addiction in Korea, and asked how the Korean government
was persuading young people to turn oV their computer screens. South Korea is the world’s most “wired”
country with around 70% of the population hooked up to a high speed internet connection. Ten people have
actually died after exceptionally long stints in front of the computer screen.
A news package from John Sudworth on South Korea Corruption is due to go out in March. Police
believe thousands of people accepted cash to vote for a candidate in the local elections. The candidate won
but is now in jail and those who accepted the bribe have been asked to turn themselves in. The case shows
how wide scale corruption can ﬂourish in even modern, economically vibrant Korea. It is also making
Korean people ask about democracy.
BBC World: Coming up in May Cooking In The Danger Zone visits South Korea. The presenter visits a
farm where over 2,000 dogs are raised for their meat. He also meets “Dr Dogmeat” and hears allegations
that dogs are tortured to death.
Future Plans
— BBC World Service in English will continue to explore new media opportunities in Japan and
South Korea.
— BBC World aims to increase distribution in this growing television news market place.
— There is little potential for BBC World Service or BBC World distribution in North Korea at
present.
— The World Service has discussed the possibilities of a Korean Service with the FCO a number of
times, but feels that there is currently no prospect of being able to make any impact. The lack of
an adequate delivery platform is the main reason.
— Short wave is currently the only feasible option—such a service might reach a few hundred senior
oYcials (who are likely to understand English and have access both to satellite TV and the internet
anyway) and a small number of North Korean civilians who are prepared to risk extremely severe
punishment in order to listen to the service. BBCWorld Service believes that this represents a poor
investment as it would not be able to make a signiﬁcant impact.
— There have been some rumours that a limitedmobile network is about to be re-established inNorth
Korea, but nothing deﬁnite has been announced yet. Even if there were a mobile network, BBC
World Servicewould not have access to it under the current restraints imposed by theGovernment.
— BBC World Service will continue to monitor the situation in North Korea.
BBC Monitoring’s coverage of Japan and the Koreas
BBC Monitoring’s Asia-Paciﬁc team, in conjunction with Monitoring’s US partner, the Open Source
Centre (OSC), provides daily coverage of news and current aVairs on North and South Korea and Japan.
Drawing on translated material supplied by OSC bureaux in the region, BBCM selects, edits and publishes
reports online from a wide range of vernacular and English-language media, including radio and TV, news
agencies and print and internet sources.
North Korea
Coverage of North Korea is given high priority with particular focus on the ongoing nuclear issue, inter-
Korean and foreign relations, and domestic political and economic aVairs. The main sources for news and
information are the country’s state-run media in both Korean and English: Korean Central News Agency
(KCNA), Korean Central Broadcasting Station (KCBS) radio and Korean Central Television via Satellite,
while reports from South Korean, Japanese and Chinese sources provide valuable insight and analysis of
North Korean aVairs.
In addition, the OSC bureau in the region produces daily radio and TV programme summaries from
North Korean state-run TV and radio and BBC Monitoring produces a weekly digest of regional reports
and reaction to the latest developments in North Korea (North Korea Brieﬁng). In 2007, BBCM published
a total of 4,409 reports on North Korea.
Japan and South Korea
Coverage of Japan and South Korea consists mainly of daily reports from English-language news
agencies Kyodo and Yonhap as well as a mixture of vernacular and English-language print and internet
media.Monitoring of the countries’ main TV broadcasters, Japan’s NHKTV and SouthKorea’sKBS TV1,
is also carried out by OSC regional bureaux on an ad hoc basis. In addition, both bureaux produce regular
press highlights from Japanese and South Korean periodicals.
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BBCMonitoring’s coverage of SouthKorea and Japan focuses mainly on foreign and defence policy with
particular emphasis given to relations with China, the US, North Korea and Europe. Economic policy and
political reform are also covered. In 2007, BBC Monitoring published a total of 2,734 reports on Japan and
1,693 reports on South Korea.
In addition to the daily online selection of news highlights for all three countries (Monitoring Select),
BBCM also produces election guides, media behaviour notes and backgrounders on major news events on
an ad hoc basis.
March 2008
Submission from Dr Christopher Hughes, University of Warwick
Introduction: Where are UK-Japan Security Realtions Heading?
1. TheUK and Japan have long enjoyed strong economic relations, especially since the inﬂux of Japanese
investment into the UK in the 1980s, and have increasingly developed a complementary set of bilateral
political relations. Since the end of the ColdWar, and accelerated by post-11 September events, the UK and
Japan have also begun to develop a more diverse set of security relations. Japan ﬁrst assisted the UK in
security terms through its large-scale ﬁnancial and more limited human contribution to the stabilisation of
the Balkans in the 1990s. UK-Japan security cooperation has now taken on a harder edge with the JSDF’s
provision of non-combat logistical support for UK and other coalition forces in Indian Ocean since 2001
as part of OEF, and with the JSDF’s despatch on non-combat reconstruction missions to work alongside
the UK in Iraq and Kuwait since 2004. For Japan, the UK in many ways has been the long-term European
partner of choice in the EU, G-7/8 and the UN.
2. The UK and Japanese governments, as indicated by the January 2007 UK-Japan Joint Statement, are
now seeking to further expand security cooperation in their respective regions and globally. Many Japanese
policy-makers have seen the UK as future model to be emulated in terms of gradually integrating their
nation into international security cooperation, and for managing the opportunities and risks of a
strengthening bilateral alliance relationship with the US. Japan for some has even been identiﬁed
(admittedly often overly hopefully; disingenuously, or in ignorance) as the new “Great Britain of the Far
East” (see Hughes 2007). Similarly, for the UK, an expanding security relationship oVers opportunities to
engage Japan’s still very considerable “soft” economic power and qualitatively upgraded “military” power
in the service of shared international security goals, and to leverage UK inﬂuence in East Asia and globally.
It might indeed be argued that 2008 is another opportune year for pushing forward UK-Japan security
cooperation, as Japan renews its refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean; mulls the passing of a newNational
Security Law which may routinise JSDF participation in various “international peace cooperation
activities”; and prepares to host the G-8 summit in Toyako, Hokkaido.
3. The purpose of this short memorandum is to consider the areas of emerging opportunity for
substantive and meaningful security cooperation between the UK and Japan, but also to point out areas of
existing and new possible diYculties that will continue to hamper the security relationship. Essentially, it
argues that the UK and Japan certainly have good reason to propel their security cooperation forward, and
this will be facilitated by the ongoing process of Japan’s self-disentanglement from many of the past
restrictions on its international security role; but that the UK will also need to be conscious of the fact that
forging a new security relationship with Japan also means forging a relationship with by deﬁnition a new
Japan itself. This new Japan may prove a more unpredictable security partner than previously imagined.
UK-Japan Opportunities for Cooperation
4. Despite some recent signs of retrenchment in Japanese security policy with the fall frompower of Prime
Minister Abe Shinzo and succession of Fukuda Takeo at the end of 2007, it is probable that there will be
little divergence on Japan’s part from its overall trajectory over the past decade of assuming the position of
a so-called more “normal” military power. Fukuda was forced to temporarily withdraw the MSDF from
the Indian Ocean in November 2007 due opposition from the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) in theNationalDiet’sUpperHouse to the renewal of legislation enabling despatch.However, Fukuda
was eventually able to use the governing Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) “super-majority” in the Lower
House to force through new legislation enabling re-despatch, even if with a contracted mandate to
concentrate on refuelling and with the same time bound limit of one year for operations. Fukuda is
undoubtedly more cautious than Abe on issues of national security, and preoccupied with attempting to
maintain his hold on power domestically. However, there are a number of long-term factors which will
continue to drive Japanese security policy forward.
— External threats: Japan will of course seek to maintain engagement with North Korea and China.
Nevertheless, the threat fromNorth Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes short-term,
and the long-term concerns over the rise of China mean that Japan will have to continue to steel
its deterrent capabilities and regional security role.
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— US-Japan alliance pressures: Japan is aware that the US since the mid-1990s has essentially
changed the terms of their grand strategic bargain ﬁrst forged at the start of the Cold War. The
US is no longer content with providing security guarantees for Japan in return simply for regional
bases. US global strategy now dictates that Japan and other regional allies shouldmake their bases
and national military capabilities available for supporting US regional and global deployments,
and for participation in “coalitions of thewilling”. Japan’s facing of this relentless alliance pressure
is unlikely to abate regardless of who enters the White House in 2009.
— Domestic changes: Japan is experiencing a state of relatively unprecedented domestic political
ﬂuidity, the result of long-term structural change now coming to a head. The old-style, politics of
redistribution, conciliation and cooptation, practiced by the previously dominant pragmatist wing
of the LDP hit the buVers with the Heisei Recession of the 1990s. It has now been replaced by a
new form of hybrid neo-liberal, neo-conservative, confrontational, revisionist form of politics
practiced to varying degrees by the Machimura faction of the LDP, which has produced the last
four prime ministers, including the incumbent Fukuda. The corollary of this domestic political
change has been a change in Japan’s external foreign policy posture. The low-proﬁle, low risk
posture of the LDP pragmatists in foreign policy, has been replaced by the acceptance in Japan
of the need for expanded security commitments, in part to meet external threats and satisfy US
expectations, but also in large part to restore Japan’s perceived rightful place as a great power. The
LDP revisionists now refuse for Japan to be weighed down by history and consequently argue for
constitutional revision, a more equal less dependent relationship with the US, and a relationship
free of the burden of historical apologies with Japan’s neighbours. Fukuda is the most moderate
of the revisionists, as shown by his non-confrontational stance on visits to Yasukuni Shrine and
emphasis on good ties with China and South Korea. But arguably Fukuda is now the aberration
within the LDP, and if/once he falls from power, then the forces arguing for amore assertive Japan
will once again be in a position to seize power.
— Oppositional politics: The DPJ under Ozawa Ichiro’s leadership has certainly been more intent on
forcing the LDP from power, and has attempted to articulate a vision of security more UN and
Asian-centred in nature. However, even if theDPJwere to secure victory in probable LowerHouse
elections in the summer of 2008, or to enter into coalition with the LDP, this would not be the end
of Japan’s security normalisation. For sure, Ozawa would focus more on strengthening Japanese
international security cooperation via the UN, and seek stronger international mandates for
cooperation in US-led operations outside Japan’s own region. But Ozawa is certainly not
advocating the abrogation of the US-Japan alliance (and indeed arguably much of his opposition
to the IndianOceanmission can be interpreted as simply his desire to force an election for domestic
political gain, rather than to deny Japan’s expanding international security role), and in certain
instances Ozawa may even advocate more radical options for Japan’s external security role. If
Ozawa’s more UN-centred security option were realised, then he has argued this should mandate
the JSDF to be despatched to Afghanistan with the necessary legitimacy to use force if necessary.
Ozawa will certainly have to struggle to maintain the unity of his diverse party, but the bulk of the
party is generally in accord with this more radical vision of Japanese security.
5. Hence, for these long-term, structural, reasons it is certain that Japan will continue to expand its role
in international security, even if at times this expansion remains incremental or stop-start. In terms of the
UK relationship with Japan, there are thus a number of opportunities that might be exploited.
— UN PKO: Japan will continue to look to the UK as an important partner from which it can gain
experience and training in peacekeeping operations. Although Japan’s participation in UN PKO
has been strictly limited up until now to operations that involve the non-use of force, there may
be scope in the future for an incremental expansion of the JSDF into more hazardous operations.
Japan’s consideration of JSDF despatch to Darfur is one instance of this.
— NATO and Afghanistan: Prime Minister Abe raised NATO hopes in January 2007 when he
addressed the North Atlantic Council and indicated that Japan would prepared to make an
expanded commitment to international security cooperation, including possible JSDF despatch as
part of PRTs in Afghanistan. In many ways, JSDF despatch to Afghanistan itself would represent
a more visible and useful contribution to post-war reconstruction than the “ﬂoating gasoline
stand” operation in the Indian Ocean. Abe’s government then disappointed NATO by its failure
to follow up on the proposal. As noted above, though, the DPJ has some appetite for JSDF
despatch to Afghanistan, and it might become a reality if a National Security Law were passed.
Prime Minister Fukuda has talked up this possibility in 2008, following his political ordeal in
attempting to pass the legislation for the re-despatch of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean. If a
National Security Law were passed, then it would provide a non-time bound set of legislation,
enabled by clearer standards of internationalmandates, whichwould allow for the routine and fast
despatch of the JSDF overseas, and obviating the current need for separate laws for each JSDF
mission. The LDP and DPJ may have suYcient consensus between them to pass such legislation.
Hence, if the UNmandates were deemed strong enough, the JSDF could indeed be despatched on
certain types of missions to Afghanistan, and to work alongside UK forces (although expecting
despatch to southern Afghanistan and combat zones would be a step too far to expect).
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— Non-Proliferation: Japan’s expanding maritime capabilities and ambitions would match those of
the UK in seeking to halt exports of nuclear materials or ballistic missiles. Japan and the UK are
already partners in the Proliferation Security Initiative.
— Arms manufacture: Japan’s defence industry is beset by the twin problems of limited demand in
Japan itself (with stagnant defence budgets) and the lack of export markets and co-development
partners for increasingly expensive weapons systems (a result of the 1967 and 1976 prohibitions
on the export of weapons technology). Japan’s defence production sector, however, is seeking to
erode the ban on arms exports to attempt to exploit the beneﬁts of global markets and co-
production with partners from other developed states. Inevitably, the prime target for Japanese
defence industrial collaboration is the US as Japan’s alliance partner. Nevertheless, Japanese
concerns at over-dependence on US military technology means that there is an interest in
expanding defence production cooperation longer term with European partners and especially the
UK, which is seen as a safe partner due to its own close links with the US. Japan’s recent interest
in the possible procurement of the Euroﬁghter Typhoon, for which BAE Systems holds the export
rights, is one example of this potential new type of military-industrial cooperation.
UK-Japan Obstacles
6. Japan’s long term trajectory as a more active partner in the US-Japan alliance and its related search
for additional partners in Europe and NATO should thus serve to elevate UK-Japan relations to a more
central role in Japan’s future security calculations.
7. At the same time, though, any deepening UK-Japan security relationship is likely to experience some
limitations or tensions over the following types of issues:
— US comes ﬁrst: Although Japan is constantly seeking to hedge against over-dependence on the
alliance with the US by seeking new security partners, its ﬁnal allegiance remains to its security ties
with the US. As long as UK-US ties remains convergent on many security issues, then there will
be no likely tension betweenUK-Japan ties. All the same, theUKwill need to remember that there
may be issues or regions where its perceived vital security interests may diverge with those of the
US, and in this event Japan may not be willing to provide support to the UK. Such examples may
include European-centred humanitarian intervention missions.
— China: Japan’s optimum policy approach to China is to seek economic and political engagement,
and thus has many similarities to UK policy. However, Japan continues to view China as the
greatest threat to its national security and much of its military transformation and the
strengthening of the US-Japan alliance is designed to counter-balance China. In this sense, the
EU’s, and concomitantly the UK’s, active engagement of China, with what is often seen from the
Japanese perspective as an unduly soft touch on security issues, is a potential stumbling block in
UK-Japan cooperation. Japan remains implacably opposed to any lifting of the EU arms embargo
on China, and would react with great disappointment at any UK move to supporting the selling
of weapons to China in the future.
— North Korea: Japan has certainly been thankful for the UK’s professed support for the Japanese
position on the abductions of its citizens. However, Japan’s insistence on a resolution to the
abductions issue as the entry point for bilateral normalisation with North Korea and for the
provision of signiﬁcant Japanese economic support for the Six Party Talks denuclearisation
process has meant that Japan has threatened to fall out of step with the international community
on the North Korean issue. In this way, Japan and the UK might ﬁnd themselves diverging if
North Korea moves ahead with its denuclearisation and this triggers calls for wider support from
the international community, but Japan is left isolated. The UK government also needs to be
conscious of the fact that the abductions issue has very much been the property of the nationalist
right-wing in Japan over past years, and that its support on this issue needs to be carefully
calibrated so as to not stimulate an overly hard-line position on North Korea from Japan.
— Reciprocity: The UK is certainly faced with a more active Japan as a potential international
security partner. But the ﬂipside of this is that the UK will also be faced with a more quixotic and
demanding partner. As Japan is encouraged to domore in the international security arena, in order
to live up to its status as a major developed power, so will it naturally expect greater reciprocation
from its partners on issues of vital importance to itself. Japan may lose its image as an ATM
providing cash when kicked for supporting international security cooperation, and instead, now
that it is making a human contribution to security, expect others to bear the costs with it. Abe’s
visit to NATO in 2007 was a portent of this type of Japanese thinking. He oVered expanded
supported for international security, but also demanded (if in oblique Japanese fashion)
reciprocation on issues such as China andNorthKorea. Japan has evenmade this clear in dealings
with the US, expecting expanded alliance commitments to make for greater US support for its
permanent UNSC bid. The fact that this support was not substantially forthcoming only served
to injure Japanese national pride. Hence, theUKmust avoid similar possible tensions. If it expects
more from Japan, then the price will be to give more back diplomatically and politically, and to
actively and even materially support Japanese security concerns in East Asia.
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Conclusion: Taking the New Japan Seriously
8. If the UKwishes to investigate an expanded security relationship with Japan, then it needs to continue
to recognise the deep-seated domestic and international changes aVecting Japan’s orientation on the world.
Japan is emerging long-term as a more active security partner for the US and other developed states,
including most especially the UK. The current impasse and retrenchment in security policy under Fukuda
is only likely to be short-term. The consequent terms of Japan’s relationship with the US and other partners
are changing. Japan may be a more reliable alliance partner of the US, but this has already been
accompanied by greater Japanese intransigence over policy towards North Korea, China, and issues of the
colonial past (see Hughes and Krauss 2007). The UK needs to recognise that in reaching out to the newly
emerging Japan, it will have to wrestle with similar problems. Japan, although it will not lose entirely its
traditional reticence in international relations, will do more potentially for the UK, but the UK will also
have to do much more for Japan; that is if they want to have a truly substantial security relationship and
move beyond the niceties of much of past security cooperation and the nostalgia for the Anglo-Japanese
alliance. Japan and the UK can do much together in their respective regions, and in the Middle East and
Africa. But closer cooperation also brings risks of placing the relationship at loggerheads over issues that
are closest and most essential to Japan’s national security.
26 March 2008
Submission from Dr Tat Yan Kong, Senior Lecturer in Politics, School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London
NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR CAPACITY AND THE PATH OF REFORM
1. Background
1.1 The North Korean nuclear crisis dates back to the 1993, when IAEA inspections concluded that
weapons grade plutonium had been extracted from spent fuel at North Korea’s nuclear facility at
Yongbyon. Failure of on-oV negotiations between North Korea and the US resulted in a tense stand-oV.
Military conﬂict was averted in July 1994 through the conclusion of a deal between the two sides. Formalized
as the Geneva Framework Agreement (GFA) of October 1994, the deal provided for energy assistance to
North Korea (oil and the eventual supply of two light water nuclear reactors) in exchange for the
disablement and eventual dismantling of existing nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and other locations.
1.2 By the end of 2002, the GFA had collapsed. The ostensible trigger was the alleged conﬁrmation of a
uranium-based nuclear programme byNorthKorean negotiators to their US counterparts in October 2002.
This prompted US cessation of the supply of oil (500,000 tons annually) to North Korea. Food aid and
support for the light water reactors were also suspended. In response to US sanctions and UN
condemnation, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors and restarted its Yongbyon reactor (including the
reprocessing of 800 spent fuel rods) and declared its right to possess nuclear weapons.
1.3 Even without the alleged October 2002 disclosures, the GFA was problematic given the loopholes of
the agreement (especially over disclosure and veriﬁcation), slow implementation of the light water project,
and North Korean attempts to extract further concessions (eg by ballistic missile testing in 1998). The most
decisive factor of all, however, was the ideological hostility towards North Korea by the new George W.
Bush administration. In the post-September 11 climate, compromise with a nuclear-proliferating, anti-
democratic state like North Korea (that had been linked to terrorism) was unacceptable to the neo-
conservative Bush administration.
1.4 To resolve the crisis, both North Korea and the US agreed to participate in the Chinese-sponsored
six-party talks (North Korea, US, China, South Korea, Russia, Japan) which begun in Beijing in August
2003. After four rounds lasting two years, an agreement of principle was signed in September 2005. The
agreed declaration contained the following provisions:
— North Korean will denuclearize on a veriﬁable basis.
— US will refrain from attacking North Korea.
— US will refrain from reintroduction of nuclear weapons to South Korea.
— North Korea had the right to use civil nuclear energy.
— North Korea and US and Japan should seek to normalize diplomatic relations.
— North Korea will receive energy assistance from the ﬁve powers.
Implementation was to be based on the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action”.
1.5 The September Agreement soon ran into diYculties, especially over the modalities of
implementation. For example, North Korea insisted on the delivery of a light water reactor (a process that
would take years) before any denuclearization. In the same month, the US treasury imposed sanctions on
Banco Delta Asia, a Macau-based banks allegedly involved with North Korean counterfeiting, resulting in
the freezing of $25 million of North Korean funds. The six-party process was halted and the situation
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deteriorated in 2006 asNorthKorea conducted a series of missile tests on 4 July and tested a nuclear weapon
on 9October.While theUSwas unable to secure support for comprehensive sanctions againstNorthKorea,
the tests did not go unpunished. South Korea suspended fertilizer and food aid for one year in response to
the July missile tests, while China reduced its aid (by two-thirds) and supported the UN (Resolution 1718)
condemnation of the nuclear test and sent a high level envoy to North Korea.
2. The February 2007 Agreement
Against the background of international isolation, and economic pressure from its principal aid
providers, North Korea returned to the six-party talks in December 2006. Under Congressional pressure to
re-engage and in the absence of progress in theMiddle East, the Bush administration decided to re-focus its
eVorts on settling the North Korea issue. Progress was surprisingly quick, and agreement was reached at
the six-party talks in February 2007. The February Agreement is divided into two phases.
2.1 Phase 1 provisions:
— NorthKoreawill freeze its nuclear installations atYongbyon and invite back the IAEA inspectors.
— North Korea will discuss with the six parties its nuclear programmes, including plutonium
extracted from the operation of its Yongbyon reactor.
— North Korea and the US will begin bilateral talks aimed at establishing full diplomatic relations.
The US will begin the process of removing North Korea from its list of terror-sponsoring states,
and advance the dismantling of economic sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act.
— North Korea and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving “outstanding issues”.
— The US will resolve the issue of sanctions against Banco Delta Asia (within 30 days of the
agreement).
— North Korea will receive 50,000 tons of heavy oil.
2.2 Phase 2 provisions:
— North Korea will declare all its nuclear programmes and disable all nuclear facilities.
— North Korea will receive one million tons of heavy fuel oil (including the initial shipment of
50,000 tons).
2.3 North Korea received its frozen funds in Banco Delta Asia in June 2007. In July, IAEA inspectors
returned to Yongbyon and conﬁrmed that the nuclear installations were shut down. South Korea delivered
50,000 tons of heavy oil to North Korea. High-level US-North Korean in September opened the way for
the arrival of US technicians to Yongbyon. A 31 December 2007 deadline for declaration of North Korean
programmes was ostensibly agreed. After initial progress, the 31 December deadline was not adhered to.
The US demanded that North Korea complete disablement of Yongbyon and provide a full account of past
and existing nuclear activities. North Korea responded by insisting that it had declared all its programmes
and called on the US to comply with its obligations on energy aid, economic sanctions and the terrorism
blacklist.
3. Complicating Factors
The current impasse (as of April 2008) is not surprising from the past history of denuclearization
agreements with North Korea. Apart from the intrinsic problems of the February Agreement arising from
the mechanics of denuclearization, and the sequencing of concessions (who gives up what, how much, and
when?), the recent leadership change in South Korea and the impending one in the US present additional
complicating factors.
3.1 Predictably, “denuclearization” is diYcult to implement given the absence of trust and divergence of
understanding between the US and North Korea. Implementation of the principle of denuclearization is
likely to be subject to disagreements over full disclosure of the extent of North Korea’s nuclear capacity,
the meaning of “denuclearization” veriﬁcation, and the reciprocal concessions that North Korea expects.
3.1.1 To denuclearize, North Korea ﬁrst needs to give a full account of its capacities and that
account needs to be acceptable to the other parties. Full disclosure of North Korea’s nuclear
programme includes not only the amount of weapons grade plutonium extracted from the
8,000 spent fuel rods after the reopening of the Yongbyon plant in 2003, but also the total
amount of plutonium accumulated (since the opening of the Yongbyon plant in 1985), the
number of nuclear weapons it possesses, and the any programmes outside of Yongbyon. All
of these issues are problematic as the US estimates are likely to diverge from those given by
NorthKorea. For example, theUS claims that there is a nuclear programme based on highly
enriched uranium, a claim denied by North Korea.
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3.1.2 What does “denuclearization” mean? The US insists on the “disablement” of nuclear
facilities to the extent that operation cannot easily be restarted. Does “denuclearization”
apply to the capacity to make nuclear weapons or to North Korean possession of any
nuclear capability, including civil? Here the North Koreans have indicated that they expect
to have to be supplied with light water reactors (LWRs) as compensation for the closure of
their existing reactors (the 1994 GFA also committed to providing North Korea with
LWRs).
3.1.3 The veriﬁcation regime under the February Agreement is limited. The role of the IAEA is
conﬁned to monitoring the freezing of the Yongbyon facility. The September 2007
discussions allowed for the arrival of US technicians at Yongbyon. Thus the system of
inspection and veriﬁcation for any installations beyondYongbyonwill need to be negotiated
with the North Koreans (who deny the existence of such facilities). Even if agreement can
be reached on the existence of nuclear facilities, the mode of veriﬁcation is likely to be
contentious given North Korea’s history of opposition to intrusive inspection.
3.1.4 What reciprocal concessions do the North Koreans expect? The February Agreement
commits the other signatories to the provision of heavy oil (one million tons), US removal
of North Korea from the terror blacklist and the ending of US economic sanctions.
Statements from North Korea, however, point to expectations for more extensive
concessions as the price for full denuclearization. These include oil shipments beyond the
speciﬁed amount, the (longstanding) demand for the construction of LWRs, and the
concomitant reduction of US military forces on the Korean peninsula. Even if these
demands could be agreed in principle, their implementation will extend the denuclearization
schedule for an indeﬁnite period into the future. There is also strongUS (and SouthKorean)
expectation that aid and diplomatic normalizationwill also be accompanied by conventional
force reduction on the North Korean side.
3.2 The US electoral cycle introduces an element of uncertainty. The prospect of improved relations at
the end of the Clinton administration was halted by the new Bush administration in 2001. Therefore North
Korea is watching and waiting for the outcome of the 2008 presidential contest (just as it did in 2004, when
the six-party process stalled). North Korea is unlikely to commit fully to denuclearization unless it can be
sure that the guarantees made by one administration will be maintained by its successor. North Korea is
likely to be most apprehensive about a McCain victory. Senator McCain was a critic of the 1994 GFA and
had advocated a more robust approach to “rogue states” (including North Korea) during the 1990s. It is
worth quoting his recent comments on the subject of North Korea, which hint at a widening of the list of
concessions expected by the US:
North Korea’s totalitarian regime and impoverished society buck these trends [towards
democracy]. It is unclear today whether North Korea is truly committed to veriﬁable
denuclearization and a full accounting of all its nuclear materials and facilities, two steps that are
necessary before any lasting diplomatic agreement can be reached. Future talks must take into
account North Korea’s ballistic missile programs, its abduction of Japanese citizens, and its
support for terrorism and proliferation. (Source: Foreign AVairs, Volume 86 (6) November/
December 2007, section 3 paragraph 3, html version)
3.3 The administration of newly inaugurated South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak has stated that it
intends to take a less indulgent attitude towards North Korea than its predecessors. While the previous Roh
administration reduced food aid in 2006 in response to North Korean testing of missiles and a nuclear
device, it did not support US calls for comprehensive sanctions or the forceful interdiction of North Korean
shipping under the Proliferation Security Initiative. Indeed, it maintained and expanded key projects
(notably the Mount Kumgang Tourism Project and the Kaesong Special Economic Zone) that provide
North Korea with much needed foreign exchange. Roh’s approach reﬂects the belief that a generous
approach towardsNorth Korea ultimately yields more beneﬁt (in softening the North’s attitude, promoting
the development of civil society) than either confrontation or strict insistence on quid pro quos. By contrast,
President Lee has indicated that he will take a more conditional approach towards North Korea meaning
that economic aid will depend upon tangible results in the areas of denuclearization, demilitarization and
human rights. Of course, President Lee’s scope for manoeuvre will also depend on the result of the
forthcoming April 2008 national assembly elections.
4. Denuclearization and North Korea’s Reform Path
Whether these complicating factors can be overcome depends on the North Korean leadership’s vision
of systemic change. A secure external environment (centred on improving relations with the US and the
opportunities for aid and investment that ﬂow from normalization) is a necessary but insuYcient condition
for the introduction of substantive market reform inNorthKorea. Equally important will be the acceptance
of the principle of reform amongst North Korean leaders. Readiness for substantive reform will reinforce
denuclearization and demilitarization. By contrast, a leadership preference for “muddling through” will
have the opposite eVect.
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4.1 North Korea’s leaders seek to remain in power indeﬁnitely and will maintain a level of social control
consistent with that objective. Any future post-Kim Jong-Il non-dynastic leadership will also aspire to
power retention using social control. Given the status accorded to themilitary as part of Kim Jong-Il’s post-
1994 power consolidation and as a response to the 1990s economic crisis, it is likely that military leaders will
play a leading role in any post-Kim leadership. Successful reformwill depend on high status military leaders
recognizing the priority of achieving a successful civilian economy.
4.2 The small size of North Korea and its weak position vis-a`-vis South Korea means that the North
Korean leadership feels more vulnerable than its counterparts in China or Vietnam. Accordingly, its
approach to economic reform is likely to be more cautious.
4.3 Historically Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il have been lukewarm about Chinese-style market reforms.
Apart from ideological hostility, concerns about loss of economic control and social challenges to the regime
always outweighed concerns about productivity. However, North Korean leaders seem to have reappraised
the Chinese experience. There are grounds for expecting North Korea to increasingly copy aspects of
Chinese reform.
4.3.1 China’s initial agricultural reforms of 1978 (de-collectivization) simply sanctioned what was
already taking place at the local level in response to food shortages. Similarly, NorthKorea’s
economic collapse of the 1990s led to the spontaneous rise of non-state economic activities
(especially private farming, light manufacturing and primitive markets) as the state could no
longer provide employment and goods for the desperate population. Other reforms include
the 2002 wage-price reform (to reﬂect scarcities more accurately), accelerated development
of special economic zones (notably Kaesong) and greater managerial autonomy.
4.3.2 The impressive results of China’s modernization demonstrate to North Korean leaders a
route for long term regime survival by promoting economic growth without surrendering
the monopoly of power. This shift in attitude is reﬂected in Kim Jong-Il’s praise for the
Chinese model (especially the special economic zones), the dispatch of economics students
to China, and in the enticement of Chinese entrepreneurs by the North Korean authorities.
4.3.3 Over the last decade, China’s inﬂuence over the North Korean economy has greatly
enhanced through its leading role as aid provider, trade partner (from 28–43% between 2001
and 2005) and foreign investor.
4.4 On the other hand, the North Korean government has also attempted to assert its control over the
ﬂedgling private economy (over foreign exchange, over cross-border trade) as the economic crisis has eased.
It continues to stress the relevance of state owned industries and central economic management. This
suggests that while China’s experience is inﬂuential, North Korea is also likely to learn from Vietnam and
South Korea, countries with greater aYnity to North Korea in terms of size and centralist background.
4.4.1 The North Korean leaders may seek to maintain a substantial but revamped state industrial
sector while inducing foreign participation in foreign exchange generating activities
(working with state agencies via special economic zones, tourism projects, and mineral
sector). This way, the state can retain control of the lead industrial sectors, minimize the
spread of independent local entrepreneurs, keep cultural contacts with foreigners strictly
regulated, and ease its foreign exchange constraints. Apart from employment rationalization
(which will need to be severe), foreign expertise and investment (eg from South Korean
conglomerates) will also be needed for the revamping of worthwhile state industries. Such
a reform strategy represents the “development dictatorship” model, that it, North Korea’s
approximation of South Korea’s centralized, state-directed capitalism of the 1960s–80s.
Such a strategy is more consistent with North Korea’s history of economic centralization
(whereas Chinese provinces enjoyed a high degree of economic autonomy). Kim Jong-Il has
also expressed admiration of the South Korean model.
4.4.2 North Korean leaders may be politically too sensitive, and unwilling to risk any kind of
substantive economic reform. Instead they may seek to “muddle through” by making the
minimal adjustments necessary to maintain the current levels of foreign exchange receipts
and aid ﬂows. Keeping the nuclear threat alive as a bargaining counter, would be consistent
with muddling through. Such behaviour would deepen North Korea’s isolation and
reinforce its dependence on nuclear diplomacy. This is the scenario least conducive to
denuclearization and least attractive to the region as a whole. Given their desperate need for
economic regeneration (eg GDP growth in 2006 turned negative for the ﬁrst time since 1999,
a grain shortfall of one million tons by the end of 2007) to sustain power, even the most
conservative North Korean leaders are likely to be aware of the limits of muddling through.
Scenarios of a permanent gangster regime eking out a basic existence through aid extorted
by nuclear diplomacy and the receipts of criminal activities (drug production and
counterfeiting of goods and currency) are unrealistic.
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4.5 Thus the choice between substantive reform/denuclearization versus muddling through/
brinkmanship depends in large part on the readiness of North Korea’s leaders to accept substantive reform.
That readiness arises from their calculations about internal political risks and external security. Their
perceptions about the intentions of the US will be crucial to shaping the latter calculation. By the signals it
conveys, the US will be able to shape those perceptions in the direction of substantive reform/
denuclearization.
4.5.1 The US should accept the North Korean political system as it stands and instead prioritize
denuclearization and economic reform. It should look to the social transformation of North
Korea over a long time frame driven by improved living standards, spread of the proﬁt
motive and generational change (ie North Korea as a slow motion replay of China or
Vietnam). This means stepping away from the moral absolutism that has dominated much
of the Bush administration (with few positive results).
4.5.2 The North Koreans will not denuclearize until they can be sure that deals will not become
hostages to ﬂuctuations in domestic US politics as in 2000. This raises the wider issue of how
guarantees of aid and security can be carried across US administrations. Given the six party
support of the current agreement, it has a more binding eVect than the 1994 GFA. Progress
on negotiation of a separate peace regime between the US, North Korea, China and South
Korea (as called for under the February Agreement) will oVer further reassurance to North
Korea. These layers of multilateral reassurance will also make North Korean non-
compliance with denuclearization diYcult.
4.5.3 The new US administration should rapidly indicate that it is committed to the
implementation of the February Agreement. While the Middle East and Afghanistan will
remain higher priorities for US, a US policy of deliberate neglect towards North Korea will
only induce the North Koreans to force the issue back onto the international agenda (eg
through further nuclear and missile testing, transfer of nuclear and missile technology).
4.5.4 The US fears that North Korea’s real agenda is to gain diplomatic normalization and other
beneﬁts without full denuclearization. What tends to be overlooked is the high value that
North Korea places on developing friendly relations with the US. Beyond immediate
economic beneﬁts,NorthKorea seeks a relationship with theUS in order to counter-balance
China’s growing inﬂuence on the Korean peninsula. As with Vietnam, there is potential for
shared strategic interest between North Korea and the US. The dramatic improvements in
US-China relations during the 1970s show how historical hostilities and divergence of
political values can be put aside when there is suYcient political will motivated by shared
interests.
31 March 2008
Submission from Norma Kang Muico, Amnesty International
I am following up on the request made by one of the Foreign AVairs Committee’s Members during my
oral evidence session at the House of Commons on “Global Security: Japan and Korea” held on 2 April
2008.
Although I was not able to ﬁnd statistics on the number of people who are or have been held in the daiyo
kangoku or substitute prison system for 23 days without access to a lawyer, I found relevant data, which
the Committee may ﬁnd equally useful.
Please ﬁnd attached data13 on the average number of days prisoners in Japan are incarcerated in the daiyo
kangoku system. The ﬁgures indicate that the average number of days of pre-trial detention from 1998–2004
exceeds 23 days. Makoto Teranaka, Director of Amnesty International Japan, explained that if after 23
days, there is still no available space at a detention centre, then a detainee could continue to be held at the
substitute prison.He said that this ismore likely to happen in rural areas where the space at detention centres
is quite limited.
I hope the ForeignAVairs Committee’smission to Japan and SouthKorea inMaywill be a successful one.
14 April 2008
13 The information is in Japanese and from the Japanese National Policy Agency’s Department of Statistics on 6 December
2005. The English translation has been done by Amnesty International.
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Reasons why the length of pre-trial detention is getting 
longer: 
1) Crimes spreading to a wider area, crimes getting more complex, increase in types of crime; increase in the number of foreign criminals, which results in longer investigation time. 
  2) The prison population is increasing, so it takes more time to find prison cells for the newly convicted people. 
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Data from the Japanese National Police Agency’s Department 
of Statistics (06 December 2005) 
Letter to the Prime Minister from Mr Eric Illsley MP and Mr Greg Pope MP
Re: Families of Japanese abductees
During a recent visit of the Foreign AVairs Committee to Japan, a meeting was arranged between
ourselves and the relatives of Japanese nationals who have been kidnapped and taken to North Korea. You
will be aware that over the last thirty years 17 individuals have been abducted in this way.
The relatives of the victims have formed support groups and continue to campaign for the return of their
family members. They have received widespread publicity and although many years have passed since the
last abduction, this remains a very high proﬁle issue in Japan. Indeed, ourmeeting was reported on Japanese
national television. It has also generated attention in the Japanese national press and the Japanese language
press overseas.
We understand that the relatives wished to meet us in order to raise awareness of the abductions. Some
of the incidents have been acknowledged byNorth Korea and the fate of the victimsmade known but sadly,
information is not available on the plight of many abductees leaving relatives without knowledge as to
whether their loved ones are even living or dead.
It must be said that we were greatly struck by the dignity and determination shown by these families in
the face of their loss and ongoing distress. As a consequence, we undertook to write to you and our
ambassador in North Korea on our return to inform you of our meeting and to ask that HM Government
bear in mind the plight of the abductees during our contacts with North Korea. In particular, the families
hope that the current talks withNorthKorea on nuclear issues will not be resolved without some concession
on information regarding the remaining abductees.
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Letter to the Parliamentary Relations Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce from
the Committee Specialist
When he gave evidence to the Foreign AVairs Committee for its inquiry into Global Security: Japan and
Korea—on 2 July, Lord Malloch-Brown agreed to provide further information on two points. You and I
agreed that I would write to clarify the information required. As the Committee’s inquiry draws to a close,
I would also like to take the opportunity to request further information on two additional points arising
from Lord Malloch-Brown’s evidence. The Committee would be grateful for a reply by 1 September.
The issues on which the Committee would like further information are as follows:
1. China’s human rights obligations regarding North Korean emigrants. In his evidence, Lord Malloch-
Brown acknowledged that China treated North Koreans discovered in China as illegal economic migrants,
and habitually returned them to North Korea without consideration of individual cases. Lord Malloch-
Brown said that it was for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to determine whether China’s practice
in this respect represented a breach of its obligations under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967
Protocol, but that he was “happy to go back and look at this again” (Q 125) and would “ﬁnd out where the
UNHCR is on this” (Q 126). Please could the FCO set out: the mechanism whereby the UNHCR would
make any determination that a State Party was in breach of the Refugee Convention or its Protocol; the
mechanisms available to the UNHCR or other UN bodies for enforcing observance of the Convention and
its Protocol; whether the UNHCR or any other UN body has publicly expressed a view on China’s practice
regarding NorthKorean emigrants; and what action the UK has taken on this issue in UN forums. It would
also be helpful if the FCO could conﬁrmwhether theGovernment considers that China is obliged to observe
the principle of “non-refoulement” with respect only to persons it has recognised as refugees, or to all non-
nationals on its territory.
2. UNCommand (Korea). In Qq 127–30, theMinister and his oYcial discussed withMembers the future
of UN Command (Korea) and the UK’s role in it. Ms Gisela Stuart MP said that she was happy for the
Minister to write to the Committee with further information on this issue. In particular, the Committee
would like information on whether and how the US and South Korea are informing or consulting with the
UK, as amember ofUNCommand (Korea) andUNCMAC, on the reconﬁguration of theUS-SouthKorea
Combined Forces Command in the run-up to its planned disbandment in 2012. In addition:
— The Committee understands that the UK has on occasion provided junior oYcers to the
UNCMAC Joint Duty OYce in the Joint Security Area. What is the Government’s policy on the
future provision of such oYcers?
— The Committee understands that until December 2007 the UK provided the international oYcer
whom UN Command (Korea) is obliged to have stationed at its rear headquarters in Japan, but
that the UK oYcer has now been withdrawn and that members of the Command are now
providing the oYcer for one year at a time in rotation. What is the Government’s policy on the
future provision of the Command’s international oYcer at the Command’s rear headquarters in
Japan? Has a commitment been secured from aUNCommandmember state to provide the oYcer
in 2009?
3. South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement negotiations. In his evidence, Head of Eastern Group Stephen
Lillie conﬁrmed that the negotiations on the South Korea-EU free trade agreement had not yet reached a
pointwhere theUKor theEUhad been required to take a view on the treatmentwhich the agreement should
extend to goods produced at theKaesong Industrial Complex. LordMalloch-Brown invited the Committee
to express a view on this issue (Qq 150, 151). It would be helpful if the FCO could indicate its anticipated
timetable for the further negotiations on the agreement, within the EU and with South Korea. When does
the Government expect to have to reach a ﬁrm view on this question for the purposes of agreeing the EU’s
negotiating position?
4. Japanese inward investment and the points-based immigration system. In his evidence, Lord Malloch-
Brown said that he “personally spend[s] an awful lot of time lobbying the Home OYce” so as to prevent the
UK’s introduction of a point-based immigration system from having a negative impact on Japanese inward
investment (Q 143). Please supply more detailed information about the potential problem, and about the
FCO’s work with the Home OYce on this issue. What representations has the Government received from
third parties, in either the UK or Japan, about this matter? Is the FCO conﬁdent that the issue has been or
is being resolved to its satisfaction?
Thank you in advance for your assistance.
31 July 2008
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Letter to Mr Eric Illsley MP and Mr Greg Pope MP from the Prime Minister
Thank you for your letter of 11 June regarding relatives of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea.
I am aware that the issue of abductees remains extremely emotive in Japan and is very distressing for the
abductees and their families to whom I extend my heartfelt sympathy and respect. We continue to support
Japanese eVorts to resolve the issue andwelcome the outcome of recent talks in Beijing when theDemocratic
People’s Republic of Korea agreed to reopen the investigation into the matter. The issue of abductees is
referred to in theUK-Japan Joint Statement of January 2007which PrimeMinister Fukuda and I reaYrmed
during our meeting on 2 June 2008.
Your letter states that the families you met were concerned that the Six Party Talks on nuclear issues
would move forward without progress on the abductees issue. The UK is not a member of the Six Party
Talks process although we follow developments closely. We support the process as the principle mechanism
for denuclearising the Korean Peninsula, however we also attach importance to Japanese concerns over
abductees. We support recent US statements by President Bush and Secretary of State Rice that the
abductees issue will not be forgotten.
The EU, including the UK, will continue to press hard for an improvement in the human rights situation
in North Korea. The abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea represents a particularly terrible abuse
of human rights. I assure you that we shall continue to press the North Korean regime on this and other
aspects of its human rights record.
11 August 2008
Letter to the Committee Specialist from the Head, Parliamentary Relations Team, Foreign and
Commonwealth OYce
Thank you for your letter of 31 July asking for further clariﬁcation on some of the points made by Lord
Malloch-Brown at his evidence session on 2nd July. Please ﬁnd our responses below.
China’s Human Rights Obligations towards DPRK Emigrants
The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has publicly stated, including in documents on its
website, that China should not return refugees to the DPRK. The UNHCR in Beijing has regularly raised
this issue with the Chinese authorities in relation to individuals who have registered with the UNHCR as
refugees (around 180 DPRK citizens at the time of writing). It has also consistently, but unsuccessfully,
sought access to the areas along the DPRK border where most emigrants are to be found. This would help
it to gain a better picture of the circumstances surrounding such emigrants’ move to China.
Either the receiving state (ie China) or the UNHCR can determine if an individual is a refugee. If the
authorities then return that person to their country of origin, the receiving state is in breach of the refugee
conventions. There is no enforcement mechanism for the convention, but member states and the UNHCR
can call on a member state to comply with the terms of the conventions if they believe a breach has taken
place. The UK has not yet done so in this case, judging that it was more eVective to raise this bilaterally and
through the EU. However, we are considering raising the issue at the next Executive Committee meeting in
October. If the Chinese authorities were to return someone they, or the UNHCR, have recognised as a
refugee, the UK would consider that a violation of the principle of non-refoulement.
UN Command (UNC)
The UNC has kept participating states informed of arrangements for reconﬁguration of the Combined
Forces Command (CFC) in the run-up to 2012 through monthly meetings with the relevant Ambassadors
in Seoul. The new Commander of the CFC has also publicly committed to continue this process as plans
develop. Furthermore, the Deputy Chief of StaV at the UNC, Major General Weida, will visit the capitals
of all participating states in the next 12 months to discuss the issue with oYcials. He will visit London on 8
and 9 September, when he will meet the Chairman of the Foreign AVairs Committee, Mike Gapes MP, as
well as senior oYcials from FCO and MoD.
In the past, the UK has provided junior oYcers on an ad hoc basis to the UNC Military Armistice
Commission (UNCMAC) Joint Duty OYce, using oYcers who were temporarily available between tours
of duty. In practice, commitments elsewhere have meant that we have not had oYcers available for the
attachment since January 2008. Nevertheless, the UK Government remains willing to continue this
arrangement when capacity allows.
Regarding the provision of an oYcer to UNC (Rear) in Japan, General Bell, the last Commander UNC,
wrote to capitals last year, seeking commitment from participating states to ﬁll this post on an annual
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rotational basis, following the decision by the UK to withdraw our permanent post there. Under this
agreement, Thailand has an oYcer in post now until 2009, when he will be replaced by Turkey and then
France. The UK will participate in this rota, and is committed to providing an oYcer in 2015.
EU—Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
We still do not have a formal timetable from the European Commission regarding a decision on whether
goods from the Kaesong Industrial Complex should be included in the terms of the FTA. However, we
anticipate that a decision will probably be taken before the ASEMSummit on 25October, as the next round
of formal negotiations are due to take place in the margins of that meeting. We are currently in the process
of preparing the ground for a decision in London and Brussels.
Japanese Inward Investment and the Points-based Immigration System
As the Committee will be aware, the Government’s new Points Based System is designed to streamline
the process of legal migration to the UK and ensure that only those who beneﬁt the UK are able to come
here to work or study.
The issue Lord Malloch-Brown was referring to in his evidence related to an English language
requirement under “Tier 2” of the new system, which applies to skilled workers with a job oVer to ﬁll gaps
in the UK labour force. Under the original proposal, all employees transferring within an organisation to
a skilled job under Tier 2 would have been required to meet an English language requirement at Council of
Europe level B2 (“independent user”).
The Japanese Government and Japanese investors were concerned that this language requirement would
have severely limited their ability to bring skilled workers from Japan to the UK. Many Japanese
manufacturers in the UK transfer technical experts from their Japanese operations to pass on knowledge
of production processes to the UK workforce. Many of these workers would not meet the language
requirement originally proposed. Yet they come to the UK for strictly limited periods and assimilation into
the UK population is not a serious issue. In the run-up to the publication of the Statement of Intent on Tier
2 in May 2008, the UK Government received a number of expressions of concern from the Japanese
Government and major Japanese investors, including from the major Japanese car makers, the Japan
Automobile Manufacturers Association and the Japan Auto Parts Industries Association.
During this period the Home OYce, as lead department, worked closely with partners across Whitehall,
including the Foreign OYce, UKTI and BERR, to reach a solution that preserved the UK’s attractiveness
as an investment location without compromising the integrity and objectives of the Points Based System.
As a result, a solution was reached whereby intra-company transfers will not be required to demonstrate
English language ability if they stay in the UK less than three years. Beyond three years the required level
is closest to Council of Europe level A1 (“basic user”).
The FCO is conﬁdent that this outcome maintains the competitiveness of the UK as an investment
location for Japanese and other international companies without undermining the objectives of the Points
Based System. The Japanese Embassy in London has expressed itself satisﬁed with this outcome and a
number of major Japanese investors have expressed their appreciation for HMG eVorts over the issue.
29 August 2008
Further brief from the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce provided to a Member of the
Committee: DPRK human rights
DPRK Human Rights Brief
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has one of the worst human rights records in the
world. Basic freedoms are severely restricted, including the freedom of speech, movement, assembly, and
the media. Punishments for speaking out against the regime are harsh and include imprisonment in labour
camps for several generations of the oVender’s family, torture, and execution.
The DPRK normally responds to criticism by either denying that abuses take place, claiming that the
reports are fabricated by the West for political reasons, or invoking sovereignty, non-interference, and
cultural diVerences to avoid its responsibilities.
The DPRK, as a member of the UN, has a duty to promote and encourage respect for human rights. It
is a party to four key UN human rights treaties and has commitments under these treaties. These include,
notably, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which provides inter alia for freedom
of expression and association, of assembly, and of religion. These commitments were made without
reservation or qualiﬁcation, but there is no real evidence that the DPRK respects the concept and principles
contained in them.
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In March 2008, the UNHuman Rights Council passed a resolution extending the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur onDPRKHumanRights, which condemned theDPRK’s “widespread and systematic” human
rights abuses. Signiﬁcantly, the Republic of Korea voted for this resolution, the ﬁrst time for two years that
it has not abstained on the subject of DPRK human rights. This is a reﬂection of the new President Lee
Myung-bak’s election promise to take a tougher line with the government in Pyongyang, and was one of
the catalysts for the chill in inter-Korean relations.
North Koreans in South Korea
Under the South Korean constitution, the whole of the Korean Peninsula is South Korean territory. This
means that North Koreans have an automatic right to claim South Korean citizenship. South Korea has
set up a receiving centre for defectors (known as New Settlers), and made provisions for them to receive
ﬁnancial and educational support to integrate into SouthKorean society. Despite this assistance, manyNew
Settlers have diYculties integrating and in ﬁnding work other than in minimum wage jobs.
There are procedures in place to ensure that any North Koreans who cross directly into South Korea
(usually drifting across the maritime boundary by accident or design) are asked individually whether they
wish to defect or be returned. SouthKorea’s policy is to only return those that ask to go back. It also actively
assists those who defect via a third country—usually China or Thailand—to get to South Korea. The policy
of collective punishment means that those who remain in the DPRK are often punished when a relative
defects. North Koreans who travel abroad oYcially—diplomats for example—are generally required to
leave a family member, usually a child, behind in the DPRK.
How is China Dealing with DPRK Refugees?
The Chinese do not recognise emigrants from DPRK as refugees, but as economic migrants. This means
that they do not have to apply the principle of non-refoulement, and can return these individuals to the
DPRK. It is illegal for DPRK citizens to leave the country without permission, and those who are caught
or returned are often imprisoned, and sometimes tortured or executed. The UK continues to urge China
to observe its obligations under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, and allow the UN High
Commission for Refugees access to the China/DPRK border region. This issue has been raised as part of
the UK-China and EU-China Human Rights Dialogues.
Japanese Abductees
In 2002 the DPRK conﬁrmed Japan’s long-held suspicions and admitted abducting 13 Japanese citizens
in the 1970s and 80s. Five abductees were subsequently returned to Japan along with the supposed ashes of
the other 8, who Pyongyang claimed had died. Following forensic tests, Tokyo is not satisﬁed that these
were in fact the remains of the individuals in question. It also maintains that there were more than 13
abductees (the Japanese government has identiﬁed 17 individuals). After bilateral discussions over the
summer, the DPRK agreed to re-open the investigation into the fate of the abductees in return for the lifting
of some Japanese sanctions. However, it then put the issue on hold again following the resignation of
Japanese PrimeMinister Yasuo Fukuda. Talks have not yet re-started under new PrimeMinister Taro Aso.
T he UK sympathises with Japan’s concerns, and hopes that further progress can be made now that the new
government is in place.
October 2008
Letter to the Head, Parliamentary Relations Team, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce
from the Committee Specialist
In your letter of 29 August in follow-up to the evidence which LordMalloch-Brown gave on 2 July to the
Committee’s inquiry on “Global Security: Japan andKorea”, you referred to the forthcomingOctober 2008
meeting of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the High Commissioner for Refugees (ExCom).
You said that the Government was “considering raising the issue” of China’s compliance with the Refugee
Convention, with respect to its treatment of North Korean emigrants in China, at the ExCom meeting.
The ExCom meeting took place between 6 and 10 October. The Committee would like to know whether
or not the Government did raise the issue at the meeting; if it did not, why not; and if it did, with what
expected results.
As the Committee is now ﬁnalising its Report, it would appreciate a response by 3 November.
Thank you in advance.
23 October 2008
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Letter to the Committee Specialist from the Parliamentary Relations Team, Foreign and
Commonwealth OYce
Global Security: Japan and Korea—DPRK Refugees
Thank you for your letter of 23rd October asking whether China’s treatment of refugees from the DPRK
had been raised at the Executive Committee of the Programme of the High Commissioner for Refugees.We
did not raise the matter on this occasion because we felt that it would be more eVective to concentrate our
eVorts on the resolution on DPRK human rights which the EU is currently sponsoring at the UN General
Assembly (UNGA). However, we will discuss this matter at working level with the UNHCR.
The text of the UNGA resolution is still being ﬁnalised, but it includes a reference to the harsh penalties
imposed upon returnees to the DPRK and calls on all States to respect the principle of non-refoulement (i.e.
not returning refugees to their country of origin). The UK also speciﬁcally raised the question of UNHCR
involvement in its statement at the interactive dialogue with the UN Special Rapporteur on DPRK Human
Rights, which was held on 23rd October. We have also raised this matter as part of the UK-China and EU-
China Human Rights Dialogues.
3 November 2008
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